An Introduction to PhilosophyPART VReading editionChapter navigation77 reading sectionsGo to chapterChoose a chapter…Front matterPREFACEPART IChapter IChapter IIPART IIChapter IIIChapter IVChapter VChapter VIChapter VIIPART IIIChapter VIIIChapter IXChapter XChapter XIPART IVChapter XIIChapter XIIIChapter XIVChapter XVPART VChapter XVIChapter XVIIChapter XVIIIChapter XIXChapter XXChapter XXIPART VIChapter XXIIChapter XXIIIChapter XXIVChapter IChapter IIChapter IIIChapter IVChapter VChapter VIChapter VIIChapter VIIIChapter IXChapter XChapter XIChapter XIIChapter XIIIChapter XIVChapter XVChapter XVIChapter XVIIChapter XVIIIChapter XIXChapter XXChapter XXIChapter XXIIChapter XXIIIChapter XXIVChapter I · , sections 1-5. If the student will take a good history of philosophy, and look over the accounts of the different systems referred to, he will see the justice of the position taken in the text, namely, that philosophy was formerly synonymous with universal knowledge. It is not necessary, of course, to read the whole history of philosophy to attain this end. One may take such a text-book as Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," and run over the summaries contained in the large print. To see how the conception of what constitutes universal knowledge changed in successive ages, compare Thales, the Sophists, Aristotle, the Schoolmen, Bacon, and Descartes. For the ancient philosophy one may consult Windelband's "History of the Ancient Philosophy," a clear and entertaining little work (English translation, N.Y., 1899).Chapter II · , sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904.Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is examined at length, with quotations and references.Chapter IV · , sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind." This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter.Chapter VI · , sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space."Chapter VII · , sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of Metaphysics," "Of Time."Chapter VIII · , sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics," Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self."Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland." Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis."Chapter X · , sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of Minds."Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."Chapter XII · , section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of some of his sections:—Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his "Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).Chapter XIII · , section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him). See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address, "The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902).Chapter XIV · , section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI, "The Insufficiency of Materialism."Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV, section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class.Chapter XVI · , sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge" (London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y., 1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898), Preface.Chapter XVIII · , section 71. The teacher might very profitably take extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality" referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide us.Chapter XIX · , section 74. The student who turns over the pages of several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality), Rational Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval landmarks which have been left standing. I may as well warn the reader that two men who discourse of Ontology may not be talking about the same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the different ways of conceiving the "One Substance"; and bear in mind also what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word "reality."Chapter XXIII · , sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the Introduction.INDEXPrevious chapter ←Part 4 — Chapter XVNext chapter →Part 5 — Chapter XVIAll chapters and sections (77)Opening pagesFront matterOther sectionsPREFACEParts1Part 1 · Chapters12Parts2Part 2 · Chapters34567Parts3Part 3 · Chapters891011Parts4Part 4 · Chapters12131415Parts5Part 5 · Chapters161718192021Parts6Part 6 · Chapters222324123456789101112131415161718192021222324Part 6 · Other sectionsChapter I · , sections 1-5. If the student will take a good history of philosophy, and look over the accounts of the different systems referred to, he will see the justice of the position taken in the text, namely, that philosophy was formerly synonymous with universal knowledge. It is not necessary, of course, to read the whole history of philosophy to attain this end. One may take such a text-book as Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," and run over the summaries contained in the large print. To see how the conception of what constitutes universal knowledge changed in successive ages, compare Thales, the Sophists, Aristotle, the Schoolmen, Bacon, and Descartes. For the ancient philosophy one may consult Windelband's "History of the Ancient Philosophy," a clear and entertaining little work (English translation, N.Y., 1899).Chapter II · , sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904.Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is examined at length, with quotations and references.Chapter IV · , sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind." This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter.Chapter VI · , sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space."Chapter VII · , sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of Metaphysics," "Of Time."Chapter VIII · , sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics," Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self."Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland." Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis."Chapter X · , sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of Minds."Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."Part 6 · Chapters3Part 6 · Other sectionsSection 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his "Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).Chapter XIII · , section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him). See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."Part 6 · Chapters12Part 6 · Other sectionsChapter XIV · , section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI, "The Insufficiency of Materialism."Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV, section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class.Chapter XVI · , sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge" (London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y., 1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898), Preface.Chapter XVIII · , section 71. The teacher might very profitably take extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality" referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide us.Part 6 · Chapters5Part 6 · Other sectionsChapter XXIII · , sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the Introduction.INDEXTHE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES← CHAPTER XVCHAPTER XVI →