Several Classes of Moral Actions.

There are several classes of moral actions. The first class includes those which in all cases destroy the best good of man. Of these are wanton cruelty to helpless creatures, and ingratitude in returning needless evil for good. In regard to such the mind, by its very constitutional impulses, revolts from them and feels them to be wrong without any process of reasoning. So also all those actions that in all cases cause enjoyment without evil, are instinctively felt to be right without any reflection.

But there are many actions that are entirely dependent on circumstances for their moral character. Thus to punish a little child in one case would be cruel and wrong, in another it might be benevolent and right. To take a woman, when not married to another, for a wife is right, but wrong if she is married. And so with thousands of other actions.

Again, some actions that do no harm to any individual at a given time, are wrong because they would [pg 148] be destructive to general happiness, if generally allowed; or, in other words, they are wrong in tendency. Thus, in a given case, a lie might do a great deal of good and no immediate harm. And yet it would be wrong, because leaving it to every man's discretion when it was best to lie would in the end destroy all confidence in human testimony.

Again, many of the laws of God can be discovered only by long experience of many communities. As soon as experience has shown that any practice will do more harm than good, then the law of God is discovered and it becomes obligatory. Thus the question of polygamy has been settled. Thus, too, the vending of alcoholic drinks has been decided to be wrong as a general practice.

Here comes up the distinction between wrong choices that deserve blame and punishment, and those that do not. In the natural system of the Creator all violations of law are followed by the natural penalties without any reference to the motives, knowledge, or ability of the agent. All questions among men, as to blame and retribution, have reference to the adding of other penalties and rewards in the present or future state. It is only in regard to such that the questions of blame, of justice, and of mercy are to be debated. Without revelation we have no evidence that the natural penalties of law are ever suspended, either as a matter of justice or mercy. In the case of great crimes and wrongs, that additional penalties are to follow in a future state is what all men fear, and this it is which induces self-inflictions to secure pardon for sin.

Now these are distinctions existing in all rational minds, and are continually referred to in every-day [pg 149] life. But it is impossible for any but an omniscient being to decide on all the motives that regulate the actions of others, while even our own motives are often so hidden and complex that we are blinded as to their true character.

The language of common life does not always recognize these distinctions. When a wrong action is done the actor is called a wrong-doer, and is blamed for the deed. And the fact that he believed that he was acting right, and even that he practices self-denial in performing what is imagined to be a duty, though it palliates, does not ordinarily end all displeasure. For in multitudes of cases the ignorance of duty results from pride or selfish neglect of inquiry. And few are competent to decide how far the ignorance is a misfortune and not a fault.

It is owing to this fact that most of the language of life assumes that all violations of law are blamably wrong, and are to be punished here or hereafter. In the most common use of the term, “sin is the transgression of law.” At the same time men recognize the distinction between sins of ignorance and willful sin.