Chapter XIX · The Nature of Mind Our Guide to the Moral Attributes of God.

Having employed the principles of common sense to gain a knowledge of the natural attributes of God, we are next to employ the same principles to gain his moral character; or those attributes which are exhibited in willing. In other words, we are to seek the character of God as expressed in his works or deeds.

In our experience of the moral character of minds in this world, we find that some of the highest grades as to intellect and susceptibilities, are lowest as to good-willing. How is it, then, with the highest mind of all? Does he so prefer evil to good, that he deliberately plans for the production of evil when he has power to produce happiness in its place? Or does he sometimes prefer evil and sometimes good, with the variable humors of the human race? Or does he always prefer good when it costs him no trouble or sacrifice, but never when it does? Or is he one who invariably chooses what is best for all, even when it involves painful sacrifices to himself?

In seeking a reply to these momentous questions, we return once more to the principle of common sense before stated, i.e., the nature of any work or contrivance is proof of the character and design of the author.

In examining the works of the Creator, we find that the material world impresses us as wisely adjusted and good in construction, only as it is fitted to give enjoyment to sentient beings. It is the intelligent, [pg 103] feeling, acting minds that give the value to every other existence. If there were no minds, all perception of beauty, fitness and goodness would perish.

It is minds, therefore, which are the chief works of the Creator's hand, and which give value to all others.

If the nature of these minds is evil, then the author of them is proved to be evil by his works. If their nature is good and perfect, then their author is proved to be good and perfect.

Here again we are driven back to our own minds to gain the only conceptions possible to us, not only of wisdom, but of goodness or benevolence.

On examination, we shall find that we can form no idea of these qualities which does not involve a limitation of power.

Our idea of power is that which we gain when we will to move our bodies or to make any other change, and this change ensues. Our only idea of a want of power is gained when the choice or willing of a change or event does not produce it. Whenever, therefore, it shall appear that the Creator wills or wishes a thing to exist or to be changed, and that change or existence does not follow his so willing, we can not help believing that he has not the power to produce it?

Again; our idea of perfectness always has reference to power; for a thing is regarded as perfect in construction only when there is no power in God or man to make it better. When any arrangement is as good as it can be, so that neither God nor man has power to make it better, we regard it as perfect, even when there is some degree of evil involved.

We are now prepared to define what is included in [pg 104] the terms perfect wisdom and perfect benevolence, when applied to the Creator or to any other being, thus: A perfectly wise being is one who invariably wills the best possible ends and the best possible means of accomplishing those ends.

An imperfectly wise being is one who does not invariably do this.

A perfectly benevolent being is one who invariably wills the most good and the least evil in his power. An imperfectly benevolent being is one who does not invariably will thus.

The degree in which a being is ranked as wise and good is estimated by the extent to which his willing good or evil corresponds with his power.

Thus it appears that, in a system where evil exists, the very idea of perfect benevolence and wisdom involves the supposition of a limitation of power.

To return, then, to the question as proposed at the commencement of the chapter—Is the Creator a being who prefers good to evil invariably, or is he one who only sometimes prefers evil to good, and at other times prefers good to evil, with the varying humors of man; or does he invariably choose what is best for all, even in cases where it may cost personal sacrifice and suffering to himself?

It will be the object of what follows to prove that the last supposition is the true one.

In attempting this, we again take the principle of common sense, that “the nature of any contrivance proves the design and character of the author.” Then we proceed to a review of the nature, first of mind, and next of the material world, to prove that the design or chief end of the Creator is, not to make happiness [pg 105] irrespective of the amount, but to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil. In other words, we are to seek for proof that God has done all things for the best, so that he has no power to do better.

In still another form, we are to seek for evidence, in the nature of God's works, that he has ever done the best he could, so that the amount of evil that ever was or ever will exist, is not caused by his willing it, but by his want of power to prevent it; so that any change would be an increase of evil and a lessening of good to the universe as a whole.

In pursuing this attempt, it will be needful to reproduce two or three chapters of a work by the author, already before the public, entitled, The Bible and the People; or, Common Sense applied to Religion.

In this work the nature of mind is presented very much more in detail, for the same purpose as that here indicated. What will now follow is a brief review of previous chapters in that work, as a summary of the evidence there presented that the chief end of God in all his works is to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil.

Whenever we find any contrivances all combining to secure a certain good result, which, at the same time, involve some degree of inevitable evil, and then discover that there are contrivances to diminish and avoid this evil, we properly infer that the author intended to secure as much of the good with as little of the evil as possible. For example, a traveler finds a deserted mine, and all around he discovers contrivances for obtaining gold, and, at the same time, other contrivances for getting rid of the earth mixed with it. The [pg 106] inevitable inference would be that the author of these contrivances designed to secure as much gold with as little earth as possible; and should any one say that he could have had more gold and less earth if he chose to, the answer would be that there is no evidence of this assertion, but direct evidence against it.

Again: should we discover a piece of machinery in which every contrivance tended to secure a speed in movement, produced by the friction of wheels against a rough surface, and at the same time other contrivances were found for diminishing all friction that was useless, we should infer that the author designed to secure the greatest possible speed with the least possible friction.

In like manner, if we can show that mind is a contrivance that acts by the influence of fear of evil, and that pain seems as indispensable to the action of a free agent as friction is to motion; if we can show that there is no contrivance in mind or matter which is designed to secure suffering as its primary end; if we can, on the contrary, show that the direct end of all the organizations of mind and matter is to produce happiness; if we can show that it is only the wrong action of mind that involves most of the pain yet known, so that right action, in its place, would secure only happiness; if we can show contrivances for diminishing pain, and also contrivances for increasing happiness by means of the inevitable pain involved in the system of things, then the just conclusion will be gained that the Author of the system of mind and matter designed “to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil.”

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In the pages which follow, we shall present evidence exhibiting all these particulars.

The only way in which we learn the nature of a thing is to observe its qualities and actions. This is true of mind as much as it is of matter. Experience and observation teach that the nature of mind is such, that the fear of suffering is indispensable to secure a large portion of the enjoyment within reach of its faculties, and that the highest modes of enjoyment can not be secured except by sacrifice, and thus by more or less suffering.

This appears to be an inevitable combination, as much so as friction is inevitable in machinery.

We have the evidence of our own consciousness that it is fear of evil to ourselves or to others that is the strongest motive power to the mind. If we should find that no pain resulted from burning up our own bodies, or from drowning, or from any other cause; if every one perceived that no care, trouble, or pain resulted from losing all kinds of enjoyment, the effort to seek it would be greatly diminished.

If we could desire good enough to exert ourselves to seek it, and yet should feel no discomfort in failing; if we could lose every thing, and feel no sense of pain or care, the stimulus to action which experience has shown to be most powerful and beneficent would be lost.

We find that abundance of ease and prosperity enervates mental power, and that mind increases in all that is grand and noble, and also in the most elevating happiness, by means of danger, care and pain. We may properly infer, then, that evil is a necessary part of the experience of a perfectly-acting mind.

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So strong is the conviction that painful penalties are indispensable, that the kindest parents and the most benevolent rulers are the most sure to increase rather than diminish those that are already involved in the existing nature of things.

Again: without a revelation we have no knowledge of any kind of mind but by inference from our experience in this state of being. All we know of the Eternal First Cause is by a process of reasoning, inferring that his nature must be like the only minds of which we have any knowledge. We assume, then, that he is a free agent, regulated by desire for happiness and fear of evil.

We thus come to the conclusion that this organization of mind is a part of the fixed and eternal nature of things, and does not result from the will of the Creator. His own is the eternal pattern of an all-perfect mind, and our own are formed on this perfect model, with susceptibilities to pain as an indispensable motive power in gaining happiness.

We will now recapitulate some of the particulars in the laws and constitution of mind which tend to establish the position that its Creator's grand design is “to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil.”