Chapter VIII · Politics (continued 2)

“Our friend arrived about four hours late, but he received me all the same at 10 P.M. on that evening. I told him all about my journey and related to him verbally the contents of Ballin’s letter. When I described the incident of how Grey had raised new objections at his interview with Metternich, and when I explained how, after that, the matter had come to a dead stop, so that nothing further was heard of it in Germany, our friend interrupted me by saying that since then the British Government had presented a memorandum containing the objections raised against the German Navy Bill. The latter, he suggested, was the only stumbling-block, as could be inferred from a letter which he had received en route from Haldane.

“When I remarked that Ballin, in a postscript to his letter, had expressed an apprehension lest some foreign influence had interfered with the course of events, our friend positively denied this. France, he said, was on good terms with Great Britain, and had no reason for intriguing against an Anglo-German agreement destined, as it was, to promote the cause of peace.

“When I then proceeded with my account, drawing his special attention to the reduction of the estimates contained in the Navy Bill, Sir Ernest interposed that he was not sufficiently au courant as to the details. He himself, in his statement prepared for the British Government, had only referred to the battleships, and he thought he had perhaps given too cursory an account of the other factors of the case. He also threw out some fairly plain hints that Haldane had gone too far in Berlin, and that he had made statements on a subject with which he was not sufficiently conversant. Later on, he continued, the Navy Bill had been subjected to a careful examination by the British Admiralty, and before his departure from Cannes he, Sir Ernest, had received a letter from Mr. Churchill, the tone of which was very angry. Churchill complained that Germany had presented such a long list of the wishes with which she wanted Great Britain to comply, that the least one could hope for was an accommodating spirit in the question of the Navy. Everything now depended on Churchill; if he could be satisfied, all the rest would be plain sailing. He and Lloyd George were the greatest friends of the agreement. Sir Ernest also made it fairly clear that Great Britain would be content with a postponement of the building dates, or in other words with a ‘retardation of the building programme.’ The negotiations would be bound to fail, unless Ballin could secure such a postponement. It was necessary to strike whilst the iron was hot, and this particular iron had already become rather cool. He quite accepted Grey’s statement that the Haldane mission had not been in vain, as the feeling had doubtless become more friendly since then. Some few individual indiscretions, such as Churchill’s reference to the German Navy as an article of luxury, should not be taken too seriously. If the German Bill were passed into law in its present shape, the British Government would be obliged to introduce one asking for three times as much, but it could not possibly do this and declare at the same time that it had reached an understanding with Germany. Such a proceeding would be absurd. The argument that it is inconsistent with common sense to conclude an agreement and yet to continue one’s armaments, is evidently still maintained in Great Britain, and is one which, of course, it is impossible to refute.

“In the course of our conversation Sir Ernest produced the letter which he had received from Haldane en route. This letter stated that the discussions with Metternich were then chiefly on the subject of the Navy Bill, and that the Admiralty had prepared a memorandum for the German Government dealing with these questions. The letter was dated February 25th, and its tone was not pessimistic; Churchill, however, as stated above, had previously written him a ‘very angry’ letter. In this connexion it must not be forgotten that the man on whom everything depends is not the amiable negotiator Haldane, but Churchill.”

In order to make further inquiries about the state of things and to assist in promoting the good cause, Ballin, immediately after my return, proceeded to Paris and then to London. He reported to the Chancellor upon the impressions he had received in Paris. The following is an extract from his report:

“Owing to the brief time at my disposal when I was in Paris, I could only learn the views of the members of the ‘haute finance.’ It is well known that in France the attitude taken up by financial circles is always regarded as authoritative. They look upon the present situation as decidedly pacific; they are pleased that the Morocco affair is settled, and they feel quite sure that the political sky is unclouded by complications. They would gladly welcome an agreement between Germany and Great Britain. My friends assure me that the Government also does not view the idea of such an understanding with displeasure; on the contrary, it looks upon it as an advantage. It is, however, thought unlikely that an agreement will be reached, because it is believed that popular feeling in Germany is too much opposed to it. If, notwithstanding these pacific views held by influential and competent sections, the casual visitor to the French capital is impressed by a certain bellicose attitude of the nation as a whole, it is largely due to the propaganda carried on by the Matin with the purpose of obtaining voluntary subscriptions for the furtherance of aviation. The French are enthusiastic over this idea, and as it has a strong military bearing, the man in the street likes to connect the French aviation successes with a victorious war.”

From London Ballin sent me some telegrams which I was instructed to pass on to the Chancellor. In these messages he stated that his conversations with the German Ambassador and with Haldane had convinced him that people in London believed that the increase in the number of the crews, if the proposed German Navy Bill became law, would be greater than the figures given by Berlin would make it appear. It would therefore be most desirable to arrange for a meeting of experts to clear up this discrepancy. Ballin’s impression was that the British Cabinet, and also the King, were still favourably disposed to the whole plan, and that the Cabinet was unanimous in this view. A conversation with Churchill, which lasted several hours, confirmed these impressions. In London the increase in the number of the crews had previously been estimated at half of what it would really be, and alarm was felt about the large number of torpedo boats and submarines demanded; but since the German Government had explained that the figures arrived at in London—i.e. those stated in the memorandum which had been addressed to the German Government some time before—were not correct, Churchill had agreed that both sides should nominate experts who would check the figures and put them right. Churchill was anxious to see that the matter was brought to a successful issue, and he was still hoping that a neutrality agreement would induce the German Government to make concessions in regard to the Navy Bill.

When Ballin had satisfied himself as to this state of things, he immediately returned to Berlin, as he did not consider it appropriate that any private person should do anything further for the time being, and as he thought that the conduct of the discussions concerning the neutrality agreement were best left to the Ambassador.

Meanwhile, however, the German Government had definitely made up its mind that the Navy Bill would have to remain as it stood. This was the information Ballin received from the Kaiser and the Chancellor when he returned from London on March 16th.

Sir Ernest Cassel then suggested to the British Government that the negotiations concerning the neutrality agreement should be re-opened as soon as the first excitement caused by the Navy Bill had subsided, which would probably be the case within a few months, and that the interval should be utilized for clearing up the details. In Berlin, however, the discussions were looked upon as having been broken off, as may be seen from the following telegram which the Kaiser sent to Ballin on March 19th in reply to Ballin’s information about his last exchange of telegrams with London:

“Many thanks for letter. The latest proposals arriving here immediately after you had left raised impossible demands and were so offensive in form that they were promptly rejected. Further harm was done by Churchill’s arrogant speech which a large section of the British press justly described as a provocation of Germany. The ‘agreement’ has thus been broken by Great Britain, and we have done with it. The negotiations must be started afresh on quite a different basis. What apology has there been offered to us for the passage in the speech describing our fleet as an article of luxury?

“(Signed) Wilhelm I.R.”

That the negotiations had actually been broken off was confirmed to Ballin by a letter of the Chancellor of the same date:

“Dear Mr. Ballin,

“My cordial thanks for your letter of the 18th. What your friend told Metternich is identical with what he wired you. Churchill’s speech did not come up to my expectations. He really seems to be a firebrand past praying for. The Army and Navy Bills will probably not go up to the Federal Council until the 21st, as the Army Bill requires some amendments at the eleventh hour. Their contents will be published simultaneously.

“My opinion is that our labours will now have to be stopped altogether for some time. The problem before us suffers from the defect that, because of its inherent difficulties, it admits of no solution. I shall always remain sincerely grateful to you for your loyal assistance. When you come to Berlin next time, please don’t forget to call at the Wilhelmstrasse.

“With kindest regards, “Sincerely yours, “(Signed) Bethmann-Hollweg.”

The conviction of the inherent impossibility of solving the problem was shared by many people in Germany—chiefly, of course, by those connected with the Navy; and some critics went so far as to say that Great Britain had never honestly meant to arrive at an understanding, or at any rate that Haldane—whose honesty and sincerity were beyond doubt—was disowned by his fellow-members in the Cabinet.

When Ballin, in compliance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, went to London during the critical period before the outbreak of the war in 1914, he wrote a letter from there to a naval officer of high rank with whom he had been on terms of friendship for years. This document is of interest now because it shows what Ballin’s own standpoint was with regard to the views described in the previous paragraph:

“People over here,” he wrote, “do not believe that negotiations with Great Britain on the subject of a naval agreement could possibly be crowned with success, and you yourself contend that it would have been better if such negotiations had never been started. Your standpoint is that the failure of any efforts in that direction would merely tend to aggravate the existing situation, a point of view with which I entirely concur.

“On the other hand, however, you cannot deny the soundness of the argument that, if the responsible leaders of British naval policy keep expressing their desire to enter into a discussion, the refusal of Germany to do so must cause the British to believe that we are pursuing aims far exceeding those we have openly avowed. My somewhat fatigued brain is unable to see whether the German contention is right or wrong. But naturally, I always look upon things from the business man’s point of view, and so I always think it better to come to some kind of an agreement with a competitor rather than allow him an unlimited measure of expansion. Once, however, I have come to the conclusion that for financial or other reasons this competitor can no longer keep pace with me, his further existence ceases altogether to interest me.

“Thus the views of the expert on these matters and those of the business man run counter to each other, and I am entitled to dismiss this subject without entering upon a discussion of the interesting and remarkable arguments which Winston Churchill put before me last night. I cannot, however, refrain from contradicting by a few brief words the contention that the motives which had prompted the Haldane mission were not sincere. A conversation with Sir Edward Grey the night before last has strengthened this conviction of mine still further. I regard Sir Edward as a serious, honest, and clever statesman, and I am sure you will agree with my view that the Haldane mission has cleared the atmosphere surrounding Anglo-German relations which had become very strained.”

It may be supposed that history, in the meantime, has proved whose standpoint was the correct one: that of the business man or that of the naval expert.

Not much need be said about the subsequent development of events up to the outbreak of the war.

The above-mentioned opinion which the Chancellor held regarding Churchill’s speech of March 18th, 1912, was probably arrived at on the strength of the cabled reports only. Whoever reads the full original text of the speech must fail to find anything aggressive in it, and there was no harm in admitting that it was a perfectly frank and honest statement concerning the naval rivalry of the two Powers. Among other things it contained the suggestion that a “naval holiday” should be agreed upon, i.e. both countries should abstain from building new ships for a definite period. We, at any rate, looked upon Churchill’s speech as a suitable means of making people see what would be the ultimate consequences of the interminable naval armaments. I made a German translation of it which, with the aid of one of the committees for an Anglo-German understanding, I spread broadcast all over the country. However, it proved a complete failure, as there were powerful groups in both countries who contended that the efforts to reconcile the two standpoints could not lead to any positive result, and that the old injunction, si vis pacem, para bellum, indicated the only right solution. Only a master mind could have overcome these difficulties. But Herr v. Bethmann, as we know, considered that the problem, for inherent reasons, did not admit of any solution at all, and the Kaiser’s initial enthusiasm had probably been damped by subsequent influences of a different kind. Ballin himself, in later years, ascribed the failure of the mission to the circumstance that the Kaiser and his Chancellor, between themselves only, had attempted to bring the whole matter to a successful issue instead of entrusting this task to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and to Admiral Tirpitz, the Secretary for the Navy.

An interesting sidelight on the causes which led to the failure of this last important attempt to reach an understanding is thrown by the rumours which were spread in the German Press in March, 1912, to the effect that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr v. Kiderlen, wished to resign, because he felt that he had been left too much in the dark with regard to the Anglo-German negotiations. It was also reported that the Chancellor’s position had been shaken, and that Admiral Tirpitz felt dissatisfied, because the Navy Bill did not go far enough. Probably there was some vestige of truth in all these rumours, and this may have been connected with the attitude which the three gentlemen concerned had taken up towards the question of the negotiations with Great Britain.

Shortly after the visit of Lord Haldane Ballin received a letter from a personage belonging to the Kaiser’s entourage in which it was said:

“The impression which has taken root with me during the many hours which I spent as an attentive listener is that your broad-minded scheme is being wrecked by our official circles, partly through their clumsiness, and partly through their bureaucratic conceit, and—which is worse—that we have failed to show ourselves worthy of the great opportunity.”

When it had become certain that the last attempt to reach an understanding had definitely and finally failed, the ambassador in London, Count Metternich, did not shrink from drawing the only possible conclusion from it. He had always expressed his conviction that a war between Germany and a Franco-Russian coalition would find Great Britain on the side of Germany’s opponents, and his resignation—which, as usual, was explained by the state of his health—was really due to a report of his in which he stated it as his opinion that a continuation of German armaments would lead to war with Great Britain no later than 1915. It is alleged that the Kaiser added a very “ungracious” marginal note to this report. Consequently, the ambassador, who was a man of very independent character, did the only thing he could consistently do, and resigned his office. In taking this step he may have been influenced by the reception which the failure of the Haldane mission met with in Conservative circles in Great Britain, where no stone was left unturned to urge the necessity for continuing the policy of big armaments and to paint German untrustworthiness in the most glaring colours.

Count Metternich’s successor was Herr v. Marschall, a gentleman whose appointment the Press and the official circles welcomed with great cordiality, and from whose considerable diplomatic abilities, which were acknowledged on all sides, an improvement of Anglo-German relations was confidently expected. It was said that the Kaiser had sent “his best man,” thus demonstrating how greatly he also desired better relations. But Herr v. Marschall’s activities came to a sudden end through his early death in September, 1912, and in October his place was taken by Prince Lichnowsky, whose efforts in the direction of an improvement in the relations are familiar to everyone who has read his pamphlet. Apart from the work performed by the ambassadors, great credit is also due to the activities displayed by Herr v. Kühlmann, the then Secretary to the Legation and subsequent Secretary of State. The public did not see a deal of his work, which was conducted with skill and was consistent. His close personal acquaintance with some of the leading British politicians, especially with Sir Edward Grey, enabled him to do much work for the maintenance of good relations and in the interest of European peace, particularly during the time when the post of ambassador was vacant, and also during the Balkan War. He had, moreover, a great deal to do with the drafting of the two colonial agreements dealing with the Bagdad Railway and the African problems respectively, both of which were ready for signature in the summer of 1914. The former especially may be looked upon as a proof not only that a considerable improvement had taken place in Anglo-German relations, but also that Great Britain was not inclined to adjust the guiding lines of her policy in Asia Minor exclusively in conformity with the wishes of Russia. Anybody who takes an interest in the then existing possibilities of German expansion with the consent of Great Britain and on the basis of these colonial draft agreements cannot do better than read the anonymous pamphlet entitled “Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg” ("German World Power and No War"), published in 1913 by Messrs. Puttkamer & Mühlbrecht, of Berlin. The author is Dr. Plehn, the then representative of the Cologne Gazette in London, and it partly reflects the views of Herr v. Kühlmann.

In this connexion I should like to refer briefly to an episode which took place towards the close of 1912. The German periodicals have already discussed it, especially the Süddeutsche Monatshafte in June, 1921, in a review of the reports which Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian minister to the Court of Berlin, had made for the information of his Government. In these reports he mentions an event to which the Kaiser had already referred in a letter to Ballin dated December 15th, 1912. The Kaiser, in commenting on the state of tension then existing between Austria and Serbia, made some significant remarks concerning the policy of Germany towards Austria-Hungary. When the relations between Vienna and Petrograd, he wrote, had assumed a dangerous character, because it was recognized that the attitude of Serbia was based on her hope of Russian support, Germany might be faced with the possibility of having to come to the assistance of Austria.

“The Slav subjects of Austria,” the letter continued, “had become very restless, and could only be brought to reason by the resolute action of the whole Dual Monarchy against Serbia. Austria had arrived at the cross roads, and her whole future development hung in the balance. Either the German element would retain its ascendancy, in which case she would remain a suitable ally, or the Slav element would gain the upper hand, and she would cease to be an ally altogether. If we were compelled to take up arms, we should do so to assist Austria not only against Russian aggression, but also against the Slavs in general, and in her efforts to remain German. That would mean that we should have to face a racial struggle of the Germanic element against Slav insolence. It is beyond our power to prevent this struggle, because the future of the Habsburg monarchy and that of our own country are both at stake. (This was the real meaning of Bethmann’s very plain speaking.) It is therefore a question on which depends the very existence of the Germanic race on the continent of Europe.

“It was of great importance to us that Great Britain had so far supported the Austro-German standpoint in these matters. Now, since a war against Russia would automatically imply a war with France as well, it was of interest to us to know whether, in this purely continental case, Great Britain could and would declare her neutrality in conformity with her proposals of last February.

“On December 6th, Haldane, obviously sent by Grey, called on Lichnowsky and explained to the dumbfounded ambassador in plain words that, assuming Germany getting involved in war against Russia and France, Great Britain would not remain neutral, but would at once come to the assistance of France. The reason given for this attitude was that Britain could not and would not tolerate at any time that we should acquire a position of continental predominance which might easily lead to the formation of a united continent. Great Britain could therefore never allow France to be crushed by us. You can imagine the effect of this piece of news on the whole of the Wilhelmstrasse. I cannot say that I was taken by surprise, because I, as you know, have always looked upon Great Britain as an enemy in a military sense. Still, this news has decidedly cleared matters up, even if the result is merely of a negative character.”

Ballin did not omit to ask his friend for some details concerning the visit of Lord Haldane mentioned in the Kaiser’s letter, and was furnished with the following explanation by Lord Haldane himself.

Nothing had been further from his intentions, he said, than to call on Prince Lichnowsky for the express purpose of making any such declaration; and Balkan questions, to the best of his recollection, had not been touched at all. He had spent a very pleasant half-hour with the Prince, and in the course of their conversation he had seen fit to repeat the formula which had been discussed during his stay in Berlin, and which referred to Britain’s interest in the preservation of the integrity of France. This, possibly, might have given rise to the misunderstanding.

Prince Lichnowsky himself, in his pamphlet entitled “My London Mission,” relates the incident as follows:

“In my dispatches sent to Berlin I pointed out again and again that Great Britain, being a commercial country, would suffer enormously through any war between the European Powers, and would prevent it by every means within her power. At the same time, however, she could never tolerate the weakening or the crushing of France, because it would disturb the Balance of Power and replace it by the ascendancy of Germany. This view had been expressed to me by Lord Haldane shortly after my arrival, and everybody whose opinion counts for anything told me the same thing.”

The failure of the negotiations aiming at an understanding led to a continuance of the increase in the British armaments, a concentration of the British battle fleet in the North Sea, and to that of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. The latter arrangement was looked upon in Germany as a menace directed against Italy, and produced a sharp semi-official criticism in the Frankfurter Zeitung. In spite of all this, however, friendly messages from London concerning the possibilities of an understanding, the “naval holiday,” etc., reached Germany from time to time.

How closely Ballin clung to his favourite idea that the naval experts of both countries should come to an understanding is demonstrated by the circumstance that in 1914, when the British squadron was present during the Kiel yachting week, he tried to bring about a meeting and a personal exchange of views between Churchill and Tirpitz.

Churchill was by no means disinclined to come to Germany for this purpose, but unfortunately the desire was expressed by the German side, and especially by the Kaiser, that the British Government should make an official inquiry whether his visit would be welcomed. The Government, however, was not disposed to do so, and the whole thing fell through, although Churchill sent word that, if Tirpitz really wanted to see him, he would find means to bring about such a meeting.

Thus the last attempt at an understanding had resulted in failure, and before any further efforts in the same direction could be made, Europe had been overtaken by its fate.