Front matter (continued 5)

Again, if a commissioned vessel hails a private ship, and, on the idea that she is a subject of prize, captures her, and it turns out that that capture is illegal and unwarranted, that fact does not make the act piracy. Although the act might be ever so irregular—although it might subject the officer to the severest damages for trespass—yet it is not piratical, and the officer is not to be hung at the yard-arm because he mistakes a question of law. Your honors therefore see how utterly it enters into the whole subject that the thing shall be done animo furandi, piratically, as against the general law of nations and the sense of right of the civilized world.

Well, now, we are at once struck with this consideration: Suppose the act is regarded as not piratical by millions of people having civilized institutions, having Courts of Justice, giving every opportunity for a trial of the question of forfeiture or no forfeiture—why, it shocks the moral sense to say that that is done animo furandi, that it is a theft and a robbery, and that the man who does it is an enemy to the human race. Carry the idea a little further, and you find that the commission under which a man acts in seizing a vessel with a view of bringing it in as a prize is regarded by all the great commercial nations of the world as regular, and that the act is regarded not as a piratical, but as a belligerent act. Does it not shock the very elements of justice to have it supposed that in such a case the man acting under the commission, and within its powers, is to be deemed an enemy of the whole human race, while all the human race, except the power which seeks to subject him to punishment, says the act is not piratical?

Now, upon this subject my learned friends have cited many authorities, which all bear on the effect of what should give validity to the transfer of captured property under the circumstances of rebellions in States. Now I beg leave, at the outset of the consideration of this case, to say that the question of passing title to property is a thing entirely different from the question of hanging a man for committing a crime. In the first place, look at the numerous acts of trespass which are committed on the high seas by vessels of every nation. The books are full of cases of marine trespass, and of damages against captors for their irregularities; but are the authorities which bear upon that subject, which is a mere question of property—a question of title—of the mere transfer of title—are they authorities which decide the question that a man should be hanged if he mistakes the law, or if he acts under the impulse of a wrong judgment as to the sovereign which he should serve? I would call your attention to the case of Klintock, reported in the 5th of Wheaton, where the Court say that they will not regard the commission of General Aubrey as sufficient to give title to the property, "although it might be sufficient to defend him from a charge of piracy." I also refer to Phillimore on International Law, vol. 3, p. 319. [Counsel read from the authority.]

Now, under what circumstances was this done? And in the discussion I give to this question I am entirely free from the necessity of considering how the Government of this country shall regard the seceded States,—as having a Government, or not. I am under the law of nations, because this act which I am now discussing, of robbery on the high seas, was evidently a transcript of the law of nations upon the subject of piracy. What are the undeniable facts?—the facts about which, in this case, there is not any dispute, either in this country or in the whole world—about which there is but one opinion—what are they? At the time the crew of the Savannah shipped for this cruise, and at the time of the capture of the Joseph, the authorities of the State of South Carolina (for the State of South Carolina had an organization from its beginning, as a part of this country, and, as a government, was well known to the Government of the United States)—the authorities of the State of South Carolina, where the Savannah was fitted out and the crew resided, had become parties to a confederation of others of the United States. Now it is immaterial to me, in the light in which I view this case, whether that was politically right or not—whether it was legally right or not—whether this country could look at it as a source of title to property or not; the fact is there, that a State—one of the original, recognized States of the Union—united itself, under an assumption of authority, revolutionary if you please, with other similar States, and formed a league and a Government. That fact is undoubtedly so. Under such confederation a Government, in fact, existed, and exercised, in fact, the powers of civil and military Government over the territories and peoples of those States, or a principal part of them. Here we have eleven recognized States, doing, if you please, an illegal thing, when you come to submit it to the just principles of law. They form a league,—against an Act of Congress,—but they do form a league, and do constitute a Government; and this Government takes possession of a territory of some ten millions of people, all of whom submit to it. It maintains the Government in its domestic character of States, and originates a Government for its foreign relations. It assumes to make war, and declares war. The President's proclamation says that the said Confederated States had in fact declared war against the United States of America, and were openly prosecuting the same with large military forces, under the military and civil organization of a Government; and had assumed, and were in the exercise of, the power of issuing commissions to private armed ships to make captures of the property of the United States, and the citizens thereof, as prize of war, and to send them into Court for adjudication as such. Now, all that is beyond any doubt; and is it possible that it can be contended that an act of that vast extent, of that wide publicity and great power, should fail even to justify the killing of a chicken, without charge of petty larceny? Does it not shock the common sense of mankind that, in the case of men dwelling there, and acting in subordination to the existing Government (you cannot say whether voluntarily or not), for every shot fired and man killed you could have a trial for murder; that for every horse shot you could have an action of trover; and for every trespass you could have an action of trespass? This practically shocks us. How is it in view of the doctrine of hostis humani generis? Here are ten millions of people doing acts which, if done only by three or four, would be murders and treasons. But justice must be equal. If required to execute justice upon three or four, you are bound to execute it on tens of millions? Why, that is the very thing which publicists tell us constitutes civil war. A civil war is always a rebellion when it begins. In the first instance it commences with a few individuals,—the Catalines of the country; but when it gets to be formed, so that a large force is collected, and, instead of the Courts of Justice before existing, it substitutes Courts of its own, then comes up the doctrine of humanity which belongs to the laws of war,—that you can no longer speak of it as a rebellion. In the judgments of publicists when a rebellion gets to that head that it represents States, and parts of a nation, humanity stops the idea of private justice, and it goes upon the principle of public and international law. That will be found elaborately stated in Vattel; but I do not intend to trouble you with any lengthened reading of citations. I refer to the 18th chap. on the subject of civil war, page 424:

"When a party is formed in a State, who no longer obey the sovereign, and are possessed of sufficient force to oppose him; or when, in a Republic, the nation is divided into two opposite factions, and both sides take up arms,—this is called a civil war. Some writers confine this term to a just insurrection of the subjects against their sovereign, to distinguish that lawful resistance from rebellion, which is an open and unjust resistance. But what appellation will they give to a war which arises in a Republic torn by two factions, or in a Monarchy, between two competitors for the crown? Custom appropriates the term of 'civil war' to every war between the members of one and the same political society. If it be between the part of the citizens, on the one side, and the sovereign, with those who continue in obedience to him, on the other,—provided the malcontents have any reason for taking up arms, nothing further is required to entitle such disturbance to the name of civil war, and not rebellion. This latter term is applied only to such an insurrection against lawful authority as is void of all appearance of justice. The sovereign, indeed, never fails to bestow the appellation of rebels on all such of his subjects as openly resist him; but, when the latter have acquired sufficient strength to give him effectual opposition, and to oblige him to carry on the war against them according to the established rules, he must necessarily submit to the use of the term 'civil war.'"

The moment the term "civil war" comes up, the idea of punishing, as rebellion or as piracy, the capture of a vessel, is an abuse of justice; and it is not only an abuse of justice, but it is an abuse of the fact, to say that those who are large enough to be a nation are to be considered as the enemies of all nations, because they undertake to make civil war. The point is not founded upon any technical considerations; it is founded upon the great doctrines of humanity and civilization. Because, what is to be the end of it? If we hang twelve men, they hang one hundred and fifty-six. If we treat them as rebels, why they treat our captured forces as these rebels are treated. You bring on a war without any civilizing rules. You bring in a war of worse than Indian barbarity. You bring in a war which can know nothing except bloodshed, in battle or upon the block. This is not a technical notion. It is that, when civil war is found to exist (and that altogether comes from the magnitude of the opposition), then the rules of war apply, as much as in any public war, so far as to protect the individuals acting under them. What would be said if you should take a gentleman who was made prisoner at Fort Hatteras, and try him for treason, and hang him? What would be said in this country, or in Europe,—what would be said anywhere, in the present or in future ages,—as to an act like that? Well, why not? Because justice must be equal. If you do it to one, you must do it to all. If you do it to all, you carry on an extermination of the human race, against all the principles which can animate a Court of Justice, or find a seat in the human bosom. Therefore, if we have the fact of civil war, we have the rules of war introduced.

Now, is this a civil war? I do not ask the question of how this country simply should regard it; but on the question in a Criminal Court, as to whether a civil war exists so as to give protection to those who act on one side of it, I have the concurrent judgments of the Courts. Judge Dunlop, in the case of the Tropic Wind, says there can be no blockade except in a case of war; that this is a civil war, and therefore there is a blockade. Judge Cadwalader says this is a civil war, and in civil war you may make captures; and Judge Betts, in a vastly profitable judgment, delivered in the other room, confiscating millions of property of Union men in the South, says that this is civil war. Now, if the Government of the United States forfeits the property of persons residing in these seceded States, without the formality of a trial for treason, because it is simply enemy's property, with what pretence can they set up the principle that they will not treat them as enemies? They will treat them as enemies, for the purpose of confiscation, and not as enemies, but as traitors and pirates, for the purpose of execution? Why, it is a glaring inconsistency. It strikes us off our feet as a people fit to be looked at by any impartial or rational person, in political jurisprudence.

We submit, therefore, that there was a civil war. Then what was the taking of the Joseph? I now pass by the Savannah's commission for a moment. The capture of the Joseph was in this way: The Joseph was approached by the Savannah, and her Captain ordered on board. I make no question about its being a taking by force; I make no question but that, if it was done piratically, there was force enough to make it piratical. But when asked, Why do you do it? Captain Baker replied, "I take this by authority of the Confederated States. I am sorry for it; but you make war upon us, and we have, in retaliation, to make war upon you." The vessel is taken; nothing is removed from her; and she is sent in as a prize, and reaches Georgetown. Nothing is then taken from her, but she is proceeded against in Court, and men are examined there as to the vessel, just as fairly, and probably just as good men, as have been examined in the other room. The question is tried. It is an undeniable case that, if this is a civil war, they having declared war, the vessel belongs to a belligerent, and she is taken, condemned and sold, according to the laws which have dominion over that country—a proceeding (erroneous as it may be in the ultimate object of it) according to all the course of every civilized country. And yet, we are told, that is piratical! I submit that this cannot be so. We cannot, with any approach to consistency, hold that we can treat them both as enemies and rebels at the same time. Not so. Treat them as rebels, and confiscate the property by due course of law, and you can get nothing; because it is a singular thing that in this country there is no such thing as forfeiture for treason. You cannot forfeit the chattels, but only the land, and that for life; and as the penalty of treason is death, leaving no life estate for the forfeiture to act on, there is, practically, no forfeiture for treason. When these men come and say, we have taken this property as an enemy, you treat them as rebels. It seems to me this is indulging a private animosity; it is indulging a fanatical principle, an unworthy principle, that cannot be carried out without disregarding the great rules that belong to civilized nations with regard to war.

Again, if your honors please, piracy and robbery always have secrecy about them. The open robber, who meets you in noonday, yet secretes the plunder. He does not go into a Court of Justice and say, "Behold what I have taken! here are the jewels, and here the gold; adjudge if they are lawful prize!" The robber never does that. Here there is nothing secret or furtive. The vessel and cargo are taken before a Court and adjudicated to be a prize. Let us take a case which, although unlikely to happen, might occur. A man goes from seceding Virginia with an execution to levy upon a man in loyal Virginia. The man there says, "You are superseded; you have no authority;" and it is tried there. The Court hold that the execution and levy from the seceded State does not pass the property; but would it be possible to say, there was anything furtive in the taking on the part of the officer? There is nothing more plain, in criminal law, than that, if you act under color of authority, although you may be ruined by suits in trespass, yet you are not to be subjected to punishment as having done what was felonious.

But there is one other consideration which I would present on the subject of piracy: it is robbery upon the high seas,—an act hostis humani generis. It is made an offence in this country, because it is an offence against the law of nations; for this is a question on which civilized nations do not differ. All the nations of Europe look on at this controversy. Here comes a man that the District Attorney of New York says is hostis humani generis. What says the great commercial nation of Great Britain? We do not treat you as pirates, but as belligerents. We do not recognize your independence, because you have not achieved it; but when the question arises, whether we shall consider you as pirates, whom we, in common with all other nations, have a right to take up, we say it is no such thing. Judge Sprague says, that they say it is no such thing. So, too, with France. Here is the authority of a great Empire that this is not a piratical but a belligerent act. And again, Spain reiterates the same decision. Suppose I could bring the authority of the highest Court in Great Britain that, just in such a case as this, the Court acquitted a man of piracy; and suppose I could add to that a similar judgment under the law of France; and bring a case from the Courts in Spain, deciding the question in the same way; and so, too, from Holland,—and when I come down to New York, the District Attorney says the man is hostis humani generis! Is it not absurd? If piracy be a crime against public law, it is so. The recognition and the application of the doctrines of common humanity to this great struggle,—that they should be regarded as the determining point upon this great question—it seems to me your honors will never hesitate in admitting. I, therefore, present this point, and if your honors will permit me, after this discursive argumentation, I will read it as I think it ought to be decided in law:

"There is evidence that at the time of the crew of the Savannah shipping for the cruise, and at the time of the capture of the Joseph, the authorities of the State of South Carolina had become parties to a confederation of others of the United States of America, named in the President's proclamation. That under such confederation a Government, in fact, existed; and exercised, in fact, the powers of civil and military Government over the territories and people of those States, or the principal part thereof. That the said Confederate States had, in fact, declared war against the United States of America, and were openly prosecuting the same, with large military forces, and the military and civil organization of a Government; and had assumed, and were in the exercise of, the power of issuing commissions to private armed ships, to make captures of the property of the United States, and the citizens thereof, as prize of war, and to send them into port for adjudication as such. And that a civil war thus, in fact, existed. That the taking of the Joseph was under such authority of the Confederate States, and in the name of prize of war, and with the purpose of having the same adjudged by a Prize Court in South Carolina, or some other of the said Confederate States. And, if the facts are so found, then the taking of the Joseph was not piratical, under the eighth section of the Act of 1790, and the prisoners must be acquitted from the charge under this count."

Now I approach the case of the commission. I suppose that the District Attorney, by not proving the commission as a part of the charge, is not entitled to convict any of these prisoners under the commission which is shown. He does not prove his case; and it is no matter what we have proved,—he is not entitled to a conviction under evidence which he does not bring.

But now I take up the matter of the commission, and the consideration of piracy by statute, under the 9th section. If your honors please, it is right that I should give some history of that 9th section's coming into the law of piracy. The 8th section you will find to be the law of piracy, by the law of nations. All nations hold that to be piracy which is there described. But, in the 11th and 12th of William III., this state of things existed: King James had abdicated the Crown of England twelve years before; William and Mary reigned together six years; William survived her. Here, then, was a Government in England, with a pretender, whom the English Government had declared was an alien from the Throne; they had banished him. But he was at the Court of St. Germain, in France; and there, through his instrumentality, privateers were fitted out against English commerce. Then this Act was enacted which I will now mention. You find it in Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, under the title Piracy, book I., chap. 37, sec. 7:

"It being also doubted by many eminent civilians whether, during the Revolution, the persons who had captured English vessels, by virtue of commissions granted by James II., at his Court at St. Germain, after his abdication of the Throne of England, could be deemed pirates, the grantor still having, as it was contended, the right of war in him, it is enacted—11 & 12 Wm. III., c. 7, s. 8—'That if any of His Majesty's natural-born subjects, or denizens of this Kingdom, shall commit any piracy or robbery, or any act of hostility against others, His Majesty's subjects, upon the sea, under color of any commission from any foreign Prince or State, or pretence of authority from any person whatsoever, such offender or offenders, and every of them, shall be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be pirates, felons, and robbers; and they, and every of them, being duly convicted thereof, according to this Act, or the aforesaid statute of King Henry VIII., shall have and suffer such pains of death, loss of lands, goods, and chattels, as pirates, felons, and robbers upon the seas ought to have and suffer.'"

When an Act of Congress, declaring the crime of piracy, was enacted, in 1790, it is perfectly apparent that those who drew up the Act were acquainted with Hawkins' Pleas, containing the 8th section, which is the recognized law of piracy by all nations, and from that book, then, took in this 9th section; because there was no exigency in our Government to call for it, and no reason for its introduction, except that it was found in a book familiar to those who were legislating for this country. In regard to the Act, there are some peculiarities which are very striking, and which bear strongly on this subject. The first is the fact that a commission, although from a foreign State, taken by a British subject or denizen of England, and committed against British commerce, protected the party against the charge of piracy,—because the thing was taken as prize, and for adjudication according to the principles of the laws of nations, for which national action the nation which took it was responsible. But, in the case and condition of James II., the English declared that he was no longer of England,—they declared him fallen from the Crown, and a foreigner. He had no dominions, and no place where the poor man could hold a Prize Court; and, if he could authorize a capture, there was no Court to adjudicate upon it; there was no sovereign to be responsible for the action of the Prize Court. He was a King without responsibility, and without the power of having Courts of Adjudication; and it was a necessity arising in the history of English law that that kind of action should be treated as piratical. The English adopted that, therefore, as the statute piracy. I refer your honors to Phillimore's International Law (vol. III., page 398), where all the discussion and reasons are contained; and they all are reasons applicable to a Prince without dominions, without Courts, without a country; and to a foreign Prince, in regard to English property and English subjects.

Now, then, let us see how these men stand. Under the 8th section, those men who were not citizens of the United States, are, of course, protected by a commission from a Government de facto. Their taking was not animo furandi, because there was a commission. The very enactment of the statute of William III. was upon the basis that it was not piracy where there was a commission, even of this questionable sort.

I say, then, in my third point, that if the facts are found as supposed in the preceding point, and if it also appears that the commission from the Confederated States, or the President thereof, had been issued for the Savannah, and that the capture was made under color thereof, then, as to the prisoners shown not to be citizens of the United States, the taking of the Joseph was not piratical under the eighth section of the Act of 1790,—first, because it was under color of authority; nor, second, was it piratical under the ninth section, because that only applies to citizens of the United States; and the prisoners, Del Carno, &c., must be acquitted under the ninth as well as under the eighth section.

But now we come to the American citizens who took that commission, and we are to see with some accuracy how the case stands as to them,—which involves two questions: One is, what kind of "other person" is embraced in that law? And the other is, whether this indictment is supported as under a commission from any person whatever? Let me call your attention to the form of the indictment in this last count of the declaration. They all run in this way: that these persons, "being citizens, did, on pretence of authority from a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis," &c. That is all that is said as to the pretence. Now there is no lack of skill in this indictment. The pleader under this indictment was surrounded with difficulties very grave indeed. He had the commission. If he had described it as a commission from certain foreign States, namely, South Carolina, Georgia, &c., the Government would have recognized the existence of those States in the most formal manner and by action of the most formal kind. If he said "Jefferson Davis, President of certain Confederate States," that would be simply that the pretence of authority was a pretence of authority from those States, and the same consequence would result. Well, what could he do? The only way in which he could make this stand at all was by saying that it is an authority from Jefferson Davis, as an individual. That is the meaning of this allegation.

Now, then, under the facts already stated, including now the commission and the action under it, the taking of the Joseph was not piratical, under the ninth section, because the commission was from the Confederate States, and not from "a person, to wit, one Jefferson Davis," as described in the indictment. Now that leads me to a consideration of this commission. We had something a little like it here yesterday, when the warrant issued by Mr. Buchanan Henry was given in evidence for the arrest of these men. I suppose I would be charged with ridicule in the last degree if I said they were arrested by the authority of Buchanan Henry, or under pretence of authority from Buchanan Henry; yet the warrant ran in the name of Buchanan Henry. Now let us see whether this commission supports the allegation of its being a commission from a private person. The allegation is, that the capture was made under pretence of authority from one Jefferson Davis. The commission runs just as the President's commission to your honors:

"JEFFERSON DAVIS,

"PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA.

"To all who shall see these presents, greeting:—Know ye, that by virtue of the power vested in me by law, I have commissioned, and do hereby commission, have authorized, and do hereby authorize, the schooner or vessel called the Savannah (more particularly described in the schedule hereunto annexed), whereof T. Harrison Baker is commander, to act as a private armed vessel in the service of the Confederate States, on the high seas, against the United States of America, their ships, vessels, goods, and effects, and those of her citizens, during the pendency of the war now existing between the said Confederate States and the said United States.

"This commission to continue in force until revoked by the President of the Confederate States for the time being.

"Schedule of description of the vessel:—Name, Schooner Savannah; tonnage, 53-41/95 tons; armament, one large pivot gun and small arms; number of crew, thirty.

"Given under my hand and the seal of the Confederate States, at Montgomery, this 18th day of May, A.D. 1861.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS.

"By the President—R. Toombs, Secretary of State."

Now I submit that, if they had framed an indictment for taking a commission under the King of England, and it had been under the Government of England as a foreign State, without naming the individual, such a commission as this would sustain it. If they had indicted as taking a commission out under any foreign State or nation, a commission in this way would have sustained that indictment; because the officer is merely the authenticator of the instrument; the authority is not his,—it is not under his authority; he is the mere ministerial officer, in fact, of the Government.

Now I submit, that this taking cannot be held piratical, under the ninth section, on this indictment; because it was a taking, not on pretence of authority from Jefferson Davis, but under authority of the Confederate States, exercised by Jefferson Davis. And, in a case of this kind, I must say that I consider it will prove the greatest Godsend to the Government, and to the prisoners on both sides who now anxiously await the result, if, without touching the other questions, this indictment shall fall to the ground on a mere technical point.

That is one reason. Another reason is this: The Act is for taking vessels under a commission from any foreign Prince or State, or on pretence of authority from any person. Now what is a foreign Prince or a foreign State? If your honors please, at the time this Act was enacted, within some three years of the United States coming together, is it conceivable that the thought entered into the heart of any man who had anything to do with it that it was to take effect against any man acting under the authority of any of the States of this Union? The States all were authorized, under certain circumstances, to have ships-of-war and to have armies. There was no telling what collision there might be; and the idea that this Act, almost a literal transcript from the English statute of 11 and 12 William III., contemplated that punishment for acting under the authority of domestic persons, is inconceivable.

In construing an Act so highly penal as this we must be very sure that we are not only within the letter, but within the very spirit and contemplation, of the Act; and can you think that the framers of this Government gravely provided for the offence of taking a commission under some of the persons acting as Governor, or in connection with the domestic institutions of this country? I submit that the Act was intended to operate against foreign States and nations, and a foreign person; and it is inconceivable that the Act should have been contemplated to embrace any such thing as is now brought up. I submit, therefore, as the third of my specifications under this point, that Jefferson Davis was not a foreign person, nor assuming the authority of a foreign Prince or Ruler. The statute was one against commissions under foreign authority of some kind or other, either Prince, or State, or person.

But I now draw your attention to another feature of the statute, which seems to me equally decisive. This statute is transmitted to us from England, and that which was the design and exigency of its adoption there is to bear with great, if not decisive, force, upon its construction here. We took it because they had it, and we took it, therefore, for reasons similar to theirs. Now what was the real difficulty there? It was this: that a Prince without dominion, a Prince having no Government de facto, a mere nominal Prince, undertook to issue commissions throughout the world against British commerce. Evils that are very manifest and plain, in regard to the law of prizes, apply to that case. The prizes could not be adjudicated in his Courts; he had none. This was an enactment against Princes who had abdicated and were without dominion. Such things were common, as well in the time of William III. as since. Abdicated Princes very soon turn to be robbers, whose only object is to get re-established, and they are not scrupulous as to means. They stand as mere fictions, undertaking to exercise authority, with none of the responsibilities which belong to Rulers. How different it is with this Jefferson Davis! I speak now in no degree of his merits, or as lessening that feeling which my fellow-citizens and I share alike upon the subject of this rebellion. But here is a man, not a nominal Prince or Ruler, but he is (if you please without right) Ruler of ten millions of people. Is this Act, which is intended to meet the case of a man without people, or dominion, or force—without any thing but the name and claim of Ruler—to be applied to a man who represents (rightfully or wrongfully) a large fraction of a great nation? To say that every man who takes a commission (applying as well to civil as to military commissions), that any man who takes a commission, from him, is either a robber or a pirate—if on land, a robber, if on sea, a pirate—is unjust and unreasonable—contrary to every principle that governs the laws of nations. Patriotic vituperation may go far—patriotic spirit and feeling may go far—but there is a limit to every thing that is real. The human mind, as it seems to me, and the human heart, cannot go to the extent of the doctrine that they can be treated as robbers who act under a Government extending de facto so far and doing de facto so many things throughout upon the principles of civilized warfare, and having a vast territory, and vast numbers of people acting as it dictates. It is perverting the law of piracy to apply it to a case so entirely different.

Now it comes back to the fact that this "pretence of authority" was the authority of all those States. Those States, when they come back to the Union, if they ever do, will come back with all their powers as original States. The Confederation you may call illegal and improper, but it is a Confederation de facto; its right may be questioned, but it is a de facto Government, with this gentleman presiding over it, and performing the duties which, as the Ruler of a great nation, devolve upon him—bringing out armies by hundreds of thousands, bringing out treasures by the million,—and yet you are to say it has no color of authority. It is idle, it seems to me, to say that a man situated as Jefferson Davis is was intended by a law against a mere nominal Prince. I submit that because Jefferson Davis was actually the Chief of a Confederation of States, not foreign, exercising actual power and government over large territories, with a large population, under an organized Government, having Courts within its territories for the adjudication of captures,—that upon each of these grounds Harleston, as well as the others who are citizens, should be acquitted under the 9th section.

That is all the argument which I address particularly; and I beg leave to read two or three general propositions on the construction of the law in this matter:

I.—The recognition, by the great commercial nations of the world, of the Confederate States as belligerents, and not pirates and robbers, prevents the captures under authority from being held piratical under the law of nations.

II.—1. The ninth section of the Act of 1790 has not in view any application to the States then recently united as the United States of America, or to the persons having authority de facto in them.

2. That section had in view foreign Princes and States, and foreign authority only.

3. The authority from any person in that section has reference to persons without the possession, in fact, of territory.

If your honors please, I have endeavored, so far as it was possible, to abbreviate what I have had to say on this subject. It is a very interesting one, undoubtedly, not only to the legal student, but to all persons in the country. This war is a war to reclaim those States. To attempt to reclaim them by prosecutions for piracy, or by acts of hostility which disregard them as having any form of society,—it seems to me that no national evil could be greater. The idea that in a commercial city it is very offensive that there should be privateers, is a trifle. The navy can regulate that. Let them look more to the privateers that want to get out than to the prizes that want to come in, and that will be provided for. We need not violate principles of law, or of humanity, or the common sense of the world, to produce an effect of that kind. We need to show that, in the midst of all this excitement and outcry against piracy—in the midst of a press that never names any of these people without calling them "pirates"—the men brought in always in chains, for the purpose of exciting public indignation against them and preventing their being treated as men of common rights and common interests with us—all which is very humiliating, it seems to me—in a Court of Justice no such feelings will be succumbed to.

Certain I am that, where I stand, no such principles will be put in use. Justice will come—severe and stern, it may be—but it will be justice, with truth, and reason, and humanity, and political tenderness accompanying all its acts and all its judgments.

Mr. Larocque: If the Court please, I had hoped to be saved the necessity of addressing your honors upon these propositions of law; but, in the distribution that has been made among the counsel, it has fallen to my lot to present the propositions in reference to which my opening was made, yesterday, to the Jury, and which will be adverted to by the counsel who, on our side, will close the case; and, simply, without detaining your honors, at this late hour, with any remarks upon them further than the reading of some extracts from authorities I have collected, I will present the propositions, leaving them to the action of your honors, and to the remarks of my associate, who will close this case, after we have ascertained the direction it will take before the Jury.

The first proposition I had stated, with reference to jurisdiction: "That the defendants, after their capture and confinement as criminals, for the acts charged in this indictment, having been taken within the District of Virginia, on board the vessel on which they were so confined before being brought within the Southern District of New York, cannot be convicted under this indictment."

In reference to that, there are a number of additional authorities that I will furnish to your honors. In the case of the United States vs. Charles A. Greiner, tried before Judge Cadwalader, in the Philadelphia District, the defendant had been arrested under a charge of treason committed in Georgia. It seems to have been understood, by the learned counsel on the other side, that the question of jurisdiction may be influenced by the fact of whether there was any possibility of these prisoners being tried in Virginia or not; and it is in reference to that point that I cite this case. Judge Cadwalader says:

"The questions in this case are more important than difficult. On the 2d of January last an artillery company of the State of Georgia, mustered in military array, took Fort Pulaski, in that State, from the possession of the United States, without encountering any forcible resistance. They garrisoned the post for some time, and left it in the possession of the government of the State. The accused, a native of Philadelphia, where he has many connections, resides in Georgia. He was a member of this artillery company when it occupied the fort, and, for aught that appears, may still be one of its members. He was not its commander. Whether he had any rank in it, or was only a private soldier, does not appear, and is, I think, unimportant. He is charged with treason in levying war against the United States. The overt act alleged is, that he participated, as one of this military company, in the capture of the fort, and in its detention until it was handed over to the permanent occupation of the authorities of the State.

"The primary question is whether, if his guilt has been sufficiently proved, I can commit him for trial, detain him in custody, or hold him to bail to answer the charge. The objection to my doing so is, that the offence was committed in the State of Georgia, where a Court of the United States cannot, at present, be held, and where, as the District Attorney admits, a speedy trial cannot be had. The truth of this admission is of public notoriety.

"The Constitution of the United States provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial by a Jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have been committed. The only statute which, if the Courts of the United States for the State of Georgia were open, would authorize me to do more than hold this party to security of the peace, and for good behavior, is the 33d section of the Judiciary Act of the 24th September, 1789. That section, after authorizing commitments, &c., for trial, before any Court of the United States having cognizance of the offence, provides that if the commitment is in a District other than that in which the offence is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the Judge of the District where the delinquent is imprisoned seasonably to issue, and of the Marshal of the same District to execute, a warrant for the removal of the offender to the District in which the trial is to be had. The District Attorney of the United States does not ask me to issue such a warrant for this party's removal to Georgia for trial. Therefore I can do nothing under this Act of Congress. It does not authorize me to detain him in custody to abide the ultimate result of possible future hostilities in Georgia, or to hold him to bail for trial in a Court there, of which the sessions have been interrupted, and are indefinitely postponed."

In reference to the counts of the indictment founded upon the 8th section of the Act of 1790 and the Act of 1820, the propositions I have are these:

"Second, That to convict the defendants, under either of the first five counts of the indictment, the Jury must have such evidence as would warrant a conviction for robbery if the acts proved had been performed on land.

"Third, That the defendants cannot be convicted of robbery, in the capture of the Joseph, unless she was taken with a piratical and felonious intent.

"Fourth, That if the defendants, at the time of her capture, were acting under the commission in evidence, and, in good faith, believed that such commission authorized her capture, they did not act with a piratical or felonious intent, and cannot be convicted under either of the first five counts in the indictment."

There are one or two authorities I did not state yesterday, which I beg now to furnish, as some additional authorities have been handed up on the other side:

The Josefa Segunda, 5 Wheaton, 357. In this case Judge Livingston says:

"Was the General Arismendi a piratical cruiser? The Court thinks not. Among the exhibits is a copy of a commission, which is all that in such a case can be expected, which appears to have been issued under the authority of the Government of Venezuela. This Republic is composed of the inhabitants of a portion of the dominions of Spain, in South America, which have been for some time, and still are, maintaining a contest for independence with the mother country. Although not acknowledged by our Government as an independent nation, it is well known that open war exists between them and His Catholic Majesty, in which the United States maintain strict neutrality. In this state of things, this Court cannot but respect the belligerent rights of both parties, and does not treat as pirates the cruisers of either so long as they act under and within the scope of their respective commissions."

In the United States vs. The Brig Malek Adhel (2 Howard's U.S. Rep. 211), as to the Act of 1819, Judge Story (page 232) says:

"Where the Act uses the word piratical, it does so in a general sense,—importing that the aggression is unauthorized by the law of nations, hostile in its character, wanton and cruel in its commission, and utterly without any sanction from any public authority or sovereign power. In short, it means that the act belongs to the class of offences which pirates are in the habit of perpetrating, whether they do it for purposes of plunder, or purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton abuse of power. A pirate is deemed—and properly deemed—hostis humani generis. But why is he so deemed? Because he commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations, without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority. If he willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just as much piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of nations, and of the Act of Congress, as if he did it solely and exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causâ. The law looks to it as an act of hostility; and, being committed by a vessel not commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the act of a pirate, and one who is emphatically hostis humani generis."

Then upon the question that this commission is only by color of authority from an unrecognized power, and that the authority to grant such a commission is disputed, I refer to the case of Davison vs. Certain Seal Skins (2 Paine's C.C.R. 332), which was a case of salvage of property after a piracy alleged to have been committed by Louis Vernet, at Port St. Louis, in the Eastern Falkland Islands, by taking them from a vessel,—he wrongfully and unlawfully claiming and pretending to be Governor of the Islands, under Buenos Ayres. The Court says:

"Robbery on the high seas is understood to be piracy by our law. The taking must be felonious. A commissioned cruiser, by exceeding his authority, is not thereby to be considered a pirate. It may be a marine trespass, but not an act of piracy, if the vessel is taken as a prize, unless taken feloniously, and with intent to commit a robbery: the quo animo may be inquired into. A pirate is one who acts solely on his own authority, without any commission or authority from a sovereign State, seizing by force and appropriating to himself, without discrimination, every vessel he meets with; and hence pirates have always been compared to robbers. The only difference between them is that the sea is the theatre of action for the one, and the land for the other."

By referring to this case, pp. 334, 335, your honors will find that Buenos Ayres had no lawful jurisdiction over the islands, and that our Executive Government had so decided; but Buenos Ayres avowed the acts of those claiming to act under her authority, and our Government discharged the prisoners who had been captured as pirates, disclaiming, under those circumstances, to hold them personally criminally responsible.

The next proposition which I state is this: "That, by the public law of the world, the law of nations, and the laws of war, the commission in evidence, supported by the proof in the case as to the color of authority under which it was issued, would afford adequate protection to the defendants against a conviction for piracy; and being an authority emanating neither from a foreign Prince nor foreign State, nor from a person merely, the offence charged in the last five counts of the indictment, is not within the purview of the 9th section of the Act of 1790, and the defendants cannot be convicted under either of those counts, if they acted in good faith under that commission."

I refer your honors to the case of the Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton, 283, to the opinion of Judge Story, in which he says:

"There is another objection urged against the admission of this vessel to the privileges and immunities of a public ship, which may as well be disposed of in connection with the question already considered. It is, that Buenos Ayres has not yet been acknowledged as a sovereign independent Government, by the Executive or Legislature of the United States, and therefore is not entitled to have her ships-of-war recognized by our Courts as national ships. We have, in former cases, had occasion to express our opinion on this point. The Government of the United States has recognized the existence of a civil war between Spain and her Colonies, and has avowed a determination to remain neutral between the parties, and to allow to each the same rights of asylum, and hospitality, and intercourse. Each party is, therefore, deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war, and entitled to be respected in the exercise of those rights. We cannot interfere to the prejudice of either belligerent, without making ourselves a party to the contest and departing from the posture of neutrality. All captures made by each must be considered as having the same validity; and all the immunities which may be claimed by public ships in our ports, under the laws of nations, must be considered as equally the right of each, and as such must be recognized by our Courts of Justice, until Congress shall prescribe a different rule. This is the doctrine heretofore asserted by this Court, and we see no reason to depart from it."

Your honors, by referring to the case of The Bello Corunnes, 6 Wheaton, 152, will see the doctrine laid down distinctly, that acts may be piratical for all civil purposes which would not authorize the conviction of the perpetrators criminally as pirates; e.g., a citizen of the United States, taking from a State at war with Spain a commission to cruise against that power, contrary to the 14th art. of the Spanish Treaty;—and the Court held, in that case, that that would involve the consequences of a piracy, for the purpose of condemnation of property; but it would not be criminal piracy, under either the law of nations or of the United States.

On the general subject of privateers I had a reference to Vattel, but I do not think it necessary to read it, because the authorities on that subject cover it so fully.

I come now, if your honors please, to what my learned friend, when he addressed the Court on the part of the Government, has been pleased to call the political part of this case; and I have distinctly stated in my propositions what I contended for on that subject. In the first place, that the Federal Executive Government, and the executive governments of the States, under the Constitution of the United States, each possess the jurisdiction to decide whether their respective acts are within or exceed the limits of their respective constitutional powers, in cases of collision between them in their administrative acts, operating upon the public domain, or upon the State, or its citizens as a body politic.

I shall, without stopping for any discussion, simply state the subordinate propositions by which I think that is established, and give a reference to the authorities. I say, in the first place, as I said to the Jury, that citizens of the United States owe a divided allegiance, partly to the United States and partly to their respective States. They can commit treason against either; for the State constitutions and laws define and punish treason against the States, as the Constitution of the United States does treason against them.

The Federal and State Governments are each supreme and sovereign within the limits of their respective jurisdictions under the Federal and State Constitutions; each operates directly upon the citizen, and each also operates as a check and restriction upon the other, and upon the encroachments of the other, in seeking to extend beyond legitimate limits its jurisdiction over the citizen, or over the public domain common to both. Now, if your honors please, in regard to that, I will very briefly refer you to what I rely upon. I refer, in the first place, to sections 2 and 3, of Article 6th, of the Constitution of the United States.

"Sec. 2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

"Sec. 3. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."

In the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Articles 9 and 10, we find this language:

"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

I refer to the case of McCulloch vs. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton, p. 400, in which the opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. He says:

"No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into one common mass."

I cite particularly from pp. 402 and 410. On page 410 his language is as follows:

"In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the Government of the Union and those of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. We cannot comprehend that train of reasoning which would maintain that the extent of power granted by the people is to be ascertained, not by the nature and terms of the grant, but by its date. Some State constitutions were formed before, some since, that of the United States. We cannot believe that their relation to each other is in any degree dependent upon this circumstance. Their respective powers must, we think, be precisely the same as if they had been formed at the same time."

The next I refer to is the case of Rhode Island agst. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 889, where Judge Baldwin says:

"Before we can proceed in this cause, we must, therefore, inquire whether we can hear and determine the matters in controversy between the parties, who are two States of this Union, sovereign within their respective boundaries, save that portion of power which they have granted to the Federal Government, and foreign to each other for all but federal purposes."

I now refer to the case of Livingston vs. Van Ingen, 9 Johnson, 574, where Chancellor Kent reasons thus:

"When the people create a single entire Government, they grant at once all the rights of sovereignty. The powers granted are indefinite and incapable of enumeration. Every thing is granted that is not expressly reserved in the constitutional charter, or necessarily retained as inherent in the people. But when a Federal Government is erected with only a portion of the sovereign power, the rule of construction is directly the reverse, and every power is reserved to the members that is not, either in express terms or by necessary implication, taken away from them and rested exclusively in the Federal Head."

"This rule has not only been acknowledged by the most intelligent friends to the Constitution, but is plainly declared by the instrument itself. This principle might be illustrated by other instances of grants of power to Congress, with a prohibition to the States from exercising the like powers; but it becomes unnecessary to enlarge upon so plain a proposition, as it is removed beyond all doubt by the 10th article of the amendments to the Constitution. That article declares that 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' The ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of this State was made with the explanation and understanding that 'every power, jurisdiction and right which was not clearly delegated to the General Government remained to the people of the several States, or to their respective State governments.' There was a similar provision in the articles of Confederation, and the principle results from the very nature of the Federal Government, which consists only of a defined portion of the undefined mass of sovereignty vested in the several members of the Union. There may be inconveniences, but generally there will be no serious difficulty, and there cannot well be any interruption of the public peace in the concurrent exercise of those powers. The powers of the two Governments are each supreme within their respective constitutional spheres. They may each operate with full effect upon different subjects, or they may, as in the case of taxation, operate upon different parts of the same subject."

I now refer to the Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1780, art. 4. It reads:

"The people of this Commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign and independent State; and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not, or may not hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to the United States of America, in Congress assembled."

I also refer to the New Hampshire Bill of Rights, of September, 1792:

"Art. 7. The people of this State have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign and independent State; and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction and right pertaining thereto, which is not, or may not hereafter be by them expressly delegated to the United States of America, in Congress assembled."

I next beg leave to refer your honors to No. 32 of the Federalist, by Hamilton, who says:

"An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts, and whatever power might remain in them would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States."

Also, to the Federalist, No. 39, by Madison, in which he says:

"The difference between a Federal and National Government, as it relates to the operation of the Government, is, by the adversaries of the plan of the Convention, supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate upon the political bodies composing the Confederacy in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the national and not the federal character, though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. But the operation of the Government on the people in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, on the whole, in the sense of its opponents, designate it, in this relation, a National Government.

"But if the Government be national with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it with regard to the extent of its powers. The idea of a National Government involves in it not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the National Legislature. Among communities united for political purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal Legislatures. In the former case all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme, and may be controlled, directed or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed Government cannot be deemed a national one, since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that, in controversies relating to the boundary line between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be established under the General Government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than the local Governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated."

I will refer, also, to the letter of Gov. Seward, written to Gov. Gilmore, of Virginia, October 24th, 1839, taken from the Assembly Journal, 63d Sess., 1840, p. 55. That distinguished public man says:

"You very justly observe, 'that neither the Government nor the citizens of any other country can rightfully interfere with the municipal regulations of any country in any way;' and in support of this position you introduce the following extract from Vattel's Law of Nations, 'that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no State has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that belong to a nation, sovereignty is doubtless the most precious, and that which other nations ought the most scrupulously to respect if they would not do her an injury.'

"It might, perhaps, be inferred, from the earnestness with which these principles are pressed in your communication, that they have been controverted on my part. Permit me, therefore, to bring again before you the following distinct admissions: 'I do not question the constitutional right of a State to make such a penal code as it shall deem necessary or expedient; nor do I claim that citizens of other States shall be exempted from arrest, trial and punishment in the State adopting such code, however different its enactments may be from those existing in their own State.' Thus you will perceive that I have admitted the sovereignty of the several States upon which you so strenuously insist. To prevent, however, all possible misconstruction upon this subject, I beg leave to add that no person can maintain more firmly than I do the principle that the States are sovereign and independent in regard to all matters except those in relation to which sovereignty is expressly, or by necessary implication, transferred to the Federal Government by the Constitution of the United States. I have at least believed that my non-compliance with the requisition made upon me in the present case would be regarded as maintaining the equal sovereignty and independence of this State, and by necessary consequence, those of all the other States."

I contend, then, that the people of the several States, in forming the State governments, have surrendered to the latter supreme and sovereign jurisdiction over all questions affecting the State, or its citizens as a body politic, not included in the grant of power to the General Government by the Federal Constitution. This surrender necessarily includes the power and jurisdiction to determine, co-ordinately with the Federal Government, whether the Federal Executive Government is acting within or transgressing the limits of its legitimate authority in any case affecting the State as such, or its citizens as a body politic, when the question is not one of the validity or constitutionality of a law of the United States, operating directly upon individual citizens, and conformity to which is to be enforced or resisted by suit or defence in the Federal or State Courts, with the right of ultimate appeal, in either case, to the Supreme Court of the United States; but, on the contrary, brings into collision the Federal and State Executive Departments of the Government, in the exercise of powers which, from their very nature and the mode in which they are exerted, never can be presented for the determination of a Court.

And with regard to that proposition I would cite Vattel, Book I., chap. 1, sec. 2, upon the proposition that jurisdiction to determine such a mixed question of law and fact has been ceded equally to the State as to the Federal Government. Vattel says:

"It is evident that, by the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body in everything that relates to the common welfare. The authority of all over each member therefore essentially belongs to the body politic or State; but the exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands, according as the society may have ordained."

I refer, also, to the Federalist, No. 40, by Madison. He uses this language:

"Will it be said that the fundamental principles of the Confederation were not within the purview of the Convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, what are those principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. * * * Do they require that the powers of the Government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new Government will act on the States in their collective character. In some instances, also, those of the existing Government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture, of piracy, of the post-office, of coins, weights and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the cases of trial by Courts Martial, in the Army and Navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a Jury, or even of a Civil Magistrate,—in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens."

I would also refer your honors to the Report of the Committee of the General Assembly of Connecticut, on a call for the militia, by the General Government, in 1812. The Report reads:

"The people of this State were among the first to adopt that Constitution; they have been among the most prompt to satisfy all its lawful demands, and to give facility to its fair operations; they have enjoyed the benefits resulting from the Union of the States; they have loved, and still love and cherish that Union, and will deeply regret if any events shall occur to alienate their affection from it. They have a deep interest in its preservation, and are still disposed to yield a willing and prompt obedience to all the legitimate requirements of the Constitution of the United States.

"But it must not be forgotten that the State of Connecticut is a free, sovereign and independent State,—that the United States are a Confederacy of States,—that we are a confederated and not a consolidated Republic. The Governor of this State is under a high and solemn obligation 'to maintain the lawful rights and privileges thereof as a sovereign, free and independent State,' as he is 'to support the Constitution of the United States,' and the obligation to support the latter imposes an additional obligation to support the former. The building cannot stand if the pillars upon which it rests are impaired or destroyed. The same Constitution which delegates powers to the General Government, forbids the exercise of powers not delegated, and reserves those powers to the States respectively."

And that was "approved by both Houses," and the following resolution passed:

"Resolved, That the conduct of His Excellency, the Governor, in refusing to order the militia of this State into the service of the United States, on the requisition of the Secretary of War and Major-General Dearborn, meets with the entire approbation of this Assembly."

I would also refer to the second speech of Mr. Webster on Mr. Foot's resolution, in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the Senate of the United States, where he thus expresses himself:

"The States are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law (the Constitution). * * * The General Government and the State governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary."

Also, to the case of Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard, 1—one of the Dorr rebellion cases. The Supreme Court of the United States there decided that the government of a State, by its Legislature, has the power to protect itself from destruction by armed rebellion by declaring martial law, and that the Legislature is the judge of the necessary exigency.

At this point the Court intimated that they would adjourn to the following day.

The District Attorney, Mr. E. Delafield Smith, stated that the case of the United States vs. William Smith, one of the ship's company of the privateer Jefferson Davis, the trial of which had been proceeding in Philadelphia, had terminated in a verdict. That case involved the main questions, and also the question of jurisdiction involved here. Mr. Smith further stated that he had sent for a copy of the charge of Mr. Justice Grier in that case, and expected to receive it by telegraph, and he desired to reserve the right to refer to that charge as one of his authorities in this case.

The Court assented.

Adjourned to Saturday, October 26th, at 11 A.M.

FOURTH DAY.

Saturday, Oct. 26, 1861.

The Court met at 11 o'clock, when—

Mr. Larocque resumed:

I will proceed very briefly, if your honors please, to close what I was submitting to the Court upon the propositions which, as I maintain, tend to show a colorable authority in the State government, in possible cases that might arise, to authorize the issuing of letters of marque. I will state them in their connection, in order that your honors may see what they are. The first is the one I considered yesterday, viz., that the Federal Executive Government and the executive governments of the States, under the Constitution of the United States, each possess the jurisdiction to decide whether their respective acts are within or exceed the limits of their respective constitutional powers in cases of collision between them in their administrative acts operating upon the public domain, or upon the State, or its citizens as a body politic.

I had concluded what I intended to submit upon that, and proceed to the others, which are—

2. That in such cases, the Constitution having erected no common arbiter between them, the right of forcible resistance to the exercise of unlawful power, which, by the law of nature, resides in the people, has been delegated by them, by the Federal and State Constitutions respectively, to the Federal and State Governments respectively, and each having the jurisdiction to judge whether its acts are within the constitutional limit of its own powers, has also necessarily the right to employ force in their assertion or defence, if needed.

3. That in such cases the citizen of a State which, in its political capacity, has come into forcible collision with the Federal Government, owing allegiance to both within the limits of their respective constitutional powers, and each possessing the jurisdiction to determine for him the compound question of law and fact, whether the constitutional limit of those powers has been exceeded by itself or the other in the particular case, is protected from all criminal liability for any act done by him, in good faith, in adhering to and under the authority of either Government.

I wish very briefly to refer your honors to a few authorities, which, I hold, sustain these propositions. I say, in the first place, that this right bears no analogy whatever to the right, once claimed and most successfully refuted, of the inhabitants of a State, in Convention, to decide by ordinance upon the unconstitutionally of a law of the Union, and to prevent by force its operation within the limits of the State, in a case legitimately falling within the cognizance of the Courts. The claim to collect duties under an Act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional was strictly an instance of this latter class. The citizen from whom the duties were claimed could simply refuse to pay, and thereby refer the question of constitutionality of the law to the judicial tribunals to which it properly belonged, and which must necessarily pass upon the question before the duties could be collected. On the other hand, the claim to hold or retake forts or other public places within the limits of a State, as property of the United States, is one against which, if unauthorized, the State could not by possibility defend itself through the agency of the Courts.

Now, if your honors please, I have stated most distinctly, and admitted most fully, that, in whatever cases the judicial power of the United States extends to, it is supreme. That is to say, if a collision takes place in a suit in a State Court between the Federal and State laws, and the decision of the State Court is against the right, privilege, or exemption, as it is called in the judiciary Act, claimed under the authority of the Union, the Supreme Court of the United States can redress the error. But I am now speaking of that class of cases where the judiciary have nothing whatever to do, and in which, I contend, the Federal and State authorities are each supreme and sovereign, within the limits of their respective power, and neither has any right or authority beyond the lines which bound their respective jurisdiction. And, if your honors please, I refer to the Inaugural Address of Mr. Lincoln, not only for the proposition that the judicial authority has nothing to do whatever in a case such as that I am now supposing, but that, even in cases where the judiciary is competent to act, its decisions do not form precedents, do not form rules for the government of the co-ordinate departments of the Union, in future cases of State policy, and that the executive and the legislative departments are still left at liberty to act as if no decision had been made. I do not mean to be understood as acquiescing in that claim; I consider it as a doctrine infinitely more dangerous and destructive than the doctrine of constitutional secession; but it comes to us as the claim set up on the part of the President; and if that is at all correct, there is an end of all pretence that the judiciary is competent to afford any relief or protection in the other class of cases referred to.

He says:

"I do not forget the position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decision must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it being limited to that particular case, with the chances that it may be overruled, and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that, if the policy of the Government upon the vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigations between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own masters, having to that extent practically resigned the Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there, in this view, any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes."

I have not the document at this moment; but your honors will probably bear in mind that the Executive also lately consulted the law-officer of the Government upon the question of suspending the privilege of habeas corpus, and I well remember the clause in the opinion which was delivered by that eminent legal gentleman and high officer of the Government on that occasion, and which was afterwards communicated by the President to Congress as the basis of his action. In that opinion the present learned Attorney-General used this language: "To say that the departments of our Government are co-ordinate, is to say that the judgment of one of them is not binding upon the other two, as to the arguments and principles involved in the judgment. It binds only the parties to the case decided." And your honors will recollect that, acting upon that enunciation of the law of the land and of the construction of the Constitution, although he admitted that the Supreme Court of the United States had decided that the privilege of habeas corpus could not be suspended by the Executive, without the interposition of Congress, the legal adviser of the Government held, at the same time, that that decision of the Supreme Court was not binding upon the Executive.

Now, for the purpose of showing what I mean by the right of resistance reserved to the people by the law of nature, which, as I say, is delegated by them to these two sovereigns, for the purpose that each may maintain its own authority and prevent encroachment by the other, I beg to refer your honors to Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law, vol. 1, page 391, commencing with section 10. And as a proof than I broach no novel or revolutionary doctrine, your honors will bear in mind that these Institutes of Natural Law were a course of lectures delivered in one of the great seminaries of learning of England, and their doctrines thought fit and proper to be instilled into the minds of the youth of that Kingdom, the loyalty of whose people to their Government has become proverbial among all the nations of the world.

The author says:

"It is a question of some importance, and has been thought a question not easily to be determined, whether the members of a civil society have, upon any event, or in any circumstances whatsoever, a right to resist their governors, or rather the persons who are invested with the civil power of that society."

Then he states several cases in which the civil governors, as he calls them, lose their power over their subjects, and continues:

"Fourthly, Though the governors of a society should be invested by the constitution with all civil power in the highest degree and to the greatest extent that the nature of a civil power will admit of, yet this does not imply that the people are in a state of perfect subjection. Civil power is, in its own nature, a limited power; as it arose at first from social union, so it is limited by the ends and purposes of such union, whether it is exercised, as it is in democracies, by the body of the people, or, as it is in monarchies, by one single person. But if the power of a Monarch, when he is considered as a civil governor, is thus limited by the ends of social union, whatever obedience and submission the people may owe him whilst he keeps within these limits, he has no power at all, and consequently the people owe him no subjection, when he goes beyond them.

"Having thus taken a short view of the several ways in which the authority of the governors of a society fails, and the subjection of the people ceases, we may now return to the question which was before us.

"If you ask whether the members of a civil society have a right to resist the civil governors of it by force? your question is too general to admit of a determinate answer.

"As far as the just authority of the civil governors and the subjection of the people extend, resistance by force is rebellion.

"Subjection consists in an obligation to obey; as far, therefore, as the people are in subjection, they can have no right to resist; because an obligation to obey, and a right to resist, are inconsistent with one another.

"But the power of civil governors is neither necessarily connected with their persons, nor infinite whilst it is in their possession.

"It ceases by abdication; it is overruled by the laws of nature and of God; and it does not extend beyond the limits which either the civil constitution or the ends of social union have set to it.

"Where their power thus fails in right, and they have no just authority, the subjection of the people ceases; that is, as far as of right they have no power, or no just authority, the people are not obliged to obey them; so that any force which they make use of, either to compel obedience or to punish disobedience, is unjust force; the people may perhaps be at liberty to submit to it, if they please; but, because it is unjust force, the law of nature does not oblige them to submit to it.

"But this law, if it does not oblige the people to submit to such force, allows them to have recourse to the necessary means of relieving themselves from it, and of securing themselves against it, to the means of resistance by opposing force to force, if they cannot be relieved from it and secured against it by any other means."

I continue my citation at—

"Sec. XV. In the general questions concerning the right of resistance, it is usually objected that there is no common judge who is vested with authority to determine, between the supreme governors and the people, where the right of resistance begins; and the want of such a judge is supposed to leave the people room to abuse this right; they may possibly pretend that they are unjustly oppressed, and, upon this pretence, may causelessly and rebelliously take up arms against their governors, although they are laid under no other restraints, and no other compulsion is made use of, but what the general nature of civil society or the particular circumstances of their own society require.

"But, be this as it may, the possibility that the right may be abused, does not prove that no such right subsists.

"If we would conclude, on the one hand, that the people have no right of resistance, because this right is capable of being abused, we might, for the same reason, conclude, on the other hand, that supreme governors have no authority.

"Whatever authority these governors have in any civil society, it was given them for the common benefit of the society; and it is possible that, under the color of this authority, they may oppress the people in order to promote their own separate benefit.

"Sec. XVI. It is a groundless suggestion, that a right of resistance in the people will occasion treason and rebellion, and that it will weaken the authority of civil government, and will render the office of those who are invested with it precarious and unsafe, even though they administer it with the utmost prudence and with all due regard to the common benefit.

"The right of resistance will indeed render the general notion of rebellion less extensive in its application to particular facts.

"All use of force against such persons as are invested with supreme power, would come under the notion of rebellion, if the people have no right of this sort; whereas, if they have such a right, the use of force to repel tyranical and unsocial oppression, when it cannot be removed by any other means, must have some other name given to it. So that, however true it may be that, in consequence of this right of resistance, supreme government will be liable, of right, to some external checks, arising out of the law of nature, to which they would otherwise not be liable, yet it cannot properly be said to expose them to rebellion."

I beg, in the next place, to read to your honors, from the opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, a short paragraph. It is to be found in 1st Wheaton, 363, in the case of Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee. I believe a paragraph from that has been already read, on the other side, and I wish to give you, in connection with it, what he says, speaking of the power of the judiciary, and the consequences that would result in any case to which that power did not reach. He says:

"On the other hand, so firmly am I persuaded that the American people no longer can enjoy the blessings of a free Government, whenever the State sovereignties shall be prostrated at the feet of the General Government, nor the proud consciousness of equality and security, any longer than the independence of judicial power shall be maintained consecrated and intangible, that I could borrow the language of a celebrated orator, and exclaim, 'I rejoice that Virginia has resisted.'"

I also wish to read a sentence from the case of Moore vs. The State of Illinois, in 14 Howard, p. 20—the opinion by Mr. Justice Grier. He says:

"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or Territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either."

And Mr. Justice McLean, in speaking of the same subject, in the same case, at page 22, says:

"It is true the criminal laws of the Federal and State Governments emanated from different sovereignties; but they operate on the same people, and should have the same end in view. In this respect the Federal Government, though sovereign within the limitation of its powers, may, in some sense, be considered as the agent of the States, to provide for the general welfare by punishing offences under its own laws within its jurisdiction."

I wish also to refer to the case of the United States vs. Booth, in 21 Howard—the opinion of Chief Justice Taney—in connection with the question of what the result is where the judiciary has not power to act. He says:

"The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives this Court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose this Union, when a controversy arises between them. Instead of reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to submit to the decision of this Court, and to abide by its judgment. And it is not out of place to say, here, that experience has demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the States; for, in the time that has already elapsed since this Government came into existence, several irritating and angry controversies have taken place between adjoining States, in relation to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened to end in force and violence, but for the power vested in this Court to hear them and decide between them.

"The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the United States and jurisdiction upon its Courts. In the first case, it provides that 'this Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and obligatory upon the Judges in every State.' The words in italics show the precision and foresight which marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created was to be limited in its powers of legislation; and, if it passed a law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State Judges bound to carry it into execution."

And further on, speaking of the claimed right of the State of Wisconsin to discharge a prisoner convicted in the United States Court upon a criminal conviction, and to refuse afterwards to obey a writ of error issued out of the Supreme Court of the United States to review that judgment, he uses language of this kind:

"This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows necessarily out of the complex character of our Government, and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its powers, and each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other."

Now, if your honors please, upon that question still further—that where there is no possibility of the power of the judiciary being exercised, there being, as the learned Chief Justice expresses it in his own language, "two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space" exercising jurisdiction, the right of forcible resistance exists in the State governments. I beg to refer to the Federalist, No. 28, by Alexander Hamilton, p. 126. He says:

"It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will in all possible contingencies afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the federal authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men as of the people at large. The Legislatures will have better means of information; they can discover the danger at a distance, and, possessing all the organs of civil power and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition; they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty."

I refer also to the Federalist, No. 46, by James Madison, where he uses this language:

"Were it admitted, however, that the Federal Government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If the act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the National Government, be generally popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately, and of course by means on the spot, and depending on the State alone. * * * On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the Federal Government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are at hand. * * *

"But ambitious encroachments of the Federal Government on the authority of the State governments would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause; a correspondence would be opened; plans of resistance would be concerted; one spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and, unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness would ever drive the Federal Government to such an extremity? * * * But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few Representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or, rather, one set of Representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of Representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the Federal Government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. * * * Extravagant as the supposition is, let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed, and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Federal Government; still it would not be going too far to say that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed 1/100th of the whole number of souls, or 1/25th part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield to the United States an army of more than 25 or 30,000 men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near 500,000 citizens, with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence."