Morning Session (continued 2)
Reading edition
DR. NELTE: I hope, Mr. President, that nevertheless the facts which I am putting to you in my manuscript will be considered by the Tribunal. You will notice that I shall refer to this matter at a later stage. On 1 February the session took place during which this affair came up, and on 11 February I went to the French Delegation.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I have stated, Dr. Nelte. I have already pointed that out to you.
DR. NELTE: And the French Prosecution did not give it to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Why did you not come back to the Tribunal if you had any complaint to make? I have said—and I repeat—that I think to make a complaint now after not having made it for all these months is a frivolous complaint and an attempt to create prejudice, and I should be glad of your explanation.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, it is merely an attempt to show you that I did not wish to raise a complaint about the Prosecution, recognizing as I did that the Prosecution did not want to help me. I have never been inclined to raise complaints about higher authorities, and I did not want to do it in this case either.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think that is a most unfair and a most improper thing for a responsible counsel to say. I think the mention of such a complaint is, as I have said, simply an effort on your part to create prejudice against the French Prosecution and against the fair conduct of this Trial.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, in my view it was merely meant to show how difficult it was for us to find material in favor of our clients.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps you will try and get on to something that is really material for the Tribunal to consider.
DR. NELTE: May I ask you to turn to Page 15 where, under Figure 3, I am dealing with the documents.
The document governs the hearing of evidence before this Tribunal. Against that the witnesses remain in the background. More important is the examination of these documents to ascertain the possibility of their utilization and their probative value.
The Prosecution has submitted as evidence to a large extent official reports which are admitted according to Article 21 of the Charter. I intended to show with respect to a number of these documents the conditional value of such reports as evidence. But I shall limit myself to a few fundamental arguments in this connection, trusting that you, Your Honors, in examining this kind of evidence will take my statements into consideration.
These numerous official reports submitted contain factual statements which to a great extent are based on witnesses’ testimony. These testimonies are not always related in the form of protocols but as summarizing reports. I do not want to dispute that these testimonies of witnesses are made as deposed in the reports. However, I will not do injustice to any of the witnesses who are not known by the Tribunal and whose testimony is hard to verify for lack of a personal impression, when I say that it concerns mostly very subjective attestations. There are a number of documents in which this is clearly recognizable, and in fact stated, and even documents in which hatred finds its clear expression. I can understand the hatred of these hard-hit people. The suffering they had to endure was so great that one cannot expect impartiality from them. I may, however, say too that such personal feelings are not conducive to rendering the testimony of these sorely afflicted ones a suitable basis for finding the real truth. I am thinking of the form of oath so often heard here on the part of the witnesses: “Swear that you will tell without hatred or fear...” And these official reports often contain not only factual statements, but final conclusions and judgments. To this extent, the probative value of these official reports cannot be recognized. In part these judgments go so far that outside the sphere of those directly involved they level reproaches against authorities, that is, the OKW and Keitel, without it being possible to recognize from the document itself on what the conclusion drawn rests. As long as it is a question of the indictment of an individual like the Defendant Keitel, a document used in evidence must give a proof which yields concrete facts for responsibility or which at least reveals causal connection. Above all, it cannot suffice, in order to consider Keitel’s responsibility as proved, if in such reports crimes committed by soldiers and officers of the Army or of the Armed Forces are alleged in order to derive responsibility on the part of the Defendant Keitel from this fact alone, because he was the Chief of Staff of the OKW.
It must be added that in these reports military agencies have often been erroneously named and confused; for example, when the Defendant Keitel is spoken of as the “High Commander (Oberkommandierender) of the Wehrmacht,” which is called “OKW” instead of “OKH.” It is not always possible to decide to what extent it is a question of an erroneous conception on the part of the Prosecution or whether it comes from a translation which is not in accordance with the meaning.
In order to examine the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel, I wish to make clear to the Tribunal, in a manner which excludes any doubt, what the channels of command and competence were and to this end I have submitted two affidavits to the Court: a) “The Channels of Command in the East” (Document Book 2, Keitel-10); b) “The Development of the Situation in France 1940-1945 and the Military Authorities” (Document Book 2, Keitel-13). The latter affidavit has also been signed by the Codefendant Jodl. I refer to these affidavits and make them the contents of my argument without reading from them.
Finally I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal toward other circumstances which may well impair the probative value of the documents which the Prosecution has submitted and you have accepted—for example, when documents do not bear any signatures, and it is impossible to decide whether it is a question of copies of documents which have actually been issued. As an example I will refer to Document 081-PS, which was submitted by the Prosecution for Keitel’s Indictment during the question of the treatment of prisoners of war. As far as its contents are concerned it is a fabulous document. Keitel does not remember ever having seen this report or ever having knowledge of the details contained in it. From all appearances one must consider this document as the draft of a report which was not issued, for:
a) it bears neither a signature nor an initial as is usual in copies,
b) if this letter had been sent out, it would have a blank journal number; and
c) the letter was not found at the addressee’s. In such cases mere knowledge of the addressee—in this case the Defendant Keitel—and the consequent deduction of his guilt in omitting to take measures to change conditions cannot be considered as proved.
I come to the Indictment against Field Marshal Keitel. I shall shorten the reading of Pages 19 to 21. The reading of the general Indictment and the special Indictment in the trial briefs can be omitted here since, with the exception of the Jewish problem and the persecution of the Church, there is no part of the Indictment which the Prosecution has not raised against the Defendant Keitel.
I should wish merely to point out that the original general Indictment holds Keitel responsible only for the period after 1938 and secondly, that at the beginning of the Indictment, Keitel is described as Chief of Army Command. According to the evidence submitted by the Prosecution, Keitel was also held responsible for the period after 1933, although the American, British, and French Prosecutions seem to have dropped the allegation that Keitel was Chief of Army Command. The Indictment of Field Marshal Keitel is split, therefore, between the periods 1933 to 1938—that is, 4 February 1938—and from 4 February 1938 until the end.
I shall now continue on Page 21, the last paragraph.
Herewith the defendant is not only indicted as a member of the conspiracy but is also accused of personally participating in all the crimes in the Indictment. The space which the Prosecution has devoted to the defendant in its statements corresponds with the comprehensive Indictments. The name of no other defendant has been mentioned so often by the Prosecution as that of the Defendant Keitel. Again and again we hear the words “Keitel’s order,” “Keitel’s decree,” and just as often “order of the OKW,” “directives of the OKW,” along with Keitel’s name as “Chief, OKW” after 4 February 1938.
From this is derived the very substance of the Indictment, namely, the position the Defendant Keitel occupied after 4 February 1938. But from it is also derived the scope of the justification. Here it is not a question of examining to what extent the defendant participated in the individual facts of the case, which in the long run arose from the so-called “Keitel orders” or “OKW instructions”; but what matters is the position he occupied—whether he took part and what part he took in the planning and execution of those orders and instructions, and finally and most important of all, whether his part in it was causal and culpable in the sense of the law which is to be applied here.
It seems to be of importance to stress from the outset several points of view which are important for the treatment of the case and for its judgment.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?