Afternoon Session (continued 2)
Reading edition
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, with regard to this, you say that when Warlimont says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warlimont is not speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth?
VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, it is not true, because it can be seen from another document which I have also seen here that this document was sent to the Führer and that I said there that the Führer must approve it. I did see also another document regarding it. That is also my recollection of the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, if you referred to the Führer’s view, let us just have a look at what that was. Have a look at Document 3780-PS, which will be GB-293, which is an account of a meeting that you and Hitler had with Oshima on the 27th of May 1944. It is on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oshima that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot, that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did you agree with that view?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this document, that is not my meaning, not my opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not even know where what you said here is in the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will find it on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that, but I can only say that this attitude of Hitler’s as it appears in this document was brought about by the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I heard all that before. I asked you whether you agreed or not; you said “no.” I want you now to deal with another point.
VON RIBBENTROP: I want to say something further, however, regarding this point because it is of decisive importance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will say that to learned Counsel after you have answered my question on this. I want you now to direct your attention to Stalag Luft III. You may have heard me asking a number of witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the 50 British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you know that? Do you know what I am talking about?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murderers? Do you remember that, in June of 1944?
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard of this through the speech made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that the Reich Government issued a statement saying that, in a communication by the Reich Government conveyed to the British via Switzerland, this unqualifiable charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that being issued in July 1944? Do you remember that being issued?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember it. I remember only the following: That at that time we received evidence of what had happened and that it was communicated to us in a note from the protecting powers. That is all I know about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know at the time that this statement was issued—did you know that these officers had been murdered in cold blood?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot while trying to escape. At that time, to be sure, we did have the impression that everything was not in order, I know that. I remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it in two stages. Who told you the lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of that lie?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember in detail. At that time we received the documentation from the competent authorities and a memorandum was forwarded to the Swiss Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From whom did you get your documentation which contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Göring?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you told us, I think, that you had a good idea that things were not all right, hadn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at this stage that you were merely an honorary member of the SS? It has been suggested by your counsel, and I am sure it must have been on some misunderstanding of information, that you were merely an honorary member of the SS. That is not the case, is it?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is no misunderstanding. This is exactly how it was: I received the SS uniform from Adolf Hitler. I did not serve in the SS, but as ambassador and later as Foreign Minister it was customary to have a rank of some sort and I had received the rank of SS Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you that that is entirely untrue, that you joined the SS by application before you became ambassador-at-large in May 1933, isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know that. At any rate I always belonged to the SS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said just now it was honorary, because Hitler wanted you to have a uniform. I am putting it to you; you applied to join the SS in May 1933, in the ordinary way. Did you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Of course, one had to make an application; but the fact was this, that I occasionally went around in a grey greatcoat and thereupon Hitler said I must wear a uniform. I do not remember when that was. It must have been 1933. As ambassador I received a higher rank, as Foreign Minister I received a still higher one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in May 1933, after you made application, you joined the SS in the not too high rank of Standartenführer, didn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that could be.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you became an Oberführer only on the 20th of April 1935, a Brigadeführer on 18 June 1935, and Gruppenführer on the 13th of September 1936—that was after you became an ambassador—and Obergruppenführer on the 20th of April 1940. Before you were made an ambassador you had been in the SS for 3 years and you had received promotion in the ordinary way, when you did your work with the SS, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: Without ever taking any steps or doing anything myself in the SS, yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look. It is Document D-744(a), Exhibit GB-294. The correspondence is 744(b). You may take it; you need not go through it in detail. That is your application, with all the particulars. I just want to ask you one or two things about it. You asked to join, did you not, the “Totenkopf,” the Death’s-Head Division of the SS?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that cannot be true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember getting a special Death’s-Head ring and dagger from Himmler for your services? Don’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember. I never belonged to a Death’s-Head Division. You were just talking about a Death’s-Head Division, were you not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A Death’s-Head Division.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. If it says so here, it is not true. But I think that I at one time received a so-called dagger, like all SS Führer. That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the ring, too. Here is a letter dated the 5th of November 1935, to the Personnel Office of the Reichsführer SS: “In reply to your question I have to inform you that Brigadeführer Von Ribbentrop’s ring size is 17. Heil Hitler,” (signed) (Adjutant) “Thorner.” Do you remember getting that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that everyone received such a ring but I do not remember precisely. No doubt it is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took, didn’t you, continuous interest in the SS from 1933 up to well into the war? I think your correspondence with Himmler goes on to well into 1941 or 1942.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, that is certainly correct. Of course, we had a great deal to do with the SS in all fields. That is quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had, and especially in the field of concentration camps, hadn’t you? Are you saying that you did not know that concentration camps were being carried on in an enormous scale?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look around for the moment. [A map behind the witness box was uncovered.] That is an enlargement of the exhibits put in by the French Prosecution and these red spots are concentration camps. Now, I would just like you to look at it. We will see now one of the reasons for the location of your various residences. There, one north of Berlin, Sonnenburg. Do you see roughly where that is on that map?
VON RIBBENTROP: Sonnenburg is 1 hour’s auto ride from Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: North of Berlin?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, east of Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another house. You are quite near it yourself, your schloss or tower at Fuschl. That is quite near the border; just over the border, and very near it, the group of camps which existed around Mauthausen. Do you see them, just above your right hand? Do you see the group of camps, the Mauthausen group?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to state on my oath that I heard the name of “Mauthausen” for the first time in Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another of the places. You say you did not go there very often, but you used to...
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I can make this much more brief for you. I can say that I heard of only two concentration camps until I came here—no it was three: Dachau, Oranienburg, and Theresienstadt. All the other names I heard here for the first time. The Theresienstadt camp was an old people’s home for Jews, and I believe was visited a few times by the International Red Cross. I never heard previously of all the other camps. I wish to make that quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that near Mauthausen there were 33 camps at various places, within a comparatively short distance, and 45 camps as to which the commandant did not give the names because there were so many of them, and in the 33 camps there were over 100,000 internees? Are you telling the Tribunal that in all your journeys to Fuschl you never heard of the camps at Mauthausen, where 100,000 people were shut up?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me, and I can produce dozens of witnesses who can testify to that. Dozens.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not care how many witnesses you produce. I ask you to look at that map again. You were a responsible minister in the Government of that country from the 4th of February 1938 till the defeat of Germany in May 1945, a period of 7 and a quarter years. Are you telling the Tribunal that anyone could be a responsible minister in that country where these hundreds of concentration camps existed and not know anything about them except two?
VON RIBBENTROP: It may be amazing but it is 100 percent true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that it is not only amazing, but that it is so incredible that it must be false. How could you be ignorant of these camps? Did you never see Himmler?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I never saw him about these things. Never. These things were kept absolutely secret and we heard here, for the very first time, what went on in them. Nobody knew anything about them. That may sound astounding but I am positively convinced that the gentlemen in the dock also knew nothing about all that was going on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear from them in their turn. Did you know that at Auschwitz alone...
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard the name Auschwitz here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the German official of Auschwitz has sworn an affidavit that 4 million people were put to death in the camp. Are you telling the Tribunal that that happened without your knowing anything about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me. I can state that here on my oath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, there is one other subject, which I would like you to deal with; and here, fortunately, I am in the position of assisting your memory with some documents. It is a question of the partisans. I want you to look at a few documents, three documents, with regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish tonight?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall, if Your Lordship will allow me 5 minutes. That is what I have been trying to do.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you agree that you were in favor of the harshest treatment of people in the occupied countries?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand. Could you repeat the question?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question is, would it be a fair way of expressing your point of view to say that you were in favor of the harshest treatment of—I will put it first of all—of partisans?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I ever expressed myself about the treatment of partisans. I do not recall having done so. In any case, I was against it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, look at Document D-735, which will be Exhibit GB-295. That is a discussion between you and Count Ciano in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Führer’s headquarters after breakfast on the 19th of December 1942. Now, if you will look at Page 2, you will see that there is a passage where Field Marshal Keitel told the Italian gentlemen that:
“The Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian troops working in co-operation; and this while it was still winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area. The Führer explained that the Serbian conspirators were to be burned out, and that no soft methods were to be used in doing this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village in which partisans were found had to be burned down. Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in the closest collaboration with the German troops. In this connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this cleaning-up operation as a favoring of the Croatians. The Reich Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Poglavnik to whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100 percent ready to come to an agreement with Italy.”
Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian conspirators should be burned out”?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian conspirators should be burned out”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know that expression. At any rate it is certain that they should have been locked up.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What it means is that their villages should be razed to the ground by fire.
VON RIBBENTROP: Where did I say that? I do not believe I said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the Führer’s point of view. Was it your point of view?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Führer took a very harsh attitude on these questions, and I know that occasionally harsh orders had to be issued also from other offices, including the military. It was a struggle for life and death. One should not forget that it was war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you denying...
VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, I do not see where I said anything about partisans, that is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that is not your point of view? Is that what you are saying? That is not your point of view? Are you saying that it is not your point of view as to the way to treat them? Do not look at the next document. Tell me, is that your point of view?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question that you want me to answer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you say that you were not in favor of harsh treatment of partisans?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am of the opinion that the partisans who attack the troops in the rear should be treated harshly. Yes, I am of that opinion, I believe everyone in the Army is of that opinion, and every politician.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including women and children?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, by no means.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at that, if you deny this attitude to women and children. Look at the document, Number D-741.
My Lord, that will be Document D-741; this will be GB-296.
[Turning to the defendant.] Will you look at the end of that. That is a conference between you and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 21 February 1943. The last paragraph says:
“Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the conditions which Roatta’s policy had helped to produce in Croatia were causing the Führer great concern. It was appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were, trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. These partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, women, and children, as their further existence imperiled the lives of German and Italian men, women, and children.”
Do you still say that you did not want harsh treatment of women and children?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page is that on?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is on Pages 10 to 13. It is the last paragraph of my translation.
“These partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, women and children, as their further existence imperiled the lives of German and Italian men, women, and children.”
VON RIBBENTROP: If I did say that at any time, it must have been under great excitement. In any case, it does not correspond to my opinion which I have proved by my other acts during the war. I cannot say anything else at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just show you one of your other acts, which will be the final one, if the Tribunal will bear with me. It is Document D-740, which will be GB-297. This is a memorandum of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Secretary of State Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors Von Mackensen and Alfieri at Klessheim castle on the afternoon of the 8th of April 1943. If you will look at the beginning, I think you were discussing some strike in Italy. You say:
“The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike had perhaps been instigated by British agents was energetically contested by Bastianini. There were Italian communists who were still in Italy and who received their orders from Moscow. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in such a case, only merciless action would remedy.”
And then, after a statement with regard to the information, you say:
“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to discuss Italy but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown that one would not get anywhere with soft methods or in the endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister then explained his views by a comparison between Denmark and Norway. In Norway brutal measures had been taken which had evoked lively protests, particularly in Sweden.”
And then you go on, and after a certain criticism of Dr. Best...
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot find it; what page is it on, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The paragraph begins: “The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike has perhaps been instigated by British agents...”
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see what I have put to you. You say:
“Only merciless action would be any good. In Norway brutal measures had been taken.”
And at the beginning of the next paragraph:
“In Greece, too, brutal action would have to be taken if the Greeks should sense a change for the better. He was of the opinion that the demobilized Greek Army should be deported from Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should be shown in an iron manner who was master in the country. Hard methods of this kind were necessary if one was waging a war against Stalin, which was not a gentleman’s war but a brutal war of extermination.”
And then, with regard to France, after some statement about the French you say:
“Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once again stressed the necessity of taking severe measures.”
And in the third line of the next paragraph:
“The Führer would have to take radical measures in the occupied territories to mobilize the local labor potential in order that the American armament potential might be equaled.”
Do you agree? Does that fairly express your view, that you wanted the most severe measures taken in occupied territories in order to mobilize labor to increase the Reich war potential?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can say the following in regard to this document. I know that at that time...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, you can say that, but you can answer my question first. Do these views express your view that...
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...severe measures should be taken with foreign labor and with people in occupied territories. Does that document express your view?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it does not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you say it? Why did you say these things?
VON RIBBENTROP: Because at that time, on the commission of the Führer, I had to keep the Italians’ noses to the grindstone, since there was complete chaos in some of the areas and the Italians always attempted to cause complete confusion in the rear areas of the German Army by some of the measures they took there. That is why I occasionally had to speak very harshly with the Italians. I recall that very distinctly. At that time the Italians were fighting together with the Chetniks partly against German troops; it was complete chaos there and for this reason I often used rather earnest and harsh language with the diplomats—perhaps an exaggerated language. But things actually looked quite different afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was not a bit exaggeration, was it, in both Norway and Greece? You were taking the most brutal measures against the occupied countries.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. We had absolutely nothing to say in Norway; we always tried to do things differently. And in Denmark we did everything to reduce these harsh measures, which were in part necessary, because of the paratroopers and so forth, and tried not to have them carried out.
I think it can be proved, from a number of other documents, that I and the Foreign Office always worked toward compromise in the various occupied countries. I do not believe that it is quite fair and correct to take only one or two such statements from the innumerable documents where occasionally I did use harsh words. It is certain that in the course of 6 years of war harsh language must be used from time to time. I may remind you that foreign statesmen also used harsh language regarding the treatment of Germany. But I am sure they did not mean it that way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me this: Every time today when you have been confronted with a document which attributes to you some harsh language or the opposite of what you have said here you say that on that occasion you were telling a diplomatic lie. Is that what it comes to? Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you have all these documents in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.