Part 3 — APPENDIX PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS (continued 2)

When peace shall be discussed, those objects alone should be Germany’s care. Some petitions laid before Your Excellency go against them: so we consider it our duty energetically to resist such endeavors and to declare publicly that we think their realization a political error, which may produce dangerous consequences, and not a strengthening but an ominous weakening of the German Empire.

Practically we lay down the principle that annexation or conquest of nations, which so far have been politically independent, is not advisable. The German Empire is the result of the idea of national unity, of national kinship. Foreign elements have been amalgamated only slowly and incompletely; so we object to events, persons or tendencies which may be easily influenced one way or another, disturbing the leading principles of the creation of our Empire, and destroying the character of our national State.

Of course we cannot allow a territory which we should evacuate according to our conditions of the peace to become a stronghold for our enemies, we cannot allow the adversaries of Germany to settle there. There should not be any possibility of the hostile feelings of the inhabitants revealing themselves in hostile actions, which might threaten the peace and security of our border-provinces. Such dangers can be averted and we trust that suitable and effective measures will be chosen and applied to accomplish this. But those measures should not after all lead to annexation in any form.

With our whole nation we share the conviction that this war will end in a complete victory of Germany. All those heroic deeds, those endless sacrifices and labors, all this military glory and all the sorrow borne in mute heroism, entitle Germany to a price of victory corresponding—as far as that is possible—to what she has sacrificed.

The highest price will be the proudly acquired knowledge that Germany need not fear a world full of enemies, and the unprecedented display of strength she has shown before all the nations of the earth and the generations yet to come.

The German nation can only conclude a peace which assures the foundations of the strategical wants, of the political and economic interests of the country and the unimpeded development of its strength and its energy at home and on the free seas. We trust that with the help of the bodies indicated by the Constitution Your Excellency may succeed in obtaining such a peace resolutely, while we are in the zenith of our military successes.

Proposals of South German Social Democrats

South German Social Democrats.

1 a. Restitution of status quo ante, or

1 b. Plebiscite in disputed territories (Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig, Poland, Baltic Provinces, Finland, Trentino). International possession of Bosphorus, Dardanelles, Suez Canal, Gibraltar, and Kiel Canal.

2. No indemnifications.

3. Confederacy of all European States.

4. Limitations of armies and navies. People’s army for defense only.

5. Alliance of all against aggression.

6. International Parliaments and permanent international committees in place of diplomacy.

7. International police. International law-courts for minor international offenses.

8. Guarantees of democratic government: equality of electoral district, ten-year redistribution, proportional representation, payment of members.

Peace Aims of German Socialists: Conference of Party’s Members in Reichstag with Members of Party Committee.

(Reported in New York Times, August 26, 1915.)

Socialist Joint Committee.

1. Peace must be a permanent one, leading the nations to closer relations.

2. Germany’s opponents must not be permitted to acquire any German territory.

3. “Most favored nation” clauses should be introduced into peace terms with all belligerents.

4. Tariff walls should be removed.

5. So far as possible, freedom of the seas should be established, the right of capture abolished, and the straits, important for the world’s commerce, should be internationalized.

6. Austria and Turkey should not be weakened.

7. Annexations of foreign territories violate the rights of peoples to self-rule, and weaken internal strength and harmony in the German nation. Therefore, all plans of short-sighted politicians favoring conquest are opposed.

8. Finally, the party demands the establishment of an international court to which all future conflicts of nations shall be submitted.

The German Socialists’ Peace Manifesto

German Socialists.

The manifesto was published June 26, 1915, in the form of a full page advertisement in the Berlin Vorwaerts. The paper was promptly suspended but not until its message had crossed the German frontier. The New York Times publishes a translation in full as follows:

“For nearly a year the world has been devastated by the fury of war. Hundreds of thousands of human lives have been cut off in their prime, works of incalculable value to civilization have been destroyed, and there has been an appalling weakening of human forces. Millions of mothers, wives, and children are weeping for their lost sons, husbands and fathers. Want and hardship heighten the misery now oppressing the nations. Must this terrible drama, which has no precedent in the history of the world, go on indefinitely?

“The Socialist Party foresaw this world catastrophe and predicted it. It has consistently fought, therefore, against the policies of imperial expansion and against the fatal competition in armaments, which in the last instance is the cause of this war. It has worked unceasingly for a good understanding among the nations, for the cause of our common civilization, and for the welfare of mankind. When last year threatening war clouds were gathering on the horizon the German Socialists up to the very last moment bent all their energies to preserving peace. But, to the misfortune of mankind, they were unable to avert the catastrophe.

“Then when the Czar’s Cossacks came across the border, pillaging and burning, the Socialists made good the promise that had been given by their leaders—they put themselves at the service of the Fatherland and voted the means for its defense. They not only did their duty in defending Germany’s national independence, but they worked with all their might to safeguard its internal interests in the matter of food supplies, in relieving the needy, and in protecting the working classes against avaricious tradesmen and narrow-minded bureaucrats.

“Faithfully observing the obligations which all Socialist parties are bound to respect, the German Socialist Party, from the very first days of this awful tragedy, has striven to further the cause of a speedy peace. When the first war loan was voted, in August, 1914, the Socialist group in the Reichstag, through its spokesman, Herr Haase, said: ‘We demand that as soon as guarantees of national safety are secured and the enemy shows an inclination to make peace, the war be brought to an end on conditions admitting of friendly relations with neighboring nations.’

“This demand, which was accompanied by an expression disapproving any policy of conquest, was repeated when the new war loan was voted on December 2. On May 29, after Italy had intervened, the statement was made in the Reichstag in behalf of the Socialist Party that the desire for peace was increasing and that the Socialists wanted no policy of conquest. At a meeting in Vienna on April 12 and 13 representatives of the German and Austro-Hungarian Socialist Parties again adopted a resolution in favor of peace. But the German Socialists have not been content with such measures. In spite of opposition and suspicion, they have striven for a renewal of international relations with the Social-Democrats of all countries, and when the executive committee of the international Socialist organization made a proposal to hold a meeting at The Hague to discuss the possibility of peace negotiations, the German Socialist leaders agreed, under condition that the French Socialist Party participate. All efforts at an international agreement, however, were thwarted by the attitude of the French Socialists.

“We recognize with satisfaction that in England, as well as in France, there are Socialists who are working for peace. That cannot blind us to the deplorable fact that the majority of the Socialists, both in England and France, favor continuing the war until Germany is completely conquered.

“The Socialists in the Reichstag and the official leaders of the Socialist Party have constantly and unitedly fought against a policy of conquests and annexation. We protest again with all possible emphasis against all efforts looking to the annexation of foreign territory and the oppression of other peoples—measures now demanded by the great business organizations and influential political leaders. The mere fact that such efforts are being made tends to postpone the day of peace, which the whole public is now so earnestly awaiting.

“The people want no conquest of land, they want peace. If the war is not to go on indefinitely until all the nations are completely exhausted, some one of the Powers involved must stretch out the hand of peace. Upon Germany, which has successfully defended itself against superior forces, and which has frustrated the plan to bring it to starvation, rests the duty of taking the first steps toward peace. In the name of humanity and civilization, and recognizing the favorable military position which our brave troops have won, we urge the Government to try to end the struggle. We expect of our fellow Socialists in other belligerent countries that they will make the same demand upon their own governments.”

German Proposals for Peace

Letter of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg to American Newspapers, April 18, 1915.

Dr. Dernburg.

1. The peace must be of a permanent nature.

2. The world is one interlocking family of nations. World dominion is possible only with dominion on high seas. All the seas and narrows must be neutralized permanently by common and effective agreement guaranteed by all the Powers.

3. The free sea is useless without free cables. Cables must be jointly owned by the interested nations, with a world mail-system. Customs duties must be equal for all exports and imports, for whatever destination and from whatever source. Preferential tariffs with colonies are the basis of world-empire, and must not be permitted.

4. International law should be codified, with guarantees to save all neutrals from implication in wars in which they do not wish to take part.

5. A natural commercial relationship between Germany and Belgium must be established in workable form.

6. Germany should be permitted industrial expansion in such foreign parts as need or wish for development.

Dr. Dernburg’s Speech at City Club, Cleveland, May 8, 1915.

1. Asks recognition of the truth that strong nations showing great vitality and large increase are entitled to enough soil, air and water to maintain and advance their growing population. The lack of such proper adjustment of the conditions of the European Powers during the last fifty years has been one of the primary causes for unrest in Europe, and one of the principal dangers to the peace of the world.

2. Since no readjustment of the kind can take place in Europe on national lines, it is necessary to seek the solution, first, by the apportioning of all uncivilized parts of the globe, that is, by a readjustment of colonial possessions, then by the creation of spheres of influence and non-interference with nations who are willing to take and to concede such spheres; further, by an open door and equal opportunity policy all over the globe; and finally, by the neutralization of all the seas and narrows, cables and overseas mails of the world. This readjustment must be sanctioned by a simple and codified international law, safeguarded so that it cannot be broken without putting the infractor outside the pale of international relationships, not only with the party attacked, but also with all the parties remaining neutral. England must give up her rule of the seas, which must be placed definitely in the hands of all the Powers of the world. World trade must be free and all colonies neutralized. The decision whether there is to be a free and neutralized sea or a Chinese wall will also be decisive regarding the fate of Belgium. If the sea remains fortified, there can be no choice for Germany except to have her own sea fortresses as well, and since the only way of getting out into the high sea would be by way of Belgium, there would be no possibility of Germany’s considering the return of Belgium to its former status.

PROF. DR. L. QUIDDE ON REAL GUARANTEES FOR A DURABLE PEACE

Prof. Dr. L. Quidde.

I. The annexation of Belgium would prolong the war indefinitely.

II. The strength of the German Empire would decrease instead of increase by the annexation of Belgium, in times of peace as well as during the war.

The annexation of Belgium would destroy every outlook of a better understanding between Germany and her present enemies, after the war. It would make almost the whole rest of the world remain our enemies and would call forth a coalition of all against one. Germany need not foster illusions in this respect, if she only considers the effect of the invasion into Belgium upon public opinion throughout the world, especially in those neutral countries who were originally Germany’s friends.

He who wishes to annex Belgium must have the courage to face the fact that annexation will make the whole world our enemy for an indefinite space of time and will completely isolate Germany politically, so far as the feelings of the nations are to bring about such isolation.

III. The annexation of Belgium is bound to bring about a new war.

It is evident that neither England nor France can allow Belgium to be annexed by Germany as long as they do not wish to be annihilated themselves. Especially England would have to prepare retaliation with all the force that she can display, and it would be easy enough for her to find allies to support her. One may differ vastly on the subject of annexation, its advantages and drawbacks, but one cannot deny that durable peace and annexation of Belgium are two things absolutely incompatible.

Finally Prof. Quidde asks how it will be possible to make a durable peace which at the same time guarantees the welfare of Germany. This will be first of all a general removal of the causes that have led to the war, followed by a thorough reorganization of Europe on lines offering a better security for peace.

The first essentials for that reorganization are the “open-door” and the “free sea,” which will have to be guaranteed by international treaties.

One of the best grounded charges against International Law is, that International Law is in many cases so hopelessly rudimentary that the lack of precision forms a temptation to violate it. It is necessary that a strong agitation for the development, perfection and sanction of International Law should result from the experiences, the causes and the course of this war.

ED. BERNSTEIN ON PEACE TERMS

I

Ed. Bernstein.

It is the vital interest of the majority of the German nation, that the present war should end by a peace treaty which, as to the rights and the relations of the nations, is in conformity with the principles laid down in the program of the German Social-Democrat Party and in the resolutions adopted by their party-meetings and by the International Social-Democratic Congresses.

Only a peace based on these principles will result in renewing the friendly relations between Germany and the nations she is now at war with, as soon and as thoroughly as possible.

II

The supreme principle, insisted upon in the program and the resolutions of the Social-Democratic Party is the right of peoples to decide their own fate, within the limits of international law.

The German Socialists consider it their duty to defend this principle by all available means against any attack from any side whatsoever. No nation or part of a nation having so far enjoyed national independence, may be deprived of this right or see it impaired; no territory may be annexed, when the annexation would deprive the inhabitants of that right.

The Social-Democratic Party do not admit the right of conquest of one nation over any other.

III

In the case of countries of European civilization, which have lived under foreign rule, no territorial changes shall take place without a referendum being taken of the inhabitants. This referendum should be arranged and supervised by representatives of neutral States, so as to insure perfect freedom in voting. Any inhabitant, who is of age and has lived in the country for at least a year before the outbreak of the war, shall have the right to vote.

In the interests of peace, all peoples of European civilization living under foreign rule in sufficient numbers to form a community in the international Concert, shall obtain political independence.

When a sufficient number out of subject peoples incorporated by force in one State, desire to belong to another, they shall be given the right to decide by vote as to which State they will belong.

IV

Transfer of territory outside of Europe shall only take place under such conditions, as guarantee that the legal and material conditions of such native population shall not be injured.

V

Nations can only be safeguarded against a renewal of war or wars of retaliation by developing and strengthening international law.

In this respect the following means should be emphasized:

a. Development of the Hague Conference into a Permanent International Conference for the Codification of International Law and for International Arbitration. Concentration of the various Hague institutions into a permanent international court, suitably divided into branch courts.

b. All States to bring those differences they cannot themselves peaceably solve, before the Court of Justice to be instituted by the Hague Conference, where they will be settled either by mutual agreement, conciliation or arbitration.

c. All signatory States to refrain from war or warlike measures till the Court of Justice has examined the cause of war and till all attempts to settle the difference in a peaceful manner, have proved useless. Any State or Union resorting to hostilities contrary to these rules to be treated as an enemy by all the others.

d. The Parliaments to decide about war and peace. Secret treaties to be abolished.

e. Development of International Law relating to the conduct of war and the protection of the civil population. Abolition of the right of capture at sea and of the right to levy war-contributions. No hostages to be taken. Abolition of the system of reprisals against inhabitants of an invaded country for acts of self-defense or defense of other non-combatants. Permanent committees to watch the actions of belligerents in occupied territories and the treatment of prisoners of war and of civil prisoners interned in the enemy’s country.

f. Internationalization of transcontinental railways and of all waterways connecting seas or lakes surrounded by different countries, with the ocean.

g. Adoption of the principle of the Open Door for all Colonies, Protectorates and for every territory which lies in the sphere of influence of an European State.

h. These principles to be inserted into the constitutions of the Powers.

BELGIUM

Whereas, Art. 2 already excludes any forcible annexation of Belgian territory or any attack on the independence of Belgium by another State, Germany has moreover invaded Belgium, overpowered its army and occupied its territory without any provocation from the side of Belgium and as the Chancellor has himself admitted violating the neutrality of Belgium in defiance of the law of nations. Germany having thus made her way into Belgium to satisfy her own designs, beat down the resistance of the army and occupied the country by force, Germany is therefore bound in honor to evacuate Belgium immediately on the conclusion of peace, in accordance with the solemn declaration, made on August 4, 1914, by the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, to the English Secretary of State, Sir Edward Grey, and to pay a full and ample indemnity to the people of Belgium for the material and moral injury which they have suffered.

PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 5. FRANCE

French General Confederation of Labor

C. G. T.

1. Federation of nations.

2. Compulsory arbitration of international disputes.

3. Independence of nationalities. Right of all peoples to dispose of themselves to be safeguarded.

4. Suppression of secret diplomacy.

5. End of competitive armament.

6. Conference of organized labor forces of the world at same time as conference of diplomats.

PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 6. SWITZERLAND

Resolutions of Swiss Peace Society

At Annual Meeting, May 17, 1915.

Swiss Peace Society.

1. The avoidance of any annexation or territorial changes which are in opposition to the interests and wishes of a population; a guarantee of religious liberty, free speech and equality before the law, for the minority.

2. The creation of a permanent organization in which all European States shall be equally represented, for the purpose of safeguarding the order, peace and safety of our portion of the earth.

3. The development of an international law organization by continual Hague Conferences.

Swiss Committee for the Study of the Principles of a Durable Treaty of Peace

President: Prof. Otto Nippold, Bern.

Swiss Committee for Study of Peace.

1. Participation of neutral nations in the settlement.

2. Prohibition of secret treaties and agreements between nations.

3. Participation of popular representative bodies in control of foreign policy.

4. No annexation except after plebiscite of populations concerned.

5. Limitation of armaments to point of mere protection.

6. Manufacture of armaments to become State monopoly.

7. The States which participate in the settlement are to mutually guarantee each other’s territories.

8. Since the best guarantee for the preservation of world peace lies in the creation of international law and custom, arbitration must be substituted for war.

9. Disputed regions of the earth should be neutralized.

10. Free trade in all colonies.

PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS 7. HOLLAND

Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad

The Hague

Founded on the 8th of October, 1914

Dutch Anti-War Council.

The Council is of opinion that the following principles are indispensable to attain a lasting peace:

1. Concert of the Powers instead of mutually opposed Alliances;

2. Limitation of armaments by international regulations;

3. Influence of the different Parliaments on the peace-treaty;

4. Avoidance of the dangers engendered by annexation or by transfer of territory against the will of the population;

5. Removal of the obstructions to commerce or at least of difference in treatment of the various nations in colonies and settlements, according to international regulations.

6. New endeavors to promote compulsory arbitration and compulsory inquiry of international differences.

DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY FOR AMERICA

One would prefer to think otherwise, but the truth probably is that the future peace of the world, and the nature of international organization depends a good deal less upon definitely conceived plans like that of the League to Enforce Peace (however admirable and desirable it may be to promote definite projects of that kind) than upon the nature of the foreign policy which each nation individually pursues. Disagreements between nations arise generally in situations in which both sides honestly believe themselves to be in the right. Most nations are honestly in favor of peace in general, and would go to The Hague and assist in drawing up plans to maintain it; yet each may be persisting in a line of conduct which, in its own view entirely defensive and defensible, appears to another unwarrantably aggressive. And when that is the case paper arrangements for avoiding conflict are apt to break down.

So the most practical question for each of us for some time is likely to be this: what will be the effect of our own country’s conduct in its relations with other countries, upon the future peace and international condition of the world? Or, to put the question in another form: What can our country do, irrespective of what others may do, to contribute to a more orderly international condition, saner world politics?

America is of course concerned in the present war whether she will or no. She may, by her material resources in supplies, ammunition, credit, be largely influencing its decision. As part of the problem of protecting her own rights, incidentally menaced by the operations of the war, she has taken very solemnly a certain position in international affairs. She has declared, for instance, that she stands irrevocably for the protection of innocent non-combatant life at sea in war time. She would undoubtedly stand as decisively for certain lesser rights of trade and free communication on the seas as well (in the past she has gone to war in their defense) but for the fact that doing so against one belligerent would aid the cause of the other guilty of still greater offenses.

And if we look beneath diplomatically expressed claims into unofficial, but unmistakably expressed public opinion, we find America standing strongly for certain other rules of life between nations—the right of each nation to national existence for instance—like those violated in the invasion of Belgium.

Is America really serious in the stand thus made? Or is she going to avow by her future policy, if not in words, that she will take no real risk nor assume any real obligation in support of the principles she has been maintaining diplomatically and by her clearly expressed public opinion. Is she going to submit lamely, to the indignities and violation of right involved in the massacre of her innocent non-combatant citizens at sea?

I put the question in that form because it is generally a rhetorical prelude to the demand for warlike action. And yet the American who is moved by his country’s dignity and right to have thought this thing out, as well as to have become angry about it, knows that warlike action is perhaps the very last thing—though it may be the last thing—which the situation calls for; and that warlike action alone would be a betrayal of his country’s highest interests in the matter. If America is really serious she must prepare herself—in public opinion, in political education—for action of a different kind: for the abandonment of certain traditions about freedom from entangling alliances, for the assumption of risks and obligations which to most Americans is to ask a great deal more than the mere act of going to war.

Why will war of itself not suffice?

Suppose this country goes to war, over, for instance, the submarine issue; and is finally entirely successful, so far as defeating Germany is concerned. How do we then know that America has got what she has been fighting for? Our demands at the end of the war will be that American rights at sea shall be respected; that, most particularly, non-combatants shall not be drowned by attacks on merchantmen. Very good. Germany gives us her promise. She has given it before. How do we know that it will be kept—either by her or any other nation that in a future war may find a ruthless use of the submarine the only weapon left to it against a power commanding the sea? Can we hope that if we show now that we are ready to fight “at the drop of the hat,” in future a hard-pressed belligerent will be overawed by the great American navy? Then why is not the belligerent we now propose to deal with held in check by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Again, when we have that promise at the end of our victorious war how do we know that it will be kept, that we shall have got what we have been fighting for?

And what of the American case against the Allies? Is America now to surrender rights upon which she has insisted ever since she became an independent State and which she once fought a war and twice very nearly came to war to defend? Is America, in fighting Germany to make the British Order in Council the basis of future sea law, so that when say Japan goes to war with some other nation America will have to submit to Japanese control of her trade and communication with neutral States—even to mail and banking correspondence—as she now submits to British control?

It is quite obvious that American claims have this difference from those of the Allies: they, in so far as they are territorial can at the peace be satisfied on the spot. America’s cannot. Hers depend absolutely upon the establishment, after the war, of a different and better international order; upon agreement as to what shall constitute international law and some method of ensuring its observance.

Now has it not become evident that the present German-American situation contains the elements of a great opportunity for America: not only of putting an end to a situation humiliating for herself but of creating a new state of world affairs out of which might grow—would almost inevitably grow—the restoration of general peace on conditions that civilization could accept?

But that result is certainly conditional on one thing: that American diplomacy is great enough to make precedent, to be dangerously honest to the point of dropping diplomatic make-believe and breaking with diplomatic usage.

Germany says in effect that she will make military sacrifices for the purpose of respecting American neutral right, if America on her side will reciprocally fulfil neutral obligation by insisting on the military sacrifice from both belligerents; so that American rights are not made a means of handicapping one party as against the other; are not invoked in what Germany regards as so one-sided a fashion as to become an arm for the use of one belligerent against the other.

Now it is quite within precedent, right and usage, to reply, as in the past, to such a demand by diplomatic punctilio: “America cannot discuss the behavior of one belligerent with the other,” and so forth and so forth. The American government could make excellent debating points and be diplomatically entirely correct.

But suppose, instead, it were undiplomatically honest and unprecedentedly bold and said bluntly what every one knows to be the truth: that because of the slowly acquired American conviction of the badness of the German cause—the danger to civilization and ourselves which this country has come to believe inherent in that cause—it is impossible for America to enforce the law—or what America holds to be the law—sharply against England, to take any action which would seriously add to the chances of German victory; to be, in other words, really neutral. Suppose America bold and honest enough to avow the quite simple obvious truth that we are not indifferent as to the outcome of the war and that in the long run our conduct won’t be guided as though we were; that so long as we have reason to believe German policy a menace it will encounter in one form or another (not excluding necessarily even the military form) our active or latent opposition.

And then, suppose that on top of that impossibly bold and honest stand this country were further to announce that it can only act effectively for the sea law Germany desires, and otherwise withdraw its opposition, if Germany is prepared to reassure us as to her cause by stating definitely that the terms upon which she is prepared to discuss peace include such things as the evacuation of Belgium and France and indemnification for damage done; the acceptance of the international principles involved in the American claims; recognition of the absolute right to existence of all States great and small; readiness to enter, at least to the extent that others are ready, into European or world arrangements for the guarantee of that right and the mutual discussion and limitation of armaments; together with such minor details as agreement to the appointment of an international commission to enquire into the violation of the laws of war on land and sea and the punishment of the individuals convicted by that commission.

Once convinced that Germany stands for a policy such as peace on those terms would imply, America could on her side (so this impossibly honest diplomacy might make plain) stand effectively for the freedom of the sea as against England if needs be at least to the extent of upholding the Declaration of London; could assure Germany that this country would never be reckoned among her enemies, but on the contrary would co-operate with her in defense of that equality of commercial opportunity in the world of which Germany accuses her enemies of trying to deprive her.

Such a “Declaration of America’s International Position” as that which I am here imagining would, in more precise terms, be about as follows:

1. Though America since the outbreak of the war has done everything possible to observe the form of neutrality which international practise had heretofore imposed upon States not actively participating in a war, the circumstances of the present conflict have shown that the future protection of her own particular interests are so identified with the maintenance of certain general rules of international intercourse that in all future wars she will differentiate in her treatment of the combatants. Thus in no case will American resources be available for the military purposes of a belligerent who had entered upon a war refusing to submit his case to enquiry and the necessary delay, and to adhere to certain rules necessary for the safeguarding of innocent non-combatant life.

The United States could not in consequence feel that her relations with Germany could be placed upon a really sound foundation of friendly cooperation until that country had

(a) accepted the international principles (as for instance the sanctity of non-combatant life) involved in the American claims and the further principle that their violation is an unfriendly act towards America whether American life and property are concerned or not;

(b) undertaken to evacuate Belgium, France and Serbia and indemnify Belgium for damage done;

(c) agreed to the appointment of an international commission of inquiry into the violation of the rights of non-combatants on land and sea, with authority to assess damages, and to payment of any damages in which Germany may be cast, and to punishment of individuals convicted of offenses against the laws of war.

On the acceptance of these terms by Germany, America would undertake:

A. Not to furnish military or naval aid to Germany’s enemies in this war.

B. To become one of the guarantors of the integrity of Belgium.

C. In the event of the creation of new buffer States, to assist in the maintenance of their inviolability by refusing to allow American citizens to furnish their invader with supplies of any nature: by the application, that is, of the principle of differential neutrality above indicated.

D. To accord to German citizens in protectorates subject to American control, commercial access on equal terms with American citizens and to support by the differential neutrality already indicated the policy of the open door in all protectorates and non-self-governing territories. That is to say America would undertake not to furnish military or naval aid to any power or group of powers that refused to apply the principle of the open door in their protectorates, and to prohibit the export of supplies or munitions to such powers in their military operations.

E. To join, pari passu, with other powers in any arrangement for enforcing the submission of international disputes to enquiry.

Now whatever followed that announcement America and the world would gain. If Germany refused she would by that prove that she was still unchastened, not ready to surrender or modify her policy of world hegemony. America then knows that her fears are justified. She is definitely warned of a fact which sooner or later she will have to face if it is really a fact. And it is obviously far better that it should become patent to America (and the world) now, than later (after a possibly patched up peace). Indeed, on grounds simply of sheer national security America should attempt by some such means to establish now, when Germany is relatively helpless so far as damaging us is concerned, where she stands, what America faces. It would enable her to make her future policy definite and objective.

But suppose Germany, realizing at last that it is impossible to maintain a national policy which during the next generation or two will have to meet not only the opposition of the Western democracies of Europe and the potential forces of Russia, but all that North America might during the next generation develop into, accepts? What if the German government were pushed by the best elements of the German people to take the opportunity thus so publicly offered for putting themselves right with the world and starting afresh on a more workable basis?

If that happened—which after all is the most probable thing of all—America, without striking a blow, would have secured from Germany the main thing for which the Western democracies are now fighting. Not only would she have laid the foundation for the future protection of her own sea rights in the only way in which finally they can be protected—by an international law that is a reality because rooted in a real international order—but she would have helped win the battle of democracy by bringing about a discussion of terms before the democratic nations have bled themselves white.

Never in history had a nation such an opportunity. But to take it means breaking with routine, employing a new method, a new manner; great governmental boldness, great political honesty. And all that is, perhaps, too much to ask.

But that is no reason why we should not face the fact that on those conditions the opportunity is there. Nor why those most responsible for the direction of American public opinion should not help the nation to realize it.

Norman Angell.