Part 2 — NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION. (continued 2)

It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be allowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it ought to appeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.

Even within the region of pure reason (or the 'prima facie case') modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely done more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of battle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have been fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles, 'inventions of priests,' &c., which was the most formidable kind of criticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical facts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative criticism on merely a priori grounds. This remaining—and, ex hypothesi, necessary—doubt is of very different importance from the other.

Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all that is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.

These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old Testament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.

Plan in Revelation.

The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate [i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the theory of Evolution—i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of ascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this particular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the history of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more than any other history.

It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full implications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to this particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events (i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of Theism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of the Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in organic nature—it being only a question of modus operandi whether all pieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the evidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown elsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to a man who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of modus, but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.

So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been no alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to appear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which Christians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be demonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden revelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides, even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of demonstrative value—as by making prophecies of historical events, scientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there may well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such reasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual unfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the end of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden manifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be historically attested for all subsequent time. For

1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.

2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the historical period.

3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all times—i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to some one (ex hypothesi) unequivocally attested event in history.

The appearance of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable enough to arrest serious attention.

If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that it must have been so, not only historically, but likewise intellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be always adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts, unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as requisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern advancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the world at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts before us.

Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it conveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical period. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity as a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective evidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be seen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with moral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so largely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion unique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period, has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been painted—and painted so gradually that not until the process had been going on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the subject thereof.

Christian Dogmas.

Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far as the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution is concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view. From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God to man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference belongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to the mental, &c., this passage may have been ultimately due to divine volition, and must have been so due on the theory of Theism. Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific point of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either case, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal cause of the observable results.

Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves itself into the question of all questions—viz. is or is not mechanical causation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual grace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?

Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really divine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause of the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins'; that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an abiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change of an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on the 'question of questions' just stated.

Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity.

Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have nothing to do with metaphysical theology. That is a department of enquiry which, ex hypothesi, is transcendental, and is only to be considered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic days. But now, as a pure agnostic, I see in them no rational difficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So that at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being postulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further difficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one time it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by [purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it ought to be if true. Common sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view for the sake of argument, the whole raison d'être of mankind is bound up in Him. Lastly, there are considerations per contra, rendering an incarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there must be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God, &c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their occurrence in Christianity is no proper objection to Christianity. Why, again, stumble a priori over the doctrine of the Trinity—especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind (i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)? The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged triunity of God.

Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil.

These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit by the scientific proof of evolution (but are the only dogmas which can fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the question is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure agnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in turning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.

First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before Darwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful theologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the first chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as distinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely because it has been proved not to be a history—and this even though we cannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has certainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the present, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point for the Divine Plan of Redemption.

The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared.

It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence of design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of adaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case. But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus begged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation per se sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation, like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when it is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which assumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other words, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes, the facts of adaptation are only then available as per se good evidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, qua due to natural causes, they are due to design.

Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both divine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us, there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to the question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all ages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On this point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many other authors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and Revelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author—i.e. quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.

Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true, it follows that in both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of immediate intuition—i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is supplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our present hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek Him diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in Nature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another—so yielding additional evidence to his reason.

The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the spiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one another.

Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the teleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very imperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he treats only of the New Testament, and even of that very partially—ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what happened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have observed the similarity of the argument, as developed in his Natural Theology and Evidences of Christianity respectively. But no one has developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not perceiving that this teleological argument, per se, is not in either case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be sufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for faith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in man, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a Christian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is certain that the teleological argument alone ought to result, not in conviction, but in agnosticism.

The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great; the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism—i.e. nil.

Christian Demonology[77].

It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away a priori objections to miracles on a priori grounds, there remains the fact that Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic possession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the horn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not. If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases are so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of mistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in A.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if you choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the ignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'

The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity. For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the acceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or merely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ knew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He, if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case, if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of His time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance with His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has nowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.

The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much larger one.

Darwin's Difficulty[78].

The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind having ever heard of Christ, is manifold:—

1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation; i.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it follows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind should never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.

2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their religion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of development. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts xvii. 30).

3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it is represented that He died for all men—i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at the times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as transcendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the Atoner.

4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by this fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the theory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without having violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of Theism, He ought to have appeared when He did—i.e. at the earliest possible moment in history.

So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other respects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of the combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and religion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.

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