HOUSE OF LORDS, FEB. 13, 1740-1. (continued 2)

Why new forces were raised, my lords, it is very easy to judge; new forces required new commissions, and new commissions produced new dependencies, which might be of use to the minister at the approaching election; but why the new-raised troops were sent on this expedition rather than those which had been longer disciplined, it is very difficult to assign a reason, unless it was considered that some who had commands in them had likewise seats in the senate; and the minister was too grateful to expose his friends to danger, and too prudent to hazard the loss of a single vote. Besides the commander-in-chief, there is but one senator in the expedition, and, my lords, he is one of too great integrity to be corrupted, and, though sensible of the weakness of the troops, too brave to quit his post. How much our country may suffer by such absurd conduct, I need not explain to your lordships; it may easily be conceived how much one defeat may dispirit the nation, and to what attempts one victory may excite our enemies; those enemies whom, under a steady and wise administration, we should terrify into submission, even without an army.

I cannot forbear to remark on this occasion, how much the ignorance of this man has exposed a very important part of our foreign dominions to the attempts of the Spaniards. Gibraltar, my lords, is well known to be so situated, as to be naturally in very little danger of an attack from the land, and to command the country to a great distance; but these natural advantages are now taken away, or greatly lessened, by new fortifications, erected within much less than gunshot of the place, erected in the sight of the garrison, and while one of our admirals was cruizing upon the coast.

The pretence, my lords, upon which they were erected, was, that though Gibraltar was granted to Britain, yet there was no district appendent to it, nor did the British authority extend beyond the walls of the town: this poor excuse did the chicanery of the Spaniards invent, and with this, my lords, was our minister contented, either not knowing or not appearing to know what, I hope, the children whom we have despatched to America have been taught, and what no man, versed in national affairs, can be ignorant of without a crime, that when a fortress is yielded to another nation, the treaty always virtually includes, even without mentioning it, an extent of land as far as the guns of the fortification can reach.

Whether this man, my lords, was so ignorant as to be deceived thus grossly, or so abandoned as willingly to deceive his country, he is equally unqualified to support the office of first minister, and almost equally deserves to be prosecuted by the indignation and justice of this assembly, in the severest manner; for how great must be his wickedness who undertakes a charge above his abilities, when his country may be probably ruined by his errours?

Your lordships cannot but observe, that I make use rather of the term minister than that of the administration, which others are so desirous to substitute in its place, either to elude all inquiry into the management of our affairs, or to cover their own shameful dependence.

Administration, my lords, appears to me a term without a meaning, a wild indeterminate word, of which none can tell whom it implies, or how widely it may extend: a charge against the administration may be imagined a general censure of every officer in the whole subordination of government, a general accusation of instruments and agents, of masters and slaves: my charge, my lords, is against the minister, against that man, who is believed by every one in the nation, and known by great numbers, to have the chief, and, whenever he pleases to require it, the sole direction of the publick measures; he, to whom all the other ministers owe their elevation, and by whose smile they hold their power, their salaries, and their dignity.

That this appellation is not without sufficient reason bestowed upon that man, I have already proved to your lordships; and as it has already been made appear that common fame is a sufficient ground of accusation, it will easily be shown that this man has a just claim to the title of minister; for if any man be told of an accusation of the minister; he will not ask the name of the person accused.

But there is in the motion one title conferred upon him, to which he has no pretensions; for there is no law for styling him the first commissioner of the treasury. The commissioners, my lords, who discharge, in a collective capacity, the office of lord high treasurer, are constituted by the same patent, invested with equal power and equal dignity, and I know not why this man should be exalted to any superiority over his associates.

If we take, my lords, a review of our affairs, and examine the state of the nation in all its relations and all its circumstances, we cannot, surely, conceive that we are in a state of prosperity, unless discontent at home, and scorn abroad, the neglect of our allies, and insolence of our enemies, the decay of trade, and multitude of our imposts, are to be considered as proofs of a prosperous and nourishing nation.

Will it be alleged, my lords, has this man one friend adventurous enough to assert, in open day, that the people are not starving by thousands, and murmuring by millions, that universal misery does not overspread the nation, and that this horrid series of calamities is not universally, among all conditions, imputed to the conduct of this man?

That great evils are felt, my lords, no Briton, I am certain, who converses promiscuously with his countrymen, will attempt to dispute, and until some other cause more proportioned to the effect shall be assigned, I shall join the publick in their opinion, and while I think this man the author of our miseries, shall conclude it necessary to comply with the motion.

Lord HARDWICK spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, though I very readily admit that crimes ought to be punished, that a treacherous administration of publick affairs is, in a very high degree, criminal, that even ignorance, where it is the consequence of neglect, deserves the severest animadversion, and that it is the privilege and duty of this house to watch over the state of the nation, and inform his majesty of any errours committed by his ministers; yet I am far from being convinced either of the justice or necessity of the motion now under consideration.

The most flagrant and invidious part of the charge against the right honourable gentleman appears to consist in this, that he has engrossed an exorbitant degree of power, and usurped an unlimited influence over the whole system of government, that he disposes of all honours and preferments, and that he is not only first but sole minister.

But of this boundless usurpation, my lords, what proof has been laid before you? What beyond loud exaggerations, pompous rhetorick, and specious appeals to common fame; common fame, which, at least, may sometimes err, and which, though it may afford sufficient ground for suspicion and inquiry, was never yet admitted as conclusive evidence, where the immediate necessities of the publick did not preclude the common forms of examination, where the power of the offender did not make it dangerous to attack him by a legal prosecution, or where the conduct of the accusers did not plainly discover that they were more eager of blood than of justice, and more solicitous to destroy than to convict.

I hope none of these circumstances, my lords, can at present obstruct a candid and deliberate inquiry: with regard to the publick, I am not able to discover any pressing exigencies that demand a more compendious method of proceeding, than the established laws of the land, and the wisdom of our ancestors have prescribed. I know not any calamity that will be aggravated, nor any danger that will become move formidable, by suffering this question to be legally tried.

Nor is there, my lords, in the circumstances of the person accused, any thing that can incite us to a hasty process; for, if what is alleged by the noble lords is not exaggerated beyond the truth, if he is universally detested by the whole nation, and loaded with execrations by the publick voice; if he is considered as the author of all our miseries, and the source of all our corruptions; if he has ruined our trade, and depressed our power, impoverished the people, and attempted to enslave them, there is, at least, no danger of an insurrection in his favour, or any probability that his party will grow stronger by delays. For, my lords, to find friends in adversity, and assertors in distress, is only the prerogative of innocence and virtue.

The gentleman against whom this formidable charge is drawn up, is, I think, not suspected of any intention to have recourse either to force or flight; he has always appeared willing to be tried by the laws of his country, and to stand an impartial examination; he neither opposes nor eludes inquiry, neither flies from justice, nor defies it.

And yet less, my lords, can I suspect, that those by whom he is accused, act from any motive that may influence them to desire a sentence not supported by evidence, or conformable to truth; or that they can wish the ruin of any man whose crimes are not notorious and flagrant, that they persecute from private malice, or endeavour to exalt themselves by the fall of another.

Let us, therefore, my lords, inquire before we determine, and suffer evidence to precede our sentence. The charge, if it is just, must be, by its own nature, easily proved, and that no proof is brought may, perhaps, be sufficient to make us suspect that it is not just.

For, my lords, what is the evidence of common fame, which has been so much exalted, and so confidently produced? Does not every man see that, on such occasions, two questions may be asked, of which, perhaps, neither can easily be answered, and which, yet, must both be resolved before common fame can be admitted as a proof of facts.

It is first to be inquired, my lords, whether the reports of fame are necessarily or even probably true? A question very intricate and diffusive, entangled with a thousand, and involving a thousand, distinctions; a question of which it may be said, that a man may very plausibly maintain either side, and of which, perhaps, after months or years wasted in disputation, no other decision can be obtained than what is obvious at the first view, that they are often true, and often false, and, therefore, can only be grounds of inquiry, not reasons of determination.

But if it appear, my lords, that this oracle cannot be deceived, we are then to inquire after another difficulty, we are to inquire, What is fame?

Is fame, my lords, that fame which cannot err? a report that flies, on a sudden, through a nation, of which no man can discover the original; a sudden blast of rumour, that inflames or intimidates a people, and obtains, without authority, a general credit? No man versed in history can inquire whether such reports may not deceive. Is fame rather a settled opinion, prevailing by degrees, and for some time established? How long, then, my lords, and in what degree must it have been established, to obtain undoubted credit, and when does it commence infallible? If the people are divided in their opinions, as in all publick questions it has hitherto happened, fame is, I suppose, the voice of the majority; for, if the two parties are equal in their numbers, fame will be equal; then how great must be the majority before it can lay claim to this powerful auxiliary? and how shall that majority be numbered?

These questions, my lords, may be thought, perhaps with justice, too ludicrous in this place, but, in my opinion, they contribute to show the precarious and uncertain nature of the evidence so much confided in.

Common fame, my lords, is to every man only what he himself commonly hears; and it is in the power of any man's acquaintance to vitiate the evidence which they report, and to stun him with clamours, and terrify him with apprehensions of miseries never felt, and dangers invisible. But, without such a combination, we are to remember, that most men associate with those of their own opinions, and that the rank of those that compose this assembly naturally disposes such as are admitted to their company, to relate, or to invent, such reports as may be favourably received, so that what appears to one lord the general voice of common fame, may, by another, be thought only the murmur of a petty faction, despicable, with regard to their numbers, and detestable, if we consider their principles.

So difficult is it, my lords, to form any solid judgment concerning the extent and prevalence of any particular report, and the degree of credit to be given to it. The industry of a party may supply the defect of numbers, and some concurrent circumstances may contribute to give credit to a false report.

But, my lords, we are ourselves appealed to as witnesses of the truth of facts, which prove him to be sole minister, of the number of his dependents, the advancement of his friends, the disappointments of his opponents, and the declarations made by his followers of adherence and fidelity.

If it should be granted, my lords, that there is nothing in these representations exaggerated beyond the truth, and that nothing is represented in an improper light, what consequence can we draw, but that the followers of this gentleman, make use of those arts which have always been practised by the candidates of preferment, that they endeavour to gain their patron's smile by flattery and panegyrick, and to keep it by assiduity and an appearance of gratitude. And if such applications exalted any man to the authority and title of first minister, the nation has never, in my memory, been without some man in that station, for there is always some one to whom ambition and avarice have paid their court, and whose regards have been purchased at the expense of truth.

Nor is it to be wondered at, my lords, that posts of honour and profit have been bestowed upon the friends of the administration; for who enriches or exalts his enemies? who will increase the influence that is to be exerted against him, or add strength to the blow that is levelled at himself?

That the right honourable gentleman is the only disposer of honours, has never yet appeared; it is not pretended, my lords, that he distributes them without the consent of his majesty, nor even that his recommendation is absolutely necessary to the success of any man's applications. If he has gained more of his majesty's confidence and esteem than any other of his servants, he has done only what every man endeavours, and what, therefore, is not to be imputed to him as a crime.

It is impossible, my lords, that kings, like other men, should not have particular motions of inclination or dislike; it is possible that they may fix their affection upon objects not in the highest degree worthy of their regard, and overlook others that may boast of greater excellencies and more shining merit; but this is not to be supposed without proof, and the regard of the king, as of any other man, is one argument of desert more than he can produce, who has endeavoured after it without effect.

This imputed usurpation must be proved upon him either by his own confession, or by the evidence of others; and it has not been yet pretended that he assumes the title of prime minister, or indeed, that it is applied to him by any but his enemies; and it may easily be conceived how weakly the most uncorrupted innocence would be supported, if all the aspersions of its enemies were to be received as proofs against it.

Nor does it appear, my lords, that any other evidence can be brought against him on this head, or that any man will stand forth and affirm that either he has been injured himself by this gentleman, or known any injury done by him to another by the exertion of authority with which he was not lawfully invested; such evidence, my lords, the laws of our country require to be produced before any man can be punished, censured, or disgraced. No man is obliged to prove his innocence, but may call upon his prosecutors to support their accusation; and why this honourable gentleman, whatever may have been his conduct, should be treated in a different manner than any other criminal, I am by no means able to discover.

Though there has been no evidence offered of his guilt, your lordships have heard an attestation of his innocence, from the noble duke who spoke first against the motion, of whom it cannot be suspected that he would, voluntarily, engage to answer for measures which he pursued in blind compliance with the direction of another. The same testimony, my lords, can I produce, and affirm with equal truth, that in the administration of my province, I am independent, and left entirely to the decisions of my own judgment.

In every government, my lords, as in every family, some, either by accident or a natural industry, or a superiour capacity, or some other cause, will be engaged in more business, and treated with more confidence than others; but if every man is willing to answer for the conduct of his own province, there is all the security against corruption that can possibly be obtained; for if every man's regard to his own safety and reputation will prevent him from betraying his trust, or abusing his power, much more will it incite him to prevent any misconduct in another for which he must himself be accountable. Men are, usually, sufficiently tenacious of power, and ready to vindicate their separate rights, when nothing but their pride is affected by the usurpation, but surely no man will patiently suffer his province to be invaded when he may himself be ruined by the conduct of the invader.

Thus, my lords, it appears to me to be not only without proof, but without probability, and the first minister can, in my opinion, be nothing more than a formidable illusion, which, when one man thinks he has seen it, he shows to another, as easily frighted as himself, who joins with him in propagating the notion, and in spreading terrour and resentment over the nation, till at last the panick becomes general, and what was at first only whispered by malice or prejudice in the ears of ignorance or credulity, is adopted by common fame, and echoed back from the people to the senate.

I have hitherto, my lords, confined myself to the consideration of one single article of this complicated charge, because it appears to me to be the only part of it necessary to be examined; for if once it be acknowledged that the affairs of the nation are transacted not by the minister but the administration, by the council in which every man that sits there has an equal voice and equal authority, the blame or praise of all the measures must be transferred from him to the council, and every man that has advised or concurred in them, will deserve the same censure or the same applause; as it is unjust to punish one man for the crimes of another, it is unjust to choose one man out for punishment from among many others equally guilty.

But I doubt not, my lords, when all those measures are equitably considered, there will be no punishment to be dreaded, because neither negligence nor treachery will be discovered. For, my lords, with regard to the treaty of Vienna, let us suppose our ministers deceived by ignorant or corrupt intelligence, let us admit that they were cautious where there was no danger, and neglected some opportunities, which, if they had received better information, they might have improved to the advantage and security of the nation. What have they done, even under all these disadvantageous suppositions, but followed the lights which they judged most clear, and by which they hoped to be conducted to honour and to safety?

Policy, my lords, is very different from prescience; the utmost that can be attained is probability, and that, for the most part, in a low degree. It is observed, that no man is wise but as you take into consideration the weakness of another; a maxim more eminently true of political wisdom, which consists, very often, only in discovering designs which could never be known but by the folly or treachery of those to whom they are trusted. If our enemies were wise enough to keep their own secrets, neither our ministers nor our patriots would be able to know or prevent their designs, nor would it be any reproach to their sagacity, that they did not know what nobody would tell them.

If therefore, my lords, the princes, whose interest is contrary to our own, have been at any time served by honest and wise men, there was a time when our ministers could act only by conjecture, and might be mistaken without a crime.

If it was always in our power to penetrate into the intentions of our enemies, they must necessarily have the same means of making themselves acquainted with our projects, and yet when any of them are discovered we think it just to impute it to the negligence of the minister.

Thus, my lords, every man is inclined to judge with prejudice and partiality. When we suffer by the prudence of our enemies, we charge our ministers with want of vigilance, without considering, that very often nothing is necessary to elude the most penetrating sagacity, but obstinate silence.

If we inquire into the transactions of past times, shall we find any man, however renowned for his abilities, not sometimes imposed upon by falsehoods, and sometimes betrayed by his own reasonings into measures destructive of the purposes which he endeavoured to promote? There is no man of whose penetration higher ideas have been justly formed, or who gave more frequent proofs of an uncommon penetration into futurity than Cromwell; and yet succeeding times have sufficiently discovered the weakness of aggrandizing France by depressing Spain, and we wonder now how so much policy could fall into so gross an errour, as not rather to suffer power to remain in the distant enemy, than transfer it to another equally divided from us by interest, and far more formidable by the situation of his dominions.

Cromwell, my lords, suffered himself to be hurried away by the near prospect of present advantages, and the apprehension of present dangers; and every other man has been, in the same manner, sometimes deluded into a preference of a smaller present advantage, to a greater which was more remote.

Let it not be urged, my lords, that politicks are advanced since the time of Cromwell, and that errours which might then be committed by the wisest administration, are now gross and reproachful; we are to remember that every part of policy has been equally improved, and that if more methods of discovery have been struck out, there have been likewise more arts invented of eluding it.

When, therefore, we inquire into the conduct, or examine the abilities of a minister, we are not to expect that he should appear never to have been deceived, but that he should never be found to have neglected any proper means of information, nor ever to have willingly given up the interest of his country; but we are not to impute to his weakness what is only to be ascribed to the wisdom of those whom he opposed.

If this plea, my lords, is reasonable, it will be necessary for those who support the motion, to prove, not only that the treaty of Vienna was never made, but that the falsehood of the report either was or might have been known by our ministers; otherwise, those who are inclined to retain a favourable opinion of their integrity and abilities, may conclude, that they were either not mistaken, or were led into errour by such delusions as would no less easily have imposed on their accusers, and that by exalting their enemies to their stations, they shall not much consult the advantage of their country.

This motion, therefore, my lords, founded upon no acknowledged, no indisputable facts, nor supported by legal evidence; this motion, which, by appealing to common fame, as the ultimate judge of every man's actions, may bring every man's life, or fortune, into danger; this motion, which condemns without hearing, and decides without examining, I cannot but reject, and hope your lordships will concur with me.

Lord CARLISLE spoke next, to the following purport:—My lords, the state of the question before us has, in my opinion, not been rightly apprehended by the noble lord who spoke last, nor is the innocence or guilt of the minister the chief question before us, because a minister may possibly mean well, and yet be, in some particular circumstances, unqualified for his station.

He may not only want the degree of knowledge and ability requisite to make his good intentions effectual, but, my lords, however skilful, sagacious, or diligent, he may be so unfortunate, in some parts of his conduct, as to want the esteem and confidence of the people.

That a very able and honest minister may be misinformed by his intelligence, disappointed by his agents, or baffled by other men of equal capacity and integrity with himself, cannot be controverted; but it must surely be owned likewise, that when this has happened so often, and in cases of such importance, as to deprive him entirely of the regard and affection of the people; when he is reduced to intrench himself behind his privileges, to employ all the influence of the crown for his own security, and make it his daily endeavour to create new dependencies, he ought to be pitied and discarded.

That this is the state of the minister whose removal is desired by the motion, cannot be denied; the exaltation of his adherents to places and preferments, the noble lord has been so far from questioning, that he has endeavoured to justify it, and has in plain terms inquired, who would have acted otherwise?

Every man, my lords, would have acted otherwise, whose character had not been blasted by general detestation; every man would have acted otherwise, who preferred the publick good to his own continuance in power; and every man has acted otherwise who has distinguished himself as a friend to the publick.

It is the interest of the nation, my lords, that every office should be filled by that man who is most capable of discharging it, whatever may be his sentiments with regard to the minister; and that his attention should be confined to his employment, rather than distracted by various concerns and opposite relations. It is, therefore, an injury to the publick, to thrust a skilful commissioner into the senate, or to embarrass an industrious senator with a post or commission.

Yet, my lords, that multitudes have obtained places, who have no acquaintance with the duties of their offices, nor any other pretensions to them, than that they have seats in the other house, and that by distinguishing himself in that assembly, any man may most easily obtain the preferments of the crown, is too obvious for controversy.

This practice, my lords, is a sufficient foundation for the motion; a practice so injurious to the nation, so long continued, and so openly avowed, requires to be vigorously opposed, lest it should become established by long custom, and entangle itself with our constitution.

If the minister, my lords, has made it necessary to employ none but his adherents and blind followers, this necessity is alone a sufficient proof how little he confides in his own prudence or integrity, how apprehensive he is of the censure of the senate, and how desirous of continuing his authority, by avoiding it. And, surely, my lords, it is our duty, as well as our right, to address the throne, that a minister should be removed who fears the people, since few men fear without hating, and nothing so much contributes to make any man an enemy to his country, as the consciousness that he is universally abhorred.

But, my lords, if this is done by him without necessity, if the general preference of his friends is only the consequence of mistaken judgment, or corrupt gratitude, this address is equally necessary, because the effects are equally pernicious.

When a minister, suspected of ill intentions, is continued in employment, discontent must naturally spread over the nation; and if the end of government be the happiness of the people; if suspicion and jealousy be contrary to a state of happiness; and if this suspicion which generally prevails, this discontent which fills the whole nation, can only be appeased by the removal of the minister; prudence, justice, and the examples of our ancestors, ought to influence us to endeavour that the affairs of the nation may be transferred to such whose greater integrity or wisdom has recommended them to the affection of the people.

In this motion, therefore, we need not be supposed to imply that the minister is either ignorant or corrupt, but that he is disliked by the people, disliked to such a degree, my lords, that it is not safe for his majesty to employ him.

It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.

By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general a clamour without failing equally in our duty to both.

To what, my lords, is the untimely end of so many kings and emperours to be imputed, but to the cowardice or treachery of their counsellors, of those to whom they trusted that intercourse, which is always to be preserved between a monarch and his people? Were kings honestly informed of the opinions and dispositions of their subjects, they would never, or, at least rarely, persist in such measures, as, by exasperating the people, tend necessarily to endanger themselves.

It is the happiness of a British monarch, that he has a standing and hereditary council, composed of men who do not owe their advancement to the smiles of caprice, or the intrigues of a court; who are, therefore, neither under the influence of a false gratitude, nor of a servile dependence, and who may convey to the throne the sentiments of the people, without danger, and without fear. But, my lords, if we are either too negligent, or too timorous to do our duty, how is the condition of our sovereign more safe, or more happy than that of an emperour of Turkey, who is often ignorant of any complaints made against the administration, till he hears the people thundering at the gates of his palace.

Let us, therefore, my lords, whatever may be our opinion of the conduct of the minister, inform his majesty of the discontent of his subjects, since, whether it is just or not, the danger is the same, and whenever any danger threatens the king, we ought either to enable him to oppose, or caution him to avoid it.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, I cannot but observe in this debate an ambition of popularity, in my opinion not very consistent with the freedom of debate, and the dignity of this assembly, which ought to be influenced by no other motive than the force of reason and truth.

It has been a common method of eluding the efficacy of arguments, to charge the opponent with blind adherence to interest, or corrupt compliance with the directions of a court; nor has it been less frequent to prevent inquiries into publick measures, by representing them as the clamours of faction, the murmurs of disobedience, and the prelude to rebellion.

So necessary, my lords, has it been always thought to be uninfluenced in our examinations by dependence or interest, that the most irrefragable reasons have lost the power of conviction, by the condition and characters of those by whom they were produced; and so much is it expected from innocence and justice to despise all foreign assistance, and to stand the test of inquiry without asking the support of power, that every man has been concluded guilty that has fled for shelter to the throne.

And surely, my lords, if that man's suffrage is of little weight, who appears determined to subscribe to the dictates of a minister, no greater credit can be assigned to another, who professes himself only the echo of the clamours of the populace. If it be a proof of a weak cause, and consciousness of misconduct, to apply to the crown for security and protection, it may be accounted an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of arguments, when the people is called in to second them, and they are only to expect success from the violence of multitudes.

That all government is instituted for the happiness of the people, that their interest ought to be the chief care of the legislature, that their complaints ought patiently to be heard, and their grievances speedily redressed, are truths well known, generally acknowledged, and, I hope, always predominant in the mind of every lord in this assembly. But, that the people cannot err, that the voice of fame is to be regarded as an oracle, and every murmur of discontent to be pacified by a change of measures, I have never before heard, or heard it only to disregard it.

True tenderness for the people, my lords, is to consult their advantage, to protect their liberty, and to preserve their virtue; and perhaps examples may be found sufficient to inform us that all these effects are often to be produced by means not generally agreeable to the publick.

It is possible, my lords, for a very small part of the people to form just ideas of the motives of transactions and the tendency of laws. All negotiations with foreign powers are necessarily complicated with many different interests, and varied by innumerable circumstances, influenced by sudden exigencies, and defeated by unavoidable accidents. Laws have respect to remote consequences, and involve a multitude of relations which it requires long study to discover. And how difficult it is to judge of political conduct, or legislative proceedings, may be easily discovered by observing how often the most skilful statesmen are mistaken, and how frequently the laws require to be amended.

If then, my lords, the people judge for themselves on these subjects, they must necessarily determine without knowledge of the questions, and their decisions are then of small authority. If they receive, implicitly, the dictates of others, and blindly adopt the opinions of those who have gained their favour and esteem, their applauses and complaints are, with respect to themselves, empty sounds, which they utter as the organs of their leaders. Nor are the desires of the people gratified when their petitions are granted; nor their grievances overlooked when their murmurs are neglected.

As it is no reproach to the people that they cannot be the proper judges of the conduct of the government, so neither are they to be censured when they complain of injuries not real, and tremble at the apprehension of severities unintended. Unjust complaints, my lords, and unreasonable apprehensions, are to be imputed to those who court their regard only to deceive them, and exalt themselves to reputation by rescuing them from grievances that were never felt, and averting dangers that were never near.

He only who makes the happiness of the people his endeavour, loves them with a true affection and a rational tenderness, and he certainly consults their happiness who contributes to still all groundless clamours, and appease all useless apprehensions, who employs his care, not only to preserve their quiet and their liberty, but to secure them from the fear of losing it, who not only promotes the means of happiness, but enables them to enjoy it.

Thus, it appears, my lords, that it is possible to be a friend, at the same time, to the people and the administration, and that no man can more deserve their confidence and applause, than he that dissipates their unreasonable terrours, and contributes to reconcile them to a good government.

That most of the clamours against the present government arise from calumnies and misrepresentations, is apparent from the sanction of the senate, which has been given to all the measures that are charged as crimes upon the administration.

That the army is supported by the consent of the senate, that the senate has approved the convention, and that our taxes are all imposed and continued by the senate, cannot be denied. What then is demanded by those that censure the conduct of publick affairs, but that their opinion should be considered as an overbalance to the wisdom of the senate, that no man should be allowed to speak but as they dictate, nor to vote but as they shall influence them by their rhetorick or example?

To repeat the particular topicks of accusation, and recapitulate the arguments which have been produced to confute it, would be a tedious and unnecessary labour; unnecessary, because it is well known that they once had the power of convincing this house, and that nothing has since happened to lessen their force, and because many of them now have been already repeated by the noble lords that have opposed the motion.

To search far backward for past errors, and to take advantage of later discoveries in censuring the conduct of any minister, is in a high degree disingenuous and cruel; it is an art which may be easily practised, of perplexing any question, by connecting distant facts, and entangling one period of time with another.

The only candid method of inquiry is to recur back to the state of affairs, as it then appeared, to consider what was openly declared, and what was kept impenetrably secret, what was discoverable by human sagacity, and what was beyond the reach of the most piercing politician.

With regard to the Hanover treaty, it is not, my lords, requisite that we should engage ourselves in a very minute examination; for it was not only not transacted by the right honourable gentleman whose behaviour is the subject of this debate, but cannot be proved to have been known by him till it was formally ratified. If he afterwards approved it either in the council or the senate, he cannot justly, how destructive or ridiculous soever that treaty may be thought, be charged with more than his share of the guilt, the bare guilt of a single vote.

But there is one accusation yet more malicious, an accusation not only of crimes which this gentleman did not commit, but which have not yet been committed, an accusation formed by prying into futurity, and exaggerating misfortunes which are yet to come, and which may probably be prevented. Well may any man, my lords, think himself in danger, when he hears himself charged not with high crimes and misdemeanours, not with accumulative treason, but with misconduct of publick affairs, past, present, and future.

The only charge against this gentleman, which seems to relate more to him than to any other man engaged in the administration, is the continuance of the harbour of Dunkirk, which, says the noble duke, he must be acquainted with as commissioner of the treasury; but if the title of first commissioner be denied, if his authority be but the same with that of his associates, whence comes it, my lords, that he is more particularly accused than they? Why is his guilt supposed greater if his power is only equal?

But, my lords, I believe it will appear, that no guilt has been contracted on this account, and that Dunkirk was always intended, even by those that demanded the demolition of it, to continue a harbour for small trading vessels, and that if larger ever arrived from thence, they lay at a distance from the shore, and were loaded by small vessels from the town.

With regard to other affairs, my lords, they were all transacted by the council, not by his direction, but with his concurrence; and how it is consistent with justice to single him out for censure, I must desire the noble lords to show who approve the motion.

If the people, my lords, have been, by misrepresentations industriously propagated, exasperated against him, if the general voice of the nation condemns him, we ought more cautiously to examine his conduct, lest we should add strength to prejudice too powerful already, and instead of reforming the errours, and regulating the heat of the people, inflame their discontent and propagate sedition.

The utmost claim of the people is to be admitted as accusers, and sometimes as evidence, but they have no right to sit as judges, and to make us the executioners of their sentence; and as this gentleman has yet been only condemned by those who have not the opportunities of examining his conduct, nor the right of judging him, I cannot agree to give him up to punishment.

Lord HALIFAX spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, though I do not conceive the people infallible, yet I believe that in questions like this they are seldom in the wrong, for this is a question not of argument but of fact; of fact discoverable, not by long deductions and accurate ratiocinations, but by the common powers of seeing and feeling.

That it is difficult to know the motives of negotiations, and the effects of laws, and that it requires long study and intense meditation to discover remote consequences, is indubitably true. And, with regard to the people in general, it cannot be denied, that neither their education qualifies them, nor their employments allow them to be much versed in such inquiries.

But, my lords, to refer effects to their proper causes, and to observe, when consequences break forth, from whence they proceed, is no such arduous task. The people of the lowest class may easily feel that they are more miserable this year than the last, and may inquire and discover the reason of the aggravation of their misery; they may know that the army is increased, or our trade diminished; that the taxes are heavier, and penal laws become more grievous.

Nor is it less easy for them to discover that these calamities are not brought upon them by the immediate hand of heaven, or the irresistible force of natural causes; that their towns are not ruined by an invasion, nor their trade confined by a pestilence; they may then easily collect, that they are only unhappy by the misconduct of their governours; they may assign their infelicity to that cause, as the only remaining cause that is adequate to the effect.

If it be granted, my lords, that they may be mistaken in their reasoning, it must be owned, that they are not mistaken without probabilities on their side: it is probable that the ministry must injure the publick interest when it decays without any other visible cause; it is still more probable, when it appears that among those whose station enables them to enter into national inquiries, every man imputes his calamities to the minister, who is not visibly dependent on his favour. It becomes more probable, yet, when it appears that it is the great business of the minister to multiply dependencies, to list accomplices, and to corrupt his judges.

At least, my lords, if it be granted, which, surely, cannot be denied, that the people may be sensible of their own miseries, it is their part to declare their sufferings, and to apply to this house for relief, and it is our business to discover the authors of them, and bring them to punishment.

That the people are very loud and importunate in their complaints, is daily evident; nor is it less apparent, that their complaints are just; if, therefore, their miseries must have an author, let the defenders of this gentleman point out the man whom they may more properly accuse.

But, my lords, nothing is more evident, than that the crimes and the criminal are equally known, that there is one man predominant in his majesty's councils, and that it has long been the practice of that man at once to oppress and ridicule the people, to plunder them, and set them at defiance.

Nothing is more known than that this man pretends to a superiour knowledge, and exerts a superiour power in the management of the publick revenues, and that they have been so ill managed for many years, that the expenses of peace have been almost equal to those of a most vigorous and extensive war.

Nothing is more probable, than that most of the foreign negotiations are conducted by his direction, nor more certain, than that they have generally tended only to make us contemptible.

That the excise was projected in his own head, that it was recommended by him upon his own conviction, and pressed upon the legislature by his influence, cannot be questioned; and if this were his only crime, if this were the only scheme of oppression that ever he planned out, it is such a declaration of war upon the publick liberty, such an attack of our natural and constitutional rights, as was never, perhaps, pardoned by any nation.

Nor is it less notorious, that the late infamous convention was transacted by one of his own dependents, that he palliated or concealed the losses of our merchants, that he opposed the declaration of war, and has since obstructed its operations.

On this occasion, my lords, it may be useful to remark the apparent partiality of this gentleman's vindicators, who declare, that measures are not to be censured as imprudent, only because they are unsuccessful, and yet when other instances of his conduct fall under our examination, think it a sufficient defence to exclaim against the unreasonableness of judging before the event.

To deny that, in the conduct both of civil and military affairs, he has obtained, I know not by what means, an authority superiour to that of any other man, an authority irresistible, uncontroulable, and regal, is to oppose not only common fame, but daily experience. If as commissioner of the treasury he has no more power than any of his associates, whence is it, that to oppose or censure him, to doubt of his infallibility, to suspect his integrity, or to obstruct his influence, is a crime punished with no lighter penalty than forfeiture of employment, as appears, my lords, from the late dismission of a gentleman, against whom nothing can be alleged but an obstinate independence and open disregard of this arbitrary minister.

But happy would it be, my lords, for this nation, if he endeavoured not to extend his authority beyond the treasury or the court; if he would content himself with tyrannising over those whose acceptance of salaries and preferments has already subjected them to his command, without attempting to influence elections, or to direct the members of the other house.

How much the influence of the crown has operated upon all publick councils since the advancement of this gentleman, how zealously it has been supported, and how industriously extended, is unnecessary to explain, since what is seen or felt by almost every man in the kingdom cannot reasonably be supposed unknown to your lordships.

Nothing can be more contrary to the true notion of the British constitution, than to imagine, that by such measures his majesty's real interest is advanced. The true interest, my lords, of every monarch, is to please the people, and the only way of pleasing Britons, is to preserve their liberties, their reputation, and their commerce. Every attempt to extend the power of the crown beyond the limits prescribed by our laws, must in effect make it weaker, by diverting the only source of its strength, the affection of his subjects.

It is, therefore, my opinion, my lords, that we ought to agree to this motion, as a standing memorial not only of our regard for the nation, but of our adherence to our sovereign; that his councils may be no longer influenced by that man whose pernicious advice, and unjustifiable conduct, has added new hopes and new strength to his enemies, impoverished and exasperated his subjects, inflamed the discontent of the seditious, and almost alienated the affection of the loyal.

The bishop of SALISBURY spoke next, to the following purport:—My lords, after all the exaggerations of the errours, and all the representations of the malconduct of the right honourable gentleman; after the most affecting rhetorick, and the most acute inquiries, nothing has appeared of weight sufficient to prevail with me to agree to the present motion; a motion, if not of an unprecedented, yet of a very extraordinary kind, which may extend in its consequences to futurity, and be, perhaps, more dangerous to innocence than guilt.

I cannot yet discover any proof sufficient to convict him of having usurped the authority of first minister, or any other power than that accidental influence which every man has, whose address or services have procured him the favour of his sovereign.

The usurpation, my lords, of regal power must be made evident by somewhat more than general assertions, must appear from some publick act like that of one of the prelates left regent of the kingdom by Richard the first, who, as soon as the king was gone too far to return, in the first elevations of his heart, began his new authority by imprisoning his colleague.

To charge this gentleman with the dismission of any of his colleagues, can, after the strongest aggravations, rise no higher than to an accusation of having advised his majesty to dismiss him, and even that, my lords, stands, at present, unsupported by evidence; nor could it, however uncontestably proved, discover either wickedness or weakness, or show any other authority than every man would exercise, if he were able to attain it.

If he had discharged this gentleman by his own authority, if he had transacted singly any great affair to the disadvantage of the publick, if he had imposed either upon the king or the senate by false representations, if he had set the laws at defiance, and openly trampled on our constitution, and if by these practices he had exalted himself above the reach of a legal prosecution, it had been worthy of the dignity of this house, to have overleaped the common boundaries of custom, to have neglected the standing rules of procedure, and to have brought so contemptuous and powerful an offender to a level with the rest of his fellow-subjects by expeditious and vigorous methods, to have repressed his arrogance, broken his power, and overwhelmed him at once by the resistless weight of an unanimous censure.

But, my lords, we have in the present case no provocations from crimes either openly avowed, or evidently proved; and certainly no incitement from necessity to exert the power of the house in any extraordinary method of prosecution. We may punish whenever we can convict, and convict whenever we can obtain evidence; let us not, therefore, condemn any man unheard, nor punish any man uncondemned.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, it is easy to charge the most blameless and gentle procedure with injustice and severity, but it is not easy to support such an accusation without confounding measures widely different, and disguising the nature of things with fallacious misrepresentations.

Nothing is more evident than that neither condemnation nor punishment is intended by the motion before us, which is only to remove from power a man who has no other claim to it than the will of his master, and who, as he had not been injured by never obtaining it, cannot justly complain that it is taken from him.

The motion, my lords, is so far from inflicting punishment, that it confers rewards, it leaves him in the possession of immense wealth, however accumulated, and enables him to leave that office in security, from which most of his predecessors have been precipitated by national resentment, or senatorial prosecution.

There is no censure, my lords, made of his conduct, no charge of weakness, or suspicion of dishonesty, nor can any thing be equitably inferred from it, than that in the opinion of this house his majesty may probably be served by some other person, more to the satisfaction of the British nation.

Though it is not just to punish any man without examination, or to censure his conduct merely because it has been unpleasing or unsuccessful; though it is not reasonable that any man should forfeit what he possesses in his own right, without a crime, yet it is just to withdraw favours only to confer them on another more deserving; it is just in any man to withhold his own, only to preserve his right, or obviate an injurious prescription, and it is, therefore, just to advise such a conduct whenever it appears necessary to those who have the right of offering advice.

To advise his majesty, my lords, is not only our right but our duty; we are not only justifiable in practising, but criminal in neglecting it. That we should declare our apprehensions of any impending danger, and our disapprobation of publick misconduct, is expected both by our sovereign and the people, and let us not, by omitting such warnings, lull the nation and our sovereign into a dangerous security, and, from tenderness to one man, prolong or increase the miseries of our country, and endanger or destroy the honour of our sovereign.

Lord HERVEY spoke next, in effect as follows:—My lords, this is surely a day destined by the noble lords who defend the motion, for the support of paradoxical assertions, for the exercise of their penetration, and ostentation of their rhetorick; they have attempted to maintain the certainty of common fame in opposition to daily observation; the existence of a sole minister in contradiction to the strongest evidence; and having by these gradations arrived at the highest degree of controversial temerity, are endeavouring to make it appear that the publick censure of the house of lords is no punishment.

If we take the liberty, my lords, of using known words in a new sense, in a meaning reserved to ourselves only, it will, indeed, be difficult to confute, as it will be impossible to understand us; but if punishment be now to be understood as implying the same idea which has hitherto been conveyed by it, it will not be easy to show that a man thus publickly censured is not severely punished, and, if his crimes are not clearly proved, punished in opposition to law, to reason, and to justice.

It has been hitherto imagined, my lords, that no punishment is heavier than that of infamy; and shame has, by generous minds, been avoided at the hazard of every other misery. That such a censure as is proposed by the motion, must irreparably destroy the reputation of the person against whom it is directed, that it must confirm the reports of his enemies, impair the esteem of his friends, mark him out to all Europe as unworthy of his sovereign's favour, and represent him to latest posterity as an enemy to his country, is indisputably certain.

These, my lords, are the evident consequences of the address moved for by the noble lord; and, if such consequences are not penal, it will be no longer in our power to enforce our laws by sanctions of terrour.

To condemn a man unheard, is an open and flagrant violation of the first law of justice, but it is still a wider deviation from it to punish a man unaccused; no crime has been charged upon this gentleman proportioned to the penalty proposed by the motion, and the charge that has been produced is destitute of proof.

Let us, therefore, my lords, reverence the great laws of reason and justice, let us preserve our high character and prerogative of judges, without descending to the low province of accusers and executioners; let us so far regard our reputation, our liberty, and our posterity, as to reject the motion.

[Several other lords spoke in this debate, which lasted eleven hours; at length the question was put, and, on a division, carried in the negative. Content, 59. Not content, 108.]

After the determination of the foregoing question, the duke of MARLBOROUGH rose up, and spoke as follows:—My lords, though your patience must undoubtedly be wearied by the unusual length of this day's debate, a debate protracted, in my opinion, not by the difficulty of the question, but by the obstinacy of prejudice, the ardour of passion, and the desire of victory; yet, I doubt not but the regard which this assembly has always paid to the safety and happiness of the state, will incline you to support the fatigue of attention a little longer, and to hear with your usual impartiality another motion.

The proposition which I am about to lay down, my lords, is not such as can admit of controversy; it is such a standing principle as was always acknowledged, even by those who have deviated from it. Such a known truth as never was denied, though it appears sometimes to have been forgotten.

But, my lords, as it never can be forgotten, without injury to particular persons, and danger to the state in general, it cannot be too frequently recollected, or too firmly established; it ought not only to be tacitly admitted, but publickly declared, since no man's fortune, liberty, or life, can be safe, where his judges shall think themselves at liberty to act upon any other principle. I therefore move, "That any attempt to inflict any kind of punishment on any person without allowing him an opportunity to make his defence, or without any proof of any crime or misdemeanour committed by him, is contrary to natural justice, the fundamental laws of this realm, and the ancient established usage of the senate, and is a high infringement of the liberties of the subject."

He was seconded by the duke of DEVONSHIRE:—My lords, though the motion made by the noble duke is of such a kind, that no opposition can be expected or feared, yet I rise up to second it, lest it should be imagined that what cannot be rejected is yet unwillingly admitted.

That where this maxim is not allowed and adhered to, rights and liberties are empty sounds, is uncontestably evident; if this principle be forsaken, guilt and innocence are equally secure, all caution is vain, and all testimony useless. Caprice will, in our courts, supply the place of reason, and all evidence must give way to malice, or to favour.

I hope, therefore, my lords, that your regard to justice, to truth, and to your own safety, will influence you to confirm this great and self-evident principle by a standing resolution, that may not only restrain oppression in the present age, but direct the judiciary proceedings of our successors.

Lord LOVEL rose next, and spoke as follows:—My lords, liberty and justice must always support each other, they can never long flourish apart; every temporary expedient that can be contrived to preserve or enlarge liberty by means arbitrary and oppressive, forms a precedent which may, in time, be made use of to violate or destroy it. Liberty is in effect suspended whenever injustice is practised; for what is liberty, my lords, but the power of doing right without fear, without control, and without danger.

But, my lords, if any man may be condemned unheard, if judgment may precede evidence, what safety or what confidence can integrity afford? It is in vain that any man means well, and acts prudently; it is even in vain that he can prove the justice and prudence of his conduct.

By liberty, my lords, can never be meant the privilege of doing wrong without being accountable, because liberty is always spoken of as happiness, or one of the means to happiness, and happiness and virtue cannot be separated. The great use of liberty must, therefore, be to preserve justice from violation; justice, the great publick virtue, by which a kind of equality is diffused over the whole society, by which wealth is restrained from oppression, and inferiority preserved from servitude.

Liberty, general liberty, must imply general justice; for wherever any part of a state can be unjust with impunity, the rest are slaves. That to condemn any man unheard is oppressive and unjust, is beyond controversy demonstrable, and that no such power is claimed by your lordships will, I hope, appear from your resolutions.

Lord GOWER spoke next:—My lords, to the principle laid down by those noble lords, I have no objection, and concur with them in hoping that all our proceedings will contribute to establish it; but why it should be confirmed by a formal resolution, why the house should solemnly declare their assent to a maxim which it would be madness to deny, it is beyond my penetration to discover.

Though the noble lord's position cannot be controverted, yet his motion, if it is designed to imply any censure of the proceedings of this day, may reasonably be rejected, and that some censure is intended we may conjecture, because no other reason can be given why it was not made at some other time.

Lord HALIFAX then rose:—My lords, that a censure is intended, will, I suppose, not be denied, and that such a censure is unjust must doubtless be the opinion of all those who are supposed to have incurred it, and it will, therefore, not be wondered that the motion is opposed by them, as indecent and calumnious: late as it is, my lords, I will not, for my part, suffer such an indignity without opposition, and shall think my conscience and my honour require, that I should not be overborne by perseverance or by numbers, but that I should, if I cannot convince the noble lords by argument, of the impropriety of the motion, record my reasons against it, which may, perhaps, be more candidly received by posterity.

Lord TALBOT spoke to this effect:—My lords, it is not without indignation that I hear a motion so injurious to my own honour, and to that of the noble lords who have concurred with me in the last debate, nor without contempt that I observed the motion confounded with the positions contained in it; the low subtilty of such conduct is no less to be despised than the malice to be abhorred.

Fifty-nine lords are here branded as strangers, or enemies to the first principle of judicial equity, for doing what will entitle them to the general applause of every man in the kingdom that has the full possession of his understanding, or the free use of his senses; of every man that can distinguish truth, or feel oppression.

They have endeavoured to rescue their country from the rapine of pensioners and the tyranny of an army, from perpetual taxes, and useless expenses; they have attempted to expose the errours of arrogant ignorance, and to depress the power of greatness, founded on corruption, and swelling beyond legal restraints.

That for such attempts they are vilified and reproached, is not to be observed without indignation and astonishment; astonishment which nothing could abate but the recollection of the situation of those lords who have united to promote so unjust a censure.

Let us, my lords, consider the circumstances of the three noble lords by whom this motion has been made and supported, let us take a view of their conduct, and consider the visible motives to which it may be ascribed, their places, their dependence—

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, I rise thus abruptly to preserve that order and decency which is essential to publick councils, and particularly suitable to the dignity of this assembly, which can only become a scene of tumult and confusion by such methods of debate, and lose that respect which it has hitherto preserved, not only by the justice of its determinations, but by the solemn grandeur of its procedure.

The motion, my lords, is allowed to contain nothing but what every man avows in speculation, and observes, or ought to observe, in publick transactions, and yet those that offer and support it are represented as abettors of oppression, and instruments of tyranny.

It is surely wonderful, my lords, that those who are solicitous for the preservation of their own honour, and so diligent to obviate the most remote reflection that may glance upon it, should not remember, that the same delicacy may raise in others the same resentment, when their reputation is openly attacked; and that while they are asserting the right of the minority to an exemption from censure, they shall not allow the greater number at least an equal claim to the same privilege.

Lord TALBOT then resumed:—My lords, whether any thing has escaped from me that deserves such severe animadversions, your lordships must decide. For what I might intend to say, since by the interruption of that noble lord I was hindered from proceeding, I hope I shall not be accountable.

Not that I acknowledge myself to have asserted any thing either contrary to law, or to the privileges of the house, or inconsistent with the character of an independent lord, a character which I shall always endeavour to preserve, and which I will not forfeit for the smiles of a court, the dignity of high employment, or the affluence of a pension.

Nor, my lords, whenever the necessities of my country require that I should speak my sentiments with freedom, will I be awed into silence and submission, but will set any power at defiance that shall dare to restrain me.

I pretend not, my lords, to be always in the right, I claim no other merit than that of meaning well; and when I am convinced, after proper examination, that I am engaged on the side of truth, I will trample on that insolence that shall command me to suppress my sentiments.

When I reflect, my lords, on the distresses of my country, when I observe the security and arrogance of those whom I consider as the authors of the publick miseries, I cannot always contain my resentment; I may, perhaps, sometimes start out into unbecoming transports, and speak in terms not very ceremonious of such abandoned, such detestable— But as this is, perhaps, not the language of the house, I shall endeavour to repress it, and hope that the bounds of decency have never been so far transgressed by me that I should be exposed to the censure of your lordships.

Lord ABINGDON next rose, and said:—My lords, the present motion is undoubtedly just, but by no means necessary, or particularly adapted to the present time. It contains a general principle, uncontested, and established; a principle which this assembly has never denied, and from which I know not that it has ever departed.

As there is, therefore, no particular necessity of confirming it by a new resolution, and as the present time seems less proper than any other, I cannot but declare my opinion, that to resume it at some other time will be more prudent, than to give the lords, who think their conduct censured, any occasion of resentment or discontent.

Lord CARTERET spoke to the following effect:—My lords, the maxim laid down in the present motion, is in itself incontestable, and so far from any inconsistency with the former, that as there was no reason for making, there is, in my opinion, none for opposing it; as it may at any time be made, it may at any time be properly passed. And I hope that our unanimity on this occasion will show that truth, however unseasonably advanced, will, in this house, be always received.

But, lest the noble lords who have opposed the motion, should think their honour engaged in continuing the opposition, I take the liberty, my lords, to move that the previous question may be put.

[Other lords spoke on each side; at last the previous question was put by the president, who demanded, "Is it your lordships' pleasure, that the question be now put? Those lords who are for it, say, Content: those who are against it, say, Not content." There was, accordingly, a cry of both; after which the president declared, "the contents have it;" and some lords replying, "the non-contents have it," his lordship said, "the non-contents must go below the bar:" which is the manner of dividing the house. Those who remained being told in their seats, and those who went out being told at coming in again, there were Content, 81; Not content, 54: so that the resolution moved for, passed without a division.]