DEFENCE. (continued 5)

On behalf of the government there appeared six persons as prosecuting officers. One United States Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Cooper), the Attorney-General of Maryland, the District Attorney of Pennsylvania, the Recorder of the City of Philadelphia, and two members of her bar.[178] For Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, was highly desirous that Maryland should send her Attorney-General, Hon. Mr. Brent, to help the government of the United States prosecute a Quaker miller, a Non-resistant, for the crime of treason. Hon. James Cooper, the Pennsylvania Senator, also appeared on behalf of Maryland, seeking to convict one of his own constituents! Gentlemen, such conduct carries us back to the time of the Stuarts; but despotism is always the same. It was very proper that the United States government should thus outrage the common decencies of judicial process.

This question amongst others was put to each juror:—

"Have you formed an opinion that the law of the United States, known as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, is unconstitutional, so that you cannot for that reason convict a person indicted for a forcible resistance thereto, if the facts alleged in the indictment are proved and the court hold the statute to be constitutional?"

Thus all persons were excluded from the jury who believed this wicked bill a violation of the constitution; and one most important means of the prisoner's legitimate defence was purposely swept away by the court.

Now look at the law as laid down by the government.

Mr. Ashmead, the government's Attorney, said when the Constitution was adopted "Men had not then become wiser than the laws [the laws of England and colonial laws which they were born under and broke away from]; nor had they learned to measure the plain and unambiguous letter of the Constitution by an artificial standard of their own creation [that is the Self-evident Truth that all men have a natural and unalienable Right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness]; to obey or disregard it according as it came up to or fell beneath it [as the law was just or unjust]."

"You will receive the law from the court." "You are bound by the instructions which the court may give in respect to it;" "it is in no sense true that you are judges of the law." "You must take the interpretation which the court puts upon it. You have a right to apply the law to the facts, but you have no right to go further."

"The crime charged against this defendant is ... that of levying war against the United States. The phrase levying war was long before the adoption of the Constitution, a phrase ... embracing such a forcible resistance to the laws as that charged against this defendant [that is, speaking against the fugitive slave bill and refusing to kidnap a man is 'levying war against the United States']!"

It is treason "if the intention is by force to prevent the execution of any one ... of the general laws of the United States, or to resist the exercise of any legitimate authority of the government."

"Levying war embraces ... any combination forcibly to prevent or oppose the execution ... of a public statute, if accompanied or followed by an act of forcible opposition." Of course the court is to determine the meaning of force; and using the same latitude of construction as in interpreting levying war, it would mean, a word, a look, a thought, a wish, a fancy even.

Mr. Ludlow enforced the same opinions, relying in part on the old tyrannical decisions of the British courts in the ages of despotism, and on the opinion of Judge Chase—who had derived his law of treason from that source, and was impeached before the American Senate for his oppressive conduct while judge in the very trials whence these iniquitous doctrines were derived! But Mr. Ludlow says "if a spurious doctrine have been introduced into the common law ... it would require great hardihood in a judge to reject it." So the jury must accept "a spurious doctrine" as genuine law!

"In treason, all the participes criminis are principals; there are no accessaries to this crime. Every act which ... would render a man an accessary will ... make him a principal." "If any man joins and acts with an assembly of people, his intent is always to be considered ... the same as theirs; the law ... judgeth of the intent by the Fact." This was Judge Kelyng's "law."

"It may be ... advanced that because Hanway was not armed, he was not guilty. It is perfectly well settled that arms are not necessary." "Military weapons ... are not necessary ... to a levying war." "This is the opinion of Judge Chase," and "it may be alleged that Judge Chase was impeached, and that [therefore] his opinions are of little weight. Whatever may have been the grounds of that impeachment, it is not for us to discuss."

"If a body of men be assembled for the purpose of effecting a treasonable object [that is, 'to oppose the execution of a public statute,' no matter what or how] all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action ... are equally traitors."

Mr. Brent, the Maryland State Attorney, whom Mr. Webster had sent there, declared that "any combination like this, of colored and white persons, to prevent the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, is treason."

Mr. Cooper, the Pennsylvania Senator, adds, "Castner Hanway ... having been present ... at the time the overt act was committed, he is a principal ... provided he was there aiding and abetting the objects of the confederated parties." "Persons procuring, contriving, or consenting, come within the words aid and abet." So "if he encourages, assists, or consents to the act, it is enough; he becomes at once an aider and abettor, and obnoxious to all the pains and penalties denounced against it." "If persons do assemble themselves and act with some force in opposition to some law ... and hope thereby to get it repealed, this is a levying war and high treason." That is, an assembly of men acting against any law, with any force of argument, in order to procure its repeal, levies war and is guilty of treason!

To connect Mr. Hanway with this constructive treason, the government relied on the evidence of Mr. Kline, the Deputy Marshal of the court, a man like Mr. Butman and Mr. Patrick Riley, so well known in this court, and so conspicuous for courage and general elevation of character. Witnesses testified that Kline was so much addicted to falsehood that they would not believe him on oath,—but what of that? He had "conquered his prejudices." It appeared that Mr. Hanway went to the scene of action on a sorrel horse, in his shirt-sleeves, with a felt hat on, and did not join the Deputy in attempting to kidnap when commanded. Hear how Mr. Ludlow constructs levying war out of the disobedience of a non-resistant Quaker in a felt hat and shirt-sleeves, mounted on a sorrel horse! Hearken to this voice of the government:—

"Suddenly he sees the assembled band of infuriated men.... Does he leave the spot? No, Sir! Does he restrain the negroes? Take the evidence for the defence in its fullest latitude, and you will perceive he raised the feeble cry, 'Don't shoot! for God's sake don't shoot!' and there it ended. Is that consistent with innocence?... according to their own evidence the conclusion is irresistible that he was not innocent."

"But he does more than this." When summoned by the Deputy to steal a man "he is thrown off his guard, and exclaims, 'I will not assist you;' 'he allowed the colored people had a right to defend themselves.' 'He did not care for that Act of Congress or any other Act of Congress.'"

And so with his unsaddled sorrel nag this non-resistant miller levies war upon the United States by crying "Don't fire," and commits treason by the force and arms of a broad-brimmed Quaker hat. "The smallest amount of force is sufficient," "military weapons are not necessary to levy war!"

Mr. Brent thought if Mr. Hanway was not hanged it would appear that a "small and miserable and traitorous faction can resist and annul the laws of the United States." "Put down these factions [the Free-Soil Party, the Liberty Party, the Anti-Slavery Societies], overwhelm them with shame, disgrace, and ruin, or you are not good citizens fulfilling the bonds that bind you to us of the South."

The government Attorney declared that Mr. Hanway and others

"Had no right to refuse to assist because it was repugnant to their consciences. Conscience! Conscience ... is the pretended justification for an American citizen to refuse to execute a law of his country." "Damnable, treasonable doctrine." "He has become a conspirator, he has connected himself with them, and all their acts are his acts, and all their intentions are his intentions."

"The whole neighborhood was not only disloyal, but wanting in common humanity:" "the whole region is infected," "in that horde of traitors;" "a whole county, a whole township, a whole neighborhood are involved in plotting treason." "When you see these things can you not infer ... that he went there by pre-arrangement!" "When you see a man ... not saying one word to save his dear colored friends from the guilt of murder, I say it is passing human credulity to say that you cannot infer in all that a feeling of hostility to the law, and an intention to resist it."

"The consequences [of the verdict] are not with the jury:" the responsibility will not be with you—you are not responsible for those just consequences."

"When you allege that a master has come into Pennsylvania and illegally seized and possessed himself of his slave without process, you are to inquire, 'Has he done that which he had authority to do in his own State?' You are to look to the laws of his own State; for the Supreme Court says,[179] 'He has the same right to repossess his slave here as in his own State.'" "He who employs a man said to have come from Maryland without being satisfied of his freedom, is himself guilty of the first wrong."

Senator Cooper closed for the government. Law was not enough for him; he would have the sanction of "Religion" also. So he read extract from a Sermon. Gentlemen of the Jury, you have not had the benefit of Rev. Dr. Adams's prayers in this court; it is a pity you should not be blessed with the theology of despotism; listen therefore to the "Thanksgiving Sermon" of Rev. Dr. Wadsworth, which Hon. Mr. Cooper read to the Jury in Independence Hall.

"For passing by all other causes of irritation as just now secondary and subordinate, look for a moment, at the influence which the Gospel of Christ would have in this great sectional controversy about slavery.

"First, It would say to the Northern fanatic, who vapors about man-stealing as if there were no other evil under the sun but this one evil of Slavery—it would say to him, Emulate the spirit of your blessed Master and his apostles, who, against this very evil [man-stealing] in their own times, brought no railing accusation; but in one instance at least, sent back a fugitive from the household of Philemon.

"In treating Southern Christian slaveholders with Christian courtesy, and sending back their fugitives when apprehended among you, you neither indorse the system nor partake of its evil; you are only performing in good faith the agreement, and redeeming the pledges of your forefathers, and leaving to each man for himself to answer for his own acts at the judgment-seat of Jesus. It would tear away from the man, as the foulest cloak of hypocrisy, that pretence of a religious principle in this whole matter of political abolitionism.

"Religious principle! Oh my God! That religious principle, that for the sake of an abstract right whose very exercise were disastrous to the unprepared bondmen who inherit it, would tear this blest confederacy in pieces, and deluge these smiling plains in fraternal blood, and barter the loftiest freedom that the world ever saw, for the armed despotism of a great civil warfare! That religious principle which, in disaster to man's last great experiment, would fling the whole race back into the gloom of an older barbarism—rearing out of the ruin of these free homes, the thrones of a more adamantine despotism—freedom's beacons all extinguished, and the whole race slaves. That religious principle through which, losing sight of God's great purpose of evangelizing the nations, [by American Slavery,] would shatter the mightiest wheel in the mechanism of salvation, and palsy the wing of God's preaching angel in its flight through the skies.

"Alas—alas! ye that count as little this bond of blessed brotherhood, wrought by our fathers' mighty hands and bleeding hearts—we tell you, sorrowing and in tears, that your pretence is foul hypocrisy. Ye have reversed the first precept of the gospel, for your wisdom is a dove's, and your harmlessness a serpent's. Ye have not the first principle within you either of religion or philanthropy, or common human benevolence. Your principle is the principle of Judas Iscariot, and with the doom of the traitor ye shall go to your own place."

"No, Sir—no, Sir," concludes the Senator thirsting for his constituent's blood, "'There is no gospel in all this treasonable fanaticism—for treason to my country is rebellion to my God.'"

Judge Grier charged the Jury;—but as he stuck out from the phonographer's report—of which the proof-sheets were sent to him—the most offensive portion, Gentlemen of the Jury, I shall not be able to enlighten you with all the legal words of this "consummate judge." So be content with the following Elegant Extracts.

"With the exception of a few individuals of perverted intellect in some small districts or neighborhoods whose moral atmosphere has been tainted and poisoned by male and female vagrant lecturers and conventions, no party in politics, no sect of religion, or any respectable numbers or character can be found within our borders, who have viewed with approbation or have looked with any other than feelings of abhorrence upon this disgraceful tragedy."

"It is not in this Hall of Independence that meetings of infuriated fanatics and unprincipled demagogues have been held to counsel a bloody resistance to the laws of the land. It is not in this city that conventions are held denouncing the Constitution, the Laws, and the Bible. It is not here that the pulpit has been desecrated by seditious exhortations, teaching that theft [a man stealing his own limbs and person from his 'lawful owner'] is meritorious, murder [in self-defence killing a man-stealer] excusable, and treason [opposition to the fugitive slave bill] a virtue!"

"The guilt of this foul murder [the shooting of a kidnapper by the men whom he intended for his victims, and whose premises he invaded without due process of law, and with armed force], rests not alone on the deluded individuals who were its immediate perpetrators, but the blood taints with even deeper dye the skirts of those who promulgated doctrines subversive of all morality and all government, [that is, of Slavery and the fugitive slave bill]."

"This murderous tragedy is but the necessary development of principles and the natural fruit from seed sown by others whom the arm of the law cannot reach," [such as the Authors of the Declaration of Independence, and still more the Author of the "Sermon on the Mount]."

"This [the slave clause of the Constitution] is the Supreme law of the land, binding ... on the conscience and conduct of every individual citizen of the United States." "The shout of disapprobation with which this [the fugitive slave bill] has been received by some, has been caused ... because it is an act which can be executed ... the real objection ... is to the Constitution itself, which is supposed to be void in this particular, from the effect of some 'higher law.' It is true that the number of persons whose consciences affect to be governed by such a law [that is the law of Natural Morality and Religion], is very small. But there is a much larger number who take up opinions on trust,—and have concluded this must be a very pernicious and unjust enactment, for no other reason than because the others shout their disapprobation with such violence and vituperation."

"This law is Constitutional." "The question of its Constitutionality is to be settled by the Courts, [fugitive slave bill courts,] and not by conventions either of laymen or ecclesiastics." "We are as much bound to support this law as any other." "The jury should regard the construction of the Constitution as given them by the court as to what is the true meaning of the words levying war." "In treason all are principals, and a man may be guilty of aiding and abetting, though not present."

He spoke of those "associations, or conventions, which occasionally or annually infest the neighboring village of West-Chester, for the purpose of railing at and resisting the Constitution and laws of the land [that is the fugitive slave bill and other laws which annihilate a man's unalienable right to his liberty], and denouncing those who execute them as no better than a Scroggs or a Jeffreys;—who stimulate and exhort poor negroes to the perpetration of offences which they know must bring them to the penitentiary or the gallows."

But he thought refusing to aid the deputy marshal in kidnapping was not an act of levying war, or treason against the United States. "In so doing he is not acting the part of an honest, loyal citizen [who ought to do any wickedness which a bum-bailiff commands]; he may be liable to be punished for a misdemeanor for his refusal to interfere."

"But he thought the government was right "in procuring an indictment for Treason." For "meetings had been held in many places in the North, denouncing the law, and advising a traitorous resistance to its execution: conventions of infuriated fanatics had invited to acts of rebellion; and even the pulpit had been defiled with furious denunciations of the law, and exhortations to a rebellious resistance to it.

"The government was perfectly justified in supposing that this transaction was but the first overt act of a treasonable conspiracy, extending over many of the Northern States, to resist by force of arms the execution of this article of the Constitution and the laws framed in pursuance of it. In making these arrests, and having this investigation, the officers of government have done no more than their strict duty.

"The activity, zeal, and ability, which have been exhibited by the learned Attorney of the United States, in endeavoring to bring to condign punishment the perpetrators of this gross offence, are deserving of all praise. It has given great satisfaction to the Court also, that the learned Attorney-General of Maryland, and the very able counsel associated with him [Senator Cooper of Pennsylvania] have taken part in this prosecution."

In about fifteen minutes the Jury returned a verdict of "not guilty."[180]

(4.) On the 29th of April, 1852, a man named William Smith was arrested by Commissioner McAllister of Columbia, Pennsylvania, on complaint of one Ridgeley of Baltimore. While in the custody of the officers, Smith endeavored to escape, and Ridgeley drew a pistol and shot him dead. The murderer escaped. No serious efforts were made by the State authorities to bring that offender to justice. "He has the same right to repossess his slave here as in his own State;" the same right to kill him if he attempts to escape! Mr. Toombs is modest—but we shall soon see the slaveholder not only sit down with his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument, but shoot them if they attempt to run away! Nay, Gentlemen, we shall see this Court defending the slave-hunter's "privilege."

(5.) Here is another case, Gentlemen of the Jury, in which this same Judge Grier appears, and with his usual humanity. This is a brief account of the case of Daniel Kauffman. In 1852 he allowed a party of fugitive slaves to pass the night in his barn, and gave them food in the morning. For this he was brought before Judge Grier's court and fined $2,800! It was more than his entire property. Gentlemen, there are persons in this room who gave money to Mr. Kauffman, to indemnify him for his losses; were not they also guilty of treason, at least of a "misdemeanor?" They "evinced an express liking" for Freedom and Humanity, not Slavery and bloodshed.

(6.) But here is yet one more,—which you shall have in the language of another:—

"In a case of attempted Slave-catching at Wilkesbarre, in Pennsylvania, the Deputy Marshal, Wyncoop and his assistants, had behaved with such atrocious and abominable cruelty, that the citizens felt that justice demanded their punishment for the outrage. They were, accordingly, arrested on a warrant issued by a most respectable magistrate, on the oath of one of the principal inhabitants of the place. A writ of habeas corpus was forthwith sued out, returnable before Judge Grier. When the District Attorney, Ashmead, moved the discharge of the relators, (which, it is needless to say, was ordered,) Judge Grier delivered himself to the following effect. 'If habeas corpuses are to be taken out after that manner, I will have an indictment sent to the United States Grand-Jury against the person who applies for the writ, or assists in getting it, the lawyer who defends it, and the sheriff who serves the writ, to see whether the United States officers are to be arrested and harassed whenever they attempt to serve a process of the United States.'"

2. Gentlemen of the Jury, you might suppose that love of liberty had altogether vanished from the "Free" States, else how could such men ride over the local law as well as natural justice? But I am happy to find one case where the wickedness of the fugitive slave bill courts was resisted by the people and the local judges—it is a solitary case, and occurred in Wisconsin:—

"About the middle of March, 1854, a man named Joshua Glover, was seized near Racine, in Wisconsin, as a Fugitive Slave. His arrest was marked by the circumstances of cruelty and cowardice which seem to be essential to the execution of this Law above all others. He was brought, chained and bleeding, to Milwaukee, where he was lodged in jail. As soon as the news spread, an indignation, as general as it was righteous, prevailed throughout the city. A public meeting was forthwith called, and held in the open air, at which several of the principal citizens assisted. Stirring speeches were made, and strong resolutions passed, to the effect that the rights of the man should be asserted and defended to the utmost. Counsel learned in the law volunteered, and all necessary process was issued, as well against the claimant for the assault and battery, as in behalf of the man restrained of his liberty. A vigilance committee was appointed to see that Glover was not secretly hurried off, and the bells were ordered to be rung in case any such attempt should be made. But the people were not disposed to trust to the operation of the Slave Law, administered by United States Judges or Commissioners, and they stepped in and settled the question for themselves in a summary manner. A hundred men arrived, in the afternoon, from Racine, the town from which the man had been kidnapped, who marched in order to the jail. They were soon reinforced by multitudes more, and a formal demand was made for the slave. This being denied, an attack was made upon the door, which was soon broken in, the man released, and carried back in triumph to Racine, whence he was afterwards conveyed beyond the jurisdiction of the star-spangled banner. A mass convention of the citizens of Wisconsin was afterwards held to provide for similar cases, should they occur, and a most sound and healthy tone of feeling appears to have pervaded that youthful commonwealth.

"After the rescue had been effected, the United States Marshal arrested several persons for the offence of resisting an officer in the discharge of his duties. Among these was Mr. Sherman M. Booth, the editor of the Free Democrat. When brought before a Commissioner, in the custody of the Marshal, a writ of habeas corpus was sued out on his behalf, and he was brought before Judge A.D. Smith, of the Supreme Court. After a full hearing, Judge Smith granted him his discharge, on the ground that the fugitive slave law was unconstitutional. The Marshal then had the proceedings removed by a writ of certiorari before a full bench of the Supreme Court, when the decision of Judge Smith was confirmed, and Mr. Booth discharged from custody. Immediately afterwards, Judge Miller, of the United States District Court, issued another warrant for the arrest of Mr. Booth, making no mention of the fugitive slave act, but directing his arrest to answer to a charge for abetting the escape of a prisoner from the custody of the United States Marshal. Another writ of habeas corpus was sued out, but it was denied by the Supreme Court, on the ground that there was nothing on the face of the record to bring it within range of their former decision."

"In the mean time the United States Judge and Marshal were busy in their vocation. It affirmed that the Grand-Jury was packed in the most unblushing manner, until an inquest was made up that would answer the purpose of the Government. However this may have been, indictments were found in the District Court, against Mr. Booth and several other persons. A petty Jury selected with the same care that had been bestowed on the composition of the Grand-Jury, convicted Mr. Booth and Mr. Ryecraft. All the weight of the government was thrown against the defendants. Special counsel were retained to assist the District Attorney, the instructions of the Court were precise and definite against them; all motions in their behalf resting on the irregularities and injustices of the proceedings were overruled. So were all motions subsequent to the conviction for an arrest of judgment. They were sentenced to fine and imprisonment—Mr. Booth to pay one thousand dollars and costs, and to be imprisoned one month, and Mr. Ryecraft to pay two hundred dollars, and to be imprisoned for ten days. On these sentences they were committed to jail. The public excitement in Milwaukee, and throughout the State, was intense. It was with difficulty that the people could be restrained from forcibly liberating the prisoners. Fortunately there was no occasion for any such extreme measures. They found protection, where it ought to be found, in the constituted authorities of their State. A writ of habeas corpus was issued in their behalf by the Supreme Court, then sitting at Madison, the Capital of the State, returnable before them there. Escorted by two thousand of their fellow-citizens, thither, in charge of the High Sheriff, they had a hearing at once. After full deliberation, the Court unanimously ordered them to be discharged. The majority of the Court made this decision on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the fugitive slave law, one Judge (Crawford) sustaining the law, but concurring in the order on the ground that no offence, under that Act, was charged in the indictment. So the prisoners were discharged, and brought home in triumph."

Gentlemen, that matter will be carried up to the Supreme Court of the United States, and you may yet hear the opinion of the Hon. Associate Justice Curtis, for which let us wait with becoming reverence.

3. Here is the case of Mr. Sloane, which happened in the State of Ohio.

In October, 1852, several colored persons were about leaving Sandusky in a steamer for Detroit, when they were seized and taken before Mr. Follet, mayor of the city, and claimed as fugitive slaves. This seizure was made by the city marshal and three persons claiming to act for the owners of the slaves.

After the colored persons were brought before the mayor, their friends engaged Mr. Rush R. Sloane to act as counsel in their defence. He demanded of the mayor and the claimants by what authority the prisoners were detained. There was no reply. He then asked, whether they were in the custody of a United States Marshal or Commissioner. Again there was no reply. He next called for any writs, papers, or evidences by which they were detained. Still there was no answer. He then said to his clients, "I see no authority to detain your colored friends."

At that time some one near the door cried out, "Hustle them out," and soon the crowd and the alleged fugitives were in the street. Then one of the claimants said to Mr. Sloane, "I own these slaves; they are my property, and I shall hold you individually liable for their escape." These were the first and only words he spoke to Mr. Sloane, and then not until the black men were in the street.

In due time Mr. Sloane was arrested for resisting the execution of the fugitive slave bill, though he had only acted as legal counsel for the alleged slaves and had offered no resistance to the law, by deed, or word, or sign.

He was brought to trial at Columbus. Before the jurors were sworn they were all asked "whether they had any conscientious scruples against the fugitive slave law, and would hesitate to convict under it." If they said "Yes," they were rejected. Thus a jury was packed for the purpose, and the trial went on. Thirteen unimpeached witnesses deposed to the facts stated before, while the slave claimant had no evidence but the city marshal of Sandusky—the Tukey of that place—and two of the three slave-catchers—who swore that they had with them powers of attorney for the seizure of twenty-four slaves.

Gentlemen, such was the action of the court, and such the complexion of the packed jury, that Mr. Sloane was found "guilty." The Judge, Hon. Mr. Leavitt, refused to sign a bill of exceptions, enabling him to bring the matter before the Supreme Court. Mr. Sloane was sentenced to pay a fine of $3,000, and $930 as costs of court! Such was the penalty for a lawyer telling his clients that he saw no authority to detain them,—after having three times demanded the authority, and none had been shown!

4. Gentlemen of the Jury, I now come to cases which have happened in our own State,—in this city. Some alarm was felt as soon as Mr. Mason's fugitive slave bill was proposed in the Senate. But men said, "No northern man will support it. There is much smoke and no fire." But when on the 7th of March, 1850, Mr. Webster adopted the bill, and promised to defend it and the amendments to it, "with all its provisions to the fullest extent;" when he declared that Massachusetts would execute the infamous measure "with alacrity"—then not only alarm but indignation took possession of northern breasts. The friends of Slavery at Boston must do all in their power to secure the passage of the bill, the prosperity of its adoptive father, and its ultimate enforcement—the kidnapping of men in Massachusetts. Here are the measures resorted to for attaining this end.

i. A meeting was called at the Revere House, that Mr. Webster might defend his scheme for stealing his constituents and putting himself into the Presidency.

ii. A public letter was written to him approving of his attempts to restore man-stealing, and other accompaniments of slavery, to the free States. This letter declared the "deep obligations" of the signers "for what this speech has done and is doing;" "we wish to thank you," they say, "for recalling us to our duties under the constitution;" "you have pointed out to a whole people the path of duty, have convinced the understanding, and touched the conscience of the nation;" "we desire, therefore, to express to you our entire concurrence in the sentiments of your speech." This letter was dated at Boston, March 25th, 1850, and received 987 signatures, it is said.

iii. When the bill became an Act of government, a hundred cannons, as I have before stated, were fired on Boston Common in token of joy at the restoration of slavery to our New England soil.

iv. Articles were written in the newspapers in defence of kidnapping, in justification of the fugitive slave bill. The Boston Courier and Boston Daily Advertiser gave what influence they had in support of that crime against America.

v. Several ministers of Boston came out and publicly, in sermons in their own pulpits, defended the fugitive slave bill, and called on their parishioners to enforce the law!

Gentlemen of the Jury, need I tell you of the feelings of the Philanthropists of Boston,—of the colored citizens who were to be the victims of this new abomination! Within twenty-four hours of its passage more than thirty citizens of Boston, colored citizens, fled in their peril to a man whose delight it is to undo the heavy burthens and let the oppressed go free. While others were firing their joyful cannon at the prospect of kidnapping their brothers and sisters, Francis Jackson helped his fellow Christians into the ark of Deliverance which he set afloat on that flood of Sin. Gentlemen, he is here to-day—he is one of my bondsmen. There are the others—this venerable gentleman [Samuel May], this steadfast friend [John R. Manley.]

vi. It was not long before the kidnappers came here for their prey.

(1.) I must dwell a moment on the first attempt. Gentlemen of the Jury, you know the story of William and Ellen Craft. They were slaves in Georgia; their master was said to be a "very pious man," "an excellent Christian." Ellen had a little baby,—it was sick and ready to die. But one day her "owner"—for this wife and mother was only a piece of property—had a dinner party at his house. Ellen must leave her dying child and wait upon the table. She was not permitted to catch the last sighing of her only child with her own lips; other and ruder hands must attend to the mother's sad privilege. But the groans and moanings of the dying child came to her ear and mingled with the joy and merriment of the guests whom the mother must wait upon. At length the moanings all were still—for Death took a North-side view of the little boy, and the born-slave had gone where the servant is free from his master and the weary is at rest—for there the wicked cease from troubling. Ellen and William resolved to flee to the North. They cherished the plan for years; he was a joiner, and hired himself of his owner for about two hundred dollars a year. They saved a little money, and stealthily, piece by piece, they bought a suit of gentleman's clothes to fit the wife; no two garments were obtained of the same dealer. Ellen disguised herself as a man, William attending as her servant, and so they fled off and came to Boston. No doubt these Hon. Judges think it was a very "immoral" thing. Mr. Curtis knows no morality here but "legality." Nay, it was a wicked thing—for Mr. Everett, a most accomplished scholar, and once a Unitarian minister, makes St. Paul command "Slaves, obey your masters!" Nay, Hon. Judge Sprague says it is a "precept" of our "Divine Master!"

Ellen and William lived here in Boston, intelligent, respected, happy. The first blow of the fugitive slave bill must fall on them. In October, 1850, one Hughes, a jailer from Macon, Georgia, a public negro-whipper, who had once beaten Ellen's uncle "almost to death," came here with one Knight, his attendant, to kidnap William and Ellen Craft. They applied to Hon. Mr. Hallett for a writ. Perhaps they had heard (false) rumors that the Hon. Commissioner was "a little slippery in his character;" that he was "not overscrupulous in his conduct;" that he "would do any dirty work for political preferment." Gentlemen, you know that such rumors will get abroad, and will be whispered of the best of men. Of course you would never believe them in this case: but a kidnapper from Georgia might; "distance lends" illusion, as well as "enchantment, to the view." But be that as it may, Mr. Hallett (in 1850) appeared to have too much manhood to kidnap a man. He was better than his reputation; I mean his reputation with Knight and Hughes, and would not (then) steal Mr. and Mrs. Craft. This is small praise; it is large in comparison with the conduct of his official brethren. But for the salvation of the Union another Commissioner was found who had no such scruples. This Honorable Court—Mr. Woodbury was then in the chief place, and Mr. Sprague in his present position—issued the writ of man-stealing. Two gentlemen of this city were eminently, but secretly, active in their attempt to kidnap their victim. I shall speak of them by and by. Somebody took care of Ellen Craft. William less needed help; he armed himself with pistols and a poignard, and walked in the streets in the face of the sun. He was a tall, brave man, and was quite as cool then as this Honorable Court is now, while I relate their "glorious first essay" in man-stealing. Public opinion at length drove the (southern) kidnappers from Boston. Then the Crafts also left the town and the country, and found in the Monarchical Aristocracy of Old England what the New England Democracy refused to allow them—protection of their unalienable right to Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

Gentlemen, the Evangelists of slavery could not allow a Southern kidnapper to come to Boston and not steal his man: they were in great wrath at the defeat of Hughes and Knights. So they procured a meeting at Faneuil Hall to make ready for effectual kidnapping and restoring Slavery to Boston. "The great Union meeting" was held at Faneuil Hall November 26th, 1850,—two days before the annual Thanksgiving; it was "a preparatory meeting" to make ready the hearts of the People for that dear New England festival when we thank God for the Harvest of the Land, and the Harvest of the Sea, and still more for the State whose laws are Righteousness, and the Church that offers us "the Liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free," "the glorious Liberty of the Sons of God." Here are the Resolutions which were passed.

"Resolved, That the preservation of the Constitution and the Union is the paramount duty of all citizens;—that the blessings which have flowed from them in times past, which the whole country is now enjoying under them, and which we firmly believe posterity will derive from them hereafter, are incalculable; and that they vastly transcend in importance all other political objects and considerations whatever.

"Resolved, That it would be folly to deny that there has been and still is danger to the existence of the Union, where there is prevalent so much of a spirit of disunion, constantly weakening its strength and alienating the minds of one part of the people of the United States from another; and that if this spirit be not checked and restrained, and do not give way to a spirit of conciliation and of patriotic devotion to the general good of the whole country, we cannot expect a long continuance of the political tie which has hitherto made us one people; but must rather look to see groups of rival neighboring republics, whose existence will be a state of perpetual conflict and open war.

"Resolved, That all the provisions of the Constitution of the United States—the supreme law of the land—are equally binding upon every citizen, and upon every State in the Union;—that all laws passed by Congress, in pursuance of the Constitution, are equally binding on all the citizens, and no man is at liberty to resist or disobey any one constitutional act of Congress any more than another; and that we do not desire or intend to claim the benefit of any one of the powers or advantages of the Constitution, and to refuse, or seem to refuse, to perform any part of its duties, or to submit to any part of its obligations.

"Resolved, That the adjustment of the measures which disturbed the action of Congress for nearly ten months of its last session, ought to be carried out by the people of the United States in good faith, in all the substantial provisions; because, although we may differ with each other about the details of those measures, yet, in our judgment, a renewed popular agitation of any of the main questions then settled, would be fraught with new and extreme dangers to the peace and harmony of the country, which this adjustment has happily restored.

"Resolved, That every species and form of resistance to the execution of a regularly enacted law, except by peaceable appeal to the regular action of the judicial tribunals upon the question of its constitutionality—an appeal which ought never to be opposed or impeded—is mischievous, and subversive of the first principles of social order, and tends to anarchy and bloodshed.

"Resolved, That men, who directly or indirectly instigate or encourage those who are or may be the subjects of legal process, to offer violent resistance to the officers of the law, deserve the reprehension of an indignant community, and the severest punishment which its laws have provided for their offence; and that we have entire confidence that any combination or attempt to fix such a blot upon the fair fame of our State or city, will be promptly rebuked and punished, by an independent and impartial judiciary, and by firm and enlightened juries.

"Resolved, That we will at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances, so far as our acts or influence may extend, sustain the Federal Union, uphold its Constitution, and enforce the duty of obedience to the laws."

A singular preparation for a Thanksgiving day in Boston! But on that festival, Gentlemen, three Unitarian ministers thanked God that the fugitive slave bill would be kept in all the land!

Several speeches were made at the meeting, some by Whigs, some by Democrats, for it was a "Union meeting," where Herod and Pilate were made friends. Gentlemen, I must depart a little from the severity of this defence and indulge you with some of the remarks of my distinguished opponent, Hon. Attorney Hallett: then he was merely a lawyer, and fugitive slave bill Commissioner, appointed "to take bail, affidavits," and colored men,—he was only an expectant Attorney. His speech was a forerunner of the "Indictment" which has brought us together. Hearken to the words of Mr. Hallett in his "preparatory lecture:"—

"We can now say that there is no law of the United States which cannot be executed in Massachusetts. If there was any doubt before, there can be no doubt now; and if there be any wild enough hereafter to resort to a fancied 'Higher Law' to put down law [that is, the fugitive slave bill], they will find in your determined will a stronger law to sustain all the laws of the United States." "The threatened nullification comes from Massachusetts upon a law [the fugitive slave bill] which the whole South insist is vital to the protection of their property and industry [much of their "property" and "industry" being addicted to running away]. And shall Massachusetts nullify that law?" "The question for us to-day is whether we will in good faith abide by, and carry out these Peace Measures [for the rendition of fugitive slaves, the new establishment of Slavery in Utah and New Mexico, and the restoration of it to all the North] or whether we shall rush into renewed agitation," etc. "Resort is had to a new form of moral treason which assumes by the mysterious power of a 'Higher Law' to trample down all law [that is, the fugitive slave bill]. Some of our fellow-citizens have avowed that the fugitive slave bill is to be treated like the Stamp Act, and never to be enforced in Massachusetts. If that means any thing, it means that which our fathers meant when they resisted the Stamp Act and threw the tea overboard—Revolution.[181] It [opposition to the fugitive slave bill] is revolution, or it is treason. If it only resists law, and obstructs its officers, it is treason; and he who risks it, must risk hanging for it."[182]

Gentlemen, that meeting determined to execute the fugitive slave bill "with all its provisions, to the fullest extent." It is dreadful to remember the articles in the Daily Advertiser and the Courier at that period. Some of the sermons in the Churches of Commerce on the following Thursday, Thanksgiving day, were filled with the most odious doctrines of practical atheism. The "preparatory meeting" had its effect. Soon the seed bore fruit after its kind. But some ministers were faithful to their Brother and their Lord.

(2.) February 15th, 1851, a colored man named "Shadrach" was arrested under a warrant from that Commissioner who had been so active in the attempt to kidnap Mr. and Mrs. Craft. But a "miracle" was wrought: "where sin abounded Grace did much more abound," and "the Lord delivered him out of their hands." Shadrach went free to Canada, where he is now a useful citizen. He was rescued by a small number of colored persons at noonday. The kidnapping Commissioner telegraphed to Mr. Webster, "It is levying war—it is treason." Another asked, "What is to be done?" The answer from Washington was, "Mr. Webster was very much mortified."

On the 18th, President Fillmore, at Mr. Webster's instigation, issued his proclamation calling on all well disposed citizens, and commanding all officers, "civil and military, to aid and assist in quelling this, and all other such combinations, and to assist in recapturing the above-named person" Shadrach. General orders came down from the Secretaries of War and the Navy, commanding the military and naval officers to yield all practicable assistance in the event of such another "insurrection." The City Government of Boston passed Resolutions regretting that a man had been saved from the shackles of slavery; cordially approving of the President's proclamation, and promising their earnest efforts to carry out his recommendations. At that time Hon. Mr. Tukey was Marshal; Hon. John P. Bigelow was Mayor; Hon. Henry J. Gardner, a man equally remarkable for his temperance, truthfulness, and general integrity, was President of the Common Council.

It was not long, Gentlemen, before the City Government had an opportunity to keep its word.

(3.) On the night of the 3d of April, 1851, Thomas Sims was kidnapped by two police officers of Boston, pretending to arrest him for theft! Gentlemen of the Jury, you know the rest. He was on trial nine days. He never saw the face of a jury, a judge only once—who refused the Habeas Corpus, the great "Writ of Right." That judge—I wish his successors may better serve mankind—has gone to his own place; where, may God Almighty have mercy on his soul! You remember, Gentlemen, the chains round the Court House; the Judges of your own Supreme Court crawling under the southern chain. You do not forget the "Sims Brigade"—citizen soldiers called out and billeted in Faneuil Hall. You recollect the Cradle of Liberty shut to a Free Soil Convention, but open to those hirelings of the Slave Master. You will never forget the Pro-Slavery Sermons that stained so many Boston pulpits on the "Fast-day" which intervened during the mock trial!

Mr. Sims had able defenders,—I speak now only of such as appeared on his behalf, others not less noble and powerful, aided by their unrecorded service—Mr. Sewall, Mr. Rantoul, men always on the side of Liberty, and one more from whose subsequent conduct, Gentlemen of the Jury, I grieve to say it, you would not expect such magnanimity then, Mr. Charles G. Loring. But of what avail was all this before such a Commissioner? Thomas Sims was declared "a chattel personal to all intents, uses, and purposes whatsoever." After it became plain that he would be decreed a slave, the poor victim of Boston kidnappers asked one boon of his counsel, "I cannot go back to Slavery," said he, "give me a knife, and when the Commissioner declares me a slave I will stab myself to the heart, and die before his eyes! I will not be a slave." The knife was withheld! At the darkest hour of the night Mayor Bigelow and Marshal Tukey, suitable companions, admirably joined by nature as by vocation, with two or three hundred police-men armed, some with bludgeons, some with drawn swords and horse pistols, took the poor boy out of his cell, chained, weeping, and bore him over the spot where, on the 5th of March, 1770, the British tyrant first shed New England blood; by another spot where your fathers and mine threw to the ocean the taxed tea of the oppressor. They put him on board a vessel, the "Acorn," and carried him off to eternal bondage. "And this is Massachusetts liberty!" said he, as he stepped on board. Boston sent her Delegates to escort him back, and on the 19th of April, 1851, she delivered him up to his tormentors in the jail at Savannah, where he was scourged till human nature could bear no more, while his captors were feasted at the public cost. Seventy-six years before there was another 19th of April, also famous!

(4.) Then came the examination and "trial" of the Shadrach Rescuers in February and the following months. Some of these trials took place before his Honor Judge Peleg Sprague. Therefore, you will allow me, Gentlemen, to refresh your memories with a word or two respecting the antecedents of this Judge—his previous history.

In 1835 the abolition of Slavery in the British West Indies and the efforts of the friends of Freedom in the Northern States, excited great alarm at the South, lest the "peculiar institution" should itself be brought into peril. Fear of a "general insurrection of the slaves" was talked about and perhaps felt. The mails were opened in search of "incendiary publications;" a piano-forte sent from Boston to Virginia, was returned because the purchaser found an old copy of the "Emancipator" in the case which contained it. Public meetings for the promotion of American Slavery were held. There was one at Boston in Faneuil Hall, August 21, 1835, at which a remarkable speech was made by a lawyer who had graduated at Harvard College in 1812, a man no longer young, of large talents and great attainments in the law. He spoke against discussion, and in behalf of Slavery and Slaveholders: he could see no good, but only unmixed evil "consequent upon agitating this subject here." He said:—

"When did fear ever induce a man to relax his power over the object that excited it? No, he will hold him down with a stronger grasp, he will draw the cords tighter, he will make the chains heavier and sink his victim to a still deeper dungeon."

"The language and measures of the abolitionists clearly tend to insurrection and violence." "They [the slaves] hear that their masters have no legal or moral authority over them. That every moment's exercise of such dominion is sin, and that the laws that sanction it are morally void: that they are entitled to immediate emancipation, and that their masters are to be regarded as kidnappers and robbers for refusing it." "It is deluding these unfortunate beings to their own destruction, we should not aid them. The Constitution provides for the suppressing of insurrections ... we should respond to its call [if the slaves attempted to recover their liberty]; nay, we should not wait for such a requisition, but on the instant should rush forward with fraternal emotions to defend our brethren from desolation and massacre."

"The South will not tolerate our interference with their slaves, [by our discussing the matter in the newspapers and elsewhere]." "The Union then, if used to disturb this institution of Slavery, will be then as the 'spider's web; a breath will agitate, a blast will sweep it away forever.'"

"If, then, these abolitionists shall go on ... the fate of our government is sealed.... And who will attempt to fathom the immeasurable abyss of a dissolution of the Union?"

"Tell the abolitionists this; present to them in full array the consequences of their attempts at immediate emancipation, and they meet all by a cold abstraction. They answer, 'We must do right regardless of consequences.'" "They assume that such a course [undoing the heavy burthens and letting the oppressed go free, and loving your neighbor as yourself] is right. When that is the very point in controversy, and when inevitable consequences demonstrate that it must be wrong."

"They [the abolitionists] insist upon immediate, instantaneous emancipation.... No man, say they, can be rightfully restrained of his liberty except for crime." "They come to the conclusion that no laws that sanction or uphold it [Slavery] can have any moral obligation. The Constitution is the Supreme law of the land. It does sanction, it does uphold Slavery; and if this doctrine be true, that sacred compact has always been [so far] morally null and void." "He [Washington] that Slaveholder ... came with other Slaveholders to drive the British myrmidons from this city and this Hall. Our fathers did not refuse to hold communion with him or with them. With Slaveholders they formed the Confederation ... with them they made the Declaration of Independence." "And in the original draft of the Declaration was contained a most eloquent passage upon this very topic of negro Slavery, which was stricken out in deference to the wishes of members from the South." "Slavery existed then as now." "Our fathers were not less devoted friends of liberty, not less pure as philanthropists or pious as Christians than any of their children of the present day." [Therefore we must not attempt to emancipate a slave!]

Here is the passage which the speaker thought it so praiseworthy in the Revolutionary Congress to strike out from the Declaration of Independence:—

"He [the king] has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of Infidel nations, is the warfare of the Christian King of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where Men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce. And that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished dye, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he also obtruded them: thus paying off former crimes committed against the Liberties of one people with crimes which he urges them to commit against the Lives of another."

Mr. Jefferson says, "It was struck out in compliance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and who, on the contrary, still wished to continue it. Our Northern brethren also, I believe, felt a little tender under it, for though their people have very few slaves themselves, yet they have been pretty considerable carriers of them to others."

But the orator went on protesting against righteousness:—

"I would beseech them [the Abolitionists] to discard their dangerous abstractions [that men are endowed by their Creator with certain natural, equal, and unalienable Rights—to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness] which they [in common with the Declaration of Independence] adopt as universal rules of human conduct—without regard to time, condition, or circumstances; which darken the understanding and mislead the judgment, and urge them forward to consequences from which they will shrink back with horror. I would ask them to reflect that ... the religion they profess is not to be advanced by forgetting the precepts and the example of their Divine Master. Upon that example I would ask them to pause. He found Slavery, Roman Slavery, an institution of the country in which he lived. Did he denounce it? Did he attempt its immediate abolition? Did he do any thing, or say any thing which could in its remotest tendency encourage resistance and violence? No, his precept was, 'Servants (Slaves) obey your Masters.'"[183] "It was because he would not interfere with the administration of the laws, or abrogate their authority."

Gentlemen of the Jury, this alleged precept of the "Divine Master" does not occur in any one of the four canonical Evangelists of the New Testament; nor have I found it in any of those Spurious and Apocryphal Records of old time. It appears originally in the Gospel according to the Hon. Peleg Sprague. "Slaves, obey your masters," "a comfortable Scripture" truly; a beatitude for the stealers of men!

Gentlemen of the Jury, that was the language of Mr. Peleg Sprague at the time when the State of Georgia offered $5,000 for the head of Mr. Garrison; when the Governors of Virginia and other Slave States, sent letters to the Governor of Massachusetts asking for "penal statutes" to prohibit our discussion in Boston; it was the very year that a mob of "Gentlemen of Property and Standing" in Boston broke up a meeting of women assembled to endeavor to abolish Slavery. Gentlemen of the Jury, Mr. Sprague had his reward—he sits on the bench to try me for a "misdemeanor"—"obstructing, resisting, and opposing an officer of the United States," "while in the discharge of his duty" to steal a man in Boston, that his "owner" might sell him in Richmond. The "chief commandment" of the New Testament is, "Slaves, obey your masters;" on that commandment he would now hang all the law, and the Abolitionists.

It would take a long time to tell the dark, sad tale of the trial of the Shadrach Rescuers; how the Judge constructed and charged the Jury; how he constructed his "law." It was the old story of the Stuart despotism, wickedness in the name of the law and with its forms. Gentlemen, in that trial you saw the value of the jury. The Judges of Massachusetts went under the chain which the kidnappers placed about the Court House in 1851. The Federal Judges sought to kidnap the citizens of Boston and to punish all such as opposed man-stealing. The Massachusetts Judges allowed the law, which they had sworn to execute, to be struck down to the ground; nay, themselves sought to strike it down. The Federal Judges perverted the law to make it an instrument of torture against all such as love mankind. But the jury held up the Shield of Justice, and the poisoned weapons of the court fell blunted to the ground. The government took nothing by that motion—nothing but defeat. There was no conviction. One of the jurors said, "You may get one Hunker on any panel; it is not easy to get twelve. There was no danger of a conviction." But still it is painful to think in what peril our lives and our liberties then were.

(5.) At length came the "Burns case." You know it too well. On the night of Wednesday, May 26, 1854, in virtue of Commissioner Loring's warrant, Anthony Burns was arrested on the charge of burglary, and thrust into jail. The next morning he was brought up for condemnation. Two noble men, Mr. Dana and my friend Mr. Ellis, defended Mr. Burns. There was to be no regular trial before Commissioner Loring.

On the evening of Friday, May 28th, there was a meeting at Faneuil Hall, and an attack on the Court House where Mr. Burns was illegally held in duress. In the attack a Mr. Batchelder was killed,—a man hired to aid in this kidnapping, as he had been in the stealing of Mr. Sims. To judge from the evidence offered before the Grand-Jury of the Massachusetts Court, and especially from the testimony of Marshal Freeman, it appears he was accidentally killed by some of his own confederates in that wickedness, and before the door of the Court House was broken through. But that is of no consequence: as Mr. Dana has said, "He went in for his pay, and has got his corn." On Friday, June 4th, Mr. Burns was declared a slave by Commissioner Loring and delivered up to eternal bondage.

It seems to be in consequence of my connection with this case that I am indicted; so you now approach the end of this long defence. I come to the last part of it.

(III.) Of the Indictment against Theodore Parker.

I am indicted, gentlemen, for "resisting an officer" who was engaged in kidnapping Mr. Burns; and it is charged that I, at Boston, May 26th, "with force and arms did knowingly and wilfully, obstruct, resist, and oppose, ... Watson Freeman, then and there being an officer of the United States, to the great damage of the said Watson Freeman; to the great hinderance and obstruction of justice, [to wit, of the kidnapping of Anthony Burns,] to the evil example of all others in like case offending, against the peace and dignity of the said United States and contrary to the form of the statute made and provided."

It is also charged that "one Theodore Parker of Boston, ... with force and arms in and upon the said Watson Freeman, then and there, in the peace of the said United States being, an assault did make, he the said Freeman also then and there being an officer of the said United States, to wit, Marshal of the United States, ... and then and there also being in the due and lawful discharge of his duties as such officer" [to wit, stealing and kidnapping one Anthony Burns]. These and various other pleasant charges, Mr. Hallett, in the jocose manner of indictments, alleges against me; wherefrom I must defend myself, as best I may.

Now, Gentlemen, that you may completely understand the accusation brought against me, I must go back a little, and bring up several other matters of fact that have straggled away from this long column of argument which I have led into the field thus far;—and also rally some new forces not before drawn into the line of defence. I must speak of the Hon. Justice Curtis; of his conduct in relation to Slavery in general, to this particular prosecution, and to this special case, United States vs. Theodore Parker.

First, Gentlemen, let me speak of some events which preceded Mr. Curtis's elevation to his present distinguished post. To make the whole case perfectly clear, I must make mention of some others intimately connected with him.

There is a family in Boston which may be called the Curtis family. So far as it relates to the matter in hand, it may be said to consist of six persons, namely, Charles P. Curtis, lawyer, and Thomas B. Curtis, merchant, sons of the late Thomas Curtis; Benjamin R. Curtis, by birth a kinsman, and by marriage a son-in-law of Charles P. Curtis, late a practising lawyer, now this Honorable Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, and his brother, George T. Curtis, lawyer, and United States Commissioner for the District of Massachusetts; Edward G. Loring, a step-son of the late Thomas Curtis, and accordingly step-brother of Charles P. and Thomas B. Curtis, lawyer, Judge of Probate for Boston, United States Commissioner, and, until recently, Lecturer at the Cambridge Law School; and also William W. Greenough, son-in-law of Charles P. Curtis, merchant.

This family, though possessing many good qualities, has had a remarkably close and intimate connection with all, or most, of the recent cases of kidnapping in Boston. Here are some of the facts, so painful for me to relate, but so indispensable to a full understanding of this case.

1. In 1836 Charles P. Curtis and Benjamin R. Curtis appeared as counsel for the slave-hunters in the famous case of the girl Med, originally a slave in the West Indies, and brought to Boston by her mistress. Med claimed her freedom on the ground that slavery was not recognized by the laws of Massachusetts, and could not exist here unless it were in the special case, under the Federal Constitution, of fugitives from the slave States of this Union. The Messrs. Curtis contended with all their skill—totis viribus, as lawyers say—that slavery might, by legal comity, exist in Massachusetts—that slaves were property by the law of nations; and that an ownership which is legal in the West Indies continued in Boston, at least so far as to leave the right to seize and carry away.

Mr. Charles P. Curtis had already appeared as counsel for a slave-hunter in 1832, and had succeeded in restoring a slave child, only twelve or fourteen years of age, to his claimant who took him to Cuba with the valuable promise that he should be free in the Spanish West Indies.[184]

In the Med case Mr. Benjamin R. Curtis made a long and elaborate argument to show that "a citizen of a slaveholding State, who comes to Massachusetts for a temporary purpose of business or pleasure and brings his slave as a personal attendant, may restrain that slave for the purpose of carrying him out of the State and returning him to the domicil of his owner." To support this proposition, he made two points:—

"1. That this child by the law of Louisiana is now a slave."

"2. That the law of Massachusetts will so far recognize and give effect to the law of Louisiana, as to allow the master to exercise this restricted power over his slave." That is, the power to keep her here as a slave, to remove her to Louisiana, and so make her a slave for ever and her children after her.

To prove this last point he says by quotation, "we always import, together with their persons, the existing relations of foreigners between themselves." So as we "import" the natural relation of husband and wife, or parent and child, in the Irish immigrants, and respect the same, we ought equally to import and respect the unnatural and forcible relation of master and slave in our visitors from Cuba or Louisiana.

"It will be urged," he said, "that though we claim to exercise only a qualified and limited right over the slave, namely the right to remove him from the State, yet if this is allowed, all the rights of the master must be allowed, ... and thus Slavery will be introduced into the Commonwealth. To this I answer,

"(1.) There is no practical difficulty in giving this qualified effect to the law of Louisiana, [allowing the master to bring and keep his slaves here and remove them when he will]. The Constitution of the United States has settled this question. That provides for and secures to the master, the exercise of his right to the very extent claimed in this case."

"(2.) Neither is there any theoretical difficulty."

To do this, he thinks, will "promote harmony and good feeling, where it is extremely desirable to promote it, encourage frequent intercourse, and soften prejudices by increasing acquaintance, and tend to peace and union and good-will." "It will work no injury to the State [Massachusetts], by violating any public law of the State. The only law in the statute-book applicable to the subject of Slavery is the law against kidnapping." "It will work no direct injury to the citizens of this State for, ... it respects only strangers." "It is consistent with the public policy of Massachusetts, to permit this ... right of the master." "It may be perfectly consistent with our policy not only to recognize the validity and propriety of those institutions [of Slavery] in the States where they exist, but even to interfere actively to enable the citizens of those States to enjoy those institutions at home." That is, it may be the duty of Massachusetts, "to interfere actively" in Louisiana for the establishment and support of Slavery there!

Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, he adds, have made laws allowing the slaveholder this right: "The legislatures of those States are the legitimate and highest authority in regard to their public policy; what they have declared on this subject, must be deemed to be true.... We are not at liberty to suppose that it is contrary to their public policy, that the master should exercise this right within their territory. I respectfully ask what difference there is between the policy of Pennsylvania, New York, Rhode Island, and New Jersey, and the policy of Massachusetts, on the subject of Slavery."

"I shall now attempt," he adds, "to prove that Slavery is not immoral." How do you think he proved that? Did he cite the Bible? No, he left that to lower law divines. Did he manufacture Bible? No, the Hon. Peleg Sprague had sufficiently done that a year before. He took a shorter cut—he denied there was any morality but Legality. "I take it to be perfectly clear," said this young man in all the moral enthusiasm of his youth, "that the Standard of Morality by which Courts of Justice are to be guided is that which the law prescribes. Your Honors' Opinion as Men or as Moralists has no bearing on the question. Your Honors are to declare what the Law deems moral or immoral."

Gentlemen, that needs no comment; this trial is comment enough. But according to that rule no law is immoral. It was "not immoral" in 1410 to hang and burn thirty-nine men in one day for reading the Bible in English; the Catholic Inquisition in Spain was "not immoral;" the butchery of Martyrs was all right soon as lawful! There is no Higher Law!

It was "not immoral" for the servants of King Pharaoh to drown all the new-born Hebrew boys; nor for Herod's butchers to murder the Innocents at Bethlehem. Nay, all the atrocities of the Saint Bartholomew Massacres, Gentlemen, they were "not immoral," for "the Standard of Morality" is "that which the law prescribes." So any legislature that can frame an act, any tyrant who can issue a decree, any court which can deliver an "opinion," can at once nullify the legislation of the Universe and "dissolve the union" of Man and God: "Religion has nothing to do with politics; there it makes men mad." Is that the doctrine of Young Massachusetts? Hearken then to the Old. In 1765 her House of Representatives unanimously resolved that "there are certain essential Rights ... which are founded on the Law of God and Nature, and are the Common Rights of Mankind, and that the inhabitants of this Province are unalienably entitled to these essential Rights in common with all men, and that no law of Society ... can divest them of these Rights." No "Standard of Morality" but Law! A thousand years before Jesus of Nazareth taught his Beatitudes of Humanity, the old Hebrews knew better. Hearken to a Psalm nearly three thousand years old.

Among the assemblies of the great, A Greater Ruler takes his seat; The God of Heaven, as Judge, surveys Those Gods on earth, and all their ways. Why will ye, then, frame wicked laws? Or why support the unrighteous cause? When will ye once defend the poor, That sinners vex the Saints no more? Arise, oh Lord, and let thy Son Possess his universal Throne, And rule the nations with his rod; He is our Judge, and he our God.

"By the law of this Commonwealth," added Mr. Curtis, "Slavery is not immoral. By the Supreme law of this Commonwealth Slavery is not only recognized as a valid institution, but to a certain extent is incorporated into our own law. Before you [the court] rise from your seats, you may be called upon by the master of a fugitive slave, to grant a certificate ... which will put the whole force of the Commonwealth at his disposal, to remove his slave from our Territory."

Gentlemen of the Jury, that was conquering his prejudices "with alacrity;" it was obeying the fugitive slave bill fourteen years before it was heard of.

He adds still further, by quotation, "I have no doubt but the citizen of a Slave State has a right to pass, upon business or pleasure, through any of the States attended by his slaves—and his right to reclaim his slave would be unquestioned. An escape from the attendance upon the person of his master, while on a journey through a free State, should be considered as an escape from the State where the master had a right of citizenship."

Mr. Charles P. Curtis thus sustained his kinsman:—

"Is that to be considered immoral which the Court is bound to assist in doing? It is not for us to denounce as legally immoral a practice which is permitted and sanctioned by the supreme law of the land!" "It is said the practice of Slavery is corrupting in its influence on public morals. But the practice of bringing slaves here was much more common thirty years ago than now. If this practice be so corrupting, why is it tolerated in other States?"... "The law of New York allows even foreigners to go there with their slaves; and have the morals of that State suffered in consequence? In Pennsylvania the law is similar, but where is the evidence of its pernicious influence?" "As to the right to using them, [the slaves voluntarily brought here by their masters,] notwithstanding the supposed horror at such an admission, the legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and New Jersey, have actually enacted statutes allowing precisely that privilege."[185]

But the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held otherwise. Med was declared free. Chief Justice Shaw covered himself with honor by his decision. And soon after, (Aug. 29,) the Daily Advertiser, the "organ" of the opinions of this family, said:—

"In some of the States there is ... legislative provision for cases of this sort, [allowing masters to bring and hold slaves therein,] and it would seem that some such provision is necessary in this State, unless we would prohibit citizens of the Slave States from travelling in this State with their families, and unless we would permit such of them as wish to emancipate their slaves, to throw them, at their pleasure, upon the people of this State."

Gentlemen, Mr. Curtis in 1836 contended for all which Mr. Toombs boasts he shall get—the right of the slaveholder to sit down at the foot of Bunker Hill monument with his slaves! Nay, Mr. Curtis granted more: it may be the duty of Massachusetts "to interfere actively," and establish slavery in Louisiana, or in Kansas. It may be said, this was only a lawyer pleading for his client. It was—a lawyer asking the Supreme Court of Massachusetts to establish slavery in this Commonwealth. Is it innocent in a lawyer to ask the court to do a wicked thing, to urge the court to do it? Then is it equally innocent to ask the Treasurer of a Railroad to forge stock, or an editor to publish lies, or a counterfeiter to make and utter base coin, or an assassin to murder men. Surely it is as innocent to urge men to kidnap blacks in Africa as in Boston.

Gentlemen, That declaration—that the Statute supersedes natural Justice, and that the only "Standard of Morality" by which the courts are to be guided is "that which the law prescribes"—deserves your careful consideration. "He that squares his conscience by the law is a scoundrel"—say the proverbs of many nations. What do you think of a man who knows no lawgiver but the General Court of Massachusetts, or the American Congress: no Justice but the Statutes? If Mr. Curtis's doctrine is correct, then Franklin, Hancock, Adams, Washington, were only Rebels and Traitors! They refused that "Standard of Morality." Nay, our Puritan Fathers were all "criminals;" the twelve Apostles committed not only "misdemeanors" but sins; and Jesus of Nazareth was only a malefactor, a wanton disturber of the public peace of the world!

The slave child Med, poor, fatherless, and unprotected, comes before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, claiming her natural and unalienable Right to Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness,—if not granted she is a slave for ever. In behalf of her wealthy "owner" Mr. Curtis resists the girl's claim; tells the court she "is now a slave;" there is "no practical difficulty" in allowing the master to keep her in that condition, no "theoretical difficulty;" "slavery is not immoral;" it may be the duty of Massachusetts not only to recognize slavery at home, but also "even to interfere actively" to support slavery abroad; the law is the only "Standard of Morality" for the courts; that establishes slavery in Massachusetts! Gentlemen, what do mankind say to such sophistry? Hearken to this Hebrew Bible: "Wo unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and that write grievousness which they have prescribed, to turn aside the needy from judgment, and to take away the Right from the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey, and that they may rob the fatherless." Let the stern Psalm of the Puritans still further answer from the manly bosom of the Bible.

"Judges who rule the world by laws, Will ye despise the righteous cause, When the injured poor before you stands? Dare ye condemn the righteous poor And let rich sinners 'scape secure, While Gold and Greatness bribe your hands? "Have ye forgot, or never knew, That God will judge the judges too? High in the Heavens his Justice reigns; Yet you invade the rights of God, And send your bold decrees abroad, To bind the Conscience in your chains. "Break out their teeth, eternal God, Those teeth of lions dy'd in blood; And crush the serpents in the dust; As empty chaff, when whirlwinds rise, Before the sweeping tempest flies, So let their hopes and names be lost. "Thus shall the Justice of the Lord Freedom and peace to men afford; And all that hear shall join and say, Sure there's a God that rules on high, A God that hears his children cry, And all their sufferings will repay."

2. After Mr. Webster had made his speech of March 7, 1850, pledging himself and his State to the support of the fugitive slave bill, then before Congress, "to the fullest extent," Thomas B. Curtis, with the help of others, got up a letter to Mr. Webster, dated March 25, 1850, signed, it is said, by 987 persons, who say: "We desire to express to you our deep obligations for what this speech has done and is doing." "You have pointed out to a whole people the path of duty, have convinced the understanding and touched the conscience of the nation." "We desire, therefore, to express to you our entire concurrence in the sentiments of your speech."

3. A little later, Mr. Webster returned to Boston, and was "rapturously received" at the Revere House, April 29, 1850, by a "great multitude," when Benjamin R. Curtis made a public address, and expressed his "abounding gratitude for the ability and fidelity" which Mr. Webster had "brought to the defence of the Constitution and of the Union," and commended him as "eminently vigilant, wise, and faithful to his country, without a shadow of turning."

4. Presently, after the passage of the fugitive slave bill, at a dinner party, at the house of a distinguished counsellor of Boston, Charles P. Curtis declared that he hoped the first fugitive slave who should come to Boston would be seized and sent back!

5. Charles P. Curtis and his step-brother Edward G. Loring, and George T. Curtis, defended the fugitive slave bill by writing articles in the Boston Daily Advertiser.

6. In November, 1850, the slave-hunters, thus invited and encouraged, came to Boston, seeking to kidnap William and Ellen Craft: but they in vain applied to Commissioner Benj. F. Hallett, and to Judges Woodbury and Sprague, for a warrant to arrest their prey. Finally, they betook themselves to Commissioner George T. Curtis, who at once agreed to grant a warrant; but, according to his own statement, in a letter to Mr. Webster, Nov. 23, 1850, as he anticipated resistance, and considered it very important that the Marshal should have more support than it was in his power as a Commissioner to afford, he procured a meeting of the Commissioners, four in number, and with their aid succeeded in persuading the Circuit Court, then in session, to issue the warrant.

Gentlemen, as that letter of Mr. George T. Curtis contains some matters which are of great importance, you will thank me for refreshing your memory with such pieces of history.

"An application [for a warrant to arrest Mr. Craft] had already been made to the judges [Messrs. Woodbury and Sprague] privately ... they could not grant a warrant on account of the pendency of an important Patent Cause then on trial before a jury." "To this I replied, that ... the ordinary business of the Court ought to give way for a sufficient length of time, to enable the judges to receive this application and to hear the case." "On a private intimation to the presiding judge of our desire to confer with him [the desire of the kidnapping commissioners, Mr. B.F. Hallett, Mr. Edward G. Loring, Mr. C.L. Woodbury, and Mr. G.T. Curtis] the jury were dismissed at an earlier hour than usual, ... and every person present except the Marshal's deputies left the room, and the doors were closed." "The learned Judge said ... that he would attend at half past eight the next morning, to grant the warrant." "A process was placed in the hands of the Marshal ... in the execution of which he might be called upon to break open dwelling-houses, and perhaps take life, by quelling resistance, actual or threatened." "I devoted at once a good deal of time to the necessary investigations of the subject." "There is a great deal of legislation needed to make the general government independent of State control," says this "Expounder of the Constitution," "and independent of the power of mobs, whenever and wherever its measures chance to be unpopular." "The office of United States Marshal is by no means organized and fortified by legislation as it should be to encounter popular disturbance."

7. The warrant having been issued for the seizure of Mr. Craft, Marshal Devens applied to Benjamin R. Curtis for legal advice as to the degree of force he might use in serving it, and whether it ought to be regarded as a civil or a criminal process. George T. Curtis was employed by his brother to search for authorities on these points. They two, together, as appears from the letter of George T. Curtis to Mr. Webster, induced Marshal Devens to ask a further question, which gave Benjamin R. Curtis an opportunity to come out with an elaborate opinion in favor of the constitutionality of the fugitive slave bill, dated November 9, 1850. This was published in the newspapers. In order to maintain the constitutionality of this act, Benjamin R. Curtis was driven to assume, as all its defenders must, that the Commissioner, in returning the fugitive, performs none of the duties of a Judge; that the hearing before him is not "a case arising under the laws of the United States;" that he acts not as a judicial, but merely as an executive and "ministerial" officer—not deciding him to be a slave, but merely giving him up, to enable that point to be tried elsewhere.[186] But, spite of this opinion, public justice and the Vigilance Committee forced the (Southern) slave-hunters to flee from Boston, after which, Mr. and Mrs. Craft left America to find safety in England, the evident rage and fierce threats of the disappointed Boston slave-hunters making it unsafe for them to remain.

8. After the failure of this attempt to arrest Mr. Craft, Thomas B. Curtis got up a "Union Meeting" at Faneuil Hall, November 26, 1850.[187] The call was addressed to such as "regard with disfavor all further popular agitation" of the subject of Slavery. Thomas B. Curtis called the meeting to order: William W. Greenough, from the "Committee of Arrangements," presented the resolutions, which you have already heard.[188] It was said at the time that they were written, wholly or in part, by Mr. Benjamin R. Curtis, who moved their adoption and made a long and elaborate speech thereon.

Gentlemen of the Jury, as I just now gave you some passages from Mr. Hallett's speech on that occasion, allow me now to read you some extracts from Mr. Curtis's address. The general aim of the speech was to reconcile the People to kidnapping; the rhetorical means to this end were an attempt to show that kidnapping was expedient; that it was indispensable; that it had been long since agreed to; that the Slaves were foreigners and had no right in Massachusetts. He said:—

"We have come here not to consider particular measures of government but to assert that we have a government, not to determine whether this or that law be wise or just, but to declare that there is law, and its duties and power."

"Every sovereign State has and must have the right to judge what persons from abroad shall be admitted."

"Are not these persons [fugitive slaves] foreigners as to us—and what right have they to come here at all, against the will of the legislative power of the State. [Massachusetts had no legislation forbidding them!] And if their coming here or remaining here, is not consistent with the safety of the State and the welfare of the citizens may we not prohibit their coming, or send them back if they come?" "To deny this is to deny the right of self-preservation to a State.... It ... throws us back at once into a condition below the most degraded savages who have a semblance of government." "You know that the great duty of justice could not otherwise be performed, [that is without the fugitive-from-labor clause in the Constitution]; that our peace at home and our safety from foreign aggression could not otherwise be insured; and that only by this means could we obtain 'the Blessings of Liberty' to the people of Massachusetts and their posterity." "In no other way could we become an example of, and security for, the capacity of man, safely and peacefully and wisely to govern himself under free and popular institutions."

So the fugitive slave bill is an argument against human depravity, showing the capacity of man to govern himself "safely and peacefully and wisely."

He adds, as early as 1643 the New England colonies found it necessary "to insert an article substantially like this one," for the rendition of fugitive servants, and in 1789 the Federal government demanded that the Spaniards should surrender the fugitive slaves of Georgia. Injustice, Gentlemen, has never lacked a precedent since Cain killed Abel. Mr. Curtis continues:—

"When I look abroad over 100,000 happy homes in Massachusetts and see a people, such as the blessed sun has rarely shone upon, so intelligent and educated, moral, religious, progressive, and free to do every thing but wrong—I fear to say that I should not be in the wrong to put all this at risk, because our passionate will impels us to break a promise our wise and good fathers made, not to allow a class of foreigners to come here, or to send them back if they came."

So the refusal to kidnap Ellen and William Craft came of the "passionate will" of the people, and is likely to ruin the happy homes of a moral and religious people!

"With the rights of these persons I firmly believe Massachusetts has nothing to do. It is enough for us that they have no right to be here. Whatever natural rights they have—and I admit these natural rights to their fullest extent—this is not the soil on which to vindicate them. This is our soil, sacred to our peace, on which we intend to perform our promises, and work out for the benefit of ourselves and our posterity and the world, the destiny which our Creator has assigned to us."

Gentlemen of the Jury, it is written of that Creator that He is "no Respecter of Persons;" and "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth." The "Our Creator" of Mr. Curtis is also the Father of William and Ellen Craft; and that great Soul who has ploughed his moral truths deep into the history of mankind, represents the final Judge of us all as saying to such as scorned his natural Law of Justice and Humanity, "Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these ye did it not to me."

Massachusetts is "our soil," is it; "sacred to our peace," which is to be made sure of by stealing our brother men, and giving to Commissioners George T. Curtis and Edward G. Loring ten dollars for making a slave, and only five for setting free a man! Peace and the fugitive slave bill! No, Gentlemen of the Jury, it is vain to cry Peace, Peace—when there is no peace! Ay, there is no peace to the wicked; and though the counsel of the ungodly be carried, it is carried headlong!

In that speech, Gentlemen, Mr. Curtis made a special attack upon me:—

"There has been made within these walls," said he, "the declaration that an article of the Constitution [the rendition clause] of the United States 'shall not be executed, law or no law.' A gentleman offered a resolve ... that 'constitution or no constitution, law or no law, we will not allow a fugitive slave to be taken from Massachusetts.' The chairman of a public meeting [Hon. Charles Francis Adams, on October 14th] declared here that 'the law will be resisted, and if the fugitive resists, and if he slay the slave-hunter, or even the Marshal, and if he therefor be brought before a Jury of Massachusetts men, that Jury will not convict him.' And as if there should be nothing wanting to exhibit the madness which has possessed men's minds, murder and perjury have been enacted into virtues, and in this city preached from the sacred desk. I must not be suspected of exaggerating in the least degree. I read therefore the following passage from a sermon preached and published in this city:—

"'Let me suppose a case which may happen here and before long. A woman flies from South Carolina to Massachusetts to escape from bondage. Mr. Greatheart aids her in her escape, harbors and conceals her, and is brought to trial for it. The punishment is a fine of one thousand dollars and imprisonment for six months. I am drawn to serve as a juror and pass upon this offence. I may refuse to serve and be punished for that, leaving men with no scruples to take my place, or I may take the juror's oath to give a verdict according to the law and the testimony. The law is plain, let us suppose, and the testimony conclusive. Greatheart himself confesses that he did the deed alleged, saving one ready to perish. The judge charges that if the jurors are satisfied of that fact then they must return that he is guilty. This is a nice matter. Here are two questions. The one put to me in my official capacity as juror, is this: "Did Greatheart aid the woman?" The other, put to me in my natural character as man, is this: "Will you help punish Greatheart with fine and imprisonment for helping a woman obtain her unalienable rights?" If I have extinguished my manhood by my juror's oath, then I shall do my official business and find Greatheart guilty, and I shall seem to be a true man; but if I value my manhood I shall answer after my natural duty to love man and not hate him, to do him justice, not injustice, to allow him the natural rights he has not alienated, and shall say, "Not guilty." Then men will call me forsworn and a liar, but I think human nature will justify the verdict.'"

"I should like to ask," he continued, "the reverend gentleman in what capacity he expects to be punished for his perjury?" Gentlemen of the Jury, I rose and said, "Do you want an answer to your question, sir?" He had charged me with preaching murder and perjury; had asked, How I expected to be punished for my own "perjury?" When I offered to answer his question he refused me the opportunity to reply! Thus, Gentlemen, he charged me with recommending men to commit perjury! Did he think I advised men to take an oath and break it? On the other side of the page which he read there stood printed:—

"Suppose a man has sworn to keep the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution is found to be wrong in certain particulars; then his oath is not morally binding, for before his oath, by his very existence, he is morally bound to keep the law of God as fast as he learns it. No oath can absolve him from his natural allegiance to God. Yet I see not how a man can knowingly, and with a good Conscience, swear to keep what he deems it wrong to keep, and will not keep, and does not intend to keep."

Gentlemen, when that speech came to be printed—there was no charge of "perjury" at all, but a quite different sentence![189]

9. In February, 1851, George T. Curtis issued the warrant for the seizure of Shadrach, who was "hauled" in to the court house before that Commissioner; but "the Lord delivered him out of their hands," and he also escaped out of the United States of America.

10. After the escape or rescue of Shadrach, George T. Curtis telegraphed the news to Mr. Webster, at Washington, declaring "it is levying war;" thus constructing high treason out of the rescue of a prisoner by unarmed men, from the hands of a sub-deputy officer of the United States.

11. George T. Curtis also officiated as Commissioner in the kidnapping of Thomas Sims, in April, 1851; and under the pretence of "extradition," sent him to be scourged in the jail of Savannah, and then to suffer eternal bondage. It was rumored at the time that Charles P. Curtis and Benjamin R. Curtis, his law-partner and son-in-law, were the secret legal advisers and chamber-counsel of the Southern slave-hunters in this case. I know not how true the rumor was, nor whether it was based on new observation of facts, or was merely an inference from their general conduct and character.

12. When Mr. Sims was brought before Judge Woodbury, on habeas corpus, Benjamin R. Curtis appeared as counsel for the Marshal, and also assisted Judge Woodbury in strengthening his opinion against Sims, by a written note transmitted by an officer of the Court to the Judge, while he was engaged in delivering his opinion.