THE TRIAL.

First Day—February 7.

The first day’s proceedings began with the entrance of the presiding judge, M. Delegorgue, the other members of the court being Councillors Lault and Bousquet. Attorney-General Van Cassel appeared for the prosecution, M. Fernand Labori for M. Zola, and M. Albert Clemenceau, assisted by his brother, M. Georges Clemenceau, for M. Perrenx, the gérant of “L’Aurore.” The court-room of the assize court of the Seine was crowded to its utmost capacity; wherefore the judge, on taking his seat, addressed those present as follows:

“I notify the public that we shall not begin until all are seated. I likewise warn the public that every sort of manifestation, whether for or against the accused, is formally forbidden, and that at the first sign of disorder I shall order the court-room cleared. Please consider this said once for all, for I shall not repeat it.”

The usual dialogue then ensued between the judge and M. Zola.

“Your name?”

“Emile Zola.”

“Your profession?”

“Man of letters.”

“Your age?”

“Fifty-eight years.”

“Your residence?”

“21 bis, Rue de Bruxelles.”

The drawing of the jury was then proceeded with. Three challenges were used by the prosecution, and seven by the defence, the jurors finally selected being as follows:

Foreman, Auguste Dutrieux, merchant; Auguste Leblond, roof-builder; Pierre Emery, merchant; Bernier, molder in copper; Edouard Gressin, clerk; Bouvier, proprietor; Albert Chevanier, wine merchant; Nigon, leather-dresser; Charles Fouquet, seedsman; Joseph Moureire, wire-drawer; Charles Huet, market-gardener; Brunot, linen-draper. Supplementary jurors: Antoine Jourde, tradesman; Alfred Boucreux, butcher.

Then began the reading of the documents in the case by the clerk, the only one of interest being the complaint of Gen. Billot. Referring to M. Zola’s letter, the complainant declared:

This article contains a series of insults and slanders directed against two ministers of war, general officers, and army officers of all grades under their orders. Chiefs and subordinates are above such outrages, and the opinion of parliament, of the country, and of the army has already placed them beyond reach of attack. Though the minister of war does not consider it his duty to lodge a complaint for the persons above referred to, any more than for the council of war which rendered the verdict of 1894, the authority of which must remain intact, we cannot admit any suspicion of the independence of military justice or any accusation that it rendered on January 11 in obedience to orders an iniquitous sentence and committed a judicial error in knowingly acquitting a guilty man. Consequently I have the honor to lodge a complaint against the gérant of “L’Aurore” and M. Emile Zola on account of the defamation directed against the first council of war of the military government of Paris, which at its sessions of January 10 and 11, 1898, declared the acquittal of Major Esterhazy.

After the reading of the documents, Attorney-General Van Cassel took the floor to make what he described as “a statement of the case,” speaking as follows:

“The minister of war has taken notice, in his complaint, of the imputation cast by M. Emile Zola upon the first council of war of having acquitted Major Esterhazy in obedience to orders. The summons could not go beyond the terms of the complaint. It is natural that every complainant should circumscribe the grievances for which he demands reparation. Otherwise it would be too easy for the accused to turn the discussion from its proper course, and create a diversion for the audience, which is the great art in the assize court. A single question is submitted to you, gentlemen of the jury: Did the first council of war act in obedience to orders in acquitting Major Esterhazy? The other imputation contained in M. Zola’s article the minister of war holds in contempt. Nevertheless the accused assert the right to discuss all the allegations contained in the article. Their avowed plan is to make you judges of the legality of the sentence passed upon Dreyfus. We shall not permit it. I warn them that any attempt on their part to provoke a sort of indirect revision of the Dreyfus case would be illegal and futile. No one has a right to indirectly call in question the thing judged. Our legislation, in its desire to avoid judicial error, has laid down rules for revision. These rules were broadened by the law of 1895. This law was passed prior to the trial of Dreyfus. Why have the accused not availed themselves of it? Why have they not attempted revision by the legal methods? They have not done so. They have tried to secure the conviction of a second officer on account of the crime of which Dreyfus was convicted. They have failed in their undertaking. Since then no new fact has been produced; no unknown document of such a nature as to establish the innocence of the condemned has been revealed to justice. In the absence of material wherewith to secure a legal revision, they wish—I use the words of M. Emile Zola—to provoke a revolutionary revision. The court will not lend itself to this manœuvre. Respect for the thing judged requires that the discussion be circumscribed to the single matter of which the minister of war takes notice in his complaint. Therefore no evidence can be admitted here except such as tends to prove the charges relating to the pretended iniquity committed in obedience to orders in 1898 by the military judges of Major Esterhazy. Accusations foreign to this special matter must remain outside of the discussion. I ask, then, that the accused may not be authorized to attempt proof thereof, either by documents or by testimony. The charges preferred by them against the officers, the witnesses, the experts, the members of the council of war of 1894, which convicted Dreyfus, have no connection with the defamation of the council of war of 1898.”

To this contention M. Labori made the following reply:

“I am not much astonished, gentlemen, at the difficulties which M. Zola meets in this affair, and I expect that this incident, which is the first, will not be the last. We expected that they would offer to you and impose upon us a restricted discussion. Such was the desire of the minister of war, and it was his right. It will be ours, at a certain moment, to ask what could have been the underlying reasons for the exercise of this right under the circumstances in which the minister of war has made use of it. However that may be, it was his right, and I do not deny it. But, gentlemen, I do not believe that the form of the complaint within which he confines himself involves the consequences which he has hoped for.”

Reading then all the charges made at the end of M. Zola’s letter, M. Labori continued:

“You know, gentlemen, what was the reply. It began on the day when, after five days and five nights of deliberation and uncertainty, the minister of war preferred this complaint, the bearing of which you now know, and it continues today in the motions which the attorney-general now makes in the name of the complainant and in his own name. Do you think that that is going to strangle the discussion? Absurd! It is as if one should place himself in the middle of a torrent to prevent it from flowing. The discussion is open. If they wanted to stifle it, they need not have prosecuted either Perrenx or Zola. They had the right to refrain; and, in fact, public opinion, to which, gentlemen, I shall speak,—public opinion, which is not enlightened, and which, admirable in generosity and in faith, but blind, most faithfully supports the ruling powers,—public opinion perhaps would have given its sanction to such a course. But they have chosen to prosecute M. Zola. Being accused, he will defend himself. Are they, then, serious when they say to us today that the three paragraphs cited from this letter of two thousand lines have nothing to do with the intention of M. Zola on the one hand, or, on the other, with the article as a whole and the other charges contained in it? Can the court accept that? Between the three matters taken notice of by the minister of war and the sum total of the matters which I have read to the court there is a connection not only close, but indivisible. In the first place, gentlemen, Major Esterhazy was prosecuted for the same crime of treason for which Captain Dreyfus had been prosecuted. The document of the trial was the bordereau; the bordereau concerning which the first experts testified; the bordereau concerning which, at the second trial, experts testified again. And it is not strange to read that the experts of both trials, not being the same, feel no desire to meet at this bar in contradiction of each other in a discussion where the light is to be complete. But it is certain that the document in question, and which was the object of discussion in the Esterhazy trial and in the Dreyfus trial, is the bordereau. The two crimes were the same. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had denounced Major Esterhazy. If Major Esterhazy had been condemned, the setting aside of the verdict against Captain Dreyfus would have followed as a matter of necessity. Major Esterhazy was acquitted. The question remains open, and we are to deal with it. The question takes the form of a dilemma. Either we are to be prevented from offering any proof, and in that case we shall see; or, on the contrary, we are to be permitted to examine the situation of Captain Dreyfus as well as that of Major Esterhazy, since both are closely connected, and it would not be possible for us to prove here the guilt of Major Esterhazy and his acquittal in obedience to orders, if we had not the right to prove at the same time the innocence of Captain Dreyfus. To say nothing of the fact, gentlemen, that the minister of war, in drawing up his complaint, perhaps not perceiving this dangerous detail, allowed a little paragraph to slip in, in which it was said that the second council of war covered the illegality to which the first had committed itself. Now, gentlemen, how are we to demonstrate that they have covered an illegality, unless we are allowed to demonstrate first that an illegality has been committed? Unless, indeed, they mean—and I confess that that would seem to me a really curious preliminary to this discussion—to acknowledge that the illegality has been committed, and that it is recognized in the face of France and the civilized world. If not, then on this point as on others we must be permitted the opportunity of proof. You know, gentlemen, what the authorities say. It is a matter of doctrine and of law that, outside of the matters set forth in the summons, it is permissible to prove matters connected with them by close and indivisible ties. I have shown you that the matters which it is our right to prove are closely bound up with the other matters of which we likewise offer proof. It remains only to say a single word in answer to a last objection of the attorney-general,—the thing judged. The thing judged! What will be left of it, gentlemen, if we succeed in showing that it has been irregularly and illegally judged, this thing, in which public opinion has such faith that it considers as public malefactors those who dream for a second of doubting it, even though they have declared that they are ready to furnish the proof? Citizens respect this thing judged. It is their right and their duty to respect it. But only, I repeat, because they believe it to have been regularly and legally judged. Where there is no right, there is no legality, no justice, no thing judged, Mr. Attorney-General, and let us say no more of exceptions.”

In reinforcement of the position of M. Labori, M. Albert Clemenceau then addressed the court:

“I wish to speak simply of two points made by the attorney-general. He has told us that his hands are tied by the minister of war, that he is unable to broaden the discussion, and that it must take the form that the minister of war desires. We suspected it, but I believe that it will be interesting to the jury to know that, if he had desired a general discussion, the minister of war perhaps would have done as all French citizens do when they believe themselves injured,—namely, would have lodged a complaint with the attorney-general. The attorney-general is supposed to know something about law. He would have read M. Zola’s article, and it is probable that he would have had us indicted on grounds much more numerous than those which this complaint specifically alleges. So much for the first point. The second is this. The attorney-general, who knows the meaning of words, began his observations by saying: ‘Gentlemen, I am going to make a statement of the case’; but he made an argument, and he finished in a way of which the jury had had no warning, asking the court to limit the discussion which we desire to carry on at this bar.”

M. Labori then submitted a formal motion that the court authorize the introduction of evidence on all the matters referred to in M. Zola’s letter.

Before the court had passed upon this motion, the three experts in handwriting, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, intervened through their counsel, M. Cabanes, asking that, in view of the fact that they had prosecuted M. Zola and “L’Aurore” in the police courts, no introduction of their names into the case now on trial should be permitted.

The Judge.—“The purpose of this motion is to enable the experts, in case it is granted, to prosecute M. Zola in the assize court for outrages upon witnesses because of their testimony before the council of war.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We accept any discussion before the assize court.”

M. Labori.—“If that is the motive of the intervention of the experts, I ask the court to suspend judgment on the motion, until that point in the discussion is reached which concerns the experts and their testimony. And, if it is a matter of reserving to these gentlemen a special right, which will end, I imagine, in one facility more for the production of the explanations that we have to furnish, we can only congratulate ourselves in so far as we are concerned. I speak in the name of M. Zola and M. Perrenx.”

M. Zola.—“Complete light!”

M. Clemenceau.—“Whatever motions may be made in this court, and from whatsoever persons they may come, if their object is to bring about a public discussion in the assize court, we second them. In fact, I do not care even to know whether these motions are well founded in law; you warn us that their tendency would be to bring us here again on another charge; we accept every sort of discussion before the assize court.”

Without passing upon the motion of M. Cabanes, the court then rendered an adverse decision on M. Labori’s motion for the introduction of evidence concerning all the charges preferred by M. Zola, claiming that they were not indivisibly connected with the matter on trial.

The time having arrived for the calling of the witnesses, the court announced that it had received letters from several of them, in explanation of their absence.

The Judge.—“I have a letter from the keeper of the seals, saying that the minister of war, General Billot, has not been authorized to respond to the summons. M. Labori and M. Clemenceau, do you forego this witness’s evidence?”

M. Labori.—“In regard to him we make a reservation.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from General Gonse. He asks to be heard among the first, because of his service.”

M. Labori.—“We shall be able to hear General Gonse among the first. It was our intention to do so. But, in spite of our great desire to hear him, we cannot take his personal convenience into consideration.”

The Attorney-General.—“Nor his service?”

M. Labori.—“Nor his service.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Major d’Ormescheville, declaring that, having been the reporter for the council of war, he does not believe it his duty to respond to the summons.”

M. Labori.—“I make a reservation, as in the case of General Billot.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Gibert, cited as a witness by M. Zola. ‘I have left Havre, and have retired to.... In view of the gravity of my condition, it is impossible for me to come to testify in person, and I have just sent what I have to say to M. Labori.’”

M. Labori.—“I have not yet received it.”

The Judge.—“Then you make a reservation?”

M. Labori.—“Yes.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from M. Casimir-Perier, in which he says: ‘I am unable to enlighten justice on any matter that has occurred since my resignation of the presidency of the republic. I add that, if I were questioned concerning matters which occurred when I held the presidency, personal responsibilities would impose silence upon me. Out of deference for the court, I am ready to appear before it, if it deems it necessary that I repeat this declaration verbally.’”

M. Labori.—“I make a reservation in regard to M. Casimir-Perier.”

The Judge.—“Here is a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. He says: ‘In the Dreyfus case I performed the functions of an officer of judicial police. My only part in the Esterhazy trial was to testify behind closed doors, and in the matter of this testimony I am bound to professional secrecy. Under these circumstances I have the honor to pray you to excuse me from appearing in court, where I should be unable to furnish any information concerning the matters mentioned in the summons.’”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola and M. Perrenx deem Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam a witness of the highest importance, not only in matters relating to the Dreyfus trial, but in matters relating to the Esterhazy trial. Furthermore, the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is necessary, because it bears upon the good faith of the accused, for, if certain information that has come to M. Zola, and the production of which he will call for before this court, is to be believed, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam has been mixed up in matters which concerned Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, certain of which are very curious. Furthermore, a complaint has been lodged against Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, the consideration of which has been entrusted to Examining Magistrate Bertulus. For all these reasons the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam is indispensable. We cannot produce here certain evidence that concerns him, unless he is called to explain himself in person. And under these circumstances I believe it my duty to make formal motion that all legal means be employed to make Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam come here and testify concerning his relations with the de Comminges family, concerning the scene with the mysterious lady in 1892, and concerning the telegrams signed ‘Speranza’ and ‘Blanche,’ addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart at Tunis.”

The Attorney-General.—“M. du Paty de Clam declares in his letter, like all the members of the council of war, the hearing of whom has been abandoned because it was evident that it could not be exacted, that professional secrecy prevents him from giving any information whatever. Consequently there is no reason for rejecting his excuse. But M. Labori points out that Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam was interested as a witness in an examination not yet finished, but opened on the complaint of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The reply to this is manifest and direct. There can be no confusion here between M. Zola and the gérant of ‘L’Aurore’ on the one hand, and Colonel Picquart on the other. The latter has lodged a complaint which is being regularly examined, and it is for him alone to intervene if he sees fit. But his proceeding is the proceeding of a third party, so far as these defendants are concerned. From no point of view, then, do the arguments that have just been presented seem to me well founded.”

M. Labori.—“Will the court permit me to indicate the matters concerning which M. Zola desires to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, and the connection between them and the verdict of January 11? In 1892 Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, who had not then risen to his present office, was in very close relations with the de Comminges family, whose society Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart also frequented. Mlle. Blanche de Comminges and her brother, Captain de Comminges, have been summoned here as witnesses.”

The Judge.—“I regret to inform you that Mlle. de Comminges is sick, and that she has sent a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Labori.—“We hope that she will be well again within forty-eight hours. There are many sick people in this case. We shall have something to say concerning the things that are happening in this matter to prevent witnesses from coming, and we shall expose all intimidations and threats. Mlle. de Comminges knew Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart and Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam. At the beginning of the campaign in relation to Major Esterhazy, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart received at Tunis two singular dispatches. One of them read: ‘All is discovered. Speranza.’ The court will remember that this is a signature which has been met already in the Esterhazy trial. The other dispatch said in substance: ‘It is known that Georges (that is the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart) is the author of the telegram. All is discovered. Blanche.’ By Blanche was meant Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, and that this was understood by the military authorities is proved by the fact that they demanded of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges certain specimens of her handwriting. She protested, and lodged a complaint, as did Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. These dispatches, then, were forgeries. It would be interesting to find out who the forgers are. Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart attributes one of them to the police agent, Souffrain, and we have summoned him. We hope that he will come, and then we shall have an explanation. As for the other telegram, we are curious to know how there could have started from certain circles which must be in touch either with the minister of war or with Major Esterhazy a dispatch signed Blanche which Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart was expected to consider as coming from Mlle. Blanche de Comminges. We should like to hear Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam concerning these matters, and others of an earlier date in which he has been mixed up, and which relate exclusively and very closely to Major Esterhazy. They happened in 1892, and we shall have need also of the testimony of Mlle. de Comminges on the same subject.”

The Judge.—“There is no question here of Mlle. de Comminges. The question is of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam.”

M. Labori.—“But it is Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam whom these matters concern. He was induced at a certain moment, on the intervention of one of his most eminent superiors, General Davout, to restore to the de Comminges family certain correspondence. I cannot be more precise on this point, and the court understands why; but the matter is in the hands of the prefect of police. One day Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam said that a certain letter belonging to this correspondence was not in his hands, and that he could not give it up directly, because it had fallen into the hands of a woman, but that it was not very difficult to see her, and that the only thing necessary was to hand her a 500-franc bill in exchange for the letter. Then, it seems, on the demand of Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, a meeting was appointed at the cours la Reine, at the very spot to which came the singular veiled lady of Major Esterhazy. There, in the presence of witnesses, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam entered into conversation with the veiled lady, with whom he remained a long time, and to whom he pretended to have given a 500-franc bill, which, however, no one had sent to him. Then he brought back the letter to transmit it anew to the de Comminges family. These are facts concerning which I can say nothing more, in presence of the interested parties. I can furnish only indications.”

The Judge.—“But I do not see the relation between what you have just said and the matter for which your client is prosecuted.”

M. Labori.—“You shall see. M. Zola does not hesitate to think that the veiled lady, far from being in relations with Colonel Picquart, as they have not feared to state in official reports, and as Major Esterhazy loudly and audaciously charges, belongs to the circle of certain members of the staff, or to the circle of Major Esterhazy himself. Now, concerning this veiled lady we shall have to have explanations. For how can you expect us to prove that a guilty man has been acquitted in obedience to orders, if we do not begin by proving that he is guilty, and by establishing consequently the various circumstances which could culminate in his guilt? Under these circumstances it is for us to examine in detail, in order to get complete light, points that in no way concern the national defence, which has been abused. It is our indisputable right to seek light on Major Esterhazy’s means of defence, which have been welcomed in another place with a facility that they will not meet at the hands of this jury.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“At the trial of Major Esterhazy, and in the course of his examination, reference was made to the veiled lady, and this mysterious person was taken so seriously that the president of the council of war asked the accused if he could not give some indications concerning this lady, who had given him the mysterious rendezvous. I conclude therefrom that in the Esterhazy trial, with which we are necessarily concerned, the veiled lady was in question, and that therefore all that concerns her is well within our case. Again, Major du Paty de Clam, in his letter, says that he cannot come here to testify, because he was a judicial officer of police in the first examination. The court perhaps remembers that in this very place, in the case known as the Prado case, they heard Examining Magistrate Guillot, who came to testify concerning facts that took place in his private office. The presiding judge was a Paris magistrate. Now, what was done in the Prado case can be done in this case, and I do not see that the fact that Major du Paty de Clam played a part in another inquiry is a reason why we should not hear him here.”

M. Labori.—“Another thing. This is the first time that I have known witnesses to be judged according to the utility of their evidence. M. du Paty de Clam is not sick, nor is he detained, so far as I know, by the duties of his military office. He does not know upon what points he is to be examined, or what we shall ask him. It is his duty to appear in this case. We have to question him as well on matters of fact as on matters of morals pertaining exclusively to the Esterhazy case, and not at all to the Dreyfus case. Under these circumstances it is indispensable that M. du Paty de Clam should appear at this bar. If we question him upon points in regard to which he can take shelter behind professional secrecy, he will take such shelter, and will not answer. And even then it will be our right to make a motion before the court, asking whether, as a matter of law, M. du Paty de Clam can cut himself off behind professional secrecy. M. du Paty de Clam refers to closed doors. Well, if closed doors are necessary in this assize court, we will have them. With a jury, closed doors have no terrors for us. But we shall ask no questions concerning the national defence. None are involved in this affair.”

M. Zola.—“None.”

M. Labori.—“They have put forward the plea of the nation’s defence. But that is a jest.”

The Attorney-General.—“The defence of the nation a jest?”

M. Labori.—“Ah! really, that is not worthy of you, Mr. Attorney-General. I do not accept that. No, no! I will suffer no one, not even you, to suspect my patriotism. No! I repeat, gentlemen of the jury, if there is any question here that concerns the national defence, we shall not approach it. If closed doors are necessary, let the doors be closed; we are willing. But we will not permit them to say, in placing us at the mercy of all calumnies and all insults, that we are paid men, when, in fact, in a trial like this, we are fighting a battle in which we risk our life and honor. We will allow no one to say that we are triflers, and that contempt is the most that we deserve. It will be seen later whether we deserve it.”

The Judge.—“I have a letter from Mme. de Boulancy in which she says: ‘I am kept in bed by an affection of the heart, which gives me much pain just now. I enclose the certificate of my doctor, M. de Basse, 4, Rue de Berlin. I beg to refer you to my evidence before M. Bertulus.’”

M. Labori.—“We must hear Mme. de Boulancy. She cannot lapse into a state of perpetual silence simply because she testified before M. Bertulus. From the standpoint of authenticity Major Esterhazy’s letters belong to this discussion. Major Esterhazy, realizing how terrible a blow the letter in which he styled himself a Uhlan would be to him, in spite of his numerous protectors, has denied its genuineness; now, it is genuine, it is, I declare it! And, if Mme. de Boulancy were here, we would prove it. In the presence of all these obstacles, I have the right, in the name of my client, who, I am sure, will approve me” ...

M. Zola.—“Certainly.”

M. Labori.—“... and it is my duty, to tell the whole. Mme. de Boulancy has other letters” ...

M. Zola.—“That is absolutely true.”

M. Labori.—“... which are authentic and still more serious. For weeks she has been the object of all sorts of threats. Major Esterhazy visits her house daily, with the support and protection of the police, who do not prevent him. And Major Esterhazy threatens her with death, if she gives up the letters. Mme. de Boulancy has also in her hands telegrams from Major Esterhazy of a later date, in which he begs her to give him the letters, and this is a fact known to more than one witness. For instance, there is M. Tysse. We shall be told directly that he will not come because, it seems, the Crédit Lyonnais threatens him with discharge if he comes, and promises to pay his fine if he does not come. We submit these facts to the jurors, and we ask them whether it is M. Zola, or the minister of war by his complaint and his limitations, who is creating in France a situation which, whatever may be said, is really revolutionary.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“It was not until this morning that Mme. de Boulancy became afflicted with heart trouble, but for two days we have known that she would not come, and that, in the fear that the court will send an expert physician to examine her, she will remain in bed all day. I must add that Mme. de Boulancy has informed the court that she lives in the Rue de Berlin. I beg the court to send either a doctor or a sheriff’s officer to that address. He will not find Mme. de Boulancy there.”

The Judge.—“She lives in the Boulevard des Batignolles, No. 22.”

M. Zola.—“She is not there either.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“You will not find Mme. de Boulancy at 22, Boulevard des Batignolles. I have the honor to offer a motion drawn up forty-eight hours ago, in which we foresaw that Mme. de Boulancy would be afflicted with heart trouble, and here, according to the terms of her letter, she is suffering with an affection of the heart. We were not mistaken.”

M. Clemenceau then offered a formal motion that, whereas Mme. de Boulancy had declared on several occasions that she possessed letters from Major Esterhazy no less insulting to the French army than those already known, and that she would produce them in the assize court, and whereas it was known to the defence that Mme. de Boulancy had recently received three dispatches from Major Esterhazy demanding a return of these letters, and threatening her with death if she should produce them in court, and whereas, because of these threats, Mme. de Boulancy had moved, concealing her new address, a physician be sent to examine her physical condition, and that a police officer be sent to seize the letters and dispatches referred to, wherever he might find them.

The Judge.—“M. Lebrun-Renault writes: ‘I am summoned only because of the special service that I performed January 5, 1895, at the parade in which Captain Dreyfus was disgraced. I can report what took place in the course of this service only to my hierarchical chiefs, and that is what I did. It is for them to make such use of my report as may seem to them proper. As for me, outside of them, I am bound to silence by my professional duty. Wherefore it is impossible for me to testify before the jurors. Under these circumstances I shall not respond.’”

M. Labori then offered a motion that, whereas there had been for some weeks a question in the press and at the tribune of the chamber of deputies of pretended confessions made by ex-Captain Dreyfus to Captain Lebrun-Renault on the day of the former’s degradation, the court order the hearing, first, of M. Lebrun-Renault, who will be asked to state whether he received the confession from Dreyfus and under what conditions, whether he reported the confession officially and under what circumstances, and whether he has spoken to various persons concerning them, and especially to M. Forzinetti, the baron de Vaux, M. P..., M. Fontbrune, and M. Dumont, and, second, of any other witness who can be usefully questioned concerning these matters.

The judge then read the following letter from Major Ravary:

My presence at the trial would be absolutely useless. I abstain, then, from appearing.

Ravary.

M. Labori.—“Major Ravary was the first to establish officially, in a report that has been read publicly, the existence of what is known as the secret documents in the Dreyfus case. This is a point wholly pertinent to the discussion, since M. Zola and his fellow-defendant are authorized to prove that an illegality was committed in 1894 and covered in 1898. Therefore it is indispensable that M. Ravary be heard, and I shall have the honor to make a motion to that effect.”

The Judge.—“I have received a letter from General Mercier, in which he says that the prosecution of M. Zola deals only with the Esterhazy verdict, with which he had nothing do. He says that he has received from General Billot an authorization not to appear.”

M. Labori.—“I am greatly surprised that General Mercier, like so many others, should constitute himself judge of the question whether it is incumbent upon him to appear before the court. The minister of war may confine his complaint within limits, but he has no right as complainant to pursue the shocking and monstrous course of interposing an obstacle, not juridical, but material to the facts that we wish to establish. General Mercier is a witness of the first importance. Perhaps he will read tomorrow in the newspapers what has occurred at this first hearing, which is given in the presence, not of fifteen hundred persons simply, but of all France. M. Zola declares that in 1894 General Mercier, then minister of war, constituting himself judge in a council of war, did, after the hearing was over, outside of the discussion, without the knowledge of the accused, without examination of the accused upon the matter, and without even submitting it to his counsel, communicate to the council of war a secret document, and a document, for that matter, of no significance. If that is not true, let General Mercier come here tomorrow and say so. If it is true, I have no further use for him.”

The judge then announced that Major Rivals and the court clerk, Vallecalle, had notified him that they would not appear.

M. Labori.—“The complainant is represented here by the attorney-general. We should like him to inform us whether the minister of war has given to all these witnesses, as to General Mercier, an authorization which to them would have been more than an authorization,—that is, an order. If the attorney-general does not know, I would like him to put the question to the minister of war between now and tomorrow, in order to give us an answer.”

M. Zola.—“In short, we should like to know whether these persons have received orders from Billot, or are acting on their own initiative.”

M. Labori.—“Have they been ordered not to come? If so, let it be stated frankly, and the court tomorrow will pass upon our motion, which possibly will ask for a postponement of the case, in order that it may be judged when we are in full possession of the facts.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“The president of the republic refused to sign the decree of the minister of justice summoning M. Billot; then M. Billot authorized General Mercier not to appear in the assize court. Knowing the beginning of the story, we are interested in knowing the sequel, and I ask the attorney-general to inform us at the next hearing if the other officers, of a lower grade than that of General Mercier, have likewise been authorized by their superiors not to appear in court. If so, I may be permitted to express my astonishment that there has not been found a person in all this hierarchy to understand that there is one thing which is above the minister of war,—namely, justice. We thought so until today.”

The court then presented the refusals of Colonel Maurel, president of the council of war of 1894, M. Autant, architect, and M. Eichmann, who sat in the first council of war; and the defence, as in the previous cases, insisted upon their appearance.

The Judge.—“A letter from General de Boisdeffre reads as follows: ‘I do not need to tell you that, out of respect to the jury and deference to the court, I would willingly appear, but I have been in no way connected with the Esterhazy case, which was conducted entirely by the military government of Paris. Outside of professional secrecy, therefore, I could furnish no useful information.’”

M. Labori.—“All these witnesses seem to imagine that they constitute a caste apart and independent, and that it is permissible to them to rise above the law, above justice itself, and personally constitute themselves judges of the question whether they are useful or not as witnesses in a trial. Consequently in the case of General de Boisdeffre, as in the other cases, we insist and we protest.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“We are a little at sea. In the letters read, some witnesses declare that they will not come because they know certain facts, while others, like M. de Boisdeffre, declare that they will not come because they do not know any facts in this case. We do not know which of these two observations is sound, but it is impossible for both of them to be. It is interesting also to the jurors to know that former cabinet ministers, who are by no means the first comers, MM. Guérin and Trarieux, former keepers of the seals, and M. Raymond Poincaré, former minister of finance, have responded to the summons. It is certain that they would have had nothing to fear, if they had written to the court that they could not come. These former cabinet ministers come; yet among the military officers we cannot get a single witness. I believe it is well for the jurors to remember that.”

The court announcing that ex-President Casimir-Perier would appear, the defence withdrew its motion for his further summons. But M. Labori then offered a formal motion that MM. d’Ormescheville, Ravary, General Mercier, Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Autant, Eichmann, de Boisdeffre, and Captain de Comminges be forcibly constrained to appear. And he submitted a further motion that Mlle. Blanche de Comminges be constrained to appear, unless it should be found that her illness was genuine, and that, in the latter case, a commission should be appointed to visit her and ask her the following questions:

(1) Is she aware that her name has been used in writing to Colonel Picquart?

(2) How did she become aware of it?

(3) Did she not give the nickname “demigod” to Captain Lallement?

(4) Does she know whether this name was used in a telegram which is said to have been a forgery?

(5) Had Colonel du Paty de Clam any reason for entertaining a revengeful feeling toward her and her family?

(6) Is it not within her knowledge that he resorted in 1892 to very serious manœuvres, notably the employment of anonymous letters?

(7) Was not this matter put in the hands of M. Lozé, prefect of police, and did not General D—— have to intervene?

(8) Did not Colonel du Paty de Clam arrange, for the restitution of a letter, a scene that took place at cours la Reine, in which a veiled lady appeared?

After hearing these motions, the court adjourned for the day.

Second Day—February 8.

The second day’s hearing began at half past twelve with the announcement of the court that, before proceeding to the hearing of the witnesses, there were new excuses to be read. The first was from Major Esterhazy, who wrote as follows:

I have been accused by M. Mathieu Dreyfus of the crime of high treason, and my judges have acquitted me by a unanimous decree of the council of war. Today I receive, at the instance of a simple individual, M. Emile Zola, a summons to appear as a witness in his trial in the assize court. It is plain, on the other hand, that in this trial the object of M. Zola is at the same time to revise by a revolutionary method the decree of acquittal rendered in my favor, and to sully, by representing them as criminals, the judges whom I respect. Such is the work in which M. Emile Zola invites me to participate. Under such circumstances I consider that I am not obliged to respond to M. Zola’s summons.

M. Labori.—“Major Esterhazy was present yesterday. It does not become me to inquire what suggestions he obeys today. I have not consulted M. Emile Zola, but I can say this for myself: it was a feeling of high discretion that led us to summon Major Esterhazy. He will not be here as an accused person, since he has been acquitted, and we consider his case a thing judged. But we have a right to the testimony of Major Esterhazy for the purpose of proving M. Zola’s good faith. Major Esterhazy refuses. So be it. I do not insist. We will discuss his rôle without him.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Pardon me. For my part, I do not give up his testimony. I have some questions to put to Major Esterhazy in the name of the gérant of ‘L’Aurore.’ I demand that he be summoned again, and, if need be, forced to come.”

The next letter was from a widow Chapelon, who declared herself afflicted with influenza.

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Mme. Chapelon appeared at the office of ‘L’Aurore’ a week ago; it was after she had been notified. She asked that her name be struck from the list of witnesses. She was asked why. She replied that she was soliciting for her son a scholarship at Chaptal, and that, if she were to testify, they would not give it to her. M. Perrenx informed her that this was not a good reason, and that she was required to come to the assize court and tell the truth. She went away, slamming the doors, and saying: ‘If you force me to come, I will tell the opposite of the truth.’ I insist that this witness shall come, and I demand that, as in the case of Major Esterhazy, she be brought to court after a second summons.”

The Judge.—“There is a doctor’s certificate.”

M. Clemenceau.—“I ask that an expert physician be sent to her. The one who is to see Mme. de Boulancy can see her too.”

The court then rendered its decision on the motions of the day before, ordering that Dr. Socquet be sent to examine Mme. de Boulancy, Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, M. Autant, and the widow Chapelon, and that a second summons be served upon Captain Lebrun-Renault, Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam, Major d’Ormescheville, Major Ravary, General Mercier, MM. Patron, Vallecalle, Maurel, Eichmann, General de Boisdeffre, and Major Esterhazy, directing them to appear on February 9.

Testimony of Mme. Dreyfus.

The calling of the witnesses was then begun, the first to take the stand being Mme. Lucie Dreyfus, wife of ex-Captain Dreyfus.

M. Labori.—“I would like Mme. Dreyfus to have the goodness to tell us what she thinks of M. Zola’s good faith, and in this connection to make known to us under what circumstances in 1894 she learned of her husband’s arrest, and what was the attitude at that time of Colonel du Paty de Clam, who was then only a major.”

The Judge.—“What has that to do with the case?”

M. Labori.—“It concerns M. Zola’s good faith.”

M. Zola.—“I ask to be allowed here the liberty that is accorded thieves and murderers. They can defend themselves, summon witnesses, and ask them questions; but every day I am insulted in the street; they break my carriage windows, they roll me in the mud, and an unclean press treats me as a bandit. I have the right to prove my good faith, my probity, my honor.”

The Judge.—“Do you know Article 52, of the law of 1881?”

M. Zola.—“I do not know the law, and at the present moment I do not want to know it. I appeal to the probity of the jurors. I make them judges of the situation in which I am placed, and I entrust myself to them.”

The Judge.—“I remind you of the terms of the decree rendered yesterday by the court, the provisions of Article 52 of the law of 1881, and the terms of your summons. Let us not depart therefrom. Any question outside of these limits will not be put by me. Let that be well understood. It is useless to recur to the matter.”

M. Zola.—“I ask to be treated here as well as thieves and murderers. All accused persons are entitled to prove their probity, their good faith, and their honor.”

M. Labori.—“Will you permit me to point out the bearing of my questions? M. Zola has made two assertions. He has asserted that the council of war of 1894 convicted, in the person of ex-Captain Dreyfus, an innocent man by illegal methods.”

The Judge.—“He is not prosecuted for that.”

M. Labori.—“Pardon me, he is prosecuted for having said that the second council of war knowingly acquitted a guilty man by covering, in obedience to orders, the illegality committed by the first.”

M. Zola.—“It is in the summons.”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola asks to prove this illegality, and the elements out of which it grew, from the standpoint of his good faith. This illegality is not confined to the moment of the verdict of the council of war, but extends over the very period of inquiry in which occurred facts of the highest gravity which M. Zola asks to produce. If the court considers that Mme. Dreyfus can not be heard on this point, I shall be obliged to offer a motion.”

The Judge.—“Offer your motion. The question will not be put by me.”

M. Clemenceau.—“I ask to make a simple observation, addressed especially to the jurors. I am of the opinion that the law must be complied with, whatever it may be. But I beg you to remember, gentlemen of the jury, that M. Zola has written an article which fills sixteen pages of the pamphlet in my hands. Out of these sixteen pages the public prosecutor, at the order of the minister of war, complains of only fifteen lines, and, when we come to court, it transpires that, in spite of a judicious selection of fifteen lines from sixteen pages, the prosecution is still embarrassed by one of these fifteen lines. They tell us in these fifteen lines there are still six which must be put aside, because, were we to leave them there, embarrassing evidence would be put in.”

The Judge.—“I repeat that no question will be put which would be a means of arriving at the revision of a case sovereignly judged.”

M. Clemenceau.—“Then the court will put no question concerning good faith?”

The Judge.—“Concerning anything that relates to the Dreyfus case. No. Offer your motions. I repeat that I will not put the question.”

M. Labori.—“Will you permit me, Monsieur le Président, in our common interest, to ask you, then, what practical means you see by which we may ascertain the truth?”

The Judge.—“That does not concern me.”

M. Labori then made a formal motion that, whereas the matters upon which the testimony of Mme. Dreyfus was required bore directly upon the matters expressly set out in the complaint, and especially upon the illegality charged, and whereas the defendants maintained, in spite of the court’s decree, the right to prove their good faith, and whereas the refusal to hear the witnesses summoned would constitute the highest violation of the defendants’ rights, the court order the following questions to be put to Mme. Dreyfus:

(1) What do you think of M. Zola’s good faith?

(2) What are the reasons that have led you to believe in his good faith?

(3) Do you consider from what you know that the measures taken against your husband were legal or illegal?

(4) Will you describe the first visit of Major du Paty de Clam at your house? Who were present?

(5) Did not M. du Paty de Clam utter the grossest insults against your husband?

(6) Did he not pretend to demonstrate his guilt geometrically and by drawing concentric circles?

(7) Did he not speak of the Iron Mask?

(8) Did he not expressly forbid you to speak of the arrest to anyone whomsoever, even to his family?

(9) After how long a time were you allowed the right to write to your husband?

(10) After how long a time did you again see your husband?

(11) Did not M. du Paty de Clam say to you: “He denies, but I shall succeed in making him spit out all that he has in his body”?

(12) Did not M. du Paty de Clam nevertheless lead you to hope that perhaps there had been an error, and that up to November?

(13) Did not M. du Paty de Clam try, by the most irregular means, and even by insidious means, to tear confessions from you throughout the trial and after the verdict?

(14) What do you think of your husband’s character and morals? What was the nature of your life with him after your marriage?

(15) Did not your husband steadily declare, during the trial and after, that this whole matter was incomprehensible, and that he was the victim of a conspiracy?

The reading of these questions being received with a hostile manifestation from those present in the court-room, M. Labori turned to the audience, and shouted: “If you think you can prevent me from doing my duty, you are mistaken. I am embarrassed only when I am applauded. Let them howl! It is all one to me.”

The Attorney-General.—“I simply call attention to this,—that these incidents are rehearsed before the audience, but they are always the same, and that the jurors whom you have just addressed will remember that you have for the thing judged yesterday the same respect that you have for the thing judged on a previous occasion. I said at the beginning that a plan had been fixed upon; it is being carried out, and you have just given us the formula: ‘I do not know the law, and I do not want to know it.’ Well, we know it, and we will see that it is respected, with the aid of the jurors, in whom I have absolute confidence.”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola will answer in a moment, and it is to assure him the means of doing so that I take the floor.”

The Judge.—“Take it once for all, and do not renew this scene with each witness.”

M. Labori.—“Pardon me, I am much grieved if the line of conduct which I follow is in any way inconvenient or disagreeable to anyone whomsoever. But I know very well that it is dictated to me by a conviction so profound and a resolution so fixed that nothing, nothing, shall force me to deviate from it by a line. That said, I answer the attorney-general in a word. The attorney-general, who, after a firm and energetic beginning, preserved a profound silence throughout the last part of yesterday’s hearing” ...

The Attorney-General.—“To the point of self-denial.”

M. Labori.—“To the point of self-denial, ... rises today to tell us that we are confronted with a fixed plan, and that the same incidents, starting from the same preconceived idea, are being rehearsed. Very well, but the plan that we have fixed is the plan that leads to the light. There is another plan which is being rehearsed at the other side of the bar,—the plan which leads to obscurity and darkness. Reference has been made to the thing judged. We respect it. We respect the thing judged yesterday, but between that and the other the difference is that the thing judged yesterday was legally judged, and that the other was judged illegally.”

M. Zola.—“Gentlemen of the jury, to you will I address myself. I am not an orator, I am a writer; but unfortunately” ...

The Judge.—“You should address the court.”

M. Zola.—“I ask your pardon. I thought that I had permission to address the jurors. But I will address myself to you. What I have to say will be as well said. I am a writer; I am not accustomed to public speaking; moreover, I am an extremely nervous being, and am liable to use words that ill express my thought. Undoubtedly I have expressed it ill, since I have been misunderstood. I am quoted as saying that I have placed myself above the law. Did I say that?”

M. Labori.—“You said: ‘I have not to know the law at this moment.’”

M. Zola.—“I meant to say, at any rate, that I do not revolt against this grand idea of the law. I submit to it completely, and from it I expect justice. I meant to say that my revolt was against the processes that find expression in all these quibbles raised against me, against the way in which I am prosecuted, against the limitation of the complaint to fifteen lines from my long letter of accusation; and these things I declare unworthy of justice. I say that these few lines are not to be taken and passed upon without regard to all that I have said. A writing is consecutive; phrases lead to phrases, ideas lead to ideas; and to fix upon a single thing therein because it brings me under the law is, I say, unworthy. That is what I say, and that is what I meant. I do not place myself above the law, but I am above hypocritical methods.”

M. Labori.—“Bravo!”

The Attorney-General.—“So, M. Labori, you give the signal for these bravos?”

M. Labori.—“It is true, I said ‘Bravo;’ but frankly, it was the cry of my conscience.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“There is one point beyond dispute,—that we are authorized to prove that M. Zola has accused the council of war of having committed an illegality. Well, I ask you how it is possible for us to prove this, if we do not begin by establishing that an illegality has been committed.”

The court denied the motion of M. Labori, and the second witness was called,—M. Leblois, a lawyer of the appellate court.

Testimony of M. Leblois.

The Judge.—“M. Labori, what question do you desire me to put to the witness?”

M. Labori.—“Will you ask M. Leblois at what date and under what circumstances he came into possession of the facts now within his knowledge concerning the Esterhazy case?”

The court interposing no objection, M. Leblois made the following statement:

“I have been for many years the friend of Colonel Picquart. We made all our studies together, and we have remained faithful to this friendship. In 1890 Colonel Picquart was made professor in the School of War, and since then I have seen him more or less frequently. Then he entered the war department, to which he had already been attached for several years, and finally, about the middle of 1895, if I am not mistaken, he was appointed chief of the bureau of information. It would have been natural at that time for him to consult me occasionally upon the legal difficulties that he met, since I was his intimate friend and had belonged to the magistracy for ten years. Nevertheless he spoke to me of only two cases,—a case of criminal procedure that was under way at Nancy, and a batch of documents relating to carrier pigeons, which was nothing but a collection of ministerial decrees upon that question. When, on November 16, 1896, Colonel Picquart was suddenly obliged to quit the war department, he had never said a word to me, either of the Dreyfus case or of the Esterhazy case, and I was absolutely unaware that he was concerning himself with either of them. All who know Colonel Picquart will not be astonished at this reserve.

“In June, 1897, I received a visit from Colonel Picquart, who had come to pass a fortnight’s leave of absence in Paris. On June 3, he had received at Sousse a threatening letter, which had been written to him by one of his former subordinates, and thus he found himself under the necessity of consulting a lawyer. For purposes of his defence he made known to me some of the facts in the cases of Dreyfus and Esterhazy. I say, gentlemen, some of the facts, for Colonel Picquart never revealed to me any military secret, in that sense of the term secret in which it is employed in military language. Colonel Picquart had become convinced of the innocence of Captain Dreyfus, and he explained to me the facts upon which his conviction rested. I had too much confidence in his intelligence and honesty not to admit the materiality of the facts that he made known to me, and from them I came to the same conclusion that he had arrived at. I was profoundly disturbed by what I had just learned, for I not only deplored the possibility of so grave an error, and the submission to undeserved torture of a man who seemed to be innocent, but I was anxious lest such revelations might agitate the country; and so I determined to exercise the greatest prudence.

“First, I collected all the information that I could procure. I consulted certain persons who had been familiar with other facts, making my study more precise by reading documents published in 1896. I gathered information as to the Dreyfus family, and as to Captain Dreyfus, whom I did not know, and finally I studied the various questions of law to which the case might give rise. In the course of these inquiries I learned that M. Scheurer-Kestner had been concerning himself with the Dreyfus case for a year, and had collected facts of some interest. About the same time I met M. Scheurer-Kestner at a dinner, and an interview was arranged between us for a subsequent day. When he found that I was in possession of important information, he urged me strongly to tell him more. He was so insistent, and showed so keen anxiety, that I could not refrain from enlightening him more completely. My original plan, the only one that seemed possible to me, was to promptly put the government in possession of the facts that I had learned through Colonel Picquart. M. Scheurer-Kestner, vice-president of the senate, seemed to me the best person that I could find through whom to approach the government. For these reasons I thought it my duty to yield to M. Scheurer-Kestner’s solicitations, and I gave him the desired enlightenment. Especially I spoke to him of letters that General Gonse had written to Colonel Picquart. M. Scheurer-Kestner begged me to show him these letters immediately, and he accompanied me to my house to get them. From that moment he was convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, and his conviction has never since been shaken. He will never abandon the cause that he has undertaken.

“Meanwhile, the vacation season was approaching, and it seemed very difficult to institute proceedings at that time. It seemed to me that an affair of this sort should not be entered upon, unless there was a possibility of pursuing it to the end. Furthermore, M. Scheurer-Kestner deemed it necessary to have in his hands certain material proofs which both he and I lacked,—proofs in the shape of examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, which was supposed to be identical with that of the bordereau. Nevertheless, I thought it my duty to submit to M. Scheurer-Kestner at that moment the idea of presenting to the keeper of the seals a petition for the cancellation of the verdict of 1894, because it seemed to me a settled fact that a secret document had been communicated to the judges, and that consequently the judgment was void. M. Scheurer-Kestner thought that it was too early to take such a step in the absence of material proofs. He made arrangements to get examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting as soon as possible, and toward the end of July started on his vacation. In the course of the following months he succeeded in procuring examples of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, and, on returning to Paris, he entered into communication with the government. Concerning that, he will testify himself. For my part, I have nothing more to say upon this point. Nevertheless I add that, when M. Scheurer-Kestner made his interpellation in the senate on November 7, 1897, it seemed to him that this should be the end of his personal participation in the matter. In fact, the declarations of the government pointed to an honest and full investigation, and it did not seem to M. Scheurer-Kestner that there was any occasion for him to interfere in the working-up of a criminal case. So about Christmas time he thought himself entitled to take a few days’ rest, of which he was in great need.

“At that moment I had been informed by Colonel Picquart of the conspiracies against him,—conspiracies of extreme gravity, the most serious and important point of which is found in two telegrams addressed to him from Paris on November 10, 1897, and reaching him at Sousse, the first on November 11, the second on November 12 in the morning. These telegrams were forgeries. It seemed plain that they could not have been drawn up, except upon information emanating from the bureau of information, and this it would be easy to demonstrate; but Colonel Picquart will demonstrate it better than I. As the jury and the court will see, this was a new incident in an extremely serious matter, since these telegrams were dated November 10, 1897. Nevertheless it was a conspiracy which had long been in preparation, for in December, 1896, false letters had been addressed to the minister of war signed with the same name, ‘Speranza,’ that appeared at the foot of the two telegrams of November 10, 1897. It seemed to me it was my first duty to inform the government of this situation. But, having with the government no easy and direct means of communication, I asked M. Trarieux, senator and former keeper of the seals, whom I had met several times at the house of a friend, and who, moreover, had taken part in the senate discussion of M. Scheurer-Kestner’s interpellation, to give me the benefit of his sanction by acting as an intermediary between myself and the government. He will tell you what steps he took. For my part I could do but one thing,—lodge, on behalf of my client, a complaint with the government attorney, which complaint is under examination by M. Bertulus, who has already taken the deposition of Mlle. Blanche de Comminges.

“I said just now that Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart suddenly left the war department on November 16, 1896, on the eve of the Castelin interpellation in the chamber of deputies. His friends were unaware of his departure, and I in particular went several times, and during several weeks, to see him, and failed to find him. One of his friends wrote to the minister of war a letter which should be among the documents in the hands of M. Bertulus, and which, at any rate, constitutes one of the papers in the investigations made by General de Pellieux and Major Ravary. This letter was insignificant, but in it there was a brief allusion to a personage who, in the salon of Mlle. de Comminges, had been nicknamed the ‘demigod.’ The letter contained this sentence: ‘Every day the demigod asks Mme. the Countess [that is Mlle. de Comminges] when he will be able to see the good God.’ In this circle, where Colonel Picquart was very popular, he was known as ‘the good God,’ and the name ‘demigod’ had been given to a certain Captain Lallement, who was the orderly of General des Garet, commanding the sixteenth army corps at Montpellier. This letter was intended for Colonel Picquart, but reached him only after it had been secretly opened and copied at the war department. The following month there came to the bureau of information a letter which was intercepted entirely, and of which no knowledge came to Colonel Picquart. This letter is surely the work of a forger. It is signed ‘Speranza.’ That was the beginning, in December, 1896, of the attempt to compromise Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart. The existence of the second letter was concealed for more than a year, and he learned of it for the first time in the course of General de Pellieux’s investigation. But it was made the basis of all the conspiracies for the ruin of this officer. Be not astonished, then, that last November, when this matter came to public attention and enlisted the interest of parliament, new conspiracies came to light. In the evening of November 10, 1897, two telegrams started from Paris together. The first read thus: ‘Stop, demigod. Affair very serious. Speranza.’ From this telegram it seemed that the demigod must be a very important personage, probably a political personality, perhaps M. Scheurer-Kestner. The second telegram read: ‘We have proofs that the dispatch was manufactured by Georges. Blanche.’ This second telegram, which was evidently a part of the same conspiracy to which the first belonged, tended to destroy the authenticity, and consequently the force as evidence, of a certain dispatch on which rested the investigation opened by Colonel Picquart in the spring of 1896 concerning Major Esterhazy. Thus they endeavored to represent Colonel Picquart as the tool of a politician and the author of a forgery. I should add that it is certain that Colonel Picquart was not acquainted with M. Scheurer-Kestner, and that he had no communication with him, direct or indirect. As for the charge of forgery brought against Colonel Picquart, it has been completely abandoned, for, although there were some insinuations to that effect in Major Ravary’s report, Colonel Picquart recently appeared before a council of inquiry, and among the things with which he was reproached there was not the slightest allusion to the possibility of a forgery in the case of the document in question.”

The Judge.—“What do you know about it?”

M. Leblois.—“Monsieur le Président, I know it in the most certain and natural way, because I was myself a witness before the council of inquiry.”

The Judge.—“Were you there throughout the hearing?”

M. Leblois.—“No, but I have knowledge of the facts with which the colonel was reproached.”

The Judge.—“You say that you have knowledge of them, but you do not know them of your own knowledge, since you were not there.”

M. Labori.—“Permit me to observe, Monsieur le Président, that the witnesses should have the advantage of the right to give their testimony without being interrupted, according to the terms of Article 315 of the code of criminal examination. I claim this right for M. Leblois. As to the fact which he affirms, the question is not how he knows it, but whether it is true.”

The Judge.—“Permit me, Maître Labori; I suppose that the court is entitled to question witnesses.”

M. Labori.—“It is not entitled to interrupt them.”

The Judge.—“I did not interrupt M. Leblois. I asked him for indications on a point which it is necessary to throw light upon. I will continue to do so, rest assured.”

M. Labori.—“I do not pretend to discuss with you the duties of the judge of the assize court. You know them better than I do. I add that I am ready to render homage to the great impartiality with which you endeavor to direct the debate. But, on the other hand, this is a matter in which it is impossible for us to part with the smallest particle of our rights. They deprive us here of all the faculties that they can deprive us of. We are here face to face with testimony which is entitled to be heard; we ask that it shall be heard freely and independently. Now, Article 315 of the code of criminal examination authorizes witnesses to give their testimony without interruption, without prejudice to the right of the court to ask them, after their deposition, whatsoever questions it sees fit.”

The Judge.—“That is what I have just done.”

M. Labori.—“The deposition of M. Leblois is not finished. He was in the course of it when you interrupted him.”

The Judge.—“Pardon, M. Leblois had finished. I asked him a question to throw light upon his deposition.”

M. Leblois.—“I will answer you in the clearest fashion. In the first place, I declare that I know that Colonel Picquart was asked but four questions. As to the source of this knowledge, I do not think that I am bound to give it, and for a good reason; I am Colonel Picquart’s lawyer.”

The Judge.—“You should have said so at the beginning.”

M. Leblois.—“I did say so.”

The Judge.—“I did not hear it.”

M. Leblois.—“I said just now that I was first introduced to this affair in June, 1897, when Colonel Picquart came to ask my aid and protection against written threats that he had received on June 3 from one of his former subordinates. It was for purposes of his defence that Colonel Picquart related to me a portion of the facts, but not those concerning military secrets, and it was for purposes of his defence that he gave me General Gonse’s letters. I consider that you are now reassured as to the source of my information.

“I add that nothing is easier than to establish materially the proof of what I have just said, for information telegraphed by a provincial agency on February 2, and not contradicted since by any newspaper or otherwise, specifies the points raised in the debate before the council of inquiry. Furthermore, Colonel Picquart has received, in conformity with military regulations, a clear notification of the questions concerning which he was examined. In fact, if a single question is to be put in a council of inquiry, the law requires that the person to be questioned shall receive a notice of the points on which the discussion will turn. Then Colonel Picquart, being in possession of such notice, emanating from the reporter in the case, is clearly in a position to prove what I have just said.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“Permit me to ask a question. Just now the witness said this second letter, which was a forgery, was so drawn up as to prove that it emanated from a personage familiar with the documents of the war offices. But the witness did not explain this declaration. I should like to ask him what there was in this letter that enables him to make this declaration, and to say that it came from the war offices.”

M. Leblois.—“I prefer not to give any explanations in regard to this letter, for I should run a risk of altering the version that you will soon hear from Colonel Picquart. [Laughter.] I think there is some misunderstanding. I said that the text of the two telegrams was a certain proof that they emanated from a man familiar with all the secrets of the war department, but I can say that only of the telegrams, because I have seen them and am in possession of their text. I cannot speak so certainly of a letter which I have not seen, and concerning which I have only information.”

M. Labori.—“From the standpoint of the conspiracies to which M. Leblois has referred, what was the bearing of the false letter intercepted in the war offices?”

M. Leblois.—“I said just now that I considered this false letter signed ‘Speranza’ another stone on which to erect, little by little, the edifice of the conspiracies against Colonel Picquart. Regarding the two telegrams, must I give details?”

The Judge [hastily].—“No.”

M. Labori.—“Monsieur le Président, we are very desirous that he should.”

The Judge [sadly].—“Since the defence demands it, speak.”

M. Leblois.—“The following telegram: ‘We have proofs that the dispatch was manufactured by Georges. Blanche,’ suggests to me this reflection: Who, outside of the war department, could then know that an inquiry was in progress concerning Major Esterhazy, and especially that the basis of this inquiry was a dispatch? That was an absolute secret. The two telegrams of which I have spoken were not the only elements of this complicated plot against Colonel Picquart. There were many other telegrams sent by third parties. For instance, an individual sent from Paris a telegram signed ‘Baron Keller’ and addressed to a pretended Baroness Keller at Sousse. All these telegrams were intended to compromise Colonel Picquart. The two which I have cited are the only ones that reached him, but they are only the centre of a very complicated network. He referred to all of this in an article in ‘La Libre Parole’ of November 16, 1897.”

M. Labori.—“M. Leblois has told us that Colonel Picquart left the war department November 16, 1896. Could he tell us what was the attitude of his superiors, and especially of General Gonse, toward him at that time? Did Colonel Picquart go in disgrace, and how has he been treated since, up to the time of his recall to Paris, under circumstances with which the jurors must be familiar, at the beginning of the Esterhazy inquiry?”

M. Leblois.—“Colonel Picquart’s superiors behaved toward him in the most kindly manner throughout his inquiry concerning Major Esterhazy,—an inquiry which began toward the end of spring and continued until September. According to Colonel Picquart, it was not until the moment had come for a decision in this matter that a difference of opinion was revealed between his superiors and himself. This difference did not assume an acute form at first. In the beginning it was simply an exchange of opposite views, such as often takes place between inferiors and superiors. The solution of the matter, clearly stated in a letter from Colonel Picquart bearing date of September 5, 1896, remained in suspense until November, 1896. At that moment things were growing worse under influences which I do not exactly know myself. Perhaps the government, upon the question being laid before it, decided that there was no occasion to review the Dreyfus case. I know nothing about it; I can only form hypotheses. Answering M. Labori’s question, I will say this: when Colonel Picquart left the war department, they gave him not the slightest hint that he was sent away in disgrace. On the contrary, they represented to him as a favor the rather vague mission with which he was entrusted. They said to him: ‘You are to go away for a few days. You will go to Nancy, to do certain things.’ When once he was at Nancy, they said to him: ‘Go elsewhere.’ Thus from day to day they gave him new orders, continually prolonging his mission; and the colonel, who had left Paris without extra clothing, was told, when he asked permission to return to get his linen, that his mission was too important to warrant a diversion of even a few hours; and they sent him to Besançon. Thus, without suspecting the fate that was in store for him, he was sent along the frontier, and then to Algeria and Tunis, where, in March, 1897, he was made lieutenant-colonel of the Fourth Sharpshooters. They pretended that he was given this appointment as a favor. General Gonse told him positively, in a letter, that the regiment was a very select one, and that he should consider himself fortunate in belonging to it. The general’s letters are full of expressions of sympathy.”

M. Labori.—“M. Leblois referred just now to a threatening letter which intervened at a certain moment, and which apparently modified the state of mind prevailing in the office of the minister of war. Could he tell us when this letter was addressed to Colonel Picquart, from whom it came, and in what spirit it was conceived?”

M. Leblois.—“I have already said that this letter was dated June 3, 1897. It came from Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, who had been Colonel Picquart’s subordinate, and it was couched in terms almost insulting.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“The witness has said that at the same time when Colonel Picquart’s letters were being seized in the war department he was suffered to receive forged telegrams, and that at the same time also General Gonse, sub-chief of the general staff, acted in a very kindly manner toward him. I ask him if these three matters were really contemporaneous.”

M. Leblois.—“The reply is simple enough. You must distinguish between two utterly distinct orders of events,—the events at the end of 1896, which was the time of Colonel Picquart’s departure, and the events at the end of 1897. I know of only one letter intercepted at the bureau of information in 1896,—namely, the letter signed ‘Speranza.’ It was at that time that General Gonse showed the greatest sympathy for Colonel Picquart. Coming to the conspiracy of 1897, it is my opinion that letters were then intercepted, but I prefer that the testimony on this point should come from Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart.”

M. Clemenceau.—“Yet the witness said just now that they sent a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart after having opened it.”

M. Leblois.—“That was in 1896. It was in December of that year that the Speranza letter was sent.”

M. Clemenceau.—“Then my question was appropriate. All these things happened at the same time.”

M. Labori.—“Does M. Leblois know of certain facts in the relations that prevailed in 1892 between M. du Paty de Clam and the de Comminges family that offer a singular analogy with the participation of the veiled lady in the Esterhazy case?”

M. Leblois.—“The comte de Comminges received in 1892 a certain number of very serious anonymous letters. He had reason to suspect that they were written by Colonel du Paty de Clam, who was then only a major. He consulted the prefect of police, M. Lozé, who, if I have been correctly informed, answered: ‘It is du Paty de Clam.’”

The Judge.—“But you know nothing about it; this information is second-hand.”

M. Labori.—“But the sequel is interesting.”

M. Leblois.—“Thereupon the comte de Comminges went to General Davout, and asked him to insist that these conspiracies should cease. General Davout sent for Major du Paty de Clam, and, as a result, the anonymous letters stopped entirely. But there remained a letter in the hands of Major du Paty de Clam, and the comte de Comminges insisted upon its restitution. General Davout helped him to bring this about, if I am correctly informed. But, however that may be, Major du Paty de Clam restored the letter under the following circumstances. He said that this letter had fallen into the hands of a woman, and that she would not part with it unless the sum of 500 francs was paid to her. So he convoked certain members of the family on the bank of the Seine, near the Jardin de Paris, at ten o’clock in the evening. There came a woman, carrying an umbrella, whom Major du Paty de Clam approached. After conversing with her a few minutes, he came back, saying: ‘I have just handed this woman an envelope containing a 500-franc bill. In exchange, she has given me the letter that you desire, in another envelope. Here it is.’ They opened the envelope, and, to be sure, found the letter. It is evident that there was something very strange about all this,—something useless, to say the least.”

The Judge.—“But what relation has all this to the charge against the defendants?”

M. Labori.—“I am ready to explain at once. It is our contention that the veiled lady, far from being in relations with, or in the circle of, Colonel Picquart, as has been insinuated, was in relations with certain members of the war department, and that those who have aided Major Esterhazy in his campaign may well have been in relation with certain members of the war department. That is the bearing of the question.”

The Judge.—“At what time did the events in connection with this letter occur?”

M. Leblois.—“In the spring of 1892, and, if I am not mistaken, the restitution took place on Good Friday of that year.”

Testimony of M. Scheurer-Kestner.

The next witness was M. Scheurer-Kestner.

M. Labori.—“Monsieur le Président, will you ask M. Scheurer-Kestner under what circumstances he was led to concern himself with the facts which revealed to him that the authorship of the bordereau, attributed in 1894 to Captain Dreyfus, was really to be attributed to Major Esterhazy, and what steps he took in the matter afterwards?”

The Judge.—“Monsieur Attorney-General!”

The Attorney-General.—“It is always the same question.”

M. Labori.—“It is always the same question, and I understand why you are always ready to welcome it in the same manner.”

The Judge.—“M. Scheurer-Kestner, you are to tell us of Major Esterhazy, but I beg you not to say anything of the Dreyfus case, concerning which we will not hear a word. Tell us of the Esterhazy case, but not of the Dreyfus case.”

M. Scheurer-Kestner.—“I note what you say, Monsieur le Président. Last July I learned that, at the office of the general staff, in the bureau of information, in September, 1896, Colonel Picquart, who was then a major and the chief of this bureau, had discovered, in the course of investigations undertaken à propos of other matters, but relating to Major Esterhazy, that there had been a mistake in 1894 in attributing the bordereau to M. Alfred Dreyfus. I learned at the same time that, as soon as Colonel Picquart had made his discovery, he made haste to consult M. Bertillon, who had been one of the experts consulted in 1894, and who, without any hesitation, had attributed the bordereau to Alfred Dreyfus. Colonel Picquart, showing him the bordereau and Major Esterhazy’s handwriting, but without telling him whose handwriting it was, asked him what he thought of it, and M. Bertillon said to him: ‘Ah! the forgers have succeeded. It is no similarity; it is identity.’ Colonel Picquart came back with this reply, and asked his chief to continue an investigation in this direction. He proposed to General Gonse, among others, to submit the documents to a new expert examination, and General Gonse dissuaded him. There is in existence a correspondence which was then exchanged between General Gonse and Colonel Picquart. I took pains to become acquainted with this correspondence, for it was of great value to me, being of a nature to settle my opinion. The correspondence being communicated to me, I was convinced by reading it that General Gonse accepted the opinion of Colonel Picquart, who was paving the way for a revision of the trial. It seems to me indispensable, in order to enlighten the jurors, that I should read this correspondence to them.”

The Judge.—“No, that is not possible.”

M. Labori.—“We must have the light, and I consider it indispensable that these letters should be put in evidence.”

The Judge.—“The law requires that witnesses shall testify without the aid of any document. However, if the attorney-general is not opposed to it, I shall not oppose it.”

The Attorney-General.—“General Gonse and Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart have been summoned. They will testify concerning the letters, if they see fit.”

M. Labori.—“I suggest that M. Scheurer-Kestner be authorized to hand the letters to the court.”

The Attorney-General.—“It is not possible. The government should have been notified of them at the proper time.”

M. Labori.—“M. Zola could not do so, as he did not then have the letters in his possession; but he called upon the attorney-general, as the representative of the complainant, to put these letters in evidence, thereby complying as far as possible with Article 52 of the law of 1881; therefore I have the honor to offer a motion” ...

The Judge.—“Oh!”

M. Labori.—“Oh! Monsieur le Président, if you knew how much pain it gives me, as a man of the world, to thus make you suffer.”

The Judge.—“Permit me to tell you, before you offer your motion, that it is impossible. Article 52 of the law concerning the press does not permit the production of documents not previously announced.”

M. Albert Clemenceau.—“The law obliges us to announce documents. We ought to have announced the letters of General Gonse. Why did we not do so? It is well that the jurors should know. We did not do so, because these letters have already been produced at one hearing,—the hearing of the council of war,—and under the following circumstances. Colonel Picquart was asked: ‘Have you General Gonse’s letters?’ He answered: ‘They are in my pocket.’ The president of the council of war then asked: ‘Will you give them to me?’ Colonel Picquart handed him the letters. The president of the council of war took them and placed them with the documents of the case, without having them read. So that, in order to conform to the law, we had to give notice of letters which had been confiscated, as it were, by a president of the council of war,—letters which were not at our disposal, and which only the attorney-general could produce.”

The Judge.—“Offer your motion. But, after all, if M. Schemer-Kestner, instead of reading them, wishes to say what they contain, he may do so.”

M. Labori.—“Very well; so be it.”

M. Scheurer-Kestner.—“I greatly regret that I cannot read these letters. I regret it from the standpoint of the manifestation of truth. I considered this reading indispensable, but I see that it is forbidden. Since, however, I am authorized to say what they contain, I will do so in a manner necessarily incomplete, but sufficient perhaps to enlighten the jurors.”

M. Scheurer-Kestner then repeated the substance of the letters, but, as the full text of the letters was printed in “L’Aurore” of the following day, February 9, they are given here in place of the description of them made to the jury by M. Scheurer-Kestner, although legally the full text of the letters forms no part of the evidence placed before the jury.

Cormeilles-en-Parisis (Seine-et-Oise), September 7, 1896.

My dear Picquart:

I have received your letter of the 5th, and, after reflecting upon all that you say. I hasten to tell you that it seems to me useful to proceed in this matter with great prudence, distrusting first impressions. The thing necessary now is to determine the nature of the documents.[1] How could they have been copied? What requests for information have been preferred by third parties? You may say that in this order of ideas it is rather difficult to reach a result without making some stir. I admit it. But in my opinion it is the best way of making sure progress. To the continuation of the inquiry from the standpoint of the handwritings[2] there is the grave objection that it compels us to take new people into our confidence under bad conditions, and it seems to me better to wait until we are more firmly settled in our opinions before going further in this rather delicate path. I return September 15, and we can better discuss an affair of this nature in conversation. But my feeling is that it is necessary to proceed with extreme prudence. I shake your hand most affectionately, my dear Picquart. Devotedly yours,

A. Gonse.

Paris, September 8, 1896.

My General:

I have read your letter carefully, and I shall scrupulously follow your instructions, but I believe it my duty to say this to you. Numerous indications, and a serious fact of which I shall speak to you on your return, show me that the time is near at hand when people who have the conviction that there has been an error in this matter are going to make a great effort and create a great scandal. I believe that I have done all that was necessary to give ourselves the opportunity of initiative. If too much time is lost, that initiative will be taken by others, which, to say nothing of higher considerations, will not leave us in a pleasant position. I must add that the people to whom I refer do not seem to be as well informed as we are,[3] and that in my opinion they will make a mess of it, creating a scandal and a great uproar without furnishing light. There will be a sad and useless crisis, which we could avoid by doing justice in season. Be good enough, etc.,

Picquart.

Cormeilles-en-Parisis (Seine-et-Oise), September 10, 1896.

My dear Picquart:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 8th, after having given it careful consideration. In spite of the disturbing fact stated therein, I persist in my first feeling. I believe that it is necessary to act in the most circumspect manner. At the point at which you have arrived in your investigation there is no question, of course, of avoiding the light, but we must ascertain what course should be taken in order to arrive at a manifestation of the truth. This granted, it is necessary to avoid all false manœuvres, and especially to guard against irreparable steps. It seems to me necessary to arrive silently, and in the order of ideas that I have pointed out to you, at as complete a certainty as possible before compromising anything. I know very well that the problem is a difficult one, and may be full of unexpected elements. But it is precisely for this reason that it is necessary to proceed with prudence. You are not lacking in that virtue; so my mind is easy. Remember that the difficulties are great, and that wise tactics, weighing in advance all possibilities, are indispensable. I have occasion to write to General de Boisdeffre; I say to him a few words of the same tenor as this letter. Prudence! Prudence! That is the word that you must keep steadily before your eyes. I return on the morning of the 15th. Come to see me at my office early, after you have been through your mail. I shake your hand most affectionately, my dear Picquart. Yours devotedly,

Gonse.

Paris, September 14, 1896.

My General:

September 7 I had the honor to direct your attention to the scandal that certain people were threatening to precipitate, and I permitted myself to say to you that, in my opinion, if we do not take the initiative, we shall have much trouble on our hands. The article from “L’Eclair” which you will find enclosed confirms me unhappily in my opinion. I shall try to find out who has succeeded so well in preparing the bomb. But I believe it my duty to affirm once more that it is necessary to act without delay. If we wait longer, we shall be run over, and imprisoned in an inextricable situation, where it will be impossible for us to establish the real truth. Be good enough, etc.,

Picquart.

M. Scheurer-Kestner, after repeating the substance of the foregoing letters, continued his testimony as follows:

“Such, gentlemen, is the résumé that I have been able to make from memory of these fine letters, which honor their author, both as a soldier and as a man. After reading them, I was convinced that there had been an error. I saw that General Gonse, Colonel Picquart’s superior, shared his ideas, and looked upon revision as a possibility. What had I to do? My first duty was to inform the minister of war, and show him the documents which proved that the handwriting of the bordereau was the handwriting of Major Esterhazy, and not that of Captain Dreyfus. That was what I did. I had a long conversation with General Billot, and showed him the documents that I possessed, though I did not speak at that time of the correspondence between General Gonse and Colonel Picquart, thinking it better not to do so. But I was not slow in offering this correspondence to the government, and naturally I was authorized to keep a copy of it. Unhappily new events had taken place, and the government perhaps had changed its attitude; I do not know; in any case, my offer was refused. It seemed to me that the honor of the government, of the republic, of democracy, and of the army required that the initiative in such a reparation should come from above, and not from below.

“Then what happened? The day after my visit to the minister of war, in which I spoke to him of the documents and showed them to him (that was October 31),—on the day after, November 1, though it had been agreed between us that our conversation should be secret, that it should not be noised abroad, that there should be no mention of it, what did I see in the newspapers inspired, so I was told, by the minister of war,—my visit to the minister related with false comments. It was said that I had shown nothing, that I had refused to give the minister of war proof of the innocence of Dreyfus, when, in fact, I had been with him three hours, begging him to make the proof public, and offering to cry it from the house-tops. He either would not, or could not, do it. He confined himself to saying: ‘He is guilty.’ ‘Prove to me that he is guilty,’ I said. ‘I cannot prove it to you.’ That was General Billot’s answer when I had brought important documents, and when my heart was full of all that I knew through the reading of the letters of which I had just spoken. That is how I came to my present conviction, and that is the way in which I gained courage to take up a cause which is a cause of humanity, truth, and justice.”