Part 1 — Footnotes for Chapter VI

{24} In the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons the following questions and answers occur, Mr. Blake questioning and Major Heany replying:

'Having got the message you went off with it and you got in, as we see by the evidence, as quickly as you could, and you just gave the message as accurately as you could to Dr. Jameson?—I read the message from my note-book absolutely accurately to Dr. Jameson.

'And he did not lose much time in making up his mind?—No; he went outside his tent. He was in a bell-tent when I arrived and he went outside and walked up and down for about twenty minutes, and then he came in and announced his determination.'

{25} In the course of the Inquiry at Westminster, Dr. Jameson himself took occasion to explain this reference, when answering a question put by Mr. Sidney Buxton.

Knowing what you do now of the position at Johannesburg, do you think it was within their power to send out 300 mounted men?—I cannot give an opinion upon that; I think all their actions were perfectly bonâ fide. There is one telegram here which has been brought up against me very unpleasantly, which I wish I had never sent, where 'fear' is imputed in the telegram as it stands here. My explanation is that I was irritated at the time at the trouble going on, and that I used it inadvertently, or possibly there is a mistake in deciphering the code word; as to that I cannot tell, but I am sorry that it should appear so in the telegram, because I never imputed fear or cowardice to anyone in connection with anything.

{26} July 1899. The originals have since been photographed and are here reproduced.

{27} Colonel Francis Rhodes.

{28} Lionel Phillips.

{29} (July, 1899.) Is it not probable that the deleted figures '2,000' in Colonel Rhodes' letter (see photograph) may account for some of the talk about 2,000 armed men?

{30} After the arrival in England of the officers of Dr. Jameson's force, a report dealing with the military aspect of the expedition was sent by Sir John Willoughby to the War Office. It has been printed and—to a certain extent—circulated, and cannot therefore be regarded as private. But apart from this it is a document so peculiar—so marked by mishandling of notorious facts—that it deserves no consideration other than it may earn on merits. It is printed in extenso with notes by a member of the Reform Committee. See Appendix H.

{31} See Appendix G. It will be noted that in his declarations Commandant Cronjé modifies his terms very considerably. It was impossible for any reasonable person to accept the explanation preferred by him, that the promise to spare the lives of the surrendered force was only to hold good until they could be handed over to the Commandant-General. In fact, it is well known that Commandant Cronjé only took up this attitude after an extremely acrimonious discussion had taken place between him and Commandant Malan—a quarrel in which they went the length of making charges against each other in the public press of treachery and neglect of duty whilst in the field. The Commandant Cronjé referred to here is the same gentleman who commanded the Boer forces at Potchefstroom in the War of Independence, and his record is an extremely unpleasant one, his conduct of operations having earned for the Potchefstroom commando the worst reputation of any. Apart from the execution of several British subjects who were suspected and, on wholly insufficient grounds, summarily shot as spies, there are the unpleasant facts that he caused prisoners of war to be placed in the forefront of the besieging operations and compelled them to work in the trenches in exposed positions so that they should be—and actually were—shot by their own comrades. There was also the incident in which he refused to allow one or two of the ladies who were among the beleaguered garrison, and who were then in extremely bad health, to leave the fort to obtain such food and medical attendance as would enable them to live. One of the ladies died in consequence. But the incident which has more bearing on Jameson's surrender than any other is that connected with the armistice, when Commandant Cronjé, in defiance of treaty obligations, withheld from Colonel Winslow and the besieged garrison the news that an armistice had been arranged between the Boer and British forces, and continued the siege until the garrison, in order to save the lives of the wounded and the women and children refugees, were obliged to surrender. It will be remembered that this incident was too much even for Mr. Gladstone, and that on its becoming known after the terms of peace had been settled, the Transvaal Government were required by Sir Evelyn Wood to allow a British force to march up from Natal and re-occupy Potchefstroom as a formal acknowledgment of Cronjé's treachery. Mr. Kruger and his party, who were in the greatest fear that the settlement would not be effected, and that Sir Evelyn Wood's action might provoke a renewal of hostilities, agreed to the terms, but with grave apprehensions as to the results. However, no contretemps occurred.

{32} Once when out hunting on foot—a young man then—Mr. Kruger, after climbing to the top of a kopje, found that he had been seen by a number of hostile natives who were then running towards him, some to climb the hill, others branching out to surround it. He knew that those on the flat could cut him off before he could descend and that his only chance lay in 'bluff.' Stepping on to the outermost ledge in full view of the enemy he calmly laid down his rifle, drew off first one and then the other of his velschoens (home-made hide shoes, in those poorer days worn without socks) and after quietly knocking the sand out of them drew them on again. By this time the natives had stopped to observe him. He then picked up his rifle again, and turning to an imaginary force behind the kopje waved to the right and then to the left, as though directing them to charge round each end of the hill. The next instant the Kaffirs were in full retreat.