Note 4 — Chapter XIV · THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL POSITION.

B. Relation of Stoicism to previous systems. (1) Its relation to Socrates and the Cynics. In order to obtain a more accurate notion of the rise of Stoicism, the premises on which it proceeds, and the grounds on which it is based, we must take a glance at its relation to preceding systems. The Stoics themselves deduced their philosophical pedigree directly from Antisthenes, and indirectly from Socrates.4 Clear as is their connection with both these philosophers, it would nevertheless be a mistake to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism, still more to regard it as a simple following of Socrates. From both it undoubtedly borrowed much. The self-sufficiency of virtue, the distinction of things good, evil, and indifferent, the ideal picture of the wise man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world within the precincts of the mind, and the strength of moral will, are ideas taken from the Cynics. In the spirit of Cynicism, too, it explained general ideas as simply names. Not to mention many peculiarities of ethics, the contrasting of one God with the many popular Gods, and the allegorical explanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed from Cynicism. The identification of virtue with intelligence, the belief that virtue was one, and could be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit of Socrates and also in that of the Cynics. The argument for the existence of God based on the subordination of means to ends, the whole view of the world as a system of means and ends, and the Stoic theory of Providence, are views peculiarly Socratic;5 and the Stoics followed Socrates in ethics by identifying the good and the useful.