Volume 6 — SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

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I

THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM AND THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

Introductory statement: Limitations of the undertaking 3

I. Definition of Insight, and of Religious Insight. Arbitrary limitation of the definition of religion here in question. The problem traditionally called that of the "salvation of man" as the main problem upon which the sources of insight here in question are to throw light 5

II. Generalised conception of "salvation." Variety of forms in which this conception has been defined and used. Resulting problem regarding the meaning of human life 9

III. Outline of the programme to be followed in the subsequent discussion 17

IV. The concept of revelation, and the "religious paradox." First statement of this paradox 19

V. Individual experience and the "inner light." What sort of religious insight is thus to be gained. Its limitations. Prospect of an appeal to other sources for aid 26

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II

INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE AS SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS INSIGHT

I. The definition of the religious problem, as given in the former lecture, simplifies our undertaking in certain respects, but seems to complicate it in others. Review of the situation. Outlook for further study 37

II. Outline of the undertaking of the present lecture 41

III. The motives that lead to religion are natural and human. Reasons why the objects of religious insight are nevertheless conceived as superhuman, and, as, for our individual experience, mysterious 44

IV. Can these objects be defined as realities or as "values" that our social experience sufficiently brings to our knowledge? Social experience as a source of religious insight. Its scope and importance 54

V. The inadequacy of social experience as a source of religious insight. Objections urged by tradition, by recent individualism, and by William James 58

VI. The social consciousness as an indispensable factor in religion. The consciousness of guilt as a sense of loneliness. Love as a glimpse of something saving and divine. The mystical aspect of our social consciousness. Despite this mystical aspect of all our better social life, our literal social relations are never sufficient to meet the religious need. The resulting outlook toward still further sources of enlightenment 65

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III

THE OFFICE OF THE REASON

I. Current objections to the Reason as a source of insight. Intuition vs. Reason. Reason vs. Experience. Usual view of the reason as "abstract" and as "analytic" in its procedure 80

II. But, in common usage, the words "reason" and "reasonable" often refer to something which does not wholly depend upon "abstract thinking" and mere "analysis." The "rule of reason." The concrete use of the reason. Reason as a survey of the connections of experience, as synthetic, and as involving broader intuitions. The alternative: "Either inarticulate intuition or else barren abstract reasoning," is falsely stated. The antithesis: "Either experience or else reason," also involves failure to see how both may be combined. Abstract thinking as a means to an end. This end is the attainment of a new and broader intuition. Relation between "becoming as a little child" and "putting away childish things" 84

III. Examples of the synthetic use of the reason. The fecundity of deductive reasoning. Novelties discovered by the purely deductive sciences. Reason and insight in their general relations 93

IV. The reason and the "religious paradox." The "paradox" as not peculiar to religion. Common sense as an appeal to standards which are in some sense superhuman. No human individual personally experiences or verifies what "human experience," in its conceived character as an integral whole, is supposed to confirm. The concepts of truth and error are dependent upon the concept of an appeal to an insight which no human individual ever possesses. This latter concept cannot be limited to the mere world of "common sense," but must be universalised. The whole real world as the object of an all-seeing comprehension of facts as they are. Otherwise our opinions about the world cannot even be false. Resulting synthetic insight of the reason. The world as the object present to the divine wisdom 102

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IV

THE WORLD AND THE WILL

I. Historical relations of philosophical idealism. General bearing of this doctrine upon the religious interest, and upon the history of religion 120

II. Objections to our doctrine of the reason as having no value for life, and as failing to help toward solving the problem of salvation 129

III. First answer to these objections. Reports of religious experience that show some relations of our doctrine to the problem in question 131

IV. Relations of knowledge and will in general. Statement of the position of Pragmatism. Resulting objections to our whole doctrine of the reason. Truth as tested through "workings." Absolute truth as indefinable. Pragmatism as taught by James has defined its own forms and tests of religious insight. These forms and tests of insight are asserted to be superior to our own. Religious insight as saving, but as also empirical, in James's sense of that term, and as never absolute 135

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V. Answer to pragmatism. Our agreement with some of its principal positions. Our intelligence as the counsellor of our actions. The point where we are at issue with pragmatism. Reason and will, their general relations. Vindication of the position taken in the former lecture 144

VI. The problem as to the absoluteness of truth. The close relations of knowledge and action do not throw doubt upon, but rather emphasise this absoluteness. For all action is expressed in individual and absolutely irrevocable deeds. These deeds, if the practical issues of life are sharply defined, remain irrevocably on the "score of life" as "hits" or "misses." This irrevocable character of our deeds insures the fact that the "counsels" or "ideas" of the intellect, which guide our individual deeds, are as absolutely "hits" or "misses" as are the deeds which they counsel. Resulting definition of absolute truth, which is something perfectly concrete, and as accessible as life itself 151

VII. Application of this view to the definition of reality. The real world as a life of counsels and of deeds. The divine wisdom and the divine will as inseparable. The eternal as, not the "timeless," but the "time-inclusive" insight and survey of life 158

V

THE RELIGION OF LOYALTY

I. Objections to all the foregoing sources of insight as inadequate,--if considered as separate sources,--to furnish a basis for a vital and positive religion. Need of a new source. Appeal to life to furnish such a source. The new source is due to men's efforts to solve the problem of duty, and results from the relations between the religious and the moral motives 166

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II. The historical conflicts between religion and morality. The relations between faith and works, divine grace and moral strenuousness. Review of these conflicts. Need of some unifying motive 170

III. Analysis of the bases of morals. Individual and social elements in the idea of duty. Resulting first statement of the search for a moral principle. Incompleteness of this first statement 182

IV. The contribution of the reason to the definition of a moral principle. Practical inadequacy of the result thus far attained 186

V. The loyal spirit illustrated 190

VI. The motives of Loyalty analysed. Definition of what is meant by a Cause to which one is loyal. The principal of Loyalty, stated and developed. The religious aspect of the loyal spirit. The finding of the cause is not due to the will of the loyal being; his service of the cause is due to his will. Resulting reconciliation of the moral and religious motives. The cause as a free gift of grace. The service as one's own. The absoluteness of the principle of loyalty. The solution of the "religious paradox" 197

VI

THE RELIGIOUS MISSION OF SORROW

I. The consideration of Loyalty leads over to a new problem. "Tribulation" as a hindrance to religious insight. Reasons why this is the case, introduced by a statement regarding our experience of evil. The principle that "Evil ought to be altogether put out of existence" stated, and the reasons therefore indicated. Man as in intent a "destroyer of evil." Our natural interest in destructive prowess 215

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II. Resulting situation in which religion seems to be placed. Religion appears (1) To presuppose as well as to experience a vast range of evils in the real world; (2) To depend upon the assurance that the ruling principle of the real world is good; and (3) To agree with morality in making use of the principle that "Evil ought to be altogether put out of existence." Resulting apparent dilemma: Religion seems either superfluous or else doomed to failure 219

III. Illustrations of the dilemma as it appears in practical life, and as a barrier in the way of the religious life. Need of an abstract statement of the dilemma as a means of discounting our emotional confusions 227

IV. Reconsideration of the principle that has led to the dilemma. Not all evils equally worthy of abolition. Idealised ills. Definition of Sorrow. The process and the results of idealisation. Creative synthesis vs. mere destruction. The winning over and conquest of ill. Strength of spirit involved in such creative synthesis, which, in its turn, is never passive, but always morally active. Suggestions toward a solution of the dilemma. Sorrow as a source of religious insight 232

V. A recent literary instance of such insight 241

VI. Summary and suggestion of possible results of such insight 250

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VII

THE UNITY OF THE SPIRIT AND THE INVISIBLE CHURCH

I. The sense in which the religious objects are "superhuman" and "supernatural." Our present "form of consciousness" and the "form of consciousness" that belongs to the "Spirit" in the sense in which that term is here used 257

II. The Church, visible and invisible 272

III. The membership of the invisible church 282

IV. Communion with the invisible church 291

V. The Spiritual Gifts of the invisible church. Charity, Tolerance and Loyalty as the Fruits of the Spirit. The work of the invisible church 293

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