BOOK IV. (continued 2)

It must be owned, that Mons. de Torcy made great merit of this confidence that his master placed in the Queen; and observing Her Majesty's displeasure against the Dutch, on account of their late proceedings, endeavoured to inflame it with aggravations enough; insinuating, "That, since the States had acted so ungratefully, the Queen should let her forces join with those of France, in order to compel the confederates to a peace." But although this overture were very tenderly hinted from the French court, Her Majesty heard it with the utmost abhorrence; and ordered her secretary, Mr. St. John (created about this time Viscount Bolingbroke),[17] to tell Mons. de Torcy, "That no provocations whatever should tempt her to distress her allies; but she would endeavour to bring them to reason by fair means, or leave them to their own conduct: That if the former should be found impracticable, she would then make her own peace, and content herself with doing the office of a mediator between both parties: but if the States should at any time come to a better mind, and suffer their ministers to act in conjunction with hers, she would assert their just interests to the utmost, and make no farther progress in any treaty with France, until those allies received all reasonable satisfaction, both as to their barrier and their trade." The British plenipotentiaries were directed to give the same assurances to the Dutch ministers at Utrecht, and withal to let them know, "That the Queen was determined, by their late conduct, to make peace either with or without them; but would much rather choose the former."

[Footnote 17: Bolingbroke had understood that he would not lose rank on his promotion, from which he concluded that the earldom of Bolingbroke, extinct in his family, would be revived in his favour. His indignation, however, was very keen when he was created only a Viscount. He wrote to Strafford at Utrecht, that his promotion had been a mortification to him. "In the House of Commons," he said, "I may say that I was at the head of business. ... There was, therefore, nothing to flatter my ambition in removing me from thence, but giving me the title which had been many years in my family, and which reverted to the Crown about a year ago, by the death of the last of the elder house. ... I own to you that I felt more indignation than ever in my life I had done." (Letter to the Earl of Strafford, July 23, 1712). [T.S.]]

There was, however, one advantage which Her Majesty resolved to make by this defection of her foreigners. She had been led, by the mistaken politics of some years past, to involve herself in several guaranties with the princes of the north, which were, in some sort, contradictory to one another; but this conduct of theirs wholly annulled all such engagements, and left her at liberty to interpose in the affairs of those parts of Europe, in such a manner as would best serve the interests of her own kingdoms, as well as that of the Protestant religion, and settle a due balance of power in the north.

The grand article for preventing the union of France and Spain, was to be executed during a cessation of arms. But many difficulties arising about that, and some other points of great importance to the common cause, which could not easily be adjusted either between the French and British plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, or by correspondence between Mons. de Torcy and the ministry here; the Queen took the resolution of sending the Lord Viscount Bolingbroke immediately to France, fully instructed in all her intentions, and authorized to negotiate every thing necessary for settling the treaty of peace in such a course, as might bring it to a happy and speedy conclusion. He was empowered to agree to a general suspension of arms, by sea and land, between Great Britain, France and Spain, to continue for four months, or until the conclusion of the peace; provided France and Spain would previously give positive assurances to make good the terms demanded by Her Majesty for the Duke of Savoy, and would likewise adjust and determine the forms of the several renunciations to be made by both those crowns, in order to prevent their being ever united. The Lord Bolingbroke was likewise authorized to settle some differences relating to the Elector of Bavaria, for whose interests France was as much concerned as Her Majesty was for those of the Duke of Savoy; to explain all doubtful articles which particularly related to the advantages of Britain; to know the real ultimatum, as it is termed, of France upon the general plan of peace; and lastly, to cut off all hopes from that court of ever bringing the Queen to force her allies to a disadvantageous peace; Her Majesty resolving to impose no scheme at all upon them, or to debar them from the liberty of endeavouring to obtain the best conditions they could.

The Lord Bolingbroke went to France in the beginning of August,[18] was received at court with particular marks of distinction and respect; and in a very few days, by his usual address and ability, performed every part of his commission, extremely to the Queen's content and his own honour. He returned to England before the end of the month; but Mr. Prior, who went along with him, was left behind, to adjust whatever differences might remain or arise between the two crowns.[19]

[Footnote 18: "Lord Bolingbroke and Prior set out for France last Saturday. My lord's business is to hasten the peace before the Dutch are too much mauled, and hinder France from carrying the jest of beating them too far." ("Journal to Stella," August 7th, 1712. See vol. ii., p. 381 of present edition). The result of Bolingbroke's visit was the signing, on August 19th, of an agreement for the suspension of arms for four months. Torcy's reception of Bolingbroke was so managed that the bon vivant peer had as pleasant a time as he could well have wished. How much influence that had on Bolingbroke we can only speculate; but it is certain that he would have made a separate peace with France, after his return, had Oxford been willing. See Torcy's "Mémoires" (vol. ii., p. 202). "Bolingbroke avoit conseillé à la Reine sa maîtresse de préférer une paix particulière à la suspension d'armes, et d'assurer au plus tôt à ses sujets la jouissance de toutes les conditions dont le Roi étoit convenu en faveur de l'Angleterre." [T.S.]]

[Footnote 19: There is a long letter from Lord Bolingbroke to Mr. Prior, on the subject of this negotiation, printed in Scott's edition of Swift, vol. xv., pp. 524-529. [W.S.J.]]

In the mean time the general conferences at Utrecht, which for several weeks had been let fall, since the delivery of Dunkirk, were now resumed. But the Dutch still declaring against a suspension of arms, and refusing to accept the Queen's speech as a plan to negotiate upon, there was no progress made for some time in the great work of the peace. Whereupon the British plenipotentiaries told those of the States, "That if the Queen's endeavours could not procure more than the contents of her speech, or if the French should ever fall short of what was there offered, the Dutch could blame none but themselves, who, by their conduct, had rendered things difficult, that would otherwise have been easy." However, Her Majesty thought it prudent to keep the States still in hopes of her good offices, to prevent them from taking the desperate course of leaving themselves wholly at the mercy of France; which was an expedient they formerly practised, and which a party among them was now inclined to advise.

Whilst the congress at Utrecht remained in this inactive state, the Queen proceeded to perfect that important article for preventing the union of France and Spain. It was proposed and accepted, that Philip should renounce France, for himself and his posterity; and that the Most Christian King, and all the princes of his blood, should, in the like manner, renounce Spain.

It must be confessed, that this project of renunciation lay under a great disrepute, by the former practices of this very King, Lewis XIV. pursuant to an absurd notion among many in that kingdom, of a divine right, annexed to proximity of blood, not to be controlled by any human law.

But it is plain, the French themselves had recourse to this method, after all their infractions of it, since the Pyrenean treaty; for the first dauphin, in whom the original claim was vested, renounced, for himself and his eldest son, which opened the way to Philip Duke of Anjou; who would however hardly have succeeded, if it had not been for the will made in his favour by the last King, Charles II.

It is indeed hard to reflect, with any patience, upon the unaccountable stupidity of the princes of Europe for some centuries past, who left a probability to France of succeeding in a few ages to all their dominions; whilst, at the same time, no alliance with that kingdom could be of advantage to any prince, by reason of the salique law. Should not common prudence have taught every sovereign in Christendom to enact a salique law, with respect to France; for want of which, it is almost a miracle, that the Bourbon family hath not possessed the universal monarchy by right of inheritance? When the French assert a proximity of blood gives a divine right, as some of their ministers, who ought to be more wise or honest, have lately advanced in this very case, to the title of Spain; do they not, by allowing a French succession, make their own kings usurpers? Or, if the salique law be divine, is it not of universal obligation, and consequently of force, to exclude France from inheriting by daughters? Or, lastly, if that law be of human institution, may it not be enacted in any state, with whatever extent or limitation the legislature shall think fit? For the notion of an unchangeable human law is an absurdity in government, to be believed only by ignorance, and supported by power. From hence it follows, that the children of the late Queen of France, although she had renounced, were as legally excluded from succeeding to Spain, as if the salique law had been fundamental in that kingdom; since that exclusion was established by every power in Spain, which could possibly give a sanction to any law there; and therefore the Duke of Anjou's title is wholly founded upon the bequest of his predecessor (which hath great authority in that monarchy, as it formerly had in ours), upon the confirmation of the Cortes, and the general consent of the people.

It is certain, the faith of princes is so frequently subservient to their ambition, that renunciations have little validity, otherwise than from the powers and parties whose interest it is to support them. But this renunciation, which the Queen hath exacted from the French King and his grandson, I take to be armed with all the essential circumstances that can fortify such an act. For as it is necessary, for the security of every prince in Europe, that those two great kingdoms should never be united; so the chief among them will readily consent to be guarantees for preventing such a misfortune.

Besides, this proposal (according to Her Majesty's expression in her speech) is of such a nature, that it executes itself; because the Spaniards, who dread such an union, for every reason that can have weight among men, took care that their king should not only renounce, in the most solemn manner; but likewise, that the act should be framed in the strongest terms themselves could invent, or we could furnish them with. As to France, upon supposal of the young dauphin's dying in a few years, that kingdom will not be in a condition to engage in a long war against a powerful alliance, fortified with the addition of the Spaniards, and the party of the Duke of Berry, or whoever else shall be next claimer: and the longer the present dauphin lives, the weaker must Philip's interest be in France; because the princes, who are to succeed by this renunciation, will have most power and credit in the kingdom.

The mischiefs occasioned by the want of a good understanding between the allies, especially Britain and Holland, were raised every day; the French taking the advantage, and raising difficulties, not only upon the general plan of peace, but likewise upon the explanation of several articles in the projected treaty between them and Her Majesty: They insisted to have Lille, as the equivalent for Dunkirk; and demanded Tournay, Maubeuge, and Condé, for the two or three towns mentioned in the Queen's speech; which the British plenipotentiaries were so far from allowing, that they refused to confer with those of France upon that foot; although, at the same time, the former had fresh apprehensions that the Dutch, in a fit of despair, would accept whatever terms the enemy pleased to offer, and, by precipitating their own peace, prevent Her Majesty from obtaining any advantages, both for her allies and herself.

It is most certain, that the repeated losses suffered by the States, in little more than two months after they had withdrawn themselves from the Queen's assistance, did wholly disconcert their counsels;[20] and their prudence (as it is usual) began to forsake them with their good fortune. They were so weak as to be still deluded by their friends in England, who continued to give them hopes of some mighty and immediate resource from hence; for when the Duke of Ormonde had been about a month in Ghent, he received a letter from the Maréchal de Villars, to inform him, that the Dutch generals, taken at Denain, had told the maréchal publicly, of a sudden revolution expected in Britain; that particularly the Earl of Albemarle and Mons. Hompesch discoursed very freely of it, and that nothing was more commonly talked of in Holland. It was then likewise confidently reported in Ghent, that the Queen was dead; and we all remember what rumour flew about here at the very same time, as if Her Majesty's health were in a bad condition.

[Footnote 20: The Dutch had been defeated at Douay, and the Allies had suffered reverses by the reduction of Quesnoy and Bouchain. [T.S.]]

Whether such vain hopes as these gave spirit to the Dutch; whether their frequent misfortunes made them angry and sullen; whether they still expected to overreach us by some private stipulations with France, through the mediation of the Elector of Bavaria, as that prince afterwards gave out; or whatever else was the cause, they utterly refused a cessation of arms; and made not the least return to all the advances and invitations made by Her Majesty, until the close of the campaign.

It was then the States first began to view their affairs in another light; to consider how little the vast promises of Count Zinzendorf were to be relied on; to be convinced that France was not disposed to break with Her Majesty, only to gratify their ill humour, or unreasonable demands; to discover that their factious correspondents on this side the water had shamefully misled them; that some of their own principal towns grew heartily weary of the war, and backward in their loans; and, lastly, that Prince Eugene, their new general, whether his genius or fortune had left him, was not for their turn. They, therefore, directed their ministers at Utrecht to signify to the lord privy seal and the Earl of Strafford, "That the States were disposed to comply with Her Majesty, and to desire her good offices with France; particularly, that Tournay and Condé might be left to them as part of their barrier, without which they could not be safe: That the Elector of Bavaria might not be suffered to retain any town in the Netherlands, which would be as bad for Holland as if those places were in the hands of France: Therefore the States proposed, that Luxembourg, Namur, Charleroy, and Nieuport, might be delivered to the Emperor. Lastly, That the French might not insist on excepting the four species of goods out of the tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four: That if Her Majesty could prevail with France to satisfy their masters on these articles, they would be ready to submit in all the rest."

When the Queen received an account of this good disposition in the States General, immediately orders were sent to Mr. Prior, to inform the ministers of the French court, "That Her Majesty had now some hopes of the Dutch complying with her measures; and therefore she resolved, as she had always declared, whenever those allies came to themselves, not to make the peace without their reasonable satisfaction." The difficulty that most pressed, was about the disposal of Tournay and Condé. The Dutch insisted strongly to have both, and the French were extremely unwilling to part with either.

The Queen judged the former would suffice, for completing the barrier of the States. Mr. Prior was therefore directed to press the Marquis de Torcy effectually on this head, and to terminate all that minister's objections, by assuring him of Her Majesty's resolutions to appear openly on the side of the Dutch, if this demand were refused. It was thought convenient to act in this resolute manner with France, whose late success, against Holland, had taught the ministers of the Most Christian King to resume their old imperious manner of treating with that republic; to which they were farther encouraged by the ill understanding between Her Majesty and the allies.

This appeared from the result of an idle quarrel that happened, about the end of August,[21] at Utrecht, between a French and a Dutch plenipotentiary, Mons. Mesnager and Count Rechteren;[22] wherein the court of France demanded such abject submissions, and with so much haughtiness, as plainly shewed they were pleased with any occasion of mortifying the Dutch.

[Footnote 21: July. [S]]

[Footnote 22: See note on p. 95. [T.S.]]

Besides, the politics of the French ran at this time very opposite to those of Britain: They thought the ministers here durst not meet the Parliament without a peace; and that, therefore, Her Majesty would either force the States to comply with France, by delivering up Tournay, which was the principal point in dispute, or would finish her own peace with France and Spain, leaving a fixed time for Holland to refuse or accept the terms imposed on them. But the Queen, who thought the demand of Tournay by the States to be very necessary and just, was determined to insist upon it, and to declare openly against France, rather than suffer her ally to want a place so useful for their barrier. And Mr. Prior was ordered to signify this resolution of Her Majesty to Mons. de Torcy, in case that minister could not be otherwise prevailed on.

The British plenipotentiaries did likewise, at the same time, express to those of Holland Her Majesty's great satisfaction, that the States were at last disposed to act in confidence with her: "That she wished this resolution had been sooner taken, since nobody had gained by the delay, but the French King; that, however, Her Majesty did not question the procuring a safe and honourable peace, by united counsels, reasonable demands, and prudent measures; that she would assist them in getting whatever was necessary to their barrier, and in settling, to their satisfaction, the exceptions made by France out of the tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four; that no other difficulties remained of moment to retard the peace, since the Queen had obtained Sicily for the Duke of Savoy; and, in the settlement of the Low Countries, would adhere to what she delivered from the throne: That as to the empire, Her Majesty heartily wished their barrier as good as could be desired; but that we were not now in circumstances to expect every thing exactly according to the scheme of Holland: France had already offered a great part, and the Queen did not think the remainder worth the continuance of the war."

Her Majesty conceived the peace in so much forwardness, that she thought fit, about this time, to nominate the Duke of Hamilton and the Lord Lexington for ambassadors in France and Spain, to receive the renunciations in both courts, and adjust matters of commerce.

The duke[23] was preparing for his journey, when he was challenged to a duel[24] by the Lord Mohun,[25] a person of infamous character. He killed his adversary upon the spot, though he himself received a wound; and, weakened by the loss of blood, as he was leaning in the arms of his second, was most barbarously stabbed in the breast by Lieutenant-General Macartney,[26] who was second to Lord Mohun. He died a few minutes after in the field, and the murderer made his escape. I thought so surprising an event might deserve barely to be related, although it be something foreign to my subject.

[Footnote 23: James, Duke of Hamilton, was a gentleman of the bed-chamber to King Charles II. He succeeded his father in the title, April 18th, 1694, and was sent the same year envoy extraordinary to France; ... he was killed, November 15th, 1712. [S.]]

[Footnote 24: Swift's account of the duel is exactly agreeable to the depositions of Colonel Hamilton before a committee of the council. [S.]]

[Footnote 25: Charles Lord Mohun was the last offspring of a very noble and ancient family, of which William de Mohun, who accompanied the Norman conqueror, was the first founder in England. [S.]]

[Footnote 26: General Macartney was tried, at the King's Bench bar, for the murder, June 13th, 1716; and the jury found him guilty of man-slaughter. [S.]]

The Earl of Strafford, who had come to England in May last,[27] in order to give Her Majesty an account of the disposition of affairs in Holland, was now returning with her last instructions, to let the Dutch minister know, "That some points would probably meet with difficulties not to be overcome, which once might have been easily obtained: To shew what evil consequences had already flowed from their delay and irresolution, and to entreat them to fix on some proposition, reasonable in itself, as well as possible to be effected: That the Queen would insist upon the cession of Tournay by France, provided the States would concur in finishing the peace, without starting new objections, or insisting upon farther points: That the French demands, in favour of the Elector of Bavaria, appeared to be such as, the Queen was of opinion, the States ought to agree to; which were, to leave the Elector in possession of Luxembourg, Namur, and Charleroy, subject to the terms of their barrier, until he should be restored to his electorate; and to give him the kingdom of Sardinia, to efface the stain of his degradation in the electoral college: That the earl had brought over a project of a new Treaty of Succession and Barrier, which Her Majesty insisted the States should sign, before the conclusion of the peace; the former treaty having been disadvantageous to her subjects, containing in it the seeds of future dissensions, and condemned by the sense of the nation. Lastly, That Her Majesty, notwithstanding all provocations, had, for the sake of the Dutch, and in hopes of their recovery from those false notions which had so long misled them, hitherto kept the negotiations open: That the offers now made them were her last, and this the last time she would apply to them: That they must either agree, or expect the Queen would proceed immediately to conclude her treaty with France and Spain, in conjunction with such of her allies as would think fit to adhere to her.

[Footnote 27: "Come to England in ... last" in original edition. The word "May" was supplied in the edition of 1775. [W.S.J.]]

"As to Savoy, that the Queen expected the States would concur with her in making good the advantages stipulated for that duke, and in prevailing with the Emperor to consent to an absolute neutrality in Italy, until the peace should be concluded."

The governing party in Holland, however in appearance disposed to finish, affected new delays, and raised many difficulties about the four species of goods, which the French had excepted out of the tariff. Count Zinzendorf, the Emperor's plenipotentiary, did all that was possible to keep up this humour in the Dutch, in hopes to put them under a necessity of preparing for the next campaign; and some time after went so far in this pursuit, that he summoned the several ministers of the empire, and told them he had letters from his master, with orders to signify to them, "That his Imperial Majesty resolved to begin the campaign early, with all his forces united against France; of which he desired they would send notice to all their courts, that the several princes might be ready to furnish their contingents and recruits." At the same time Zinzendorf endeavoured to borrow two millions of florins upon the security of some imperial cities; but could not succeed either amongst the Jews or at Amsterdam.

When the Earl of Strafford arrived at Utrecht, the lord privy seal and he communicated to the Dutch ministers the new Treaty for a Succession and Barrier, as the Queen had ordered it to be prepared here in England, differing from the former in several points of the greatest moment, obvious to any who will be at the pains to compare them. This was strenuously opposed for several weeks by the plenipotentiaries of the States; but the province of Utrecht, where the congress was held, immediately sent orders to their representatives at The Hague, to declare their province thankful to the Queen; that they agreed the peace should be made on the terms proposed by France, and consented to the new projected Treaty of Barrier and Succession: and about the close of the year, one thousand seven hundred and twelve, four of the seven provinces, had delivered their opinions for putting an end to the war.

This unusual precipitation in the States, so different from the whole tenor of their former conduct, was very much suspected by the British plenipotentiaries. Their Lordships had received intelligence, that the Dutch ministers held frequent conferences with those of France, and had offered to settle their interests with that crown, without the concurrence of Britain. Count Zinzendorf, and his colleagues, appeared likewise, all on the sudden, to have the same dispositions, and to be in great haste to settle their several differences with the States. The reasons for this proceeding were visible enough; many difficulties were yet undetermined in the treaty of commerce between Her Majesty and France, for the adjusting of which, and some other points, the Queen had lately dispatched the Duke of Shrewsbury to that court. Some of these were of hard digestion, with which the Most Christian King would not be under a necessity of complying, when he had no farther occasion for us, and might, upon that account, afford better terms to the other two powers. Besides, the Emperor and the States could very well spare Her Majesty the honour of being arbitrator of a general peace; and the latter hoped by this means, to avoid the new Treaty of Barrier and Succession, which we were now forcing on them.

To prevent the consequences of this evil, there fortunately fell out an incident, which the two lords at Utrecht knew well how to make use of: the quarrel between Mons. Mesnager and Count Rechteren (formerly mentioned) had not yet been made up. The French and Dutch differing in some circumstances, about the satisfaction to be given by the count for the affront he had offered, the British plenipotentiaries kept this dispute on foot for several days; and, in the mean time, pressed the Dutch to finish the new Treaty of Barrier and Succession between Her Majesty and them, which, about the middle of January, was concluded fully to the Queen's satisfaction.

But while these debates and differences continued at the congress, the Queen resolved to put a speedy end to her part in the war; she therefore sent orders to the lord privy seal, and the Earl of Stafford, to prepare every thing necessary for signing her own treaty with France. This she hoped might be done against the meeting of her Parliament, now prorogued to the third of February; in which time, those among the allies, who were really inclined towards a peace, might settle their several interests by the assistance and support of Her Majesty's plenipotentiaries; and as for the rest, who would either refuse to comply, or endeavour to protract the negotiation, the heads of their respective demands, which France had yielded by Her Majesty's intervention, and agreeable to the plan laid down in her speech, should be mentioned in the treaty, and a time limited for the several powers concerned to receive or reject them.

The Pretender was not yet gone out of France, upon some difficulties alleged by the French, about procuring him a safe conduct to Bar-le-duc, in the Duke of Lorraine's dominions, where it was then proposed he should reside. The Queen, altogether bent upon quieting the minds of her subjects, declared, she would not sign the peace till that person were removed; although several wise men believed he could be no where less dangerous to Britain, than in the place where he was.

The argument which most prevailed on the States to sign the new Treaty of Barrier and Succession with Britain, was Her Majesty's promise to procure Tournay for them from France; after which, no more differences remained between us and that republic, and consequently they had no farther temptations to any separate transactions with the French, who thereupon began to renew their litigious and haughty manner of treating with the Dutch. The satisfaction they extorted for the affront given by Count Rechteren to Mons. Mesnager, although somewhat softened by the British ministers at Utrecht, was yet so rigorous, that Her Majesty could not forbear signifying her resentment of it to the Most Christian King. Mons. Mesnager, who seemed to have more the genius of a merchant than a minister, began, in his conferences with the plenipotentiaries of the States, to raise new disputes upon points which both we and they had reckoned upon as wholly settled. The Abbé de Polignac, a most accomplished person, of great generosity and universal understanding, was gone to France to receive the cardinal's cap; and the Maréchal d'Uxelles was wholly guided by his colleague, Mons. Mesnager, who kept up those brangles, that for a time obstructed the peace; some of which were against all justice, and others of small importance, both of very little advantage to his country, and less to the reputation of his master or himself. This low talent in business, which the Cardinal de Polignac used, in contempt, to call a "spirit of negotiating," made it impossible for the two lords plenipotentiaries, with all their abilities and experience, to bring Mesnager to reason, in several points both with us and the States: his concessions were few and constrained, serving only to render him more tenacious of what he refused. In several of the towns, which the States were to keep, he insisted that France should retain the chatellanies, or extent of country depending on them, particularly that of Tournay; a demand the more unjustifiable, because he knew his master had not only proceeded directly contrary, but had erected a court in his kingdom, where his own judges extended the territories about those towns he had taken, as far as he pleased to direct them. Mons. Mesnager showed equal obstinacy in what his master expected for the Elector of Bavaria, and in refusing the tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four: so that the Queen's plenipotentiaries represented these difficulties as what might be of dangerous consequence, both to the peace in general, and to the States in particular, if they were not speedily prevented.

Upon these considerations Her Majesty thought it her shortest and safest course to apply directly to France, where she had then so able a minister as the Duke of Shrewsbury.[28]

[Footnote 28: Shrewsbury had been appointed the Duke of Hamilton's successor. [T.S.]]

The Marquis de Torcy, secretary to the Most Christian King, was the minister with whom the Duke was to treat, as having been the first who moved his master to apply to the Queen for a peace, in opposition to a violent faction in that kingdom, who were as eagerly bent to continue the war, as any other could be either here or in Holland.

It would be very unlike a historian, to refuse this great minister the praise he so justly deserveth, of having treated, through the whole course of so great a negotiation, with the utmost candour and integrity; never once failing in any promise he made, and tempering a firm zeal to his master's interest, with a ready compliance to what was reasonable and just. Mr. Prior, whom I have formerly mentioned, resided likewise now at Paris, with the character of minister plenipotentiary, and was very acceptable to that court, upon the score of his wit and humour.[29]

[Footnote 29: P. Fitzgerald adds, "as well as useful to Her Majesty by his knowledge and dexterity in the management of affairs." [W.S.J.]]

The Duke of Shrewsbury was directed to press the French court upon the points yet unsettled in the treaty of commerce between both crowns; to make them drop their unreasonable demands for the Elector of Bavaria; to let them know, that the Queen was resolved not to forsake her allies who were now ready to come in; that she thought the best way of hastening the general peace, was to determine her own particular one with France, until which time she could not conveniently suffer her Parliament to meet.

The States were, by this time, so fully convinced of the Queen's sincerity and affection to their republic, and how much they had been deceived by the insinuations of the factious party in England, that they wrote a very humble letter to Her Majesty, to desire her assistance towards settling those points they had in dispute with France, and professing themselves ready to acquiesce in whatever explanation Her Majesty would please to make of the plan proposed in her speech to the Parliament.

But the Queen had already prevented their desires; and in the beginning of February, one thousand seven hundred and twelve-thirteen, directed the Duke of Shrewsbury to inform the French court, "That since she had prevailed on her allies, the Dutch, to drop the demand of Condé, and the other of the four species of goods, which the French had excepted out of the tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four, she would not sign without them: That she approved of the Dutch insisting to have the chatellanies restored, with the towns, and was resolved to stand or fall with them, until they were satisfied in this point."

Her Majesty had some apprehensions, that the French created these difficulties on purpose to spin out the treaty, until the campaign should begin. They thought it absolutely necessary, that our Parliament should meet in a few weeks, which could not well be ventured, until the Queen were able to tell both Houses, that her own peace was signed: That this would not only facilitate what remained in difference between Britain and France, but leave the Dutch entirely at the mercy of the latter.

The Queen, weary of these refined mistakes in the French politics, and fully resolved to be trifled with no longer, sent her determinate orders to the Duke of Shrewsbury, to let France know, "That Her Majesty had hitherto prorogued her Parliament, in hopes of accommodating the difficulties in her own treaties of peace and commerce with that crown, as well as settling the interests of her several allies; or, at least, that the differences in the former being removed, the Most Christian King would have made such offers for the latter, as might justify Her Majesty in signing her own peace, whether the confederates intended to sign theirs or no. But several points being yet unfinished between both crowns, and others between France and the rest of the allies, especially the States, to which the plenipotentiaries of that court at Utrecht had not thought fit to give satisfaction; the Queen was now come to a final determination, both with relation to her own kingdoms, and to the whole alliance: That the campaign approaching, she would not willingly be surprised in case the war was to go on: That she had transmitted to the Duke of Shrewsbury her last resolutions, and never would be prevailed on to reduce her own demands, or those of her allies, any lower than the scheme now sent over, as an explanation of the plan laid down in her speech: That Her Majesty had sent orders to her plenipotentiaries at Utrecht, to assume the character of ambassadors, and sign the peace immediately with the ministers of the Most Christian King, as soon as the Duke of Shrewsbury should have sent them notice that the French had complied: That the Queen had therefore farther prorogued her Parliament to the third of March, in hopes to assure them, by that time, of her peace being agreed on; for if the two Houses should meet, while any uncertainty remained, supplies must be asked as for a war."

The Duke of Shrewsbury[30] executed this important commission with that speed and success, which could only be expected from an able minister. The French King immediately yielded to the whole scheme Her Majesty proposed; whereupon directions were sent to the lord privy seal, and the Earl of Strafford, to sign a peace between Great Britain and France, without delay.

[Footnote 30: Swift writes to Abp. King, October 20th, 1713, that the Duke of Shrewsbury "is the finest gentleman we have, and of an excellent understanding and capacity for business" (Scott's edition, xvi. 71). See also Swift's remarks in "The Examiner," No. 27 (vol. ix, of this edition, p. 171), and note in vol. v., p. 377. [W.S.J.]]

Upon the second day of March, the two British plenipotentiaries met those of the allies in the town-house at Utrecht; where the lord privy seal addressed himself to them in a short speech, "That the negotiation had now continued fourteen months with great slowness, which had proved very injurious to the interests of the allies: That the Queen had stayed thus long, and stopped the finishing of her own peace, rather than leave her allies in any uncertainty: That she hoped they would now be all prepared to put an end to this great work; and therefore had commanded her plenipotentiaries to tell those of the allies, That she found it necessary to conclude her own treaty immediately; and it was her opinion, that the confederates ought to finish theirs at the same time, to which they were now accordingly invited by Her Majesty's orders." And lastly, his lordship declared, in the Queen's name, "That whoever could not be ready on the day prefixed, should have a convenient time allowed them to come in."

Although the orders sent by the Queen to her plenipotentiaries were very precise, yet their lordships did not precipitate the performance of them. They were directed to appoint as short a day for the signing as they conveniently could; but, however, the particular day was left to their discretion. They hoped to bring over the Dutch, and most of the other allies, to conclude at the same time with the Queen; which, as it would certainly be more popular to their country, so they conceived it would be more safe for themselves: besides, upon looking over their commission, a scruple sprang in their minds, that they could not sign a particular peace with France; their powers, as they apprehended, authorizing them only to sign a general one. Their lordships therefore sent to England to desire new powers,[31] and, in the mean time, employed themselves with great industry, between the ministers of France and those of the several allies, to find some expedient for smoothing the way to an agreement among them.

[Footnote 31: "Lord Bolingbroke, who says he has not sagacity enough to find the objections that the plenipotentiaries had made to their first full powers, for their satisfaction, sends them a new commission, and repeats to them positive orders to sign and conclude with France.... These difficulties of the plenipotentiaries made my lord treasurer, who never failed to exert himself when he found it absolutely necessary, think it high time to interpose his authority;.... and as his lordship never yet appeared in vain, all further obstructions at Utrecht were after this soon removed." ("Report from the Committee of Secrecy," 1715, pp. 103, 104.) [N.]]

The Earl of Strafford went for a few days to The Hague, to inform the States of Her Majesty's express commands to his colleague and himself, for signing the peace as soon as possible; and to desire they would be ready at the same time: which the pensionary promised; and that their plenipotentiaries should be empowered accordingly, to the great contentment of Mons. Buys, who was now so much altered, either in reality, or appearance, that he complained to the Earl of Mons. Heinsius's slowness; and charged all the delays and mismanagements of a twelvemonth past to that minister's account.

While the Earl of Strafford stayed at The Hague, he discovered that an emissary of the Duke of Marlborough's had been there some days before, sent by his grace to dissuade the Dutch from signing at the same time with the ministers of the Queen, which, in England, would at least have the appearance of a separate peace, and oblige their British friends, who knew how to turn so short a delay to very good account, as well as gratify the Emperor; on whom, it was alleged, they ought to rely much more than on Her Majesty. One of the States likewise told the Earl, "That the same person, employed by the Duke, was then in conference with the magistrates of Rotterdam (which town had declared for the continuance of the war), to assure them, if they would hold off a little, they should see an unexpected turn in the British Parliament: That the Duke of Marlborough had a list of the discontented members in both Houses, who were ready to turn against the court; and, to crown all, that his grace had certain intelligence of the Queen being in so ill a state of health, as made it impossible for her to live above six weeks." So restless and indefatigable is avarice and ambition, when inflamed by a desire of revenge.

But representations, which had been so often tried, were now offered too late. Most of the allies, except the Emperor, were willing to put an end to the war upon Her Majesty's plan; and the further delay of three weeks must be chiefly imputed to that litigious manner of treating, peculiar to the French; whose plenipotentiaries at Utrecht insisted with obstinacy upon many points, which at Paris Mons. de Torcy had given up.

The Emperor expected to keep all he already possessed in Italy; that Port Longue,[32] on the Tuscan coast, should be delivered to him by France; and, lastly, that he should not be obliged to renounce Spain. But the Queen, as well as France, thought that his Imperial Majesty ought to sit down contented with his partage of Naples and Milan; and to restore those territories in Italy, which he had taken from the rightful proprietors, and by the possession of which he was grown dangerous to the Italian princes, by reviving antiquated claims upon them.

[Footnote 32: Portolongone, in the island of Elba, opposite the Tuscan coast. [W.S.J.]]

This Prince had likewise objected to Her Majesty's expedient of suffering the Elector of Bavaria to retain Luxembourg, under certain conditions, by way of security, until his electorate were restored. But the Queen, supposing that these affected delays were intended only with a view of continuing the war, resolved to defer the peace no longer on the Emperor's account.

In the middle of March, one thousand seven hundred and twelve-thirteen, a courier arrived at Utrecht from France, with the plan of a general peace, as it had been agreed between the Duke of Shrewsbury and Mons. de Torcy; wherein every particular, relating to the interests and pretensions of the several allies, was brought so near to what each of them would accept, that the British plenipotentiaries hoped the peace would be general in ten or twelve days. The Portuguese and Dutch were already prepared, and others were daily coming in, by means of their lordships' good offices, who found Mons. Mesnager and his colleague very stubborn to the last. Another courier was dispatched to France, upon some disputes about inserting the titles of Her Majesty and the Most Christian King, and to bring a general plan for the interests of those allies, who should not be ready against the time prefixed. The French renunciations were now arrived at Utrecht, and it was agreed, that those, as well as that of the King of Spain, should be inserted at length in every treaty, by which means the whole confederacy would become guaranties of them.

The courier, last sent to France, returned to Utrecht on the twenty-seventh of March, with the concessions of that court upon every necessary point; so that, all things being ready for putting a period to this great and difficult work, the lord privy seal and the Earl of Strafford gave notice to the ministers of the several allies, "That their lordships had appointed Tuesday the thirty-first instant, wherein to sign a treaty of peace, and a treaty of commerce, between the Queen of Great Britain, their mistress, and the Most Christian King; and hoped the said allies would be prepared, at the same time, to follow their example." Accordingly their lordships employed the three intervening days, in smoothing the few difficulties that remained between the French ministers and those of the several confederate powers.

The important day being now come, the Lord Bishop of Bristol and the Earl of Strafford, having assumed the character of ambassadors extraordinary,[33] gave a memorial in behalf of the French Protestants to the Maréchal d'Uxelles and his colleague, who were to transmit it to their court; and these delivered to the British ambassadors a declaration in writing, that the Pretender was actually gone out of France.

[Footnote 33: To avoid the parade of ceremony, they had hitherto been considered only as plenipotentiaries. [N.]]

The conditions of peace to be allowed the Emperor and the empire, as adjusted between Britain and France, were now likewise delivered to the Count Zinzendorf. These and some other previous matters of smaller consequence being finished, the treaties of peace and commerce between Her Majesty of Britain and the Most Christian King, were signed at the lord privy seal's house between two and three of the clock in the afternoon. The ministers of the Duke of Savoy signed about an hour after. Then the assembly adjourned to the Earl of Stafford's, where they all went to dinner; and about nine at night the peace was signed by the ministers of Portugal, by those of Prussia at eleven, and when it was near midnight by the States.

Thus after all the opposition raised by a strong party in France, and by a virulent faction in Britain; after all the artifices of those who presided at The Hague, and, for their private interest, endeavoured, in conjunction with their friends in England, to prolong the war; after the restless endeavours of the imperial court to render the treaty ineffectual; the firm steady conduct of the Queen, the wisdom and courage of her ministry, and the abilities of those whom she employed in her negotiations abroad, prevailed to have a peace signed in one day by every power concerned, except that of the Emperor and the empire; for his Imperial Majesty liked his situation too well to think of a peace, while the drudgery and expenses of the war lay upon other shoulders, and the advantages were to redound only to himself.

During this whole negotiation, the King of Spain, who was not acknowledged by any of the confederates, had consequently no minister at Utrecht; but the differences between Her Majesty and that prince were easily settled by the Lord Lexington at Madrid, and the Marquis of Monteleon here: so that upon the Duke d'Ossuna's arrival at the congress, some days after the peace, he was ready to conclude a treaty between the Queen and his master. Neither is it probable that the Dutch, or any other ally, except the Emperor, will encounter any difficulties of moment, to retard their several treaties with his Catholic Majesty.

The treaties of peace and commerce between Britain and France, were ratified here on the seventh of April; on the twenty-eighth the ratifications were exchanged; and on the fifth of May the peace was proclaimed in the usual manner; but with louder acclamations, and more extraordinary rejoicings of the people, than had ever been remembered on the like occasion.[34]

[Footnote: 34 The treaty was brought to England by George St. John, Bolingbroke's young brother, who arrived with it in London on Good Friday, 3rd April, 1713. [T.S.]]

[It need hardly be observed, that this history is left incomplete by the author. [S.] Sir Walter Scott's note hardly agrees with Swift's own statement to Stella. Writing under date May 16th, 1713, he says: "I have just finished my Treatise, and must be ten days correcting it." It is evident that Swift did not intend to write a "History of the Four Last Years of Queen Anne's Reign." A better title for this work would be the title originally given it, namely, "History of the Peace of Utrecht." In the letter already quoted from Erasmus Lewis, Swift's account of the negotiations for the peace are thus remarked upon: "That part of it which relates to the negotiations of peace, whether at London or at Utrecht, they admire exceedingly, and declare they never yet saw that, or any other transaction, drawn up with so much perspicuity, or in a style so entertaining and instructive to the reader in every respect." [T.S.]]

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