Note 5 — INTERNAL POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1842

1st. It is advisable to reduce the population, etc. In the epochs when the light of experience was lacking, it was believed that the most powerful means of assuring the possession of a colony was to increase the white race therein as much as possible; and, as a school for this conviction, they preferred to send thither as employes those who had the most children, especially female. The Council of Indias5 has, up to its last gasp, given proofs of this erroneous idea. But since then it has been seen that, in fleeing from Scylla, it has fallen into Charybdis; for among this white population born in the country, there is formed a local interest opposed to that of the mother-country, which begins by creating a discontent, and ends by suggesting the desire for independence. [Although a Filipino-Spaniard calls himself a Spaniard, all his sympathies are in the Philippines, and Spain is only secondary in his thoughts. Generally the sons or grandsons of government employes, Filipino-Spaniards, receive but little education, are fond of playing the gentleman, are lazy and dissipated. Little inclined to a professional or business career, they put all their efforts on securing a government post. As it is about one-half of the posts do belong to them, but since the best posts depend upon the favor of the Madrid ministers, the Filipino-Spaniards are constantly disappointed in the promotion which they believe belongs to them by right. Consequently, there is much ill-will and complaint. Camba’s pamphlet,6 although chiefly written to prove that there was no disloyalty in the Philippines, yet noted the anger and consequent mutiny (June 2–3, 1823)7 because of the arrival of Governor J. Antonio Martinez (October, 1822) with a large staff of Peninsular officials and sergeants; as well as the displeasure manifested in October, 1825, by the arrival of a new contingent of civil and military officers with Governor Mariano Ricafort. Still, it is not right to expect that, so long as Spain does not intend to abandon the Philippines, it should refrain from sending Peninsulars to fill the posts there or cease to exercise the appointing or removing power as it sees fit. If all the posts are reserved for the Filipino-Spaniards, it cannot be expected that the islands will remain loyal to a country so distant from them. In fact, the Filipino-Spaniards, under existing circumstances, cannot receive greater consideration than at present. The natural and necessary preference for Peninsulars in the posts of the Philippines engenders the hatred of the Filipino-Spaniards toward them; but, on the other hand, this hatred has been greatly exaggerated by the Peninsulars, who are intolerant and contemptuous of the colonials. This contempt, Mas illustrates by two examples, of which he was an eyewitness. Such things, together with the contemptuous nickname given them by the Peninsulars, gives rise to much ill-will on the part of the Filipino-Spaniards, who declare that all the cause of the enmity between the two classes comes from the former. The real cause, however, of the hatred, is economic, and a matter of the posts. Each of the male Filipino-Spaniards is seeking a post, but since there are only four hundred posts of all kinds in the islands, while the Filipino-Spaniards number about one thousand, the trouble must be continuous and must even become exaggerated, just so long as a remedy is not applied. Such a remedy would be for the government to refuse them any post in the army or other department of government service in the Philippines, although recognizing them as Spaniards with full rights if they come to reside in the Peninsula. Mas proceeds to elaborate his plan for decreasing the white population of the Philippines. All Spaniards going from Europe to the Philippines before the age of fifteen or sixteen must be regarded as Filipino-Spaniards. It is proposed that only single men be sent to fill posts in the islands, and that they be compelled to return to the Peninsula after twenty years, with permission to return in ten if they so please. It will be natural for these men to marry Filipino-Spanish women, who with their children will accompany their husbands to the Peninsula at the end of the twenty years. Transportation should be at national expense. On a basis of three passages for each family, the cost would be only 450 pesos. Each twenty years, there would be one thousand two hundred return passages to be paid. This would cost only 27,000 pesos annually. In return, four hundred men would have to be sent to the islands each twenty years, or with allowance for deaths and other contingencies, five hundred. At 300 pesos apiece, this would cost annually 8,750 pesos; and the total transportation expense would be only 35,750 pesos. Although transportation is not now paid by the government, the strange mismanagement is practiced of sending married men with families, thus increasing the white population. On the basis that there are three thousand five hundred young Filipino-Spaniards in the islands (both male and female), and reckoning sixty years as the average life of the individual, there would be fifty-eight and one-third individuals for each year of the sixty years, of whom one-half would be women (and hence eligible for marriage with the Peninsulars). All the males shall be taken to Spain at the end of the fifteenth or sixteenth year at national expense, and there educated at the expense of the Manila treasury in whatever profession they choose. These shall reside in the Peninsula thereafter, where they shall be given a post. Some few of the thirty or so of the males reaching the indicated age annually, will doubtless prefer to devote themselves to commerce or industry; hence at the most there will be only about twenty-five passages of young men to reckon on annually, which will be an inconsiderable expense. If this plan be carried out there will be few children to transport after sixteen years. European Spaniards, if prohibited from marrying native Filipino and mestizo women, will marry only Filipino-Spanish women. Hence, as they continue to retire to Spain, the white population will constantly decrease. There will not be a sufficiently large number of whites to become turbulent, and the domination of the Peninsula over the islands will be ensured. This plan can be carried out at an annual expense of about 40,000 pesos, and probably much less. This will really be a saving over present expenses, for retirement and widows’ pensions cost more, the widow of an oidor receiving 18,000 reals vellon. Hence, the passive classes receive about 175,000 pesos annually. However, Mas does not advocate that those receiving pensions at present be deprived of them or sent to Spain, as this would be unjust and cause discontent. In former years the quarrels and discontent did not lead to desire for independence. The population was not so great as now; also (and especially) since an annual situado was sent from the Peninsula to pay the government employes, and the latter thus depended on the Spanish treasury, they would have gained nothing by rebelling. This is the case at present in the Marianas Islands, where the officials are paid and supported from the money and food sent there, and the few whites there, consequently, have no desire for independence.] It will also be asked, in addition, whether, in case the Philippine colony separated at present, it would be possible for the white population to become masters of the country, or would there be a tendency for them, perhaps, to amalgamate with the colored population. The observation is very just. The Filipino-Spaniards do not think of forming a body with the (Indian) natives, nor is it possible for them to desire it, for now they are the masters and in such an event they would become equals and even inferiors, since the vast mass of the natives would quickly reduce them to nullity in the matter of government, and in place of the privileges and exemptions from paying taxes, which they at present enjoy, they would more than once have to obey and humble themselves before the very one who now mops the ground that their foot touches. In the recent occurrence of Tayabas,8 when the first news of the insurrection arrived, I was at a gathering of several Spanish leaders, and they all believed, or at least suspected, that the whites of the country had compromised themselves in the matter. I maintained immediately, and obstinately, that they were mistaken in this, since however disloyal and intemperate one may fancy the Filipino-Spaniards, it was impossible for me to believe that it would ever enter their heads to arouse and arm the natives. In fact, the true spirit of the movement was soon known, and it was seen that the Filipino-Spaniards were as alarmed at the result (if not more so) as were the Europeans. Their hopes and plans, then, can only be based on the persuasion that the natives and Chinese mestizos will continue quiet, and pay the tribute as at present, and that they will make their patrimony from the country, and share its posts. This idea is highly absurd, no doubt. Much less loved by the natives than the Europeans, without the support of the friars (for even granting the case that those living in the country should remain, others would cease to go from the Peninsula), without capital, in a weak minority for the subjugation of more than two hundred thousand rich, active, and intelligent mestizos, and three and one-half millions of natives (who have already rebelled against the Spaniards themselves, in spite of the great prestige of the reenforcements that could be received from the other side of the seas), and compelled by force of circumstances to adopt a liberal and intelligent system with reference to these same natives, which would speedily make the latter more arrogant and exacting than at present, it is quite easy to see that the government of Filipinas, would within a very few years, fall into the hands of the Indian Filipinos, or, perhaps, into those of the Chinese mestizos, or of the two races mixed, and that the whites would become submissive to the people of color—if they were not despoiled of all their property, as having been usurped and without valid title, just as happened to the Turkish families who had acquired possession in that land during the long rule of the Turks in Greece, in which, since the insurrection, not a single Mussulman has remained. It is clear, therefore, that this Spanish population, long established in the country, is the one that has most to lose. In case of an outbreak, the Europeans would return to España, where they would continue their professions and would find their kin. The Filipino-Spaniards, however, would have to change utterly, for they would lose everything, and would have to seek another country. These are obvious and important truths, and nevertheless, can we tax the individuals in question with being blind or stupid, when we see repeatedly in the history of popular revolts that a Bailly, a Danton, in fine, that the most clever and eminent men persuade themselves that they are able to stop a revolution at the line which they trace, and do not suspect that they are going to be the victims of the masses who rise?