Note 1 — REFORMS NEEDED IN FILIPINAS

The army of Filipinas also contains a considerable number of Indian sergeants and corporals, and this is another of the causes from which have already arisen, and always will arise, seditions in the corps. Whoever has observed the natural disposition of the Filipino Indian will recognize two things: First, that he always imitates and obeys only that which is directly commanded, explained, and taught to him; and, second, that while he is kept in his simple condition of laborer, artisan, or soldier he is entirely void of ambition. The Indian soldier serves very contentedly during the eight years of his term, and returns to his own land without aspiring to anything; but when he is placed in command, of any degree whatever, he is filled with pride, and vehemently desires to be at the head [serlo todo], without changing, for all that, his station as an Indian. [The writer states that even these non-commissioned officers were formerly always Spaniards;1] the appointment of Indians to these posts has been only in these last years, in which a system of commerce which entirely separated those islands from their center of government has rendered impossible the despatch of reënforcements, so necessary to those islands. From that very time may be noted much laxity in the military service and discipline; and I have witnessed the insurrections and disorders which never were known in former days. In the popular uprisings in the suburbs of Manila, at the end of 1820,2 the detachments commanded by Indian corporals who were sent out to pacify the villages took such part in the lawlessness that they even attacked houses, and it was by their gunshots that many foreigners were butchered. In the military insurrection of June 3, 1823, parties of troops commanded by only one officer (a Philippine Spaniard), without any previous plan or any combination, and simply by appearing before the barracks of their regiment and offering to make captains of the Indian sergeants, immediately persuaded them to revolt; and, directing the soldiers at their own pleasure, they committed the lamentable and horrible acts of that day, which ought to be kept well in mind. [This should be a warning against allowing the Indians any place of command, especially as they have more influence with the common soldiers than do the superior officers; and all military posts of command should be filled with competent and trained Spaniards. The writer urges the following measures of reform: (1) that a sufficient number of Spanish officers to fill all the posts of sergeant and corporal, and a surplus number to fill vacancies as they occur, shall be sent to Filipinas annually; (2) the class of cadets should be suppressed, who “have always been (with a few exceptions) very unsatisfactory officers; for, belonging to very poor and obscure families, and receiving no kind of education, in a country which so depraves and corrupts a youth, they demoralize the soldiers, and cause the military career to be held there in slight esteem;” (3) in future, no other officers except the heads of corps should be sent there from the Peninsula, so as to make room for promoting the lower officers, and to avoid demoralizing the young Spaniards; (4) that the Indian and mestizo sergeants or corporals who, after fulfilling their twelve years of all service, have to be replaced by Spaniards, shall be given places in the custom-house or revenue service, or in the monopoly shops, so as to recompense them for losing their posts.] In this manner the Indian soldier—who is docile, and always imitates the desires and opinions of his immediate superiors—will receive more disinterested treatment than he has hitherto had; he will make common cause with his leaders, in critical cases of popular revolutions; and the army will remain loyal and incorrupt in its opinions, always ready for its duty, and united in action and interests.