Note 27 — Chapter XXXII
Reading edition
Concepción says (xii, pp. 345–352) that the master-of-camp in command of the fleet (who was Antonio Ramón de Abad y Monterde) was undecided whether to attack Joló, but was persuaded to do so by the Jesuits, who told him that the very sight of the Spanish squadron would ensure the surrender of the Joloans. The attack was made at the beginning of June, 1752, and was unsuccessful; Abad was angry at the Jesuits, who had led him into this difficulty, and quarreled with them. They retorted by accusing him to the governor, of conduct (in modern phrase) “unworthy of an officer and a gentleman”—that is, of neglect of official duty, mismanagement of the campaign, unnecessary sacrifice of his men’s lives, and licentious behavior at Zamboanga. This was believed, until Abad was reported much more favorably by other officers of his fleet. See full account of his residencia (ut supra, xiii, pp. 36–85), in which he was acquitted from the charges made against him, but sentenced to pay the costs of the residencia. ↑