Volume 22 — Inadvisability of a Spanish Post on the Island of Formosa

I would consider it a very important fact that the Spaniards of Filipinas have seized and fortified a site on the island of Hermosa, if that would be the efficacious means of driving out the Dutch from their fort and from that island by force of arms, but otherwise not.

In order to discuss this proposition reasonably, it will be necessary first to investigate the objects that the Dutch may have had in order to have fortified, as they have done for the last three or four years, the island of Hermosa.

Some have thought that the purpose of the Dutch must be to destroy commerce between China and Filipinas, by plundering more at their ease the Chinese ships, because they are there near China, and in a place where the fleets from Manila which have sometimes defeated them, cannot attack them. But in my judgment, this is not their purpose, although it is a fact that they are very near the coasts of China in the island of Hermosa. For that reason, even the Chinese, before they set sail, ascertain by means of oared craft whether Dutch vessels are waiting in that place. Consequently, they either do not leave their ports, or if they leave, accomplish their voyage, since they can do so easily by sailing so as not to go [156] within sight of the island. But it is impossible to escape the Dutch ships when they await the Chinese on the coasts of Filipinas, as they have done since the year 609, when they began that practice, until that of 625. During that time scarcely any ship escaped them; for the Dutch generally go to the coasts of Filipinas when there is no time to advise the Chinese not to leave their country. The latter, having sailed, necessarily fall into the hands of the Dutch. However, it is true that when the Dutch await the Chinese on the coasts of Manila, they need a larger fleet; and that they risk its loss by fighting with that of Manila. Here the capture of the Chinese is assured, while for the above reasons (of which the Dutch are not ignorant) that is almost impossible in the island of Hermosa.

But what most persuades me to believe that this is the object of the Dutch is because they are not ignorant of the great advantage to them of buying silks from the Chinese and taking their investments to Japon; for it is evident to them from the high profits made by the Portuguese of Macan. That profit will be greater for them because of the greater ease of making the investment, and their nearer and easier navigation. Whenever any other nation wishes to trade with the Chinese, that trading must be done entirely with silver; and as the Dutch can take so little silver from Europa, and have no opportunity to get it from Japon unless in exchange for Chinese merchandise, it is certain that, both because of the high profits of this trade and in order to maintain themselves in their factory at Japon—whence they furnish the forts of the Malucas, Ambueno, and other places with supplies and some food—they will procure the trade with the Chinese by all possible means, by maintaining a factory in the island of Hermosa. Thus, becoming wealthy, they will utterly destroy Macan and deprive the Filipinas of the trade of Chinese silks which they had in Japon, which was formerly of so great profit that the investment generally yielded one hundred per cent in eight or nine months. [159]

It is to be noted that this trade of Macan and Filipinas with Japon is the principal thing that should be aided by España, for it does not involve the danger of having the silver of the Indias wasted in China, if voyages are made to Macan from Lisboa by way of India, because it comes from China to Portugal, and from Nueva España to the Filipinas in return for what is taken to Nueva España. As for the investments made in Macan and Filipinas for Japon, the return for these is silver from the mines of Japon itself.

Now, then, it seems very advisable, for the above reasons, immediately to drive out the Dutch from the island of Hermosa, if there is any possibility and power therefor, uniting the forces of Filipinas, if necessary, with those of Macan—to whom the question is so vital, both because of the said reason of the commerce (which is of prime importance), and because the island of Hermosa lies in the path of the voyage from Macan to Japon; and also, I do not deny, because it is possible that the Dutch have taken a port in the island of Hermosa in order to conquer Macan therefrom, to which they are very near, as they attempted to do in the year 622. Therefore, it will be more expedient and convenient to drive out the Dutch from this island of Hermosa as soon as it is attempted; and that will be very gratifying to the Chinese, who are much offended at the Dutch because of the many robberies of their ships in the Filipinas trade that the Dutch have committed for the last seventeen years, and are bitterly hostile to them. But although it seems that that hostility will be sufficient, for the present, for the Chinese not to make any beginning in commerce in the island of [160] Hermosa with the Dutch, that disinclination will disappear in a short time—both because of the kind reception that the Chinese will experience from the Dutch, and because the Chinese are so notably covetous that, although they are prohibited under penalty of losing life and property from trading with Japon, some ships laden with silks have gone to that kingdom during the last few years, pretending in Chinese ports that they are going to the Filipinas.

The above is what occurs to me in regard to the first part. In regard to the second, namely, that it is not advisable for us to have a port in the island of Hermosa, whether the Dutch are there or not, my opinion is the following.

Since the Dutch are there, one would think it advisable to prevent them by force of arms from the commerce of China. But for that one must attack either the Chinese or the Dutch. Since the Chinese are our friends, and since we cannot live in the Filipinas without their trade, I do not see how it can be done justifiably, as they are free to trade with all. Even should we attempt it, they will oblige us to permit them [to trade as they choose] by taking the trade from the Filipinas. But if it should have to be by attacking the ships of the Dutch, new and very long and costly wars would be renewed which would complete the exhaustion of the Filipinas, as has been done in those of Terrenate. Then, too, we would not have greater advantages in this war in the island of Hermosa than in those of Terrenate; for it also is a war to be carried on with ships, and the Dutch have their factories of Japon very near by. They are not inferior to us in accommodations, although the island of Hermosa is near the Filipinas. [161]

But if the Dutch were expelled from it, neither do I find any advantage in the Spaniards having a fort and settlement in that island at present, considering the condition of the Filipinas, unless it be to prevent the return of the enemy to refortify it. For first we must determine for that purpose, whether we can prevent that, by the nature of the island and by other circumstances that would render it very difficult—as was seen in Terrenate, when, although we had five hundred or more Spaniards there, the Dutch built another fort almost in sight of ours (which they still hold), as soon as we gained that small island. Now, too, although the Dutch were fortified first in the island of Hermosa, they have not prevented us from effecting a settlement there. For among other things, for such purposes, more men are necessary, and the cost of those men with whom a fortress in a kingdom not one’s own is generally maintained.

Neither has that island of Hermosa such a location that it can be desirable for the ships of Filipinas [163] that sail both to Japon and to Macan, to put in or to seek shelter there; and even less so for those returning from a port where they have taken refuge when they sail to Nueva España, or when, in sailing from Nueva España to Filipinas, by arriving late, the vendavals overtake them; or for ships on any other of the courses that we sail today.

But if one would say that it is a matter of importance for greater attempts that could be offered in time, by reason of the entrance into or conversion of China, that is not approved now. On the contrary, I fear from the caution and mistrust of the Chinese, that if we maintain a settlement in the island of Hermosa, and it is not clear to them that it is strictly necessary for that conservation, [they will act] without heeding other ends which they must obtain by way of diverting the trade with the Filipinas (since we see that they forced the Portuguese to tear down the fortification that they permitted them to erect in Macan, in view of the risk of its being captured by the Dutch in the year 622, who threatened to return to attempt it with a greater fleet the following year, although they had not returned up to the year 625). They are not unaware that Castilians and Portuguese are vassals of one and the same king. Neither have the Dutch failed to publish (as they did in Japon), that it is the custom of the king of España to conquer kingdoms under pretext of religion. That report, according to the religious of Japon themselves, has been one of the chief causes for the instigation of so terrible a persecution against Christians. Very true is it that the success in conversion in which his Majesty has so disinterested and holy an end, can neither be assured nor guided only by human reason. Consequently, [164] what I judge to be an unsuitable thing might be the best method to attain it. In this argument one ought also to consider the heathen natives themselves in the island of Hermosa; but, admitting this, even for them at present I conclude that his Majesty is under no obligations whatever, because he has in the Filipinas not a few Indians who pay tribute, but who do not have sufficient ministers to instruct them. Also there are many heathen, who, because their country is not yet conquered, are without any knowledge at all of the holy gospel. But I shall not go into greater detail on this point, for it may, perhaps, seem to be outside the question.

Neither do I imagine that all that has occurred to me concerning this matter, and much more, has been left unconsidered by Don Fernando de Silva, governor of Filipinas, at whose order a site was occupied on Hermosa Island; for he is a very prudent gentleman and a gallant soldier, and one who will not have permitted the desire for glory and honor, of which the discoverers and conquerors of new lands are justly worthy, to carry him away. Yet I do not, on that account, regard myself as under no obligations to advise you of my opinion. Madrid, December 20, 1627.

Doctor Don Juan Cevicos [165]