Volume 19 / Part 1 — Chapter VII. Of the measures which should be chosen for the growth and preservation of that kingdom.

The first thing which offers under this heading is the consideration of the matters pertaining to the war with the Dutch, which is the basal and fundamental question for all the rest; for the enemy is making such efforts and using so many measures to get control of that archipelago, and drive out the Spaniards.

Three ways and means present themselves to the mind, beside which I find no other one, although I have considered it well.

The first, if it be possible for your Majesty, is to manage to have an armed fleet sent. If, when Don Alonso Faxardo was already your governor, he had taken the one which had been made ready, the time was opportune so that he could have driven out the enemy from their posts, together with the fleet which was in the Filipinas, which was weakened in men and artillery by its loss at Manila. On account of this, the natives of the island of Maluco, fearful of the power of your Majesty, entered our service. This fleet, which I say your Majesty should have despatched, should have been sent with a previous warning to the governor of the Filipinas so that he could [260] collect there as great a force as possible, and provisions with which to resupply the fleet which would go thither from here, the money for this purpose to be sent him from Piru or from Nueva España.

Yet besides this, on account of the straitened circumstances of your Majesty, and the need of attending to other pressing matters, it is indeed true, in view of the great importance to your Majesty of not allowing the enemy to get possession of that archipelago (for he would infallibly become master of the whole of India, and become more powerful than can be understood here), that there appears to be another measure less costly in the meantime; although it will not result in dislodging them, at least it will give them such diversion and do so much damage that the profit which they will secure will be dearly bought. This is, that your Majesty should command the governor of the Filipinas to build eight galleys, and keep them in Terrenate; I will explain what their cost would be, shortly. These would be of great importance, as can be readily seen here, if one considers these reasons and the letter which Don Geronimo de Silva writes to his cousin, and another from Master-of-camp Lucas de Vergara to the dean of Manila, and to myself—the originals of which I possess, and which, as they explain the situation of those islands, I place at the end of this relation.

In the first place, the enemy has no ports in those islands in which to take refuge; and ordinarily his fleet goes about, one way and another, among the coasts there.

Second, every day in the year (or almost every day) there are six or eight hours of dead calm, at which time galleys never meet a galleon under these [261] circumstances without taking it or sending it to the bottom; for it has been seen by experience with a galleon and a galliot which the Spaniards possess there, what excellent results they have produced.

Third, on account of this expedient of the galleys the enemy will not dare to divide their forces among the factories to carry on their negotiations; and, as they will have to go together, the cost will be so great that they cannot support it.

Fourth, the supplies will be taken away from their fortresses; for they have nothing wherewith to support themselves except it be brought from other islands. This would be very easily accomplished, and the enemy would have no means to remedy it. The natives who are devoted to them would be so terrorized that they would be obliged to come over to our side. If they accomplish that in this way and through the effective plans of whomsoever shall govern there, and the negotiations which he would conduct with them, it is quite certain that the enemy would be ruined, and could not maintain himself a year in his forts; for it is the natives who aid and sustain him, and furnish the cloves for his profit.

Fifth, it would be easy to make an invasion with the galleys on all the factories where they have not fortresses—and especially in Bantan, which is in Greater Xava, whither they carry all the spices which are shipped to Holland—and then to gain them all and burn them. They have no port there for large vessels, but only a bay where vessels which anchor there are kept at a distance from the land in the mud, aground, so that they cannot make use of them when they wish. Accordingly the galleys could easily burn those which lie there. If Don Juan de Silva had [262] adopted this measure, the enemy would already be subdued; and your Majesty would not have spent so great sums of money, and so exhausted the Filipinas Islands.

Sixth, the forces which your Majesty possesses in Maluco would be maintained with much less cost than at present by means of these galleys. For as there are no supplies in those islands it is necessary to send them from the Filipinas, which entails three difficulties. The first is that prices are thus made higher in that country, and the natives thereof are oppressed; the second, that it costs your Majesty a great deal, with the ships and men that are needed to man them; and the third, that the enemy gets a great deal of the aid which is sent. All this would be obviated by keeping galleys there; for it must be understood that the island of Macaçar is very large, rich, and abundantly supplied, and lies a two days’ journey from Maluco. The king there is desirous of friendship with us, and has even sent to the governor of Terrenate to seek religious, as he says in the letter which is at the end of this relation. Last year he wrote a letter to the governor of the Filipinas, offering to furnish him all the supplies that he might need for the forces in Maluco; and saying that, if he had not the money to pay for them, he might have them on trust until the money came. Things are very cheap there, costing less than half as much as in the Filipinas, and the said galleys could transport them easily, without the danger which they now encounter of being taken by the enemy. Rather, on the other hand, those which the enemy carry from there could be taken away with ease, and they would be caused to perish with hunger. If an ordinary [263] amount of care were taken in negotiating with this king, he would, as he is so well disposed to the Spaniards, be so devoted to your Majesty that he would not allow the enemy to enter his port. Besides, his friendship with them is already greatly strained; and there is a great disposition among all that people to receive the gospel.

Seventh, as those islands have no posts where cloves may be laded, the Dutch send their ships far from the artillery of their own forts, which they cannot approach; and it will be easy to secure the vessels, or not allow them to lade anything. Considering the calms which prevail, even if there were many ships they could not aid one another, whatever injury the galleys were inflicting upon them—the least being to dismantle them, so that they cannot sail, for there is nothing there with which to make a mast or rudder.

Eighth, as they have a number of posts where they only keep twenty-five or thirty men with a squadron commander, and the forts have no ditches or drinking-water, they could be deprived of these at any time with ease. Galleons would be of no use in such engagements, as they cannot vie with galleys, which can get under cover whenever they wish. Likewise it must be understood, as their forts are in such danger, they will need so many men to keep them from being taken, and so much to maintain them, that their profit will be so small that it will be gain for them to abandon it. This would indeed be making a pretty game of war, and cutting their throats with a wooden sword. And I assure your Majesty that this idea is not only my own, but that of all experienced men in Maluco There resides at this court [264] Juan Gomez de Cardenas, who gained considerable experience in Japon with a Dutch factor, who never thought that this man was a vassal of your Majesty. The latter made known to him the said reason, and said that they feared nothing until your Majesty should send there six or more galleys.

It now remains to tell the ease and little cost with which your Majesty could maintain these galleys and man them; and if this is explained for one, it holds in regard to all. The hull of a galley of twenty-four benches, put together and fitted for sailing, costs in the Filipinas four thousand ducats. The gang to man it must be secured in this manner. The governor of the Filipinas should send to Mindanao three hundred soldiers, by whom—besides setting free more than ten thousand Christian captives, vassals of your Majesty in the Filipinas—sufficient men could be captured to man the galleys. If this measure be not sufficient, a frigate or two should be sent to Malaca for cloves on your Majesty’s account, which would bring back negroes at two hundred reals, more or less, with which to man them; these oarsmen are very satisfactory, as experience has shown. In order to maintain the crew and replace those who die, men could be captured continually from our enemies, on a thousand occasions, without fail.

The support of the galley slaves is inexpensive, for they live on rice, fish, and a little jerked beef—which, besides, is often captured from the enemy there; and is very low in price when it has to be bought, as, at present, in the island of Macaçar.

The third and last measure is, if these two fail, such that I dure not write it, for that is not expedient; [265] but I will explain it to your Majesty, if you are pleased to learn it. I shall not go into this matter any further, nor explain the reasons more in detail, as this is not to be long; but if your Majesty should be pleased to carry out any of the suggestions here made, I shall explain away the doubts which may present themselves.

In the second place the person who is to govern should have the said requisites, for he is the soul of the undertaking; and it is he who must execute whatever your Majesty orders and commands. Whatever he is, such will be the rest. That this may not appear an exaggeration, I will prove it by evidence.

There are dependent upon the governor not only the secular Spanish residents of those islands, but the ecclesiastics; also war and peace, and the royal Audiencia, the archbishop, the bishops, and all the other soldiers and citizens; for it is he who must reward and honor them with offices of peace and war. He must assign the cargoes of the ships, the profits and advantages. The royal Audiencia, because he appoints their relatives and constituents to offices of profit, must needs keep in his graces. The archbishop and bishops, if they do not conform to his will, may have their temporal support taken from them; for if he cannot do it with good cause, he can easily do it in other ways. In a thousand things which occur, too, they need him for the direction of their affairs; and he can inflict on them so many burdens and annoyances that they realize how dearly they are buying the privilege of opposing him or contradicting his wishes. The chapter of the church is the same, or worse; for he makes appointments, [266] as your Majesty is patron, and orders the stipends to be paid. Accordingly it is necessary to be in his good graces. The cabildo of the city dare not do anything against his will; for those who oppose him or say anything in the sessions which is contrary to his wishes, it costs dear, and, besides, he is aware of whatever they do there. They dare not write to your Majesty, without taking to him the letters so that he may examine them; and there have been times when he has had these torn up, and ordered them to write others. Consequently, the religious who are teaching, and those of the convents, are all dependent upon him.

The royal officials do no more than he wishes, and, besides, they have the example of former ones, who for not acting thus were removed, and held prisoners for three years until your Majesty learned of it, and ordered their offices to be returned to them, and perchance the many hardships and afflictions which the governor inflicted upon them, and caused them to suffer, cost two of them their lives, and lost for your Majesty, in the factor, one of the best servants whom you had in the Filipinas. Accordingly, what I promised to prove is well established; for the complaints were so long in arriving, and the redress in returning, that he who awaited them was already dead.

In the third place, it is essential that he should not be excessively grasping; and that your Majesty should give him such expectations, if he conducts himself well, that his profit will rest more on them than in what the government is worth to him. He should be of mature age and great experience in handling the affairs of the commonwealth, such as [267] some knights possess who hold offices of corregidor on the coasts of España, and who govern in peace and war, as they never lack exercise for these abilities on the coasts. For if they were only required to be expert in war, the country would be in ruins before they became capable of governing it—as, for our sins, we have seen in past years. They should not come burdened with debts, which are demoralizing in a thousand ways. Notwithstanding that your Majesty has issued decrees which prohibit them from giving offices of profit to members of their households, rather than to the worthy persons of the kingdom, these decrees are the least complied with; nor is there any one who dares to interfere in this. If any one should make bold to put the bell on the cat, as the adage says, who would make him comply with it? By no means the royal Audiencia. At one time when I was petitioning for the execution of a royal decree of your Majesty there, an auditor, a friend of mine, said: “You should not do this; for, besides not accomplishing anything by it, you will get yourself into difficulty with him.”

With this in view, it is very important to forbid these offices to persons who are under obligations, which induce an insatiable greed and presumption; and, to fill that yawning void, the wealth of all the Indias is insignificant. The worst is, that they pervert a man, and lead him astray by their influence. If I were to recount here in detail all the difficulties which they occasion, I should have to take twice the space. In short, everyone there is lamenting; and these people come in smiles, and even negotiating for the honors which belong to others, with crass insolence; and, worse yet, it seems to the governor [268] that his own people alone deserve all there is, and the rest are of no account. To give color to their impudence, one of them has dared to write to your Majesty that there was not a person in all your kingdom who could in the least be trusted. The mistakes of these people are never punished, nor is there any one who dares to demand an investigation against them, even when they have done a thousand injuries. In short, he must be such a one as the emperor Theodosius spoke of to St. Ambrose, when he sent him to govern Milan: “Go; and, look you, I send you not to act as governor, but as bishop.” Such must be the governors of the Filipinas, if your Majesty would have them succeed.

And on this account I have no fault to find with Don Alonso Faxardo, whom your Majesty has sent at present to govern. On the contrary, I believe that he will conduct himself there as befits the service of your Majesty and the welfare of your kingdom. For I recognized such desires in him in the little intercourse that I had with him in Mexico, where I was acquainted with him. I am therefore very thankful to God to see him so desirous of serving you, and may He give him grace to succeed. As for the persons who are sent to that Audiencia, they should be in a degree like the governors; for your Majesty places as much confidence in them—although I think it would be more to the purpose to discontinue it, for the reasons which are given by most people in that country, in which matter I will give your Majesty a memorial.

The affairs of that kingdom are in such disorder, and move in so irregular channels, that people ask for an inspector to reform and adjust them and put [269] everything in its place, redressing injuries and punishing wrong-doing. The country is much in need of this; but that it may not be like the frogs who asked Jupiter for a king, and were given one that devoured them, it will be best for your Majesty to appoint some one from that country, who, through his great experience and knowledge, cannot be deceived, and knows what must be reformed, and who is possessed as well of the prudence and tact which are necessary in such a new country. And on the other hand, on account of the risks which exist in sending anyone from here who does not understand the affairs and conditions which must be remedied, and knows not how to proceed, it would be wiser to send no one, on account of the danger which exists of ruining the city.

Item: The governor should not consent to Japanese living in that country, as they are a great trouble and danger to the country, and the city is continually in danger from them.

Item: The Chinese should be very carefully restricted, so that no greater number of them than your Majesty has ordered be [allowed to remain there]; for they are permitted [to enter the country] without any exercise of caution, and we know by experience what this costs.

Item: Your Majesty should command the governor finally to reduce the island of Mindanao to obedience to your Majesty; for those islands are so infested that they hinder the carrying of reënforcements to Maluco. And as they are in league with the Dutch, we have a perfect right to make war upon them and subject them to slavery. All this is easy for the governor if your Majesty command it, and is so [270] necessary for the security of your Majesty’s vassals, as I intend to explain to your Majesty more at length in a separate memorial.

Item: There is an island which lies about twenty leguas from Maluco, called Macaçar, which measures about two hundred and fifty leguas around; it is very rich and well supplied, and from it the forces in Maluco could be supplied with ease and at little cost. It will be necessary for your Majesty to order the governor to negotiate with the king there for friendship and commerce. For the latter has already sent and written, saying that he desires it and that he will furnish all the supplies that are desired, and, if there is no money, will give credit for them until it is procured; and he has sent to ask for religious to preach the faith. They are a capable people, of good disposition, and are disposed to receive the gospel. As this district lies nearest to that which the fathers of the Society hold, it would be of much importance to send a few religious assigned to that island; and for your Majesty to be pleased to have their general requested to give them, which is of much importance even for temporal objects, besides the great service which they can render to God. And the Dutch could not get supplies from there, which would take away from them much of the previsions with which they are supported. Two fathers of the Society have been there, and have written that they were very well received; and it is highly expedient to encourage them.

Item: Your Majesty should order the governor to attend with much diligence to the despatching of ships which go to Nueva España, for upon this so much of the growth of that kingdom depends; [271] and since he is so good a sailor and prides himself upon it, he should regulate that in the proper way, for at present it proceeds with great disorder and even recklessness, as I shall explain to your Majesty in a separate memorial.

Item: Your Majesty should command that the garrisons of that kingdom be made open, on account of the fact that experience has shown that more men would go, if this were the case. Those in Maluco should be exchanged with those in the Filipinas every three years, for otherwise so many refuse to go to Maluco, and the forts there are in such ill-repute, that those who are taken there are discontented, as if they were being sent to the galleys; but if they are exchanged, as I have said, they will go willingly. Beside, they would become experts, and the soldiers from Maluco are worth more than those who have not been there, on account of their constant exercise in war and labor.

Item: Your Majesty should command that the city of Manila be made an open garrison, like San Juan de Ulua and Habana; for in this way the men will go to the Filipinas willingly. As Don Juan de Silva has done otherwise for years past, this country has become depopulated, and they have fled to various parts from time to time, no one daring to go there on this account.

Item: Concerning the treatment of the Indians, and what it is well to inform your Majesty in this regard, as well in what concerns your royal conscience as the good of the country, a separate memorial is required.

Item: As to the manner of governing them and collecting their tributes, as has been seen by experience, [272] the religious have done a great deal of harm by preventing the Indians from paying tributes on the fruits which they harvest; because the religious have not the inclination or sense to leave many things free—as will be seen in the account I shall give your Majesty in regard to this, all of which has been taught by experience.

Item: Finally, it is very necessary that your Majesty should consider that that country is very new, and that your Majesty should desire its growth; and because, likewise, it was not so much in need of your Majesty’s protection and favor in the beginning as it is now—when so few wish to go there on account of ill-treatment, many misfortunes, and the fear of enemies—your Majesty should protect it so that they may be encouraged to go there. For this your Majesty should command your ministers to give those who wish to go a comfortable passage. For if in early days the king our lord, the father of your Majesty, who so greatly favored and loved that land, not only furnished a passage, but likewise the necessaries for their journey, to those who wished to go, and even freed them from duties and imposts, that aid is much more necessary today; and at least they should be given some exemptions, and should not be treated with such harshness as they now are. This I can affirm as an eyewitness, that when we arrived at the port of Capulco, after having been on the voyage five months, and a great many of our people had died, and God had brought us through such boundless hardships and dangers to the place where we were to refresh ourselves, they treated us worse, indeed, than they did the Dutch; for to the latter they gave food there, and sent them away satisfied, [273] and to us they acted as they should have done to the Dutch. Since a proper remedy for what happened at the port of Capulco, which I am bound to suggest to your Majesty, and for many other matters concerning your royal service, cannot be suggested in this place, I shall give it in other memorials.

Item: The encomiendas which your Majesty used to grant were formerly for three lives; and a short time ago your Majesty ordered by a royal decree that they should be, and it should be so understood, for two lives. This is a great difficulty in the preservation of that community, and especially so as your Majesty has granted the favor to Nueva España of giving them for four lives; and as the Filipinas have been, and continue to be thus far, the colony of Nueva España, and almost governed by the royal Audiencia thereof, it is a great hardship that they should enjoy no more than two lives. In the first place, because many are discouraged from serving your Majesty, and even from remaining in that country, when they learn that their sons and grandsons must be reduced to the greatest poverty, the said encomienda expiring with the holder’s first son or his wife, as at present happens; in the second place, because four lives are shorter in the Filipinas than two in Nueva España. The reason for this is the many occasions for war and naval expeditions, wherein men are easily killed or drowned, leaving their successors in the hospital—as is at present the case with many, which makes one’s heart ache with pity.

In answer to the tacit objection which might be brought up that it is better to have the encomiendas vacated quickly, so that others may be rewarded with [274] them, and with this hope will go to serve there, I would say that the important matter is to make a compromise—namely that your Majesty should concede the said encomiendas not for four lives, as in Nueva España, nor for two as at present, but for three, as formerly, which is a very necessary measure for the relief of some, and the encouragement of others to the service of your Majesty.