Chapter IV · (continued 2)
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I am also prepared to give up something for the sake of retaining our independence, but with reference to the suggestion of offering the Gold Fields, I agree with General de la Rey on that point. We can have no other Government, no English Colony, in the midst of our country. That will cause friction. It is said that the Gold Fields have been a curse and a cancer for us. Well, they need not remain a curse. And then, how shall we materially rescue our people without the Gold Fields? Swazieland is not of much importance. That we can give up.
The war is a matter of faith. If I had not been able to do so in faith, I would never have taken up arms. Let us again renew our covenant with God. If we fix our eyes on the past we have more ground for our faith than I ever expected, and we have ground to continue in faith. The entire war has been a miracle, and without faith it would have been childish to commence the war. We must not think of intervention. That there has been no intervention is a proof that God does not will it, because through this war he wishes to form us into a people. Our help and our deliverance must come from Him alone, and then we shall not become proud. I cannot see into the future, but this I know, that behind me it is light. What lies before me I do not know. There it is dark, but we must go on trusting God, and then, when victory comes, we shall not be proud.
With reference to the Cape Colony, I may say that I am also disappointed, not with the reports from there, but because there has been no general rising. People who sent us information have not kept their word. We must accept the report of General Smuts, and he says we must not depend upon the Cape Colony; but he does not say that our cause is declining there. The Cape Colony has been of great assistance to us, because it compelled the enemy to withdraw about 50,000 troops from the Republics.
I feel for the poor families who are suffering so grievously, and also for our burghers in the camps. I think anxiously of their misery, but I have nothing to do with facts. The entire war is a matter of faith. I have to do with a fact only when I have to remove it.
I must still make this one remark, that if we surrender, as vanquished, we shall be able to depend on small mercy from England. We shall then in any case have dug the grave of our independence. Well, then, what is the difference between going into our graves in reality, and digging the grave for our national existence?
Mr. C. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said: We must be careful how we deal with the Gold Fields. Our country is dreadfully impoverished, and I fail to see how we can give up that source of income.
The meeting was then adjourned, after prayer, to the following day.
Saturday, May 17th, 1902.
At the request of the Chairman the meeting was opened with prayer by Chief Commandant de Wet at 9.30 o'clock.
A private report from Mr. Schmorderer, who had brought the despatch from Europe from the deputation, was read, after which Landdrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) said: We do not know what the future will bring us, but we can gauge the future by the past. The commando, of the district which I represent, namely, Wakkerstroom, had 600 men a year ago. Now that number has been reduced by more than 300. Then, we had more than sufficient horses. Everyone could simply catch a horse, and Vryheid got more than 400 horses from us. Now there are burghers of Wakkerstroom who have no horses, and it is impossible for them to obtain one. With regard to food, there were then 3,000 to 4,000 bags of mealies; now we have barely 300 to 400, and these are scarcely within our reach. If matters have proceeded thus in the course of a year, what will be our position twelve months hence? What will then become of the burghers who have no horses? We must also consider the condition of our families. They have no clothing. That, however, is not of great consequence. The principal matter is the want of food. More than one woman has been obliged to live for weeks on fruit alone. I myself have lived for days simply on mealie-pap (porridge). We must obtain mealies from the Kaffirs by using nice words. When the enemy operates in the district we must leave the families to the mercy of the British and the armed Kaffirs. If we supply them with provisions, the enemy simply removes those provisions, and they are left without a morsel of food. If we decide to continue the war some provision must be made for these families. Their husbands declare that if peace is not made now there is no other course open to them than to go over to the enemy, for they cannot any longer look on to see their families dying of hunger or being murdered.
Then we must also keep in view the condition of the families in the hands of the enemy. They have submitted to much anguish and suffering, but always in the belief that we had good hopes of deliverance. If they knew how matters were situated with us they would adopt other views. More than 2,000 women and children die per month in the camps, and if we prosecute the struggle without hope, we become accessory to their death.
The Kaffir question is also a serious matter.
Of intervention there is no hope. Some time ago I thought that we would get help from the British people, but that nation becomes more and more indifferent under all the occurrences of the war, and it appears to me that their Government will be able to prosecute the war to the finish.
What will now be the result if we decide to continue the struggle? We have seen how England has during the past year weakened us more and more; we have seen how many burghers have become unfaithful and strengthened the enemy. If it were not for those unfaithful people out of our midst we would never have had such a hard time of it. If we go on we shall ever become weaker and weaker, and ultimately dwindle away. What shall we then have gained by continuing the struggle? To-day we are still in a position to obtain something from the enemy, and to stipulate for assistance for our ruined people, who cannot get on their legs again without help. The burghers are prepared to proceed and to suffer still more if there is any ground upon which we can continue the war. If we have no well-founded grounds then I must warn this meeting that we shall lose many Wakkerstroom burghers. We have this opportunity for negotiating, and now is the time that we can still obtain something from the enemy. We shall never have this opportunity again. If it is clear to us that our independence is lost then we have still our people to consider. If we simply dwindle away, our people will sink and become of no account.
The matter has also been considered from a religious point of view. I am not ashamed to confess that I also serve God, but God has given us reason, and if we see that, humanly speaking, there is no prospect of our deliverance, we cannot expect that God will simply grant us our desire. If we desire to have our independence for the honour of God, He will let us retain it, but I fear that we desire it more for ourselves, more for our own honour, than for the honour of God. Unless some other light is thrown on the matter, I fear it will be wrong of us to continue the struggle. Reference is made to the blood that has been shed and to the sacrifices that have been made; but what about the women and children who will still have to give up their lives if we now continue, and yet ultimately have to give the matter up as hopeless? The persons who are still living are of more importance to me than those who have already given their lives. I say we may not proceed unless we can give ourselves and our people good reasons for doing so.
At this stage the Committee appointed to draft a resolution handed in their draft. It was read, and after some discussion, adopted.
The draft resolution was as follows:—
"This meeting of representatives of the people from both Republics, having considered the correspondence and the negotiations that passed between the Governments of both Republics and His Excellency Lord Kitchener on behalf of the British Government;
"Having heard the information supplied by the delegates from the various parts of both Republics;
"Having heard the latest reports from their Representatives in Europe;
"Considering the fact that the British Government has refused to conclude peace, on the basis of their independence, and has refused to accept the proposals of their Governments made on that basis; yet, in spite of the above-mentioned refusal of the British Government, this meeting nevertheless desires to comply with the ardent wishes of the people to retain their independence, for which so many material and personal sacrifices have been made;
"Resolves, on behalf of the people of both Republics, to authorise the Governments to conclude peace on the following basis, to wit: The retention of a limited independence with the offer, in addition to what has already been offered by the Governments in their negotiations, dated April 15th, 1902, of:—
(a) Surrender of all foreign relations and embassies;
(b) acceptance of the protectorate of Great Britain;
(c) surrender of portions of the territory of the South African Republic;
(d) the conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain with reference to South Africa."
During the discussion of this draft resolution the Governments were clearly given to understand that the portions of the territory which they could surrender were those already mentioned, namely, the Gold Fields and Swazieland.
The question was put whether the South African Republic alone should have to pay for the retention of independence, as these areas formed a portion of that territory.
To this Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) replied "Yes, and if I could secure the independence of the Orange Free State with all I possess, I would do so." Other Transvaal delegates spoke in the same sense, indicating that the sacrifices made by the Free State during the war were most highly appreciated by them.
General Froneman thanked the Transvaal delegates on behalf of the Free State, remarking that there could be no further mention of the two States having divergent interests.
With reference to the resolution, General de la Rey declared that he was opposed to the surrender of Johannesburg.
Commandant Ross (Vrede) remarked: "I am surprised that the meeting takes such a resolution. What the people demand is total independence, and we can do nothing else but comply with that demand. Otherwise we act in a childish way. My commando is prepared to do everything to secure peace provided they retain their independence. If we part with that we cease to be a people."
Commandant J. J. van Niekerk (Ficksburg) declared that the meeting could not even think of surrendering their independence.
General H. A. Alberts (Heidelberg) said: I have a free hand to act according to circumstances. We shall be committing suicide if we continue the war without any hope and without any prospect of attaining our object, and not only suicide, but a murder also of women and children. If I could to-day purchase the independence of the Free State with all that I still possess, even with my life, I would do it with pleasure, but we cannot do what is impossible.
General P. R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) agreed with what General Alberts had said, and was of opinion that they had to reckon with facts.
The meeting was now adjourned to two o'clock in the afternoon.
The meeting resumed at two o'clock p.m.
After some discussion, the following proposal, made by General Brand and seconded by Mr. de Kock, was carried with the dissentient vote of General Kemp:—
"This meeting of representatives of the people of both the Republics resolve to instruct the two Governments to appoint a Commission with instructions to negotiate with His Excellency Lord Kitchener on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government on any subject in order to try to arrive at a satisfactory peace, and to submit their attempts through the two Governments to this meeting for approval."
After this the meeting was closed with prayer.
In pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution the two Governments appointed the following gentlemen as a Commission to negotiate with Lord Kitchener:—
Commandant General Louis Botha.
Chief Commandant C. R. de Wet.
General J. H. de la Rey.
General J. C. Smuts.
General J. B. M. Hertzog.[Back to Contents]