Book 4 — INDEX

‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Ethics, 18 note 2, 177 note 1

‘Act,’ meaning of, 200 note 3, 201, 202

Action, ultimate end of, 3, 4, etc.;

motive to, may be non-rational, 5;

instinctive, 24, 61;

deliberate, 24, 61;

deliberate and impulsive, 61

Acuteness, 236

Æsthetic Intuitionism, 228, 392;

implicit reference to Ultimate Good in, 392, 393

Æsthetic sensibility, theories of, 189

Affections, Duties of the, 345-349

Affections, social and domestic, 138, 153, 156, 157, 433, 434

‘Altruism,’ 439

ἀνδρεία, 456

‘Apathy’ as ideal of happiness, 125

Aristotle, 59 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 98-99, 99 note 1, 121-122, 180, 180 note 1, 181 note 1, 215, 224, 231 note 1, 264 note 2, 281, 375 note 1, 376, 403, 456

Art, Definition of, 4

‘Art of conduct,’ 4

Austin, 300 note 1

Aversion, 42, 43, 46, 145

Axioms, 215, 338-343, 379-389 passim;

must (a) have the terms clear and precise, 338, 339;

(b) be really self-evident, 339-341;

(c) not conflict with any other accepted proposition, 341;

(d) be supported by consensus of experts, 341, 342

Axiom—of Justice or Equity, and Rational Benevolence, 387;

of Prudence, the logical basis of Egoism, 386;

of Rational Benevolence, the logical basis of Utilitarianism, 387, 388;

-s of Impartiality, 379-383, 496, 497

Bacon, 338

Bain, 43 note 2, Note 54-56, Note 87-88, 125, 126, 127, 477 note 1;

(The Emotions and the Will) 54, 55 Note, 126 note 1;

(Mental and Moral Science) 127 notes 1-3, 177 note 1

Bastiat, 278 note 1

Beauty, 114

Benevolence, 238-263 passim, 391, 393;

comprehensiveness and supremacy of, 238, 238 note 2;

common maxim of, 238-239;

axiom of, 382, 385, 387, 496;

prescribes promotion of others’ Happiness rather than Perfection, 240, 241;

principles of its distribution, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263;

and Justice, spheres of, 242, 243, 268;

virtue of, 244, 253;

duty of, 252, 253, 253 note 1, 258;

Kant’s view of the duty of, 239, 240;

intellectual versus emotional excellence of, 244 note 1;

conflicting claims to, 246;

duties of, classified, 248;

rational, cf. Rational Benevolence;

Intuitional and Utilitarian notions of, reconciled, 430-431

Benevolent—emotion, 239;

disposition, 239

Bentham, 10, 41, 41 note 1, 84, 85, 86, Note 87-88, 92, 94, 119, 124 note 1, 143, 164, 203, 292, 364, 414, 417, 423 note 2, 424;

(Memoirs) 10 notes 2 and 3,

(Deontology, Works, Bowring’s edition) 87, 88 Note,

(Principles of Morals and Legislation) 26 note 1,

(Constitutional Code) 41 note 2

Bequest, change of view respecting, 246, 247

Berkeley, Bishop, 120

Blackstone, Introduction, 302 note 1

Bouillier, 180 note 2

Butler, 7, 39, 44, 44 note 2, 81, 86, 93, 94, 119, 133 note 2, 136, 172, 200, 222, 366, 366 note 3, 371, 372, 378, 386, 401, 405, 501;

(Analogy) 378;

(Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue) 86 note 2, 176 note 1, 327 note 1;

(Sermons on Human Nature) 7 note 1, 86 note 2, 93 note 2, 120 note 1, 200 note 2, 323 note 1

Candour, 355

Cardinal Virtues, 375

Carelessness, Culpability of, 60, 292

Casuistry, 99

Categorical Imperative, 7, 8, 15, 35, 36, 37, 209, 209 note 1

Caution, 236, 236 note 1, 237

Celibacy, 487, 488

Charity (Philanthropy), 222, 239, 430, 431, 434

Chastity and Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2

‘Chief Good’ (Summum Bonum), 134, 407 note 1

Chivalry, 326

Chrysippus, 376

Cicero, 376;

De Finibus, 125 note 1

Clarke, 86, 104, 120, 120 note 2, 384, 384 notes 3 and 4, 385;

Boyle Lectures, 120 note 2, 385 notes 1 and 2

Classification of Duties, 312-315

‘Cognition,’ use of, 34 note 2

“Common good of all Rationals,” Cumberland’s ultimate end, 104, 423

Common Morality, 215-216; (cf. Morality of Common Sense)

Common Sense aversion to admit Happiness as sole ultimate Good, explanation of, 402-406

Compassion, 262, 371

Conditional prescriptions (Hypothetical Imperatives), 6, 7

Conjugal relation, the duties relating to it, 254, 255, 256, 255 notes 1 and 2, 347, 348, 348 note 1

Conscience, popular view of, 99;

jural view of, 100-101

Conscience (Moral Faculty) and Benevolence, Butler’s view of the relation between, 86, 86 note 2;

and Self-love, Butler’s view of relation between, 119, 120, 200, 200 note 2, 327 note 1, 366

Conscious Utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form of morality, 455-457

Consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain, 125

Consequences of actions, ulterior, 96, 97;

may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain, 97

Contract, claims arising from, 269;

and Freedom, 276, 276 note 1

Courage, 332-334;

defined, 332;

Greek view of, 456;

and Fortitude, are subordinate duties, 332, 333;

Moral, 333 note 3;

Virtue of, 313, 333, 334;

and Foolhardiness, distinguished by Utilitarian considerations, 334, 355

Courtesy, 253

Cudworth, 103 Note

Culture, 157, etc.

Cumberland, 86, 86 note 1, 104;

and Utilitarianism, 423, 423 note 1

Custom, alterations in, 247

Decision, 236, 237

Deductive Hedonism, 176-195

Descartes, 338, 339

Desert—Good, how determined, 284-290;

Ill, how determined, 291-292;

requital of, as principle of Ideal Justice, 280, 281, 283, 294, 349;

and Freedom, 280, 287;

and Right of Property, 280, 280 note 1;

and Determinism, 284, 285;

Utilitarian interpretation of, 284 note 1;

and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 291

‘Desirable,’ confusion in Mill’s use of, 388 note 2

Desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective relations of the conscious mind, 398-400

Desire, 43, 45-47;

non-rational, 23-24;

irrational, 23, 24;

and Pleasure, relation between, 39-56 passim

Determinism and Free Will, 57 seq.;

Aristotelian, 59 note 1;

and Materialism, 62;

arguments for, 62-65;

argument against, 65, 66

Determinist meaning of ‘desert,’ etc., 71, 72, 284 note 1

Development as ethical aim, 90 seq., 192 seq., 473

‘Dictates,’ how used, 96 note 1

δικαιοσύνη, two meanings of, 264 note 2

‘Disinterested action,’ 57

Distribution, Principle of Equality a prima facie reasonable Principle of, 417

Divine penalties, 31

‘Doing good,’ ambiguity of, 239, 240

Dualism of the Practical (or Moral) Reason, 200, 205, 206, 366, 404, 404 note 1;

need of harmonising, 507-509

Dumont, 180 note 2

‘Duties to God’ and ‘duty to man,’ 218

Duties, division of, into Self-regarding and Social, 163, 312, 313

‘Duties to oneself,’ 7

‘Duty’—meaning and use of, 78, 217, 218, 220 note 3, 239, 504-505;

and ‘right conduct’ distinguished, 217

Duty relativity of, 218, 219;

and Happiness of agent, 36, 162-175 passim, 495 seq.;

implies conflict of impulses, 81;

of self-preservation, 356;

of promoting others’ happiness, Kant’s arguments for, 389-390;

most of the received maxims of, involve reference to Ultimate Good, 391, 392

‘Egoism,’ 11, 80 note 1, 89 seq.;

ordinary use, and ambiguity of, 89;

indefiniteness of, 95;

and Greek ethical controversy, 91-92

Egoism, cf. Egoistic Hedonism

Egoism—meaning of, 120-121;

and Self-love, 36, 89-95 passim;

Principle and Method of, 119-122;

precepts of, not clear and precise, 199-200;

rationality of, 119-120, 199, 200 note 1;

sense of ignobility of, 199-200, 200 note 1 (cf. 402 seq.), 501;

= Pure (or Quantitative) Egoistic Hedonism, 95;

and Utilitarianism, relation between, 497 seq.;

and Utilitarian sanctions, 499-503

‘Egoist,’ meaning of, 121

Egoistic End—and Positive Religion, 121;

and Natural Religion, 121

Egoistic Hedonism designated as Egoism or as Epicureanism, 11, 84, 95

Egoistic Hedonism, 42, 119-121;

End of, 93;

Pure or Quantitative, defined, 95;

Fundamental Principle of, 93, 120, 121;

Empirical-reflective Method of, 121, 122, 131 seq.;

and Conscience, 161 note 1;

Fundamental Paradox of, 48, 130, 136, 137, 173-174, 194

Empirical Hedonism, 123-150;

fundamental assumption of, 123, 131, 146;

objections to, 460;

Method of, takes advantage of traditional experience and of special knowledge, 477, 479

Empirical Quantitative Hedonism, 146

Empiricism, 104

‘End,’ ethical use of the term, 134

End, Interdependence of Method and, 8, 83, 84;

adoption of any, as paramount, a phenomenon distinct from Desire, 39

Ends accepted as rational by Common Sense, 8, 9

Energy, 237

Epicureanism, 11, 84

Epicurus, 158

‘Equal return,’ ambiguity of, 261 (cf. 288 seq.)

‘Equality of Happiness,’ as Social End, 284 note 2

Ethical—judgment, 23-38, 77;

Principles and Methods, 77-88 passim;

Method, three principal species of, 83 seq.;

controversy, ancient and modern, 105, 106, 392;

Hedonism, fundamental proposition of, 129;

and Psychological Hedonism, 40-42, 412, 412 note 1;

and Physical Science, structure of, compared, 509

Ethics—boundaries of, 1;

Study or Science? 1, 2;

forms of the problem of, 2, 3, 391;

and man’s ‘True Good,’ 3;

definition of, 4, 15;

Absolute and Relative, 18 note 2, 177 note 1;

and geometry, analogy between, 18-19;

and astronomy, analogy between, 19;

concerned with Duty under present conditions, 19;

aim of, 40, 77;

and Rational or Natural Theology, 504-506;

mutual relations of the three Methods of, 496-509

Ethics and Politics (cf. Law), 15-22 passim, 266, 457;

distinguished from Positive sciences, 1, 2;

Utilitarian, 457 (cf. 274, 298);

in an ideal society, 18 seq.

εὐδαιμονία (= Well-being = the Good attainable in human life), 91, 92;

misunderstanding of Aristotle’s use of, 92 note 2

Excellence (cf. Perfection)

‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection,’ 10 note 3

Excellence beyond strict duty, Utilitarian attitude towards, 492, 493

Explanation essentially different from Justification, 2

Fame, 9, 155, 157, 159, 368, (Posthumous) 156 note 1

Feeling—preferableness of, other than pleasantness, dependent on objective relations of the feeling mind, 127, 128, 399;

quâ feeling, can only be judged by the person who feels, 128, 129, 398

Fidelity (cf. Good Faith), 258, 259

Firmness, 235, 236

Fitness and Desert, 350

‘Formal’ and ‘Material’ Rightness, 206-207, 206 note 1

Fortitude defined, 332

Free choice as virtuous, 504 note 1

Freedom—sentiment of, 39;

as absolute end of ideal law, 274 seq., 293, 297, 350-351;

sphere of, must be limited, 275;

ambiguity of, 275, 276, 293;

and Contract, 276, 276 note 1;

and Property, 276, 277;

Civil and Constitutional, 298, 351

Free Will—controversy, 57-76 passim, 59, 61-62, 65 note 1, 74, 75;

conception of, applied (a) in judging the conduct of others, 63 note 1, 66, 67, (b) in forecasting our own future, 64;

partial illusoriness of the belief in, 64, 65;

and Happiness, 68;

and Perfection (or Excellence), 68, 68 note 2;

and Moral government of the world, 69, 69 note 2, 70;

and Determinism, practical unimportance of issue between, 67, 68, 72-76, 285;

and Justice, 71, 72, 284, 291;

and Desert (or Merit), 68 note 2, 285, 291;

and Duty, 78;

(or Freedom of Will)—two senses of, 57-59;

and Moral responsibility, 58;

conception of, involved in ordinary meaning of ‘responsibility,’ ‘desert,’ etc., 71;

metaphysical—ethical import of, as regards (a) choice between rational and irrational alternatives, 67, 68, 70-71, (b) view of what is rational, 68, 69, (c) forecasts of future action, 69, 70, 70 note 1

Friendship and its duties, 257-259, 257 note 1, 437

‘General Good,’ 392

Generosity, 219, 326

Gentleness, 253, 321

God’s Will—conformity to, 79;

as ultimate reason for action, 79, 80

‘Golden Rule,’ the, unpreciseness of, 379-380

‘Good,’ 105-115 passim;

indefiniteness of, 91-92;

use and force of the term, 86 note 1, 105, 107 seq., 112, 113;

and not ‘Right’ the fundamental notion in Greek ethics, 105;

has not the same connotation as ‘pleasant,’ 107, 108, 109, 110;

implies reference to an universally valid standard, 108-109, 114;

adjective, and ‘Good’ substantive, 109;

notion of, distinct from ‘Pleasure’ and ‘the Pleasant,’ and = ‘what ought to be desired,’ 109 seq.

Good, The, 3, 92, 106;

(human) or Well-being, its relation to Happiness and to Duty, 3;

(human) is either (a) Happiness or (b) Perfection or Excellence of human existence, 114, 115;

the absolute and unconditional, in Kant’s view, 222;

in English ethical thought, 423 note 1

Good conduct, 106, 107, 112-113;

standard of, needed, 113;

Greek conception of, 107 note 1, 404-405, 405 note 1

Good Faith, 224, 303-311 passim, 352-354, 355;

stringency of the duty of, 304-305;

obligation of, affected by (a) fraud or force, 305-306, 306 note 1, (b) material change of circumstances, 306-308, (c) misapprehension, 309, (d) use of a prescribed formula, 309, 310

Good Taste, 108

Good humour, 321

Goodness, implies relation to consciousness or feeling, 113-114, 113 note 2;

(Moral) and Beauty, 107-108, 107 note 1, 228

Government—by Consent of Subjects, 297, 351;

Aristocratic and Democratic Principles of, 299;

established, difficulty of identifying, 300, 301

Governmental Authority, conflicting claims to, 296, 297, 299-301;

ideal, 297-299

Grant Allen, 187;

Physiological Æsthetics, 187 note 1

Gratitude, 259-261, 437-438;

universalised, furnishes the principle ‘that desert ought to be requited,’ 279, 279 note 1, 280;

Kant on, 223, 223 note 1

‘Greatest Happinesss,’ meaning of, 121, 413;

Utilitarian notion of, its extent, 414;

total and average, distinguished, 415, 416

‘Greatest Pleasure,’ explanation of, 44 note 3

Greek ethical thought, the problem of, 106;

tautological maxims of, 375-376

Green, T. H., 132 seq., 134 note 3, 135 note 3;

(Introduction to Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature) 132 note 2, 133 note 3;

(Prolegomena to Ethics) 93 note 1, 133 note 1, 134 notes 1 and 2, 135 notes 1 and 2, 363 note 1

Grote, J., An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, 432 note 1

Gurney, E., 123, 184; (Tertium Quid) 123 note 1;

(Power of Sound) 184 note 1

Hallam, 423 note 1

Hamilton, 139, 180-182;

(Lectures on Metaphysics) 180 note 3

Happiness—as End, 7, 8, 78;

and Duty, connexion between, 162-175 passim;

and Duty, are they coincident? 162, 163, 165, 176;

and Duty, Plato’s view of relation between, 171-172;

and Virtue, 174-175, 459;

and Virtue, connexion of, in Aristotle’s view, 121-122;

determination and measurement of, an inevitable problem for Ethics, 176;

production of, 176-177;

relation of, to mental concentration and dissipation, 193;

and Self-development, 192-193;

rejection of, as end, leaves us unable to frame a coherent account of Ultimate Good, 406;

an objection to, as Ultimate Good, considered, 407 note 1;

principle of distribution of, required, 416, 417;

universal, as divine end, 503-505;

Christian view of, 120, 138;

Sources of, 151 seq.

‘Happiness,’ 41 note 1, 92, 92 note 2, 93 note 1;

ambiguity of, 92;

precise meaning of, 120

Harm, 292, 293

Harmony as cause of Pleasure, 189

Health, 153, 154, 159

‘Hedonism,’ meaning of, 93

Hedonism (Ethical), the two Methods of, are Universalistic and Egoistic, 11;

connexion between the two Methods of, 84, 497 seq.;

objections to, stated and considered:—(a) that the calculation required by the Empirical-reflective method is too complex for practice, 131, 132;

(b) that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” 132, 133;

(c) that “a sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning,” 133, 134;

(d) that transient pleasures are unsatisfying, 135;

(e) that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end, 136 seq.;

(f) that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure, 138-140;

(g) that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and uncertain, 140-150;

Deductive, 176-195 passim;

deductive, Spencer’s view of, 177 note 1;

Method of, must be empirical, 195;

Empirical, method of, 460;

and Intuitionism, 461;

and Pessimism, 131 Note

Hedonistic Zero (or neutral feeling), 124, 125

Helvetius, 88

Highest Good, the (cf. The Good and Ultimate Good), 106

Hobbes, 44 note 1, 56, 86, 89, 103, 109, 300 note 1, 423, 476;

(Leviathan) 89 note 1

Holmes, O. W., jun., The Common Law, 281 note 1

Honour, Code of, 30, 31, 168, 340

Hume, 23, 86, 104, 220, 384, 419, 423, 424, 423 notes 1 and 2, 426, 440, 441, 493;

(Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) 44 note 2, 220 note 2, 424

Humility, 334-336 passim, 355, 356 note 1, 429

Hunger, 45, 46

Hutcheson, 44 note 2, 50, 86, 86 note 2, 104, 366;

(System of Moral Philosophy) 366 note 1

Hypothetical Imperatives imply an ulterior end, 6, 7, 37

Ideal and Actual, relation between, 79;

connected (a) in the conception of “God’s Will,” 79, (b) in the notion of “Nature,” 80-83

Ideal—Government, no consensus as to what kind is legitimate, 299 seq.;

and Traditional Authority, 296;

Society, ethics of, how far useful, 22-24, 465

“Idols of the Cave” and “Idols of the Tribe,” 152

Impulse to do acts quâ recognised as right (= Moral Motive), 77

Impulses, extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict, 51, 52, 136

Indifference (Neutrality) of feeling, cf. Hedonistic Zero

Individualistic—Ideal, 286-287;

and Socialistic Ideals, 293, 294, 444-445

Inequality, Reasonable, 268 seq.

Ingenuity, 236

Intention, 60 note 1, 202, 202 note 1

Interest, meaning of, 7, 120;

ethical character of, in Butler’s view, 176 note 1

‘Internal acts,’ 204

Instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience, 193, 194

Intrinsic value, how determined, 288, 289

Intuition of rightness of acts, excludes consideration of (a) ulterior consequences, 96, 97, (b) “induction from experience” of pleasures, 97, 98 (cf. 102 note 1)

Intuitional—Method, cf. Intuitionism;

moralists, English, may be broadly classified as Dogmatic and Philosophical, 103, 104

‘Intuitional’—sense in which used, 96, 97, 98;

wider and narrower senses of, 97, 102 note 1, 201

Intuitionism, 3, 8, 17, 20, 96-104 passim, 199-216 passim;

differences of its method due to two causes, 103;

its method issues in Universalistic Hedonism (Utilitarianism), 406-407;

chronological development of the method of, in England, 103-104;

and Utilitarianism, 85-86, 388-389, 423-457 passim, 496-497;

Philosophical, 102-104, 373-389 passim;

Perceptional, 98-100, 102;

Dogmatic, 100-101 (cf. Intuitionism, Intuitive Morality, Positive Morality, Morality of Common Sense);

Dogmatic, fundamental assumption of, 101, 200, 201;

three phases of, 102, 103;

a variety of, constituted by substituting for ‘right’ the notion ‘good,’ 105-107;

Æsthetic, 228, 392;

Jural or Rational, 228-229

‘Intuitive’ or ‘a priori’ Morality generally used to mean Dogmatic Intuitionism or Morality of Common Sense, 101-102

Irrational choice—sometimes conscious and deliberate, 36, 37-38, 41-42, 58, 59, 110;

Socratic and Aristotelian view compared with modern view of, 59 note 1

Jural method of Ethics, 100-101

Just claims—arising from contract, 269;

arising from natural and normal expectations, 269, 270, 270 note 1

‘Justice,’ ‘justify,’ etc., uses of, 264 note 2, 270, 286, 442

Justice, 20, 99, 264-294 passim, 349-352, 355, 440-448 passim;

or Equity, essence of, 496;

specially difficult to define, 264;

intuitional view of the definition of, 264;

involves notion of distribution, 265, 266, 268, 271;

and Law, connexion between, 265, 266, 267 note 1;

distinct from Order (or Law-observance), 265;

and Equality, 266, 267, 267 note 1, 268, 268 note 1, 279, 285 note 1;

and taxation, 266, 266 note 1;

Conservative and Ideal, 272-273, 273 note 1, 274, 293, 294;

Ideal, 273, 274, 293, 294, 444, 445;

Ideal, and Natural Eights, 274, 275;

Ideal, and Freedom, 278, 279;

Corrective, 281;

Reparative, 281, 282, 281 note 1, 282 note 1, 293;

Reparative and Retributive, distinguished, 282-283, 282 note 2;

and Free Will, 71, 72, 284, 285;

and ‘Equity’ or ‘Fairness,’ 285, 286;

Hume’s treatment of, 440

Kant, 6, 7, 11 note 1, 36, 58, 58 note 1, 209, 210, 210 note 1, 222, 223, 239, 240, 315, 327 note 1, 366, 385, 386, 386 note 1, 389-390 Note, 486, Appendix 510;

(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) 209 note 1, 389-390 Note;

(Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre) 223 note 1, 327 note 1, 366 note 3, 386 note 2, 389 Note;

(Kritik der reinen Vernunft) 366 note 3

Kant’s Fundamental Moral Rule or Categorical Imperative as criterion of rightness, 209-210, 209 note 1, 210 note 1, 339 note 1, 386, 389 Note, 486

Knowledge—as an End, 114, 399, 401;

and Feeling (= Cognition and Pleasure or Pain), relation between, 139, 140;

and Feeling, Hamilton’s view of the relation between, 139

Laisser faire and economic production, 445 note 2

Law, 295-303; and Morality, relation between, 29, 457;

and Positive Morality, 164;

Austin’s definition of, 300 note 1

Laws—just, characteristics of, 266, 267, 271-272;

that ought to be obeyed, are laid down by rightful authority, 296

Law-observance (or Order), 295-303 passim, 352, 440, 441;

and Good Faith, 295, 303;

in regard to mala prohibita, 302 note 1

Lecky, History of European Morals, 50 note 1, 399 note 1, 427 note 1

Legal obligation and punishment, 29

Liberality, 324-326, 325 note 1, 355

Libertarian position, 58, 64-65, 66

Liberty, Sentiment of, 58

Locke, (Essay) 205, 280 note 1, 503;

ethical view of, 205, 206

Love, 50, 244, 245, 367, 368;

common sense estimate of, 245, 258, 258 note 1

Loyalty, 223, 244, 254

Mackenzie, J. S., 47, 48

Maine, Sir H., (Ancient Law) 461 note 2

Malevolence—character of, as motive, 364;

sometimes sweepingly condemned, 321, 324;

sometimes partially approved on Utilitarian grounds, 322, 323, 324

Malevolent affections natural and normal, 320, 321

Marcus Aurelius, 376 note 1

‘Market value,’ 286 seq.

Marriage, Plato’s ideal of, 358-359 (cf. 348 note 1)

Martineau, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372;

(Types of Ethical Theory) 367 note 1, 369 note 1

Maxims—of Virtue, dependence or independence of, 313;

of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence, self-evident element in, 380-382

‘Maximum Happiness’ as criterion of conduct, 134

Meanness, notion of, examined, 325, 326

Meekness, 321

Mercy, 321

Merit, 68 note 2, 284 seq.;

(cf. Desert)

Method of Ethics, definition of, 1;

only one rational, 6, 12;

more than one natural, 6

Methods of Ethics, The, purpose of, 11-14, 78

Mildness, 321

Mill, J. S., 44, 85, 87, 94, 121, 177 note 1, 412 notes 1 and 2, 414, 418, 440, 478, 504;

(Utilitarianism) 93 note 1, 461 note 1, 499 note 1;

(On Liberty) 478 notes 1 and 2

Mind, 87 Note, 477 note 1

Modern ethical thought quasi-jural in character, 106

Moral Faculty—a function of Reason, 23-38 passim;

why subject of ethical discussion, 4, 5;

Utilitarian theory of origin of, 461, 462, 497

Moral Judgment, 23-38;

object of, 60, 61, 201-202, 202 note 1, 222, 362, 364;

(or Practical) Reason, 33-34, 34 notes 1, 2, 3; 39, 40, 100 seq.;

Sense, 34;

Reasoning, the most natural type of, 6, 12 seq., 102-103, 493-494;

Sentiment, 26-28, 77;

Sentiments, (a) difficulties of admitting or rejecting them as motives, 365-367, (b) theory of their derivation from experiences of pleasure and pain, 461, 462;

and Quasi-moral Sentiments, 28, 173, 174;

Motive, 77, 204 seq., 223;

Motive, varying forms of:—(a) Reverence for Authority, (b) Religious Sentiment, (c) Self-respect, (d) sentiment of Freedom, (e) Admiration or Aspiration, 39-40;

instincts and crude Utilitarian reasonings—discrepancy between, 466, 467;

Intuitions, 211-216 passim;

Intuitions, existence of, 211, 212, 337;

Intuitions, connexion between (a) Existence and Origin of, 211, 212, (b) Origin and Validity of, 34 note 1, 212-213, 212 note 2, 214;

Intuitions, Particular and General, 99-102, 214-216;

Rules, imperative and indicative forms of, 101 note 1;

Rules and Axioms, importance of, 229;

Axioms, abstract but significant, 379-384, 505;

Axioms, Kant’s view of, 385-386, 386 notes 1 and 2;

Maxims, 337-361 passim;

Maxims which are, and which are not, directly self-evident, distinction between, 383;

Responsibility, 59-60;

Obligation, 217;

and non-moral excellence distinguished, 426, 427

‘Moral’ (in narrower sense) and ‘Prudential’ distinguished, 25-26

Moral Courage, 333 note 3

Moral Philosophy, some problems of modern, 374

Morality—‘inductive’ and ‘intuitive,’ double ambiguity of antithesis between, 97-99;

a priori and a posteriori (or inductive and intuitive), 97;

and growth of Sympathy, 455-456, 455 note 1

Morality of Common Sense (Intuitionism), 85, 102, 229, 263 Note, 337-361 passim;

and Positive Morality, 215;

and Egoism, 498-499 (cf. Happiness and Duty);

development of, not perfectly Utilitarian, 455-456;

axiomatic character of its maxims questioned, 338, 342, 343;

furnishes valuable practical rules but not ultimate axioms, 360, 361;

and Utilitarianism, 361 note 1, 423-457 passim, 461, 498, 499;

first principles of, as “middle axioms” of Utilitarianism, 461;

Mill’s view of, 461 note 1;

not to be accepted by Utilitarianism without modification, 461 seq., 467

Motive meaning of, 202, 362, 363;

and Intention, 202, 203, 203 note 1;

-s, different views of Right, 204-207;

and Desire, Green’s view of, 363 note 1;

and Disposition, Utilitarian estimate of, 493, 494

Motives to action, 23;

as subjects of moral judgment, 362-372;

as affecting morality of actions, 60-61, 224;

regarded as better and worse rather than good and bad, 363-364;

‘seductive,’ 364;

(“Springs of action”) Dr. Martineau’s table of (369) ethically estimated, 371, 372;

‘higher’ not always to be preferred to ‘lower,’ 369, 370, 371;

moral regulation of, 370

Natural, The—Interpretation of, 80 seq.;

gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct, 82

Natural—Selection, effect of, on impulses, 194;

and normal claims, indefiniteness of, 270, 271, 272, 272 note 1;

expectations, ambiguity of, 272, 273, 352;

Rights—difficulty of determining, 298;

Good, 477

Nature—Life according to, 79 seq., 377, 378;

conformity to, 80;

Stoic use of, 377, 378 note 1;

Butler’s use of, 378

Neighbourhood and Nationality, duties of, 250, 251, 252

Neutral excitements, 186 note 1 (cf. Hedonistic Zero)

‘Objective’ and ‘subjective,’ ethical application of, 207, 207 note 1, 208 notes 1 and 2, 208, 209, 210, 344 note 2, 394, 395, 429, 430

Objective Hedonism, meaning of, 151;

and Common Sense, 151-161;

advantages of, 151;

defects of, 151 seq., 458, 459

Objective relations of conscious mind, how far desirable, 400, 401

Objectivity of Moral Judgment, 27, 33

Order, cf. Law-observance

Origin of Moral Intuitions, ethical importance of, 383, 384, 384 note 1

‘Ought,’ 23-38 passim;

relative and unconditional uses of, 6, 7, 39;

implies reasonableness, 25;

and ‘right’ imply the same notion, 1 note 1, 23, 25;

does not refer to matters of fact, 25;

implies objectivity, 27, 33;

does not merely signify (a) appropriateness of means to ends, 26, (b) an emotion of the person judging, 26-28, nor (c) bound under penalties, 29 seq.;

an elementary and irresolvable notion, 32-33;

narrower and wider sense of, 33, 34, 34 note 4;

carries with it an impulse to action, 34;

implies possible conflict with reason (thus distinguishable from ‘right’), 34, 35, 217;

determinist sense of, 78;

loose meaning of, 508

Owen, Robert, 291

Pain—definition of, 42-43 note 1, 180, 191;

the negative quantity of pleasure, 124, 125;

physical concomitant of, 183 seq.;

Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 seq., 180 note 1, 181 note 1;

Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;

Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 seq.;

Grant Allen’s view of, 187;

biological theory of, 190 seq.

Paley, 86, 121

Parents and children, duties of, 243, 243 note 1, 248-250, 248 note 1, 346, 347

Patriotism, 223, 244, 245;

duties of, 251, 252, 252 note 1

‘Perception,’ ethical use of, by Dugald Stewart, 103 Note

Perfection or Excellence as End, 10, 11, 10 notes 3 and 4, 20 note 1, 78, 114, 115;

and Intuitionism, 11, 83, 84, 97;

Kant’s treatment of, 386 note 2

Perfectionists, view of, 97

Philosophical Intuitionism, its relation to Common Sense Morality, 373

φρόνησις, 231 note 1

Pity or Compassion, 262

Placability, 321

Plato, (Republic) 21, 171, 172;

140, 145, 148, 171, 172, 281, 345, 348 note 1, 358, 375 note 1, 376;

(Gorgias) 405 note 1; 441

Pleasure—definitions of, 42, 43, 43 note 1, 125, 127 seq., 131, 190;

ambiguities of, 43, 44, 93 seq.;

forecast of, must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures, 40, 173;

the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater, 41, 42, 42 note 1, 136;

of Virtue, its ‘disinterestedness’ not abnormal, 50, 51;

as aim of unconscious action, 52, 53;

as ‘original’ aim of action, 53, 54;

application of the term, 93;

has only quantitative differences, 94, 95, 121;

maximum, deductive methods of determining, 121, 122;

rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of, 124 note 1;

‘quality’ of, 94, 95, 121, 128-129, 128 note 1;

as Feeling, conceivableness of, 132, 133;

permanent sources of, 135, 136, 153;

how estimated, 141 seq. (cf. 127, 128, 398);

from others’ pain, various modes of, 321 note 1;

and Appetite, identified by Hobbes, 44 note 1;

and Desire, controversy as to relation between, 39-56;

Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 seq., 180 note 1, 181 note 1;

Mr. Stout’s theory of, 182, 188, etc.;

Mr. Spencer’s theory of, 183 seq.;

Grant Allen’s view of, 187;

biological theory of, 190 seq.;

and Desire, (a) Mill’s view of, 43-44, (b) Butler’s view of, 44, (c) Bain’s view of, 54-56;

effect of desire on estimate of, 144, 145;

and Preservation, 190, etc.;

(Hobbes’ view of) 89;

and Perfection or Reality, (Self-development), Spinoza’s view of, 90;

and ‘quantity of life,’ 192;

‘pure’ 143;

of pursuit, 46 seq., 47 note 1, 55-56;

of attainment, 47;

of business, 49;

intellectual and æsthetic, 107-108, 153, 157, 472;

benevolent and sympathetic, 49, 50;

of virtue, 153, 170, 171, 174, 175;

-s, of the animal life, 154, 157, 159;

of wealth and greatness, Adam Smith’s view of, 155 note 1—(cf. Health, Wealth, etc.);

Stoic view of, 129;

Green’s view of, 132 seq.;

Plato’s view of its illusoriness, 140;

Spencer and Grant Allen’s ‘Intermittence’ theory of, 187

Pleasures and Pains, Moral, 170 seq., 171 note 1;

of Sympathy, 49, 50, 499-502, 499 note 1;

scale of, involves assumption of a Hedonistic zero, 124, 125;

commensurability of, 123-125, 124 note 1, 128 note 1, 131, 132, 140-150;

difficulties of a clear, definite and consistent evaluation of, 140-150;

incommensurable intensity of, doubtful, 123, 124;

intensity of, commensurable with duration, 124;

Bentham’s four dimensions of, 124 note 1;

volitional efficacy of, 125-127;

their relation to normal activities, 185, etc.;

Aristotle’s and Hamilton’s theory of, 180 seq.;

Stout’s theory of, 182;

Wundt’s theory of, 184;

Spencer’s biological theory of, 190 seq.

Plutarch, 376

Politeness (Good Breeding, Fashion, Etiquette), 253;

Code of, 30, 340, 341

Political order, Rousseau’s view of an ideally just, 298

Politics—and Ethics, 15-22;

definition of, 1 note 1, 15 (cf. Law)

Positive Morality—and Morality of Common Sense, 215;

relation of, to preservation and to happiness, 464, 465;

alteration of, 164, 480

Power, 156, 157, 159

Practical efficacy and speculative truth, relation between, 507 note 1

Practical Empirical Hedonism, an assumption of, 131

Practical (or Moral) Judgment, 23 seq.

Practical (or Moral) Reason, 23-38 passim;

its relation to Interest and to non-rational and irrational desires, 36;

and Nature, 81;

a postulate of, 6, 12;

Dualism of, 404 note 1, 366, 200, 205-206, 499, 507-509 (cf. Happiness and Duty)

Praise, common sense award of, explained by utility, 428, 429

Priestley, 88 Note

Promise, 303-311 passim;

conditions and meaning of, 304;

conditions of bindingness of a, 311

Proof of a first principle, how possible, 419, 420

Proof—of Egoism may be demanded, 418, 419;

of ordinary moral rules is often required and given, 419

Proof of Utilitarianism, 418-422 passim;

clear demand of common sense for, 418, 419;

addressed to Egoism, 420, 421, 497-498;

addressed to Intuitionism, twofold character of, 421, 422

“Proof” of Utilitarian principle, Mill’s, 387, 388

Property and Right of Bequest, 277

Prudence (or Forethought), 7, 36, 96, 391;

common sense view of, 327, 328;

Kant’s and Butler’s views of, 327 note 1;

self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of, 381;

and Benevolence, subordination of other virtues to, 496-497

‘Prudential’ and ‘Moral,’ 25-26

Psychological Hedonism, 40 seq.;

of Bentham, 85;

ethical import of, 41, 205

Public Opinion, Code of, 30

Public and private virtue, Utilitarian and Intuitionist estimates of, 495

Punishment, 281, 290 seq., 290 note 1, 291 note 1;

preventive and retributory views of, 71-72

Purity, 223, 329-331, 329 note 2, 357-359

Quantitative Hedonism, 129

Quasi-moral Sentiment, 27-28, 173-174

Quasi-moral Sentiments and Rational Self-love, 173-174

Rank of Motives, difficulties of estimating, 365-367, 369;

conflicting estimates of, by moralists, 366;

difficulty due to complexity of motive, 368

Rational action, not to be identified with (a) disinterested or (b) free action, 57;

Spinoza’s view of the principle of, 89-90

Rational Benevolence, 96;

may be self-limiting, 385;

Kant’s treatment of, 385-386 Note, 389-390

Rational Self-love (Rational Egoism, Prudence)—and Conscience, 172, 200, 200 note 2, 366;

and Rational Benevolence, 386 note 4, 498 seq.

Reason—and Ultimate Ends, 9, 77, 77 note 1;

relation of, to Will and Desire, 23 seq.;

reference of moral judgments to, signifies merely their objectivity, 33;

conflict with, implied in the terms dictate, precept, imperative, ought, duty, moral obligation, 34, 35;

dictate or precept of, is a rule which may be deviated from, 41;

dictates or imperatives of, 34, 36, 77;

and the Divine Will, 79, 80;

dictate of, implied by right, rightness, and their equivalents, 105;

and instinct, 193-195;

may be self-limiting, 345;

dictates and dictation of, 345, 395, 404

Reason for doing what is seen to be right, why men demand a, 5-6

Reasonableness of Self-love, Butler’s view of, 119, 120;

Clarke’s view of, 120;

Christian view of, 120;

common sense view of, 120

Rebellion, when justifiable?, 299, 300, 301, 352

Reciprocity, principle of, 167, 168

Religious deception, 316, 316 note 2

Renan quoted, 108 note 1

Reputation, 155

Resentment, instinctive and deliberate, 322, 323;

deliberate, Butler’s view of, 323 note 1, 371;

universalised the principle of retributive (criminal) justice, 281;

evaluation of, 449

Resolutions, 37;

general, may be contradicted by particular volitions, 37-38

Respect, tokens of, 336, 336 note 1

Reverence for Authority, 39

‘Right’—notion involved in, is unique, 25;

and ‘good,’ 3, 4;

and ‘ought,’ distinction between, 34, 35;

conduct and ‘good’ conduct, 106, 113

Right Conflict and Ultimate Good, 3

Rights, 274, etc.

Rightful authority, how known?, 296;

what are its limits?, 301, 302

Rousseau, 298;

his political ideal, difficulty of realising, 298, 299

‘Rule of Equity,’ Clarke’s, 384-385

‘Rule of Love or Benevolence,’ Clarke’s, 385

‘Rules of Righteousness,’ Clarke’s, 384, 384 note 4, 385

Rules prescribing actions as good or right open to Utilitarian interpretation, 430

Sagacity, 236

Sanctions, 164-175 passim, 498, 499, 500 seq., 502, 505, 507-508;

conflict of, 164, 165;

legal, and happiness, 165, 166, 165 note 1;

social, and happiness, 166, 167;

social, and extra-legal duty, 167, 168;

internal, and happiness, 170, 170 note 1, 171, 171 note 1, 172, 173, 501-502

Scottish School of Ethical Thought, 104

Self-control, 235-237, 331, 344, 345, 356

Self-development (Self-realisation), indefiniteness of the notion, 90, 91;

as ethical aim, 192, 193;

understood as = yielding to instinctive impulses, 193-194

Self-evidence, difficulty of discerning real, 339, 340, 341

Self-interest, 25, 26

Self-love, ordinary use and ambiguity of, 89;

and certain elevated impulses, 137-138;

Butler’s view of, 93;

and benevolence and affection, 138, 403, 502

Self-preservation, 89

Self-realisation, 80, 90, 95

Self-regarding virtues, 327-331

Self-sacrifice, 109 note 1, 138, 431, 432

Self-satisfaction, Green’s view of, 133, 135, 135 note 3

Selfishness, 499

Services, comparative worth of, how determined, 286, 287;

reward of, how determined, 290

Shaftesbury, 86, 86 notes 1 and 2, 138, 423, 423 note 1, 433, 501

Sidgwick, Principles of Political Economy, 267 note, 445 note 2, 446 note 1

Sincerity, 355

Smith, Adam, 424, 461, (Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral Sentiments) 155 note 1

Social Contract, 17, 297-298, 303, 351

Social rank and status, 153, 155

Socialistic ideal, 289, 293-294

Sociology—scope and subject of, 2;

present condition of, 472, 473

Socrates, 59 note 1, 98-99, 215, 231 note 1, 299

Socratic Induction, 98-99

Socratic principle of “Government by experts,” 299

σοφία, σοφός, 231, 231 note 1

Sources of Happiness, 135, 136, 153 seq.;

judgments of common sense respecting them, only roughly trustworthy, 158-160;

common sense estimates of (a) at best are only true for ordinary persons, (b) are vitiated by mal-observation, (c) confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of experienced pleasure, 151, 152, (d) mix moral and æsthetic preferences with hedonistic, 153, (e) are found to be full of inconsistencies, 153-158

Sovereign power, Hobbist and Austinian views of, 300 note 1

Special moral codes, 30, 31, 168, 169, 340, 341

Special need, duties arising out of, 261, 262

Spencer, H., 125-126, 177 note 1, 183 seq., 194 note 1, 470, 471, 470 notes 1 and 2, 473;

(Social Statics), 18 note 2, 194 note 1;

(Data of Ethics), 18 note 2, 177 note 1, 194 note 1, 470 note 1

“Sphere of individual option” determined by Utilitarian calculation, 477-479

Spinoza, 90

Stephen, Leslie, 319 Note, 471, 471 note 2, 472, 473;

(Science of Ethics), 42 note 1, 471

Stewart, Dugald, 454, 455;

(Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers), 92 note 2, 454 note 1

Stoic system, its place in the development of ethical thought, 106;

ethics, circular reasonings of, 376, 377

Stoicism, later compared with earlier, 376 note 1

Stoics, 92, 105, 129

Stout, G. F., 180 note 2, 182, 186;

(Analytic Psychology), 182 note 1

Subjective, cf. Objective

Suggestio falsi, 317

Suicide prohibited by Common Sense, 327, 331, 356

Sully, Pessimism, 136 note 1, 186 note 1

Suppressio veri, 317

Sympathy—and Moral Sensibility, relation between, 170 note 1, 500-501;

with impulses prompting to action, 463, 463 note 2;

limitations and perversions of, 464;

twofold operation of, on moral impulses, 483;

confusion in Mill’s view of, 499 note 1;

and happiness of agent, 170 note 1, 499 note 1, 499-503

Systematic Morality, explanation of indifference or hostility to, 99-100

Tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms, 374 seq.

Temperance, 224, 328, 329, 344 note 1, 356

Torquemada, 226 note 1

‘True Good,’ 3 (cf. Good, Ultimate Good)

Truth, Cartesian Criterion of, 339

Ultimate End, for the individual and for the whole, 404, 497-498

Ultimate Good, My, 109 seq., 109 note 1, 497-498

Ultimate Good, The (the Good), 3, 106 seq., 391-407 passim

Ultimate reasonableness, different views of, implicit in ordinary thought, 6

Ultimate reasons for conduct, 78, 79;

differences in, correspond to different aspects of human existence, 78 (cf. 79)

‘Ultra-intuitional,’ 100

‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’ of Common Sense Morality, 453 seq., 489, etc.

Universal Happiness as standard and motive, 413

Universalistic and Egoistic Hedonism, connexion between (a) in Bentham’s view, 87 Note;

(b) in Paley’s view, 121

Unveracity, common, 316 seq., 486

Utilitarian—formula of distribution not really at variance with Common Sense, 432, 433;

justification of special affections, 433, 434;

ideal code, difficulties of constructing such, for present human beings, 467-470;

rectification of Common Sense Morality must proceed by empirical method, 476-480;

innovation, negative and destructive, probable effects of (a) on the agent, 481, 482-483, (b) on others, 482, 483;

innovation, positive and supplementary, as affecting the agent and others, 483, 484;

innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of acceptance, 489-490, 489 note 1;

reform, consists largely in enforcing old rules, 484;

exceptions to current morality (a) may generally be stated as fresh rules, 485, 489, (b) special and rare cases of, 486-487;

Duty and Religious Sanction, 503-506;

Sanction, 500 seq.

Utilitarianism, 8, 11, 119;

(= Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism), 84, 119, 411;

Proof of, 418-422;

Principle of, 87, (Mill’s view of) 387, 388;

Method of, 460-495;

meaning of, 411-417 passim;

to be distinguished from (a) Egoistic Hedonism, 411, 412, (b) any psychogonical theory of the Moral Sentiments, 412-413;

motive and standard of, to be discriminated, 413;

contradictory objections to, 87;

and Intuitionism, relation between, 85-86, 386 seq., 496-497;

and Intuitionism, history of relation between, in English ethical thought, 86, 423, 424;

and Egoism, relation between, 497, 498;

and Egoism, harmony of, (a) not empirically demonstrable, 503, (b) required by Reason, 506;

and Common Sense Morality, 8, 423-457 passim, 468, 469, 475, 476, 480 seq., 498, 499;

justifies the unequal distribution which Common Sense approves, 432 seq.;

more rigid than Common Sense, 499, 504;

function of, as arbiter to Common Sense, 454, 455;

reasonable attitude of, to Common Sense Morality, 473-474, 475-476;

aims at remedying imperfections of Common Sense Morality, 476;

and Axiom of Benevolence, 387, 388, 496-497, 498;

and Conjugal and Parental Duties, 435, 436;

and Duties of Special Need, 436, 437;

and Gratitude, 437, 438;

and benevolent Duties, 435 seq.;

and Law-observance, 440, 441;

and Impartiality, 441, 442, 447, 447 note 1;

and Normal Expectations, 442-443;

and Good Faith, 443, 444, 443 note 3;

and Freedom, 444, 445;

and distribution according to Desert, 445-447;

and Justice, 440 seq., 447;

and Veracity, 448, 449, 483;

and Malevolence, 449;

and Self-regarding virtues, 450;

and Purity, 449-450;

and Sympathy, 500 seq.;

and Christianity, 504

‘Utility,’ Hume’s and Bentham’s uses of, 423 note 2

Veracity, 97, 224, 313, 314-319 passim, 355, 448, 449;

and Good Faith, 303, 304, 313, 314

Virtue (Moral Perfection or Excellence), 10, 14, 78, 106, 219, 219 note 1, 220, 220 note 3, 221, 222, 226, 227;

or Right Action, its relation to the Good, 106;

and Happiness, 119, 120, 174-175, 461;

Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of, 376;

involves reference to an Ultimate Good which is not Virtue, 393, 394, 395;

and Duty, 217-230 passim;

and emotion, 222-223, 226;

voluntariness of, 220, 227;

and motive, 223-224;

and habit, 227;

and moral effort, relation between, 224, 225, 429;

intellectual conditions of, 225;

is Knowledge, Socratic doctrine that, 227 note 1;

felicific character of, 424, 425

Virtues, intellectual, 231-237 passim;

self-regarding, 327-331 passim

Virtuous conduct, commonly regarded as disinterested, 77, 78

Virtuous motives, admitted by some moralists, 365, 366;

Dr. Martineau’s rejection of, 367

Vivisection controversy, 402, 406 note 1

Volition, analysis of, 61, 62;

Determinist view of, 62 note 1;

conception of, how far inevitably Libertarian, 67, 71;

causes muscular contractions, 73;

affects thought and feeling, 73, 74;

acting through resolutions alters men’s tendencies to action, 74, 75, 75 note 1;

its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance, 77

Voluntary action, definition of, 59

Voluntary choice and irresistible impulse, 67 note 3

Wayland, Elements of Moral Science, 256 note 2

Wealth, 153, 154, 155

Well-being (the Good attainable in human life), 92, 92 note 1;

Stoic view of, 92;

Aristotle’s view of, 92, 92 note 2;

not = mere promise of future being, 396, 397

Whewell, 58, 86;

(Elements of Morality), 58 note 2, 317 note 1, 329 note 1

Will—Subjective Rightness of, and Ultimate Good, 394, 395;

divorced from Objective Rightness is fanaticism, 395

Wisdom, 230, 231-236 passim, 344, 345, 393, 430;

meaning and use of term, 231;

Greek view of, 231;

common sense definition of, 233;

refers to ends as well as means, 231-233;

in selection of ends and means, how far voluntary, 233-235;

in adoption of selected ends, 235;

comprehensiveness of, 238;

and Temperance and Justice, tautological maxims of, 375;

and Caution and Decision, do not furnish independent rules, 237 Note

Wundt, 184 note 3

Zeal or Moral Ardour, 237, 392

Zeno, 376

THE END

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