Book 7 — INDEX (continued 3)

Thus the Lombard. Now let us see how Thomas, in his Summa theologiae, Pars Prima, Quaestio xix. Articulus ix. expounds the point: utrum voluntas Dei sit malorum.

“As to the ninth articulus thus one proceeds. (1) It seems [Videtur, formula for stating the initial argument which will not be approved] that the will of God is [the cause] of evils. For God wills every good that becomes (i.e. comes into existence). But it is good that evils should come; for Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Although those things which are evils, in so far as they are evils, are not goods; yet it is good (bonum) that there should be not only goods (bona) but evils.’ Therefore God wills evils.”

“(2) Moreover [Praeterea, Thomas’s regular formula for introducing the succeeding arguments, which he will not approve] Dionysius says, iv. cap. de divinis nominibus: ‘There will be evil making for the perfection of the whole.’ And Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Out of all (things) the admirable beauty of the universe arises; wherein even that which is called evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the good more highly; since the good pleases more, and is the more praiseworthy, when compared with evil.’ But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and grace of the universe; since this is what God chiefly wills in His creation. Therefore God wills evils.”

“(3) Moreover, the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils (mala fieri, et non fieri) are contradictory opposites. But God does not will evils not to occur; because since some evils do occur, the will of God would not be fulfilled. Therefore God wills evils to occur.”

“Sed contra est [Thomas’s formula for stating the opinion which he will approve] what Augustine says in his book of Eighty-three Questions: ‘No wise man is the author of man’s deterioration; yet God is more excellent than any wise man; much less then, is God the author of any one’s deterioration. But He is said to be the author when He is spoken of as willing anything. Therefore man becomes worse, God not willing it. But with every evil, something becomes worse. Therefore God does not will evils.’”

“Respondeo dicendum quod [Thomas’s formula for commencing his elucidation] since the reason (or ground or cause, ratio) of the good is likewise the reason of the desirable (as discussed previously), evil is opposed to good: it is impossible that any evil, as evil, should be desired, either by the natural appetite or the animal, or the intellectual, which is will. But some evil may be desired per accidens, in so far as it conduces to some good. And this is apparent in any appetite. For the natural impulse (agens naturale) does not aim at privation or destruction (corruptio); but at form, to which the privation of another form may be joined (i.e. needed, conjungitur); and at the generation of one, which is the destruction of another. Thus a lion, killing a stag, aims at food, to which is joined the killing of an animal. Likewise the fornicator aims at enjoyment, to which is joined the deformity of guilt.

“Thus evil which is joined to some good, is privation of another good. Never, therefore, is evil desired, not even per accidens, unless the good to which the evil is joined appears greater than the good which is annulled through the evil. But God wills no good more than His goodness; yet He wills some one good more than some other good. Hence the evil of guilt, which destroys relationship to divine good (quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum), God in no way wills. But the evil of natural defect, or the evil of penalty, He wills in willing some good to which such evil is joined; as, in willing righteousness He wills penalty; and in willing that the order of nature be preserved, He wills certain natural corruptions.

“Ad primum ergo dicendum [Thomas’s formula for commencing his reply to the first false argument] that certain ones have said that although God does not will evils, He wills evils to be or become: because, although evils are not goods, yet it is good that evils should be or become. They said this for the reason that those things which are evil in themselves, are ordained for some good; and they deemed this ordainment involved in saying mala esse vel fieri. But that is not said rightly. Because evil is not ordained for good per se but per accidens. For it is beyond the sinner’s intent, that good should come of it; just as it was beyond the intent of the tyrants that from their persecutions the patience of the martyrs should shine forth. And therefore it cannot be said that such ordainment for good is involved in saying that it is good for evil to be or become: because nothing is adjudged according to what pertains to it per accidens but according to what pertains to it per se.”

“Ad secundum dicendum that evil is not wrought for the perfection or beauty of the whole except per accidens, as has been shown. Hence this which Dionysius says that evil makes for the perfection of the whole may lead to an illogical conclusion.”

“Ad tertium dicendum that although the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils are opposed as contradictories; yet to will the occurrence and to will the non-occurrence of evils, are not opposed as contradictories, since both one and the other may be affirmative. God therefore neither wills the occurrence nor the non-occurrence of evils; but wills to permit their occurrence. And this is good.”

[431] Ante, Chapter XII.

[432] Ante, pp. 289 sqq.

[433] The Speculum majus of Vincent of Beauvais will afford the principal example of the resulting hybrid arrangement.

[434] Ludwig Baur, Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903), p. 193 sqq., to which I am indebted for what I have to say in the next few pages.

[435] Migne, Pat. Lat. 64, col. 10 sqq.

[436] These works were written near the middle of the twelfth century. Gundissalinus was Archdeacon of Segovia and drew upon Arab writings.

[437] See L. Baur, Gundissalinus, etc., p. 376 sqq.

[438] The treatise is not printed. Its captions are given by L. Baur in his Gundissalinus, pp. 368-375, from which I have borrowed what I give of them.

[439] Liber de praedicabilibus (tome 1 of Albertus’s works), which in scholastic logic means the five “universals,” genus, species, difference, property, accident, (also called the quinque voces) discussed in Porphyry’s Introduction to the Categories. The Categories themselves are called praedicamenta.

[440] The above gives the arguments of chapters i. and ii. of the work. One notices that Albertus in this exposition of the subject of Porphyry’s treatise, is using the method which Thomas brings to syllogistic perfection in his Summa.

[441] It was printed, more than once, in the late fifteenth century; the most readable edition is that printed at Douai in 1624, in four huge folios.

[442] Boundless as the work appears, neither in mental powers, nor learning, nor in massiveness of achievement, is its author to be compared with Albertus Magnus. The De universo of Rabanus Maurus, Migne 111, col. 9-612, is in its arrangement and method a forerunner of Vincent’s Speculum. Later predecessors were the English Franciscan Bartolomaeus, whose encyclopaedic De proprietatibus rerum was written a little before the middle of the twelfth century (see Felder, Studien in Franciscanerorder, etc., pp. 251-253); and Lambertus Audomarensis (St. Omer) with his Liber floridus, a general digest of knowledge, historical, ecclesiastical, and natural, taken from many writers, an account of which is given in Migne 163, col. 1004 sqq.

[443] Here, of course, we have the hands of Esau, but the voice of Augustine and Orosius!

[444] The above is from cap. 9 of liber i. of the Speculum doctrinale.

[445] Migne, Pat. Lat. 34, col. 246-485.

[446] Ante, p. 290.

[447] The three theological virtues are fides, spes, and caritas. They are called thus because Deum habent pro objecto; and because they are poured (infunduntur) into us by God alone. They are distinguished from the moral and intellectual virtues because their object surpasses our reason, while the object of the moral and intellectual virtues can be comprehended by human reason (Summa, Pars prima secundae, Quaestio lxii., Art. 1-4).

[448] ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, Arist. Nich. Ethics, vi. 4.

[449] One notes that these two, like many other of the vices enumerated, are vices in that they are extremes, in the Aristotelian sense.

[450] We are at Quaestio clxxi. of Secunda secundae.

[451] The order which Thomas would have followed in the unfinished conclusion of his Summa theologiae, may be inferred from the order of the last half of Book IV. of his Contra Gentiles, or indeed from the last part of the fourth Book of the Lombard’s Sentences.

[452] Ante, Chapter XII.

[453] There were, of course, attempts at translation, notably those of Notker the German (see ante, Vol. I., p. 308) and Alfred’s translation of Boëthius’s De consolatione. But such were made only of the popular parts of Scripture (e.g. the Psalms) or of very elementary profane treatises. To what extent Notker’s translations were used, is hard to say. But at all events any one really seeking learning, studied and worked and thought in the medium of Latin; for the bulk of the patristic writings never were translated; and when the works of Aristotle had at last reached the Middle Ages in the Latin tongue, they were studied in that tongue. Because of the crudeness of the vernacular tongues, the Latin classics were even more untranslatable in the tenth or eleventh century than now.

One may add, that it was fortunate for the progress of mediaeval learning that Latin was the one language used by all scholars in all countries. This facilitated the diffusion of knowledge. How slow and painful would have been that diffusion if the different vernacular tongues had been used in their respective countries, for serious writing.

[454] Ante, Chapter XII., I.

[455] Eruditio didascalica, i. cap. 12 (Migne, Pat. Lat. 176, col. 750).

[456] Cf. Abelson, The Seven Liberal Arts (New York, 1906).

[457] I am speaking generally, that is to say, omitting for the present the aberrant or special or intrusive tendencies found in a man like Roger Bacon, for example. They were of importance for what was to come thereafter; but are not broadly representative of the Middle Ages.

[458] St. Anselm, Epist. lib. iii. 41, ad Fulconem (Migne, Pat. Lat. 158, col. 1192). So Roscellin showed in his own case how problems primarily logical could pass over to metaphysics or theology. Likewise, although on the other side of the controversy, one, Odo of Tournai, a good contemporary realist, found realism an efficient aid in explaining the transmission of original sin; since for him all men formed but one substance, which was infected once for all by the sin of the first parents. Cf. Hauréau, Hist. de la philosophie scholastique, i. pp. 297-308; De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy, p. 156, 3rd ed.

[459] Abaelard, Hist. calamitatum, chap. 2.

[460] Ante, Chapter XXV.

[461] Ante, Chapter XII., I.

[462] Abaelard’s Dialectica was published by Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard (Paris, 1836). For a thorough exposition of Abaelard’s logic see Prantl, Ges. der Logik, ii. p. 160 sqq.

[463] I.e. as positive, comparative, and superlative.

[464] Cousin, Ouvr. inédits, p. 175. Cf. Aristotle’s Categories, ii. v. 20. The opening of Pars tertia of Abaelard’s Dialectica (in Cousin’s edition, p. 324 sqq.) affords an interesting example of this logical analysis and reconstruction of statement, which seems to originate in sheer grammar, and then advance beyond it.

[465] Cousin, o.c. pp. 190, 192.

[466] Cousin, o.c. p. 331.

[467] Prantl’s Geschichte der Logik, vol. ii., contains an exhaustive discussion of the various phases of this controversy: its language is little less difficult than that of the twelfth-century word-twisters.

[468] Cousin, o.c. pp. 434, 435.

[469] Theologia Christiana, iv. (Migne 178, col. 1284).

[470] Migne, Pat. Lat. 178, col. 1641.

[471] Ante, p. 292.

[472] Scito te ipsum, cap. 13 (Migne 178, col. 653).

[473] Scito te ipsum, cap. 19 (Migne 178, col. 664).

[474] Migne 178, col. 1615.

[475] Ante, pp. 304 sqq.

[476] This has been published by Stölzle: Abaelards 1121 zu Soissons verurteilter Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate divina (1891).

[477] Migne 178, col. 1123-1330; Cousin and Jourdain, P. Abaelardi opera, ii. pp. 357-566 (1859).

[478] Migne 178, col. 979-1114; Cousin and Jourdain, o.c. pp. 1-149.

[479] Ante, Chapter XXXV., I.

[480] Bernard, Ep. 338 (Migne 182, col. 542).

[481] Whose sacramental theory of the Creation has already been given at length, ante, Chapter XXVIII. For the incidents of Hugo’s life see the same chapter. Bibliography, note to page 61. See also Ostler, “Die Psychologie des Hugo von St. Viktor” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1906).

[482] De script. cap. 2 (Migne 175, col. 11).

[483] De script. cap. 2 (Migne 175, col. 10).

[484] Summa sententiarum (Migne 176, col. 42-174); also under title of Tractatus theologicus, wrongly ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin, in Migne 171, col. 1067-1150.

[485] Migne 176, col. 740-838.

[486] I think of no previous work so closely resembling the Erud. didas. as the Institutiones divinarum et saecularum lectionum of Cassiodorus.

[487] Erud. did. i. 2.

[488] Here one sees the source of much that we quoted from Vincent de Beauvais, ante, Chapter XXXV., 1.

[489] Lib. iii. cap. 13 sqq.

[490] Erud. did. iii. cap. 20. Cf. ante, p. 63.

[491] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.

[492] Migne, Pat. Lat. 175, col. 115 sqq.

[493] Migne, Pat. Lat. 175, col. 923 sqq.

[494] The following consideration of the mysticism of Christian theologians is not intended to include other forms of “mysticism” (Pantheistic, poetical, pathological, neurotic, intellectual, and sensuous) within or without the Christian pale.

[495] Ante, p. 42 sqq.

[496] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.

[497] Migne, Pat. Lat. 176, col. 617-680.

[498] De arca Noe morali, i. cap. 2 (Migne 176, col. 621).

[499] Migne 176, col. 681-703. With Hugo’s pupil, Richard of St. Victor, this constant allegory, especially the constant allegorical use of Scripture names, becomes pedantic, precieux, impossible. See e.g. his Benjamin major in Migne 196, col. 64-202.

[500] De arrha animae, Migne 176, col. 951-970.

[501] Migne 182, col. 727-808. A translation is announced by George Lewis in the Oxford Library of Translations.

[502] De consid. lib. ii. cap. 2.

[503] Migne 183, col. 789 sqq. Chapter XVII., ante, is devoted to Bernard, and his letters and sermons.

[504] Ed. by Willner (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903).

[505] See ante, Chapter XXX., 1.

[506] Bernardus Silvestris, De mundi universitate, i. 2 (ed. by Barach and Wrobel; Innsbrück, 1876). As to Bernard Silvestris, see Clerval, Écoles de Chartres au moyen âge, p. 259 sqq. and passim; also Hauréau (who confuses him with Bernard of Chartres), Hist. de la phil. scholastique, ii. 407 sqq.

[507] See Hauréau, Hist. etc. ii. 447-472; R. L. Poole, Illustrations of Mediaeval Thought, chap. vi. His Liber de sex principiis is printed in Migne 188, col. 1257-1270.

[508] Werner, “Die Kosmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen Mittelalters, mit specialler Beziehung auf Wilhelm von Conches,” Sitzungsb. K. Akad., philos. Klasse, 1873, Bd. lxxv.; Hauréau, Hist. etc. i. 431-446; ibid. Singularités littéraires, etc.

[509] Ante, Vol. I., p. 251.

[510] Ante, Chapter XXX., I.

[511] Under another title, Moralis philosophia de honesto et utile, it has been ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin, Migne 171, col. 1007-1056.

[512] For examples of John’s Latin, see ante, p. 173.

[513] See e.g. his treatment of logic in Lib. III. and IV. of the Metalogicus (Migne 199).

[514] Polycraticus, ii. 19-21 sqq. There is now a critical edition of this work by C. C. J. Webb (Joannis Saresberiensis Policratici libri VIII.; Clarendon Press, 1910).

[515] Polycraticus, lib. vii., is devoted to a history of antique philosophy.

[516] Polycraticus, vii. cap. 10.

[517] Polycrat. vii. cap. 11.

[518] Migne 199, col. 955.

[519] Ante, Chapter XXIX., 11. and XXXII., 1.

[520] The works of Alanus are collected in Migne, Pat. Lat. 210. What follows in the text is much indebted to M. Baumgartner, “Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1896).

[521] All this is thoroughly done by Baumgartner, o.c.

[522] See Baumgartner, p. 76 sqq. and citations.

[523] What I have felt obliged to say upon the organization of mediaeval Universities, I have largely drawn from Rashdall’s Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1895). The subject is too large and complex for independent investigation, except of the most lengthy and thorough character. Extracts from illustrative mediaeval documents, with considerable information touching mediaeval Universities, are brought together by Arthur O. Norton in his Mediaeval Universities (Readings in the History of Education, Harvard University, 1909). For the Paris University, the most important source is the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. by Denifle and Chatelain (1889-1891). See also Ch. Thurot, L’Organisation de l’enseignement dans l’Université de Paris (Paris, 1850), and Denifle, Die Universitäten des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1885).

[524] What has been said applies to the Bologna Law University. That had been preceded by a school of Arts, and later there grew up a flourishing school of Medicine, where surgery was also taught. These schools became affiliated Universities, but never equalled the Law University in importance.

[525] The Masters who taught were called Regentes.

[526] Both civil and canon law were studied till 1219, when a Bull of Honorius III. forbade the study of the former at Paris.

[527] See post, p. 399.

[528] Mr. Rashdall’s.

[529] Rashdall, o.c. ii. p. 341.

[530] Oxford lay in the diocese of Lincoln.

[531] For the course of medicine and the list of books studied or lectured on, especially at Montpellier, from which we have the most complete list, see Rashdall, ii. p. 118 sqq. and ibid. p. 780. In Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. xx., 1909, C. H. Haskins publishes An unpublished List of Text-books, belonging to the close of the twelfth century, when classical studies had not as yet been overshadowed by Dialectic. See also, generally, Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval Universities (Univ. of Illinois, 1910).

[532] See generally, Carra de Vaux, Avicenne (Paris, 1900); also Gazali, by the same author.

[533] Whoever will read the two monographs of the Baron Carra de Vaux, Avicenne and Gazali, will be struck by the closely analogous courses of Moslem and Christian thought; each showing the parallel phases of scholastic rationalism (reliant upon reason and rational authority) and scholastic theological piety, or mysticism (reliant upon the authority of Revelation and sceptical as to the validity of human reason).

[534] See for this matter Mandonnet, O.P., Aristote et la mouvement intellectuel du moyen âge, contained in his Siger de Brabant, and printed separately; De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd ed., pp. 243-253 and authorities; C. Marchesi, L’ Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione medievale (Messina, 1904).

[535] Ante, Chapter V.

[536] Constitutiones des Prediger-Ordens vom Jahre 1228, Prologus; H. Denifle, Archiv für Litt. und Kirchenges. des Mittelalters, Bd i. (1885), p. 194.

[537] See Felder, Wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franciskanerorden, p. 24 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904); a valuable work.

[538] See Felder, o.c. p. 29.

[539] Constitutiones, etc., cap. 28-31.

[540] Cf. Felder, o.c. p. 107 sqq.

[541] Cf. Felder, o.c. p. 177 sqq.

[542] From Denifle, Universitäten des Mittelalters, i. 99, note 192.

[543] See generally, Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l’averroisme latin au moyen âge (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1899); Baeumker (Beiträge, 1898), Die Impossibilia des Siger von Brabant; De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd ed., p. 379 sqq. (Longmans, 1909).

[544] Albert was born probably in 1193, and died in 1280; Bacon was born some twenty years later, and died about 1292. Bonaventura was born in 1221, and Thomas in 1225 or 1227; they both died in 1274.

[545] So Raphael represents them in his “School of Athens.”

[546] Bonaventura, Sermo IV., Quaracchi edition, tome v. p. 572 (cited by De Wulf, Hist. etc. p. 304, note). With all their Augustinian-Platonism, the Franciscans made a good second to the Dominicans in the study of Aristotle, as is proved by the great number of commentaries upon his works by members of the former Order. See Felder, o.c. p. 479.

[547] Epist. de tribus quaestionibus, § 12.

[548] Tome v. (Quaracchi ed.) pp. 319-325.

[549] This is from § 26, the last in the work. Bonaventura has already said (§ 7): “Omnes istae cognitiones ad cognitionem Sacrae Scripturae ordinantur, in ea clauduntur et in illa perficiuntur, et mediante illa ad aeternam illuminationem ordinantur.” (“All kinds of knowledge are ordained for the knowledge of Holy Scripture, are in it enclosed and thereby are perfected; and through its mediation are ordered for eternal illumination.”)

[550] It is contained in tomes i.-iv. of the Quaracchi edition.

[551] T. v. pp. 201-291.

[552] Breviloquium, Prologus.

[553] One feels the reality of Bonaventura’s distinctions here between theology and philosophy. They are enunciations of his religious sense, and possess a stronger validity than any elaborate attempt to distinguish by argument between the two. Thomas distinguishes them with excellent reasoning. It lacks convincingness perhaps from the fact that Thomas’s theology is so largely philosophy, as Roger Bacon said.

[554] As this chapter opens a pars, it begins with a recapitulation of what has preceded and a summary of what is to come. The specific topic of the chapter commences here.

[555] I.e. the desiderative, rational, and irascible elements in man.

[556] Bonaventura closely follows Hugo of St. Victor’s De sacramentis, see ante, Chap. XXVIII., especially p. 72.

[557] Opera, t. v. pp. 295-313.

[558] Vir desideriorum, Dan. ix. 23 (Vulgate).

[559] The Breviloquium and Itinerarium are conveniently edited by Hefele in a little volume (Tübingen, 1861).

[560] Albertus, Metaphysicorum libri XIII., lib. i. tract. 1, cap. 4.

[561] Physic. lib. viii. tract. 1, cap. 14.

[562] Poster. Analyt. lib. i. tract. 1, cap. 1. This and the previous citation are from Mandonnet’s Siger de Brabant.

[563] Ethic. lib. vi. tract. 2, cap. 25.

[564] Carus, Ges. der Zoologie, p. 231.

[565] Ernst Meyer, Ges. der Botanik, Bd. iv. p. 77.

[566] The works of Albertus were edited by the Dominican Jammy in twenty-one volumes (Lyons, 1651); they are reprinted by Borgnet (Paris, 1890 et seq.). My references to volumes follow Jammy’s edition.

[567] See ante, pp. 314 sqq.

[568] Prantl, Ges. der Logik, iii. 89 sqq., calls him an “unklarer Kopf,” incapable of consistent thinking.

[569] This is the view of A. Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903). The author presents analytically the disparate elements—Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, and theological-Augustinian, which are found in Albert’s writings.

[570] See Endriss, Albertus Magnus als Interpret der Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Munich, 1886).

[571] The above is mainly drawn from E. Meyer’s Ges. der Botanik, Bd. iv. pp. 38-78.

[572] Ante, Volume I. p. 76.

[573] See Carus, Geschichte der Zoologie, pp. 211-239.

[574] Sum. theol. pars prima, tract. I, quaest. ii.

[575] Ante, Chapter XXXV., I.

[576] Tome xx. p. 41a.

[577] The Vita of Thomas by Guilielmus de Thoco, Acta sanctorum, Martius, tome i. folio 657 sqq. (March 7), is wretchedly confused.

[578] Vita, cap. iii. § 15.

[579] One may see the truth of this by comparing the treatment of a matter in Albert’s Summa theologiae with the corresponding sections in Thomas. For example, compare Albert’s Summa theol. prima, Tract. vii. Quaest. xxx.-xxxiii., on generatio, processio, missio of the divine persons, with Thomas, Sum. theol. prima, Quaest. xxvii. and xliii.

[580] John of Damascus, an important Greek theologian of the eighth century, often cited by Thomas.

[581] Quaestiones are the larger divisions of the argument.

[582] Pars prima, Qu. xvi. Art. 3.

[583] Pars prima, Qu. lxxxii. Art. 3.

[584] Prima sec. Qu. iv. Art. 2.

[585] Prima sec. Qu. iv. Art. 3.

[586] Sum. Phil. contra Gentiles, iii. 37.

[587] One cannot avoid applying the masculine pronouns to God, and to the angels also. But, of course, this is a mere convenience of speech. Thomas ascribes no sex either to God or the angels.

[588] It will, of course, be borne in mind, that Thomas’s use of videre and visio to express man’s perception of God’s essential nature, does not mean a physical but an intellectual seeing.

[589] Given ante, pp. 290 sqq.

[590] Secundum quod est in actu, i.e. in realized actuality as distinguished from potentiality (Aristotelian conceptions).

[591] The foregoing is taken from the thirteen articuli into which Quaestio xii. is divided.

[592] Pars prima, Quaestio xxxii. Art. 1.

[593] Quaestiones disputatae: De Veritate, x. 6. Citing Rom. i. 20.

[594] Prooemium to Qu. xiv. Pars prima.

[595] Qu. xiv. Art. 2—a point which Thomas reasons out in interesting scholastic Aristotelian fashion, but in language too technical to translate.

[596] Pars prima, Qu. xiv. Art. 11.

[597] Pars prima, Qu. xv. Art. 1-3.

[598] Pars prima, Qu. xxvi. Art. 2.

[599] Pars prima, Qu. xliv. Art. 3.

[600] Pars prima, Qu. xlv. Art. 1.

[601] Summa theol. pars prima, Qu. l. As heretofore, I follow the exposition of the Summa theologiae. But Thomas began a large and almost historical treatment of angels in his unfinished Tract. de substantiis separatis, seu de Angelorum natura (unfinished, in Opuscula theol.). He has another and important tractatus, De cognitione Angelorum, Quaestiones disput. de veritate, viii.

[602] Pars prima, Qu. l. Art. 1. Thomas goes on to contradict Aristotle, in holding quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus.

[603] All that has been given concerning the knowledge of angels relates to what they know through their own natures as created. Further enlightenment (as with men) comes through grace as soon as they become beati through turning to good. Pars prima, Qu. lxii. Art. 1 sqq.

[604] Ante, Chapter XXXV., 1.

[605] A burning controversy between the Averroists and the orthodox schoolmen.

[606] This is the substance of Qu. lxxxix. Art. 1.

[607] Pars prima, Qu. xix. Art. 1.

[608] Pars prima, Qu. lxxxii. and lxxxiii.

[609] Pars prima, Qu. xx. 1.

[610] Summa theol., Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xvii. Art 8.

[611] Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xxiv. Art. 8.

[612] Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xxvi. Art. 4 and 5.

[613] Pars prima secundae, Qu. cix. sqq.

[614] Another reading is delectatio, i.e. enjoyment.

[615] Bacon’s Opus majus was edited in incomplete form by Jebb in 1733, and reprinted in 1750 at Venice. This edition is superseded by that of Bridges, in two volumes, published with the Moralis philosophia and Multiplicatio specierum by the Clarendon Press in 1897. The text of this edition had many errors, which have been corrected by a third volume published in 1900 by Williams and Norgate, who are now the publishers of the three volumes. In 1859 Brewer edited the Opus tertium, the Opus minus, and Compendium philosophiae for the Master of the Rolls Series.

“An unpublished Fragment of a work by Roger Bacon” was discovered by F. A. Gasquet in the Vatican Library, and published in the English Historical Review for July 1897. It appears to be a letter to Clement IV., written in 1267.

In 1861 appeared the excellent monograph by Émile Charles, entitled Roger Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines. To this one still must turn for extracts from the Compendium theologiae, and the Communia naturalium. The last-named work, with the Compendium philosophiae and the Multiplicatio specierum (which appears not to be an intrinsic part of the Opus majus), may have been composed as parts of what was to be the writer’s Opus principale. Bacon’s Greek Grammar has been edited by Nolan and Hirsch (Cambridge, 1902).

[616] Opus tertium, chap. xxv. p. 91 (Brewer’s text).

[617] Opus tertium, chap. xvii. (pp. 58-59, Brewer’s ed.).

[618] Brewer, R. Bacon, Opera inedita, p. 1.

[619] Opus tertium, pp. 7 and 8.

[620] In Opus tertium, chap. iii. (Brewer, p. 15), Bacon plainly tells the pope the difficulties in which he had been placed by this injunction of secrecy: “The first cause of delay came through those who are over me. Since you have written nothing to them in my excuse, and I could not reveal to them your secret, they insisted with unspeakable violence that I should obey their will; but I refused, because of the bond of your mandate, which bound me to your work, notwithstanding any order from my prelates. And, of a surety, as I was not excused by you, I met with obstacles too great and many to enumerate.... And another obstacle, enough to defeat the whole business, was the lack of funds.”

[621] These are, of course, the Opus majus, the Opus minus, and the Opus tertium; also the Vatican Fragment, the position of which is not quite clear; but it is part of the writings of this year, and constitutes apparently the introductory letter to Clement.

[622] The authority for this is the Chronica XXIV., Generalium Ordinis Minorum; see Bridges, vol. iii. p. 158.

[623] See Op. tertium, p. 26 sqq. (Brewer).

[624] Opus majus, pars ii. end of chap. v. and beginning of chap. vi. (Bridges, iii. p. 49); see Op. tertium (Brewer), p. 81.

[625] Op. maj. pars ii. chap. xv. (Bridges, iii. p. 71).

[626] Op. tertium, p. 39.

[627] Op. maj. pars ii. (Bridges, iii. pp. 69-70). Cf. ante, p. 180.

[628] The reference seems to be to the Ethics and Politics.

[629] Compendium studii, p. 424 (Brewer).

[630] Op. tertium, p. 14.

[631] Op. tertium, p. 30.

[632] Compendium studii phil., p. 429 (Brewer).

[633] Ibid. p. 398—written in 1271.

[634] I follow the paging of Bridges, vol. iii. These four causes of error are also given in Opus tertium, p. 69, Compendium studii, p. 414 (Brewer), and the Gasquet Fragment, p. 504.

[635] Op. maj. pp. 2 and 3.

[636] P. 322 sqq. (Brewer).

[637] Opus tertium, p. 102.

[638] Ante, p. 128.

[639] As, e.g. where he says that it would have been better for the Latins “that the wisdom of Aristotle should not have been translated, than to have been translated with such perverseness and obscurity.” Compend. studii, p. 469, (Brewer).

[640] See Opus majus, pars iii.

[641] Opus majus, Bridges, vol. i. p. 106.

[642] Commonly called “mathematica.”

[643] Opus majus (Bridges, i. p. 253). Bacon goes into this matter elaborately.

[644] Cf. S. Vogl, Die Physik Roger Bacos (Erlangen, 1906). Gives Bacon’s sources.

[645] Opus minus, pp. 367-371.

[646] Opus majus, pars v. dist. iii. (Bridges, ii. p. 159 sqq.).

[647] A contemporary of Bacon named Witelo composed a Perspectiva about 1270, following an Arab source; and a few years later a Dominican, Theodoric of Freiburg, was devoted to optics, and wrote on light, colour, and the rainbow. Baeumker, “Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrh.” (Beiträge, etc., Münster, 1908); Krebs, “Meister Dietrich, sein Leben, etc.” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, 1906).

[648] With Bacon, experientia does not always mean observation; and may mean either experience or experiment.

[649] See Charles, Roger Bacon, pp. 17-18.

[650] Ante, pp. 313-315. Duns Scotus puts clearly the double aspect of logic, which Albertus Magnus approached: “It should be understood that logic is to be considered in two ways. First, in so far as it is docens (instructs, holds its own school): and from its own necessary and proper principles proceeds to necessary conclusions, and is therefore a science. Secondly, in so far as we use it, by applying it to those matters in which it is used: and then it is not a science” (Super universalia Porphyrii, Quaestrio i., Duns Scotus, Opera, t. i. p. 51).

[651] The two aspects of the experimental science appear in the following statement from the Gasquet Fragment: “The antepenultima science is called experimental; and is the mistress of those which precede it; for it excels the others in three chief prerogatives. One is that all the sciences except this either use arguments alone to prove their conclusions, like the purely speculative sciences, or possess general and imperfect experiences. But only the perfect experience (experientia perfecta, i.e. the scientific experiment or observation), sets the mind at rest in the light of truth; which is certain and is proved in that part [of my work]. Wherefore it was necessary that there should be one science which should certify for us, all the magnificent truths of the other sciences, through the truth of experience, and this is that whereof I say that it is called scientia experimentalis of its own right from the truth of experience (per autonomasiam ab experienciae veritate); and I show by the illustration of the rainbow and other things, how this prerogative is reserved to that science.

“The second prerogative is the dignity which relates to those chief truths which, although they are to be formulated (nominandae) in the terms (vocabulis) of the other sciences, yet the other sciences cannot furnish (procurare) them; and of this character are the prolongation of life through remedies to counteract the lack of a hygienic regimen from infancy, or constitutional debility inherited from parents who have not followed such a regimen. I shall show how it is possible thus to prolong life to the term set by God. But men, through neglecting the rules of health, pass quickly to old age, and die before reaching that term. The art of medicine is not able to furnish (dare) these remedies, nor does it; but it says they are possible (sed fatetur ea possibilia), and so experimental science has devised remedies known to the wisest men alone, by which the ills of old age are delayed, or are mitigated when they arrive.

“The third prerogative of this science belongs to it secundum se et absolute; for here it leaves the two ways already touched on, and addresses itself to all things which do not concern the other sciences, save that often it requires the service of the others. As a mistress it commands the others as servants ... and orders them to do its work, and furnish the wise instruments which it uses; as navigation directs the art of carpentry, to make a ship for it; and the military art directs the forger’s art to make it a breastplate and other arms. In like manner, this science [the experimental], as a mistress, directs geometry to make it a burning-glass, which shall set on fire things near or far, one of the most sublime wonders that can come to pass through geometry. So it commands the other sciences in all the wonderful and hidden things of nature and art” (pp. 510-511).

[652] Opus tertium, chap. xxviii.

[653] Opus majus, pars vi. 1 (Bridges, ii. p. 169).

[654] Ibid. p. 171. Doubtless the meaning of the above is connected with Bacon’s view of the Aristotelian intellectus agens, which he takes to signify the direct illumination of the mind of man by God. “All the wisdom of philosophy is revealed by God and given to the philosophers, and it is Himself that illuminates the minds of men in all wisdom. That which illuminates our minds is now called by the theologians intellectus agens. But my position is that this intellectus agens is God principaliter, and secondarily, the angels, who illuminate us” (Opus tertium, p. 74; cf. Op. majus, pars i. chap. v.).

[655] Compendium studii (Brewer), p. 397.

[656] De secretis operibus artis et naturae, et de nullitate magiae, p. 533 (Brewer). Cf. Charles, Roger Bacon, p. 296 sqq.

[657] The most convenient edition of the works of Joannes Duns Scotus is that published by Vives, at Paris (1891 sqq.) in twenty-six volumes. It is little more than a reprint of Wadding’s Edition.

[658] See Seeberg, Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Leipzig, 1900), p. 8 sqq., a work to which the following pages owe much.

[659] Grosseteste’s philosophical or theological works are still unpublished or very difficult of access; and there is no sufficient exposition of his doctrines.

[660] Seeberg, o.c. p. 16 sqq.

[661] See De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, p. 363 sqq.

[662] See Seeberg, o.c. p. 34 sqq.

[663] The kernel of Duns’s proof is contained in the following passage, which is rather simple in its Scotian Latin: “Dicendum, quod Universale est ens, quia sub ratione non entis, nihil intelligitur: quia intelligibile movet intellectum. Cum enim intellectus sit virtus passiva (per Aristotelem 3, de Anima, cont. 5 et inde saepe), non operatur, nisi moveatur ab objecto; non ens non potest movere aliquid ut objectum; quia movere est entis in actu; ergo nihil intelligitur sub ratione non entis. Quidquid autem intelligitur, intelligitur sub ratione Universalis: ergo illa ratio non est omnino non ens” (Super universalia Porphyrii, Quaestio iv.).

[664] Cf. the far from clear exposition in Seeberg, o.c. p. 86 sqq. and 660 sqq.

[665] Miscell. quaest. 6, 18, cited by Seeberg, o.c. p. 114.

[666] The last two or three pages have been drawn mainly from Seeberg, o.c. p. 113 sqq. In discussing Duns Scotus, I have given less from his writings than has been my wont with other philosophers. And for two reasons. The first, as I frankly avow, is that I have read less of him than I have of his predecessors. With the exception of such a curious treatise as the (doubtful) Grammatica speculativa (tome i. of the Paris edition); and the elementary, and comparatively lucid, De rerum principio (tome iv. of the Paris edition)—with these exceptions Duns is to me unreadable. My second reason for omitting excerpts from his writings, is that I wished neither to misrepresent their quality, nor to cause my reader to lay down my book, which is heavy enough anyhow! If I selected lucid and simple extracts, they would give no idea of the intricacy and prolixity of Duns. His commentary on the Sentences fills thirteen tomes of the Paris edition! No short and simple extract will illustrate that! On the other hand, I could not bring myself by lengthy or impossible quotations to vilify Duns. It is unjust to expose a man’s worst features, nakedly and alone, to those who do not know his better side and the conditions which partly explain the rest of him.

[667] Quodlibetalia, i. Qu. 14, cited by De Wulf, o.c. p. 422.

[668] Expos. aurea, cited by De Wulf, o.c. p. 423, whose exposition of Occam’s theory I have followed here.

[669] On Occam, see Seeberg’s article in Hauck’s Encyclopaedia; Siebeck, “Occams Erkenntnislehre, etc.,” in Archiv für Ges. der Philosophie, Bd. x., Neue Folge (1897).

[670] Quoted by Seeberg.

[671] De Wulf, o.c. p. 425.

[672] In view of the enormous literature upon Dante, popular as well as learned, it would be absurd to give any bibliographical, biographical or historical information as to his works, himself, or his Italian circumstances.

[673] De mon. ii. 3.

[674] De mon. ii. chaps. 4, 10, 12.

[675] De mon. iii. 4 sqq.

[676] All this seems supported by Conv. i. 1, and ii. 13, the main explanatory chapters of the work.

[677] Conv. iii. 12.

[678] e.g. “benigna volontade,” Par. xv. 1.

[679] Cf. A. d’Ancona, I Precursori di Dante (Florence, 1874); M. Dods, Forerunners of Dante (Edinburgh, 1903); A. J. Butler, Forerunners of Dante (Oxford, 1910); Hettinger, Göttliche Komödie, p. 79 (2nd ed., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1889). Mussafia, “Monumenti antichi di dialetti italiani,” Sitzungsber. philos. hist. Classe (Vienna Academy), vol. 45, 1864, p. 136 sqq., gives two old Italian descriptions, one of the heavenly Jerusalem, the other of the infernal Babylon.

[680] 2 Cor. xii. 2; Paradiso, i. 73-75.

[681] Ante, Chapter XIX.

[682] Ante, pp. 98-100.

[683] The coarseness of Inf. xxi. 137-139 is of a piece with the way of mediaeval art in making demons horrible through a grotesquely indecent rendering of their persons.

[684] e.g. Inf. xviii. 100 sqq.; and Inf. xxviii. and xxix.

[685] Inf. viii. 37 sqq.; xxxii. 97 sqq.; xxxiii. 116 and 149.

[686] Cf. Moore, Dante Studies, vol. ii. pp. 266-267.

[687] Any one who looks through the first volume of Tiraboschi’s great Storia della letteratura italiana, written in the early part of the nineteenth century, will find a generous acceptance of myth as fact; just as he would find the same in the Histoire ancienne of the good Rollin, written a century or more before.

[688] Dante has frequently been spoken of as the “first scholar” of his time. I do not myself know enough regarding the scholarship of every scholar in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to confirm or deny this. Personally, I do not regard him as a Titanic scholar, like Albertus Magnus for example. He studied all the classic Latin authors available. Doubtless he had a memory corresponding to his other extraordinary powers. His also was the intellectual point of view, and the intellectual interest in knowledge and its deductions. His view of life was as intellectual as that of Aquinas. But as Dante’s powers of plastic visualization were unequalled, so also, it seems to me, were his faculties of using as a poet what he had acquired as a scholar. Regarding the extent of Dante’s use and reading of the Classics, nothing could be added to Dr. Moore’s Studies in Dante, First Series; though I think what Dr. Moore has to say of “Dante and Aristotle” would have cast a more direct light upon the matter, had he cited as far as possible from the Latin translation probably used by Dante, instead of from the original Greek.

[689] Inf. iv. 88. Cf. Moore, Studies in Dante, i. p. 6. The application of the term satirist to Horace is peculiarly mediaeval.

[690] Inf. iv. 131.

[691] Inf. ii. 20.

[692] Par. xx. 68.

[693] Purg. xxv. 22.

[694] Inf. xviii. 83 sqq.

[695] Inf. xxvi. 88 sqq.

[696] Purg. xii.

[697] Purg. xv.

[698] According to Dr. Moore, Dante quotes or refers to the “Vulgate more than 500 times, to Aristotle more than 300, Virgil about 200, Ovid about 100, Cicero and Lucan about 50 each, Statius and Boëthius between 30 and 40 each, Horace, Livy, and Orosius between 10 and 20 each,”—and other scattering references.

[699] Inf. xxxiii. 4; Aen. ii. 3.

[700] Par. ii. 16.

[701] Aen. vi. 309; Inf. iii. 112.

[702] Aen. vi. 700; Purg. ii. 80.

[703] Purg. i. 135; cf. Aen. vi. 143 “Primo avulso non deficit alter, etc.”

[704] See Inf. xxxi.; Purg. xii. 25 sqq.

[705] Purg. vi. 118: “O highest Jove that wast on earth crucified for us.”

[706] Par. i. 13 sqq.; Par. ii. 8.

[707] The provenance, etc., of Dante’s classification of sins in the Inferno, like everything else in Dante, has been interminably discussed. The reference to the De officiis of Cicero is due to Dr. Moore. See “Classification of Sins in the Inferno and Purgatorio,” Studies in Dante, 2nd Series. Also cf. Hettinger, Die göttliche Kömödie, pp. 159-162, and notes 6 and 23 on p. 204 and 207 (2nd ed., Freiburg in Breisgau, 1889). Dante’s main statement is in Inf. xi.

[708] In whom does not the awful anguish of the suicides (Inf. xiii.) arouse grief and horror?

[709] Inf. xvi. 59. They are more respectable than the blessed denizens of the Heaven of Venus, Par. ix.

[710] Inf. xix.

[711] Inf. vi. 103 sqq.

[712] The intellectual temperament finds voice in many great expressions, which are very Dante and also very Thomas, as Par. xxviii. 106-114; xxix. 17; xxx. 40-42.

[713] Inf. iii. 18.

[714] Hettinger, o.c. p. 254.

[715] Aeneid vi. 327 sqq.; Hettinger, o.c. p. 226.

[716] See Taylor, Classical Heritage, p. 162.

[717] These are pointed out in the Commentaries (e.g. Scartazzini’s) and in many monographs. Hettinger’s Göttliche Kömödie is serviceable: also Moore’s Studies in Dante and Toynbee’s Dante Studies.

[718] Purg. i. 71; John viii. 36.

[719] Purg. i. 89.

[720] Purg. iii. 34 sqq.

[721] Purg. iv. 4 sqq.

[722] Purg. v. 105 sqq.

[723] Purg. vii. 54; iv. 133-135.

[724] Cf. e.g. Purg. xii. 109.

[725] Purg. xv. 40 sqq.

[726] Purg. xvi. 64 sqq.

[727] Purg. xvii. 85 sqq., and xviii.; Hettinger, o.c. p. 235 sqq., and pp. 261-264.

[728] Purg. xxiii. 72; xxvi. 14.

[729] Purg. xxv. The notes in Hettinger, o.c., are quite full in citations of passages from Thomas and other scholastics.

[730] Thomas, Summa, iii. Qu. 89, Art. 5.

[731] As it is rather in Par. xxvii. 76 sqq.

[732] Par. iii. 52, 64, 89.

[733] Par. iv.

[734] Par. xi. 1 sqq.

[735] Par. xiv.

[736] Par. xv. 10.

[737] Par. xix. 40 sqq.

[738] Par. xx.

[739] Par. xxiv.-xxvi.

[740] Typified in St. Bernard, Par. xxxi. and following. Suitable reasons for this choice may be suggested by the extracts from Bernard’s De deligendo Deo and Sermons on Canticles, ante, Chapter XVII.

[741] Conv. ii. 13. The symbolism inherent in all human mental processes seems indicated by the argument of Aquinas (ante, p. 466) that the mind knows “the particular through sense and imagination; ... it must turn itself to images in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular.” This is a necessity of our half material nature.

[742] Convito ii. 1. Letter to Can Grande, par. 7.

[743] In the Can Grande letter, having stated this fourfold significance, Dante does not proceed to exemplify it in the interpretation which follows of the opening lines of the Paradiso. Possibly those lines did not admit of the fourfold interpretation; yet, in general, Dante does not try to carry it out in practice, any more than other mediaeval writers commonly.

[744] Convito ii. ch. 14 and 15.

[745] Doubtless the commentator habit is fixed in the nature of man; but it was pre-eminently mediaeval. We have seen enough elsewhere of the multiplication of Commentaries on the Sentences of the Lombard and other scholastic works. Dante’s friend, Guido Cavalcanti, wrote a little poem beginning Donna mi priego, upon which we have eight Commentaries, the first from Egidio Colonna in 1316.

[746] Yet, however obvious the meaning, tying the pole of the Chariot to the Tree of Life was a great stroke (Purg. xxxii. 49).

[747] There is a piece of allegory in the Paradiso which almost gets on one’s nerves, i.e. the ceaseless whirling of the blessed spirits, usually in wheel formations: e.g. Par. xii. 3; xxi. 81; xxiv. 10 sqq.: cf. x. 145; xiii. 20.

[748] One notes that all the symbolizing personages of the poem—Virgil, Statius, Matilda, Lia, Beatrice—have literal reality, however subtle or far-reaching may be the allegorical intendment with which the poet has invested them.

[749] See e.g. Par. xxxi. 67.

[750] Cf. De Sanctis, Storia della letteratura italiana, i. p. 46 sqq.

[751] Compare Purg. xxvii. 34 sqq.; xxx.; xxxi.; Par. xviii. 13 sqq.; xxiii.; xxx.; xxxi.; xxxii. 8.