Note 296 — IV. NOVEMBER, 1744—JANUARY, 1747. Foreign Politics—D'Argenson's Ministry—1745: The Convention of Augsburg—The Convention of Hanover—The Imperial Election—The Treaty of Dresden—1746: The Negotiation of Turin—The Saxon Marriage—Review.
Reading edition
On the evidence of a certain note, M. de Broglie suggests ("Marie Thérèse," I. p. 213) that d'Argenson was by no means at one with the Council, and that he accepted with reluctance a policy which was forced upon him.
The note may be read with equanimity, for it only marks the reappearance of an ideal regret, to be met with occasionally in d'Argenson's Journal—a regret for the policy of merely indirect interference which he sometimes mentions in connection with "un habile homme tel que M. Chauvelin." His true feeling with regard to the crisis is conveyed by some important words in the note immediately preceding:
"Il en arrivera ce qui pourra, bien, j'espère; mais pour la paix et un armistice dans le statu quo, il n'y faut plus penser" (De Broglie, "Marie Thérèse." I. p. 211).
It is admitted that d'Argenson was not the prime mover in the policy of the Council; he looked upon that policy as little short of desperate; but he accepted it as a choice between two evil alternatives; and, as we shall find, he did everything mortal man could do to make it a success.