Note 376 — IV. NOVEMBER, 1744—JANUARY, 1747. Foreign Politics—D'Argenson's Ministry—1745: The Convention of Augsburg—The Convention of Hanover—The Imperial Election—The Treaty of Dresden—1746: The Negotiation of Turin—The Saxon Marriage—Review.
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Perhaps it is necessary to reinforce this point. It is to be remembered that in any acutely critical period, wisdom is a matter of months or weeks. Never even for seven days can opinion safely be divorced from circumstance. It is quite true that a general view of the relations of France with the German powers during the last century and a half suggests that at the time with which we are concerned her traditional anti-Austrian policy was tending to become an anachronism; but we must be careful about making that general view the basis of particular conclusions. The available documents prove conclusively that whenever that tendency began to approach perceptibility and power, it was never in the course of d'Argenson's ministry, still less during the critical year 1745.
In and throughout that year France had but one competitor on the continent—Austria. The position of Prussia—if in connection with France and Austria we may assign her the dignity of a position—was in the highest degree precarious. No one knew it better than the Prussian king himself. There was probably not a moment in the course of the year when he did not feel himself to be within an ace of destruction; not an episode but betrays his anxiety for escape with honour. His efforts for peace in January; his desperate overtures at London after the death of the Emperor; his earnest, eloquent entreaties to maintain the Elector of Bavaria and the Prince of Conti; his dull bitterness and despair at the Convention of Augsburg and the withdrawal of the French from Germany; his continued pressure upon England, ending in the Treaty of Hanover; finally, his studious moderation when he appeared as a conqueror in Dresden; all point to but one conclusion. His position was, and he knew it be, desperate; and it was only the headlong courage of desperation that enabled him to see the year out safely.
The definitive rise of Prussia is probably to be dated from the Peace of Dresden, and not one moment before. Moreover it cannot have been immediately apparent. One year after the treaty of peace d'Argenson fell; and during that year Prussia was recovering from the effects of the war, and her ambitions and prospective power can have been present to the mind of Frederick alone. At what particular period her advance must have become sufficiently evident to affect the views of statesmen, only a profound study of that single question can disclose. Certain it is that it cannot have been at any period during d'Argenson's ministry, or more especially during the year 1745.
The truth of the matter appears to be this. Events were rapidly tending towards, though they had not yet reached, a condition of which d'Argenson had often dreamed. Prussia, if her power developed, might one day be strong enough to stand alone against the Austrian House; and France would be free to watch the contest, and might leave the rivals to ruin each other. But this was still in the future; and the time was yet apparently distant when a responsible French minister could entertain the idea of an Austrian alliance.
It is true that there was already an Austrian party in the Council; there is always such a party in any council. There are men who cannot resist the fascination of cheap success, who are devoted to a policy of ease with honour. They are not prominent in the ranks of statesmen.