Volume 1 — PHOTOGRAPHY AND ART

By HOWARD HANNAY

I

EVER since Plato reluctantly condemned art on the ground that it was mere imitation of superficial outward appearances the problem of art has been disputed on this basis. Plato did not allow the artist any initiative except to imitate, and his conception of ideal beauty had no connection with the activities of the poet, painter, and sculptor: it was not concerned with æsthetic beauty, but with intellectual and moral fitness and perfection. Aristotle gave a slightly different interpretation to the work of the artist, defining it as a description of the possible as contrasted with history which determines what has actually happened. Plotinus introduced the element of the ideal: the artist does not so much imitate natural reality as externalise an archetype existing in his mind or soul. Plotinus partly identified art with Plato's ideal beauty.

These three alternative views constitute the starting-point for the three chief divergent explanations of art which have been developed during the last two thousand years. In modern terminology they would be designated as theories of art, respectively as "reproduction," as "imagination," as "idealisation." The extent of their mutual discrepancy varies according to the exact meaning attached to the last two conceptions, imagination and idealisation. For instance, if the latter ultimately amounts to selecting certain particularly attractive real forms and events, it is virtually merely an eclectic process of reproduction. Imagination, again, may be regarded simply as a composite memory. Samuel Butler said, "Imagination is mainly memory, but there is a small percentage of creation of something out of nothing with it." It is only in so far as imagination is creative that it is different in kind from reproduction, from perception and history. And if idealisation is not a selection of given realities but a making articulate of an inner vision it also is a kind of imagination, only it is confined to the pleasantly beautiful, the attractive. The importance of all three definitions tends to be diminished when, as is often the case with modern theories, the chief emphasis is laid on the feeling or emotional element in art. Natural objects and real events can presumably excite emotion as much as imaginative creations, and this fact appears to lend a new value to the act of reproduction. The centre of interest is transferred from the knowledge content to the feeling of the subject and the knowledge content, the consciousness of the object is regarded simply as a cause which brings about that for which art exists, viz., emotion. The aim of reproduction is no longer intrinsic, but falls outside in the resultant subjective feeling. But this means a somewhat arbitrary distinction between the emotion and the representation. In actual concrete experience the two are so closely linked together that they appear almost identical: the emotion inheres in the representation. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as an instance of cause and effect: it is not analogous to the process of a pin and the ensuing prick, where the cause, the pin, is quite distinct from and independent of the feeling of pain. Mere associations of ideas are, on the other hand, nearer to the cause and effect sequence. A certain scent recalls a whole chapter of one's past history. Mr. Bosanquet's portmanteau reminds him of Florence.14 For this reason a tendency is apparent to connect emotion more definitely with imaginative and idealistic art. Mere reproduction is cold and bald and only evokes an emotion by a fortuitous association of ideas: whereas the genuine product "expresses" or contains the emotion; and in doing so it is thought that it inevitably alters the "natural" or "historical" fact, distorting, transmuting it.

The applicability of these various theories appears on the surface, at any rate, to differ according to the different arts. No one can be a thorough-going realist with regard to music, which is so indisputably a self-contained independent construction. It may be debatable whether music expresses experiences which are not of music, but music certainly does not imitate or reproduce them unless they are in the first place sounds, and for the most part they are not. The problem, therefore, is not whether music reproduces but whether it "expresses" anything except itself. Literature, again, can only directly imitate conversations between people: for the rest it can only reproduce indirectly either by symbolising or expressing. The symbol is purely arbitrary, it is entirely a referring to something other than itself. Letters of the alphabet have become symbolical. The expression, on the other hand, contains something of the object expressed, it carries a world in itself and of its own. Literature is admittedly expression, and here the problem takes the form of a contrast between history and fiction, whether at bottom literature only expresses historical fact (realism) or imagined fact, the possible.

Painting and sculpture are for the æsthetic theorist in many ways the most complex of the arts. As has been pointed out, neither music nor literature can be said to reproduce directly if they reproduce at all, because they employ a different medium, namely, sounds and words. But painting and sculpture apparently employ as a medium the very objects to be reproduced or expressed, viz., colours and lines. In literature the word refers to a reality that seemingly is not itself a word. In painting the picture and the reality can apparently be "matched" so that here literally the picture imitates reality. Outside and around us are already colours and forms, but there are no words, and only the crudest sounds. And so painting is easily regarded as par excellence the imitative or reproductive art, and of all arts to have the easiest and most direct criterion: resemblance to external reality.

II

These are the premises with which the realists and the romanticists, cubists, futurists, etc., start. They all assume rather naïvely the existence of an immediately perceived natural reality of given colours and forms. Their divergence is in their views as to the activity of the artist in respect of this natural reality. The realist considers that the painter's function is to transcribe it, to copy it on to canvas. He may select certain aspects which appeal to him, in fact he paints a particular scene exactly because that scene gives him more pleasure than others. But his creativeness is limited to this selection of given scenes and to their skilful and accurate reproduction.

The opponents of this view (and they include the majority of persons who have any serious acquaintance with painting) maintain that the essential element in a picture is not its resemblance to something else, but its intrinsic interest, and, this being the case, so long as the painting contains and conveys an emotion that is inherent in its line and colour it does not matter if there is not a literal resemblance to real objects. In fact, it is thought that the very effort to express a subjective mood centring round an external situation, to project one's own imaginative life into that which itself has no life, inevitably results in a certain distortion of the natural reality, in a deliberate emphasising of certain features. The line vibrates with feeling, the colour is grouped and blended so as to conform to the emotion of the individual mood, irrespective of whether "out there" the artist can actually "see" such an arrangement. The photograph has tended strongly to confirm this theory. Back in the eighties J. A. Symonds wrote, "The artist cannot avoid modifying his imitation of the chosen object by the impression of his own subjective quality. Human art is unable to reproduce nature except upon such terms as these. It cannot draw as accurately as the sun does by means of the photographic camera. Art will never match the infinite variety and subtlety of nature; no drawing or painting will equal the primary beauties of the living model ... yet art has qualities derived from the intellectual selective imaginative faculties of man which more than justify its existence." Walter Pater went a step further and asserted that "Art constantly aspires towards the condition of music. For while in all other works of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant aim of art to obliterate it."

The cubist and futurist art theories are a logical development of certain implications contained in arguments such as these: they are an attempt to make pictorial and plastic art identical with what music is supposed to be to get rid altogether of the irrelevant incubus of representation. They are quite distinct from the explanation often advanced for the primitive simplificatory character of Post-Impressionist art. The latter retains and is not a bit afraid of a representative content; it merely advocates a revolt from tradition and from the inclusion of facts which we know to be there in the objects depicted without actually seeing or perceiving them. Its purpose is not a musical elaboration of our vision, but a clarification and purging of it of all derivative and merely intellectual elements. Hence the stress laid on the art and vision of the child and the primitive. There is no doubt, however, that the explanations offered of the art of Gauguin, Van Gogh, and Cézanne gradually led to the cubist theory. It was felt that not only were these artists breaking away from tradition in order to attain clearness and directness of vision, but that their vision was expressive rather than representative. "Primitive art, like the art of children, consists not so much in an attempt to represent what the eye perceives as to put a line round a mental conception of the object. Like the work of the primitive artist, the pictures children draw are often extraordinarily expressive."15

It should be noted that the early Post-Impressionists were artists first and theorists afterwards, and they did not themselves produce the theories which attempt to explain their art. The later men, on the other hand, appear to have consummated a remarkable marriage of philosophical reflection and artistic expression. Their art is the conscious execution of their argument. There is no a priori objection to this luminous rationality. The only essential is that the argument should be correct. Therefore, while one cannot condemn the art of Van Gogh, Gauguin, and Cézanne on the ground that the explanatory theories subsequently put forward are fallacious, a great many of the cubist experiments live or fall with their theory.

While Cubism and Futurism had a similar origin they very soon parted ways, and each followed the light of its own peculiar interpretation. The difference of opinion concerned not the departure from verisimilitude to persons and natural objects, about which both were in agreement, but the content and character of the expression. The futurists wanted, so to speak, programme music, the cubists pure music without any taint of worldly and literary associations. It is curious that these two movements which started so near together should diverge to either extreme, Cubism to enshrine itself in a pure inhuman emotion which possesses an absolutely divine "in itselfness," but is totally unrelated to the rest of life, and can, therefore, only be ejaculated about, and Futurism "to introduce brutally life into art, to combat the old ideal æsthetic, static, decorative, effeminate, precious, cynical that loathed action."16 Cubism is fugitive, mystical, averse to science and the world of raw human passion. Futurism is explosive with mundane energy; it is not merely a theory of art, literature, music, it is a new orientation embracing the whole of life; "on every question, in Parliament, in communal councils, and in the market-places, men are divided into lovers of the past (passatisti) and futurists." Yet it is not so much the whole of life that the futurists wish to express as that part of it which is peculiarly modern, its movement, its flux, its dynamism. Any theory of a disruptive, hurly-burly aspect is grist to the mill of Futurism. With what acclamation will Professor Einstein's relativism be greeted: except that space should be angular rather than gracefully curved! And it is again curious how the extremes tend to meet. The Futurist's state, nous aspirons à la création d'un type inhumain en qui seront aboli la douleur morale, la bonté, la tendresse et l'amour.17 Man must become metallic, mechanical, and dynamical. Mr. Clive Bell aspires (if only in art) after an inhuman emotion crystallised in abstract plastic form, in intricate relations of masses: a sort of divine mathematical matter.

Recently an interesting controversy has taken place in the Burlington Magazine between Mr. Roger Fry and Mr. D. S. Maccoll on the question of representative and abstract or purely decorative form. Mr. Maccoll stands for the older school of J. A. Symonds; Mr. Roger Fry would assimilate pictorial art to music and deprive it altogether of a world outside itself. Both are in agreement as to art being non-photographic, and as to the existence parallel with or prior to visual emotional art of a photographic visual consciousness. Art, they both admit, is not reproductive; to reproduce is the function of photography and of the photographic side of our minds.

Art is temperamental, the expression in line and colour of emotion. But while Mr. Maccoll thinks that the emotion lies mainly in the rhythm of the objects represented, Mr. Fry considers that we are wrong in concerning ourselves either with the ideas and sentiments of the artist or with his interpretation of objects. We must appreciate and judge a drawing solely according to the degree of beauty the lines set up among themselves. Mr. Maccoll shrewdly points out that Mr. Fry and his school always lay great emphasis on "mass," "volume," "plasticity," etc., which are definitely characters of objects and, therefore, representative. It is possible, however, to go further: even a line and a colour are natural objects, and if we are able to find enjoyment in simple arrangements of lines and colours, why should we not find equal enjoyment in trees and clouds and hills and people? Stated thus these are generalities, but so are lines and colours: in a picture, however, or a decoration they are endowed with individual life, with a unique tone and significance.

In order to be absolutely logical, neither Mr. Roger Fry nor Mr. Clive Bell should attempt to describe or explain a picture at all. It is a world in a watertight compartment entirely severed and shut off from the ordinary world. It either throws us into an ecstasy or it does not, but these ecstasies are so many discrete units, and if they differ we cannot articulate the difference. We ought not, for instance, to describe early Italian art as ascetically religious, Botticelli as pagan and lyrical, Hogarth as satirical. For this would be ascribing to art a content extracted from life, it would be turning art into literature. Even literature, however, at its best is devoid of meaning. "In great poetry," writes Mr. Clive Bell, "it is the formal music that makes the miracle. The poet expresses in verbal form an emotion but distantly related to the words set down." And he quotes Shakespeare's poetry as an instance of this great meaningless word music. This surely is the reductio ad absurdum of the whole theory.

Mr. Clive Bell defines art as significant form. At first sight it would appear as though the delimitations set up by the reduction of art to abstract form were swept away by the admission of "significance" which might include in its range the whole world. But the significance is indescribable except in terms of form itself. Hence there is a certain justification in Mr. Maccoll's contention that Mr. Clive Bell really means "insignificant form." In his reply Mr. Bell falls back on the conception of emotion. The significance is emotional, it is not only incommunicable except by means of the actual work of art, but is also totally unrelated to life in general: it is an intelligible and self-contained department of its own, and does not require the liaison work of the critical guide and commentator.

The fact is that in their most legitimate preoccupation of ensuring that the work of art shall be a world in itself, a unity whose essential significance and content does not lie outside itself in a world of which it is merely a superfluous copy, but is firmly grasped and held in its imaginative synthesis so that the content is identical with the form. Messrs. Roger Fry, Clive Bell and Co. have gone absolutely to the other extreme and deprived the work of art of all content and significance; they have rendered it a discrete unit instead of an individual unit. Now, there is only one mental activity which deals with discrete units, and that is mathematics. Hence we can detect a gradual assimilation in their critical terminology to the language of mathematics and physics. The mysticism of art is becoming the mysticism of planes, angles, cubes, surfaces and relations of lines and masses.

But Mr. Clive Bell has another and equally legitimate preoccupation. He has observed that he experiences the same kind of pleasure from a fine piece of architecture, a specimen of pottery, a decoration on a carpet, as from a painting inside a frame which ostensibly refers to people and objects existing independently outside the frame. And he concludes that all these works must admit of reduction to a common denomination, they all have that in common which induces us to call them works of art. Obviously as architecture is non-representative in the ordinary sense, we must excogitate a general definition which does not necessitate representation. And so by a simple classificatory abstracting process he arrives at the formula of "significant form."

Now this expressly refers only to pictorial art and does not pretend to be a definition of music, literature, dancing, etc. These, however, all come under the heading of art, and any formula for any single branch of art must contain something of the universal essence of art in general. This cannot lurk in the conception of form, because by form Mr. Bell means not the logical concept, but the spatial physical image. It must, therefore, inhere in the conception of significance. Pictorial art is something significant expressed in the medium of spatial form. But here we come up against the first preoccupation of eschewing all so-called literary content. The significance of Rembrandt's dramatic masterpiece, for instance, "Christ and the Woman taken in Adultery," must consist in the relation of the colours and lines to each other and not in its intensely dramatic human expression, which is an illegitimate literary association of ideas. The significance is wrapt up in the abstract spatial image and, therefore, so far from defining the essence of all art, including literature and music, it will not even cover dramatic representational painting. In his preoccupation of including decorative art in his definition Mr. Bell has excluded all other kinds of art, and has simply universalised the idiosyncrasy of decorative art.

He has not, however, really achieved that, because even decorative art has what Mr. Bell would call a literary significance. No one can seriously reflect upon Egyptian, Greek, and Gothic architecture without admitting how profoundly they are charged with historical meaning, and that it is precisely this meaning which differentiates them and gives them their individuality. They are the spirit of their respective ages, caught up and embodied in what by an abstractive process of thought we refer to as abstract form. Actually it is only abstract when thought of apart from a particular instance: in any given instance, e.g., the Cenotaph in Whitehall, it is as concrete and individual as an ordinary picture or statue: it is a manifestation and expression of the human mind in a particular set of circumstances.

The foregoing analysis brings out two facts. The new art of abstract significant form is not, strictly speaking, anything new: it is as old, if not older, than representational art, and it is equally pregnant with literary meaning. Until quite recently, however, it has never been condensed into the form of a picture and surrounded with a frame; it has almost without exception been connected with objects of utility. This does not detract from its value in the slightest; it may mean that abstract art will outlive the picture; it is simply a statement of historical fact. Nor can we draw the immediate inference that abstract art is inappropriate in a frame. Certainly the contrary would be inappropriate: that is to say, if we built a house in the form of an Assyrian lion or made a hearthrug after Rembrandt's picture of an old woman. But it is significant that the cubist and futurist art has so far exercised a far greater and more beneficial influence in the direction of curtains, upholstery, and dresses than of pictures. Moreover, one of the leading English apostles of futurist art, Mr. Wyndham Lewis, is beginning to realise the immense field which lies open to him in the sphere of architecture, and is growing impatient with the limitations and narrow confines of the picture frame.18

However this may be, the lovers both of representational art and of abstract art must live and let live, and the wrangle as to which is the most perfect, the purest kind of art, is as sterile and futile as the dispute over prose and poetry, opera and chamber music, tragedy and comedy.

III

The problem, however, of photographic reproduction and of imagination still awaits a satisfactory solution. We have seen that no objection whatsoever can be raised against the marvellous representative detail of, say, Jan Van Eyck's "Jan Arnolfini and His Wife." Nor can we explain the joy and love expressed in the picture by reference merely to the forms and colours in abstraction from the objects and persons. For that would be transforming the living and individual unity of artistic vision into the abstract schemata of scientific thought. And art is not science, although it might very well express the delights and struggles of the scientist. But, on the other hand, there are pictures which, at any rate, appear to represent objects with the same accuracy and detail as Jan Van Eyck, and yet definitely fail to rank as works of art. They may often give us pleasure, they are often informative, but a little introspection reveals that that pleasure is due to our being reminded of something that is not itself in the picture, and that the information is not about our emotion but about an historical or a scientific fact. Similarly with the photograph which has still greater precision of scientific (not artistic) observation, and for that very reason is artistically still more jejune and barren. But there is yet another visual product which is neither photographic nor artistic "reproduction," namely, imaginative representation. From internal as well as external evidence we can infer that certain pictures were painted by the artist "out of his head," and others from "the models," and we find that artists like Velasquez, who painted masterpieces from the model, often failed miserably in their attempts at imaginative work.19 Of course, it is doubtful how far this distinction can be carried; for we have no direct proof that many of the most realistic pictures were not pure inventions, and that much of the apparently imaginative work, such as Blake's, was not simply composite memory. Imagination is just as dangerous and ambiguous a term as reproduction.

These, then, are the "facts" to be explained. On the one hand, we have undeniably a reality of perception and photography which is not that of art but often extraordinarily akin to it; on the other hand, we have a visual art which divides itself into three groups, each of which qua art is of equal value: realistic, imaginative, and, thirdly, formal, decorative, or abstract art. What is desired is some synthetic conception which will make intelligible the similarities and differences and contradictions dwelling in these, at any rate, superficially different kinds of vision.

Behind the conception of thinkers like J. A. Symonds there always lay the photographic reality which was the common reality of everyone, and supplied all the materials for the artist's reality: the framework of forms and colours, of objects and persons. It was regarded from the æsthetic point of view as rather a nightmare, for it was so unemotional, so much the same all through, so unpliable. And the explanation of art was that it consisted of this same reality, but as seen through the temperament of the artist and, therefore, somehow, by some mysterious wizardy, coloured with emotion, electrified into all kinds of subjective illuminations, a fascinating mirage. Or instead of the word temperament one substituted the phrase creative imagination. This means substantially the same thing, but it leads us away a bit further from photographic reality, widening the gulf between the two. We cannot create the outer world, but we can create an inner world of imagination, and actually bring into our life something intimately new, shedding a light of its own that never was on sea or land. Drive this argument a little further and we arrive at Cubism and Futurism.

This is the philosophical view which dominates most art criticism of to-day, and probably quite rightly so. It is fairly safe, and it "corresponds to the facts" with tolerable accuracy. It is sufficiently eclectic not to offend either an ardent philosophical realism or an ardent idealism. And it does not fall into the error of condemning one kind of art and exalting another, although our æsthetic taste when unprejudiced by theory proclaims both kinds equally delightful. This, however, is no reason why we should not attempt to deepen the theory with a view to giving it a closer organic unity and explaining facts which it does not seem at present to take into account. Needless to say, we may get entangled and strike out on a wrong track. For thinking, like everything else, is experimental.

IV

1. The very first observation to be made is that ordinary vision is not photographic: it is shot through and through with emotional elements which are part and parcel of every concrete colour and form that is seen. The photographic reality is obtained by a process of thinning down, so that only the skeleton of similarities remains. It consists of a consciousness of general facts—this is a tree, it has leaves with clearly delineated edges, underneath it is a brown and white cow.

2. Nevertheless, even if the normal man in the street were to depict precisely the semi-emotional reality which he sees, it would not necessarily be a work of art. The Royal Academy is a convincing proof of this fact. But this is not because the normal man's vision is essentially different from that of the artist; the reason is just the opposite: his seeing is borrowed from the artist, it is second-hand property. Considered in connection with the co-ordinated arrangement of the ordinary man's life this borrowed vision is absolutely correct and in its place, just as is his borrowed knowledge of science, mathematics, history. But if he tries to isolate it and put it apart in a frame, claiming for it an original independent value, it immediately becomes false, pretentious, sentimental. It still, however, is not photographic: it is an emotion out of place. There is, of course, also in Academy pictures a great deal of photography, that is to say of general statement.

3. The artistic disvalue of such statements lies not in the fact that they are reproductive and "true to nature," but in the deliberate stripping of all emotional content. So far from giving a completer and truer account of reality, the photograph gives a thoroughly impoverished account.20 It must not, however, be inferred that art should assist or take the place of, say, geological drawings, because these drawings are intentionally confined to similarities and general facts.

4. The conception of the "creative imagination" is liable to lapse into a false kind of mysticism. Imagination is always about reality. Rembrandt possessed a marvellous imagination, yet for that very reason he has considerably increased and enhanced the human consciousness of reality. In the same way the interior of a beautiful church evokes and deepens our consciousness of religious emotion, and, therefore, of the profound significance of life. And it is not the life of some abstract mysticism, but of man in the travail of history. All art is imaginative, but it is equally real and objective, it adds to our consciousness of the world in which we live. We need not even object to the metaphor about holding the mirror up to nature, for we cannot see ourselves except in a mirror.

It might be possible, therefore, to overcome the apparent distinction between "painting from the model" and "out of one's head," and to show that they are both the same kind of activity. There is no doubt that imaginative work has its roots in ordinary perception; even the creator of pure designs is using lines and colours which are visible, and he gets his suggestions from the external world. And even though in the process of creating the artist seems to move away from external reality into his inner being, the created product is definitely about external reality. The Cenotaph in Whitehall is our mourning over the dead: Goya's etchings The Disasters of War are part of our concrete consciousness of war. Blake, too, where he is not lost in impossible symbolism, is always referring back to life.

On the other side, every piece of ordinary perception is shot through with imagination, as with emotion. The mind is not a tabula rasa, but a most marvellous and intricate activity. And there is another explanation possible of the difference between the art, say, of Velasquez and of Fra Angelico than that the one was reproductive, the other the work of fantasy. At the time of Velasquez the whole interest and value of life centred round man and pre-eminently round the life of kings and nobles. On these people was focussed the emotional imagination of the age. To Fra Angelico the world was altogether different; its quintessential value lay outside it in our experience after death: this life was but a preparation for the next, and art was as it were the imaginative anticipation of the loveliness of heaven. Nevertheless, this anticipation spoke in terms of the most refined delights of this world, and the pæan to heaven was but a pæan to the beauty of life. Or if one may diverge from the artist to an appreciator of art, it is clear from Mr. Clive Bell's book, Art, that at the back of his mind there is a mystical metaphysics, a sort of conviction that the objects and events of this muddled material world are contemptible, and that we must seek for the reality of realities in some aloof inhuman state of consciousness. This is his third and in many ways most interesting preoccupation.

5. Each of the three definitions of art referred to at the beginning of this essay, those of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, sets up claims which must be satisfied if we do not want to be continually dogged by their importunate ghosts. One of the strongest objections to Plato's premise that the artist imitates is that it does not allow any element of novelty. It is true that in the physical act of painting the artist reproduces his vision, and that this act requires considerable technical accomplishment. But throughout the principal, all-powerful, radiating influence is the vision. This cannot correctly be called reproductive; it is just the unmediated consciousness of something, and of that something for the first time. For instance, the artist apparently works with a limited number of colours just as the musician with notes; but out of these he produces entirely new colours in combination (colours are never really out of combination), just as the musician produces literally new sounds. And this production is not a mere abstract physical fact, it is emotional and can contain the whole significance of a given period of history. The seeing of the colours and the emotional impulse coincide: it is an act of creation. Nor do the colours belong, so to speak, merely to the artist's palette and canvas, they are seen out there "in nature." It is a new vision of nature. It is, however, futile for the man in the street, when he sees the picture for the first time, to refer back to his own past experience, because this is a new experience, a new vision. At the same time, although the picture is hung up indoors in a room or gallery, the vision pierces, as it were, right through the canvas and walls and comes to a halt out there in the mysterious and infinite world. We have seen that this process of consciousness is undoubtedly imaginative, even if the completed product is almost historically real. It is not a mere statement of fact, but it always includes facts, surrounding them with concrete living individuality. Further, it always contains an element of the ideal, of aspiration, not of an abstract schematised Utopia or stereotyped moralising, but of a pulsating individual love and hate. In all art, even in the most realistic, this is transparent. It is, in a sense, the goodwill bending over the present and dreaming of the future.

Briefly, pictorial and plastic art is the creation of the visual feeling or emotional consciousness of the human mind. As such it is inseparably bound up in real objects, actions, and events. Remove it (speculatively in thought) and you get the bare though magnificent framework of science and the stark matters-of-fact of history.