Chapter IX

Page 289, § 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense in which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according to which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of enlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible, because too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz (Considérations sur le principe de vie; Système nouveau de la Nature, &c.). According to it development is no real generation of new parts, but only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already outlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis) is carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in his Considérations sur les corps organisés (1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the 'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within another, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis of 'Emboîtement.' 'The system which regards generations as mere educts' says Kant (Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 80; Werke, iv. 318) 'is called that of individual preformation or the evolution theory: the system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.—which might also be called the theory of generic preformation, considering that the productive powers of the générants follow the inherent tendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the specific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the opposing theory of individual preformation might be better called the involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (Emboîtement.) Cf. Leibniz (Werke, Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not entirely born at conception or generation, no more do they entirely perish at what we call death; for it is reasonable that what does not commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature. Thus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler theatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as in the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are neither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped, re-clothed, unclothed,—transformed. The souls never altogether quit their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is entirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there is metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which takes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but continually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely, at conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at once.'

The theory of Emboîtement or Envelopment, according to Bonnet (Considérations, &c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised bodies of one species were inclosed (renfermés) one in another, and have been developed successively.' So according to Haller (Physiology, Tome vii. § 2) 'it is evident that in plants the mother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is therefore no inherent improbability in the view that tous les enfans, excepté un, fussent renfermés dans l'ovaire de la première Fille d'Eve.' Cf. Weismann's Continuity of the Germ-plasma. Yet Bonnet (Contemplation de la Nature, part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The germs are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ forms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which it is developed.'

P. 293, § 163. Rousseau, Contrat Social, liv. ii. ch. 3.

P. 296, § 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.' When an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when it is clear), or in addition represent the characteristic marks belonging to the object so distinguished (when it is distinct), but also brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics, the idea is adequate. Thus adequate is a sort of second power of distinct. (Cf. Baumeister's Instit. Philos. Ration. 1765, §§ 64-94.) Hegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which I put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing represented from all other things in every case, state, and time' (Baumeister, ib. § 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79: notitia adaequata.

P. 298, § 166. Cf. Baumeister, Instit. Phil. Rat. § 185: Judicium est idearum conjunctio vel separatio.

P. 299, § 166. Punctum saliens: the punctum sanguineum saliens of Harvey (de Generat. Animal, exercit. 17), or first appearance of the heart: the στιγμὴ αἱματίνη in the egg, of which Aristotle (Hist. Anim. vi. 3) says τoῡτο τὸ σημεῖον πηδᾷ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ ἓμψυχον.

P. 301, § 169. Cf. Whately, Logic (Bk. ii. ch. I, § 2), 'Of these terms that which is spoken of is called the subject; that which is said of it, the predicate.'

P. 303, § 171. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (p. 95, 2nd ed.) § 9.

P. 304, § 172. Cf. Jevons, Principles of Science, ch. 3, 'on limited identities' and 'negative propositions.'

P. 309. Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel's Werke, v. 285.

P. 312. Colours, i.e. painters' colours; cf. Werke, vii. 1. 314 (lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they have red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other colours.'

P. 315, § 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and syllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare especially Lotze's Logic, Book i. And for the comprehensive exhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B. Bosanquet's Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge. The passage from Hegel's Werke, v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to the sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c.

P. 320, § 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual, Particular, and Universal.

P. 321, § 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was differentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five moods, which (after Arist. An. pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and the later pupils, down at least to Boëthius, had subjoined to the four recognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more than doubtful.

P. 325, § 190. Cf. Mill's Logic, Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism considered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is a petitio principii.'

Hegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the argument from the sum of actual experiences—that per enumerationem simplicem, and διὰ πάντων. Of course except by accident or by artificial arrangement such completeness is impossible in rerum natura.

P. 326, § 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably that of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (e.g. Riehl, Philosoph. Criticismus, iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even greater enormities in this department.

P. 328, § 192. Elementarlehre: Theory of the Elements, called by Hamilton (Lectures on Logic, i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to methodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant's Kritik observes the same division of the subject.

P. 332, § 193. Anselm, Proslogium, c. 2. In the Monologium Anselm expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est. Monol. c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument quod nullo ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret—i.e. from the conception of (God as) the highest and greatest that can be (aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest) he infers its being (sic ergo vere EST aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.) The absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not ipso facto imply existence.

Gaunilo of Marmoutier in the Liber pro insipiente made the objection that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and reality were prima facie different. And in fact the argument of Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject, thought rather than thinker; in human consciousness realised, but not essentially self-affirming—implicit (an:sich) only, as said in pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 Domine, non solum es, quo majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest (transcending our thought).

P. 333, line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation. In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.

P. 334, § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant, i. 86-95.

A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it 'represents,' i.e. concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena: is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, Mikrokosmus.) It is the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed. Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the universe. And yet there are monads—in the plural.

P. 334, § 194. Fichte, Werke, i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'

P. 338, § 195. Cf. Encyclop. § 463. 'This supreme inwardising of ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed order.'

Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions) his De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis (1822) and his Ueber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden (1822).

P. 340, § 198. Civil society: distinguished as the social and economical organisation of the bourgeoisie, with their particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of citoyens in the state or ethico-political organism.

P. 345, § 204. Inner design: see Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft, § 62.

Aristotle, De Anima, ii. 4 (415. b. 7) φανερὸν δ' ὠς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ ψυχὴ ατία: ii. 2 ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.

P. 347, § 206. Neutral first water, cf. Encyclop.§ 284, 'without independent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic determination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf. Werke, vii. 6. 168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised neutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of everything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and alkalis.' Cf. Oken's Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, §§ 294 and 432.

P. 348, § 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf. Chr. Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, ii. 115, seqq.

P. 359, § 216. Aristotle, De Anim. Generat. i. (726. b. 24) ἡ χεὶρ ἄνεν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι χεὶρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώνυμον.

Arist. Metaph. viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) ο δὲ (λέγoυσi) σύνθεσιν ἥ σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.

P. 360, § 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly distinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life is largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491.

P. 361, § 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the vital process.

P. 367, § 229. Spinoza (Eth. i. def. I) defines causa sui as id cujus essentia involvit existentiam, and (in def. 3) defines substantia as id quod in se est et per se concipitur.

Schelling: e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801), (Werke, iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason, in so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and objective.'

P. 367, § 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden, instead of scheiden: cf. Werke, ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of animals, e.g. are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it is not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal from another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these weapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.' Cf. Werke, vii. a. 651 seqq. (Encycl. § 370) where reference is made to Cuvier, Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrupèdes (1812), &c.

P. 368, § 230. Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft: Einleitung, § 9 (note), (Werke, ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird's Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel's Werke, ii. 3.

P. 369, § 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel, Werke, v. 307, from Wolfs Rudiments of Architecture, Theorem viii. 'A window must be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side by side. Proof. It is customary to recline with another person on the window to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main views of the owner (§ I) he must make the window broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably side by side.'

'Construction': cf. Werke, ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life and spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object, cause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here = sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external and empty application of the formula is called "Construction." The procedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed must be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the theory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is pointed at Schelling's Werke, iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding curative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction was sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from a mere practitioner into a "scientific" physician? The formalism of Naturphilosophie may teach e.g. that understanding is electricity, or that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it is like the South or the North, or that it represents it,—as baldly as is here expressed or with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the inexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the profound genius it implies,—may take delight in the sprightliness of language which instead of the abstract concept gives the more pleasing perceptual image, and may congratulate itself on feeling its soul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is as soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows familiar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once detected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to manipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and green, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if a landscape is asked for.'

Kant (Werke, iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic,' § 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity of mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in a percept, and do so à priori,—hence in a pure percept. This observation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to the first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based on some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its concepts in concreto and yet à priori, or, as it is called, construe them.'

The phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be taken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second edition of the Kritik, e.g. Pref. xii. To learn the properties of the isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by 'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibited à priori according to concepts.'

'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (Werke, v. 252: cf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular in unity':—'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225. Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische Konstruktion.

P. 372. 'Recollection' = Erinnerung: i.e. the return from differentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness: distinguished from Gedächtniss = memory (specially of words).

P. 373, § 236. Cf. Schelling, Werke, iv. 405. 'Every particular object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is also the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,—as the absolutely ideal also the absolutely real.'

P. 374, § 236. Aristotle, Metaphys. xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) αὑτὸν ἅρα νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς = θεος), εἵπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. Cf. Arist. Metaph. xii. 7.

P. 377, §239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist für Eines. On Seyn: für Eines, cf. Werke, iii. 168. Das Ideëlle ist notwendig für:Eines, aber es ist nicht für ein Anderes: das Eine für welches es ist, ist nur es selbst. ... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he himself is that which is for him.

P. 379, § 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both object and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical) in the element of Thought: but still as Idea and not—to use Kant's phrase (Kritik der r. Vern. § 26)—as natura materialiter spectata.

INDEX A. Absolute (the), 19, 50, 410; relation to God, 156; absolute idea, 374 (cf. 431); definitions of, 156, 161, 185, 206, 213, 288, 314, 352. Abstract (and concrete), 295, 301. Abstraction, 293. Accidents (of substance), 273 seqq. Activity (bringing condition to fact), 267. Actuality, 257 seqq.; its relations to reason, 10, 258, 383. Affinity (in chemism), 341. Agnosticism, 250. All (quasi-universal), 308. Alteration, 172. Analogy, 324 seqq. Analysis, 79; its dangers, 80, 398; analytical method, 365. Animals and men, 4, 47. Anselm, 140, 331 seqq.(cf. 427). Anthropomorphism, 122. Antinomies (of reason), 97, 99, 189. Apodictic judgment, 313. Appearance, 93, 239 seqq. Apperception (pure), 88, 400. Appetite, 345. A priori (the), 83. Aristotle, his idealism, 15, 75, 259, 364; as a logician, 39 seqq., 318, 322; on the dignity of philosophy, 45; compared with Plato, 259; on the Idea, 374; on life, 345, 359. Arithmetic (logic of), 163. Art, 146. Assertory judgments, 312. Atheism, what it implies, 135; charged against Spinoza, 105, 275. Atomic philosophy, 182. Atoms, 193. Attraction (as constructive principle), 181. Attribution (of predicates), 63, 298. Auflieben, explained, 180. Axioms (mathematical), 323. B. Becoming, 163. Beginning, what it implies, 166. Being (doctrine of), 156 seqq.; being and nothing, 161; contrasted with thought, 102, 107 seqq.; determinate being, 167 seqq.; being in or by self, 171; being-for-self, 176 seqq. Body (and soul), 360. Boëthius, 402. Buddhist metaphysics, 161, 163, 411. C. Caput Mortuum, 400. Cartesianism, 127. Categorical judgment, 310; syllogism, 327. Categories (the), 50, 57, 399; their finitude, 58, 121; criticism of, 91. Cause and effect, 276; efficient and final, 228, 344. Chance, 263 seqq. Chaos, 237. Chemism, 341 seqq.; chemical principles, 235, 419. Christianity, a religion of reason, 74; its faith, 125; religion of consolation, 270; of personality, 393; its philosophical precept, 251. Cognition, as analysed by Kant, 86 seqq.; its nature and methods, 362. Coleridge, 401, 410. Common sense, 126. Comparison, 216. Conceivable (the), 260. Concept: see Notion. Conception (= Representation), 37; preliminary to thought, 1. Condition, 266. Conditioned (the), 121. Conscience (rights of), 44, 388. Consciousness (appeal to), 134. Consensus gentium, 134, 408. Consolation (Christian), 269. Construction (method of), 368 (cf. 430). Content (and form), 242 seqq. Contingency, 263. Continuous quantity, 188. Contradiction (principle of), 221 seqq; 356, 418. Contrariety, 223. Conviction (right of): see Conscience. Copula (of a judgment), 298 seqq. Correctness (and truth), 304 seqq., 352. Correlation, 245. Cosmology, 70; cosmological proof, 102. Critical philosophy, its thesis, 17, 43; examined at length, 82 seqq. D. Deduction of categories, 87, 399 seqq. Definiteness, its value, 170. Definition, 366; criterion of, 186. Degree, 192. Deism, 72, 135, 136, 310. Demonstration, 368 seqq. Descartes, 127 seqq., 333; compared with Jacobi, 139. Design (argument from), 347 (cf. 424). Destiny, 269. Determinate being, 169. Development, 288 seqq.; in relation to innate ideas, 130. Dialectic, innate in thought, 18; its operation explained, 147 seqq.; in Plato and Kant, 149 (cf. 409); in Aristotle, 409; distinguished from Scepticism, 151; and from Reflection, 147. Difference, 215. Discrete quantity, 189. Disjunctive judgment, 311; syllogism, 337. Diversity, 216. Division (logical), 367 (cf. 429). Dogmatic philosophy, 60, 66. Dualism in theology, 72; in philosophy, 113. E. Eden (Garden of), 54 seqq. Education, its office, 100; mistake in, 338. Effect (and Cause), 276 seqq. Ego (the absolute), 393. Eleatic philosophy, 159 seqq., 198. 'Elements' of logic, 329. Emboîtement,289, 425. Empiricism, 14, 76 seqq.; its relative value, 77. Encyclopaedia of science, 35; of philosophy, 38. End (= final cause), 113,343 seqq. Essence (opposed to Being), 202 seqq. Eudaemonism (before Kant), 111, 403. Evil (Good and), 71; origin of, 54. Evolution, old technical sense, 424. Existence, 229 seqq. Experience, principle of, 12, 21, 384; elements in, 81. Explanation (limits of), 255. F. Faculties (in psychology), 238. Faith, as philosophic principle, 124 seqq. Fall of man, interpreted, 54. Fate, 269. Feeling, as cognitive form, 136, 408. Fichte, deduction of categories, 87, 387, 399; the Anstoss, 119, 405; Sonnenklarer Bericht, 241; characteristics of, 176, 372; on the Object, 334; the Ego, 393. Figures of syllogism, 321. Final cause, 343 seqq., 419. Finite (and infinite), 100, 173. Force, 246 seqq. Form (and content), 6, 242 seqq.; form of thought, 48; form and matter, 236. Fortuitous (the), 264. Freedom, 44, 50, 282; as character of all thought, 19, 118; as Nihilism, 162; of will, 264. G. Generality, 309. Genius (defined by Kant), 113. Geometrical method, 369. Glaube, 401, 407. God, logical definition of, 156, 161, 206; how knowable, 65, 74, 125; proofs of his being examined, 6, 20, 72, 74, 103 seqq., 115, 346; as activity, 69, 396; as spirit, 107, 137; as creator, 237, 294; as force, 247, 250; as trinity, 187, 262, 311; as absolute cunning, 350; not jealous, 254; his goodness, 145, 240; his power, 150, 210; his names, 64, 395. Goethe, 53, 80 (cf. 398), 145 (cf. 409), 253 (cf. 421), 256 (cf. 422), 400, 423. Good (the), 71, 114. Greek philosophers, 35; gods, 293. Grenze and Schranke,412. Ground (and consequent), 224 seqq. H. Haller (A. v.), quoted, 196, 252, 416. Have (and be), 233, 298. Heraclitus (and the Eleatics), 168, 412. Herder, 247 (cf. 420). History, pragmatic, 256 (cf.422); psychological, ib.; history of philosophy, 159. Hume (on ideas of necessity), 82, 96, 110. Hypothetical judgment, 311; syllogism, 327. I. I (Ego), its universality, 38, 48; source of the categories, 88; as self-reference, 179; I = I, 158, 410. Idea (the), 92, 352 seqq.; aesthetic ideas, 113; innate ideas, 130; clear and distinct, 296, 426. Ideal, 11; of reason, 102. Idealism, subjective, 90, 94; absolute, 67, 286. Ideality (of the finite), 178, 413. Identity, philosophy of, 194, 219; its meaning, 211; law of, 213. Imagination (in Spinoza), 196, 415; in Kant, 399. Immediacy (and mediation), 20; immediate knowledge, 53, 129 seqq. Indifference (absolute), 158, 161. Individuality, 291 seqq. Induction, 324, 427. Infinite (and finite), 62; wrong infinite, 174; infinite progress, 175, 194, 415. Innate ideas, 130. Intuition (and thought), 121, 386, 408. Inward (and outward), 252 seqq. J. Jacobi (F. H.), 401, 406 seqq.; against demonstration, 105; agnostic, 121 seqq.; on cause, 277 (cf. 423). Judaism, 210, 275. Judgment, defined, 297; classification of, 303 seqq. (cf. 420); Kant's criticism of the faculty, 112. K. Kant: his standpoint, 17, 83; his doctrine of categories, 83 seqq.; examination of his system, 81 seqq.; theory of matter, 183; on 'construction' in mathematics, 369 (cf. 430); on teleology, 343 on modality, 260; his ethics, 110, 372; defects of his system, 119. 372-387, 399. Kästner (A. G.), 184, 414. Kind (genus), 361. Knowledge, 94; immediate, 123. L. Lalande, 123, 407. Law (of thought), 213 seqq. (cf.417), 290; of a phenomenon, 242. Leibniz: maxim of indiscernibles, 217 (cf. 417); of sufficient reason, 227 (cf. 418); on final cause, 228 (cf. 419); his monadology, 275, 334 (cf. 428). Life (as a logical category), 358 seqq.; example of becoming, 168. Like (and unlike), 218. Limit (barrier), 172. Locke (as empiricist), 365. Logic, defined, 30; its utility, 31, 34, 40; in Aristotle, 39; applied, 50; subdivided, 155; formal, 214, 226, 288, 316. M. Magnitude, 185; intensive, 192, 415. Man (as an universal), 293. Many (and one), 181. Marks (in concept), 296. Materialism (as logical result of empiricism), 81, 118; of a mathematical system, 187. Mathematics: place in science, 187 seqq.; mathematical syllogism, 323. Matter (and form), 123, 235. Mean (= middle term), 318 seqq. Means (and end) 347 seqq. Measure (logical category), 199 seqq.; its antinomy, 202. Mechanism, 336 seqq.; in ethics and politics, 340. Mediation (and immediacy), 133 seqq. Memory (mechanical), 338. Metaphysics, as logic, 45; pre-Kantian, 61; pseudo-metaphysics in science, 184; categories, 212. Methods: different, 53; metaphysical, 61, 75; analytic, 365; synthetic, 366; speculative, 375; methodology, 328. Middle (law of excluded), 220; middle term, 318 seqq. Mind (and nature), 70 seqq., 180, 188, 414. Modality, 260. Mohammedanism, 210, 275. Monads, 334, 428. Moods (of syllogism), 334. Mysticism, 154,410; mystic numbers, 198. N. Nature (philosophy of), 50, 326, 394; and spirit, 180, 188, 263 seqq., 377, 414, 431; nature and the logical idea, 379. Natural (or physico-) theology, 162 seqq., 402. Naturalism, 118. Necessity (and freedom), 71, 100, 282; and universality, 12, 15, 82; its nature analysed, 267 seqq. Necessitarian, 110. Negation, 171, 219. Nemesis (measure as), 201. Neutralisation, 342. Newton, 13, 183, 250, 414, 421. Nicolaus Cusanus, 410. Nodal lines, 204. Nothing (and being), 161. Notion: contrasted with being, 102, 331; theory of, 286 seqq.; classifications of, 296; opposed to representative concept, 3, 16, 165. Novalis, quoted, 393. Number, 190 seqq. O. Object (and subject), 329 seqq.; objective (and subjective), 83 seqq.; objective thought, 45, 57, 145. Oken, quoted, 392, 401, 418. One (and many), 179 seqq. Ontology, 67; ontological proof in theology, 107, 331. Opposition (logical), 221. Organism, 246, 281, 360 seqq. Oriental theosophy, 64. Ought (the), 11, 115, 372. Outward (and inward), 253. P. Pantheism, 72; in Spinoza, 105, 275; its principle, 167. Paralogism (in rational psychology), 95, 97. Parmenides, 160, 411. Particular, 291 seqq. Parts (and whole), 245; distinct from organs, 246. Personality, 124, 274. Phenomenalism (Kant's), 93, 240. Phenomenology of Spirit: place in Hegel's system, 58. Philosophy: general definition, 4; its scope and aim, 28, 38, 44, 73, 127, 164, 262, 354, 376, 391; history of, 22, 159, 385, 411; in England, 12; rise of, 18; its branches, 28, 322; method of, 375; philosophy and life, 384, 393. Physicists, 193. Plato: reminiscence of ideas, 130, 289; his dialectic, 149; on the Other, 173; Philebus, 177; compared with Aristotle, 259. Pneumatology, 68 seqq. Polarity, 221 (cf. 418). Porosity, 238. Positive (and negative), 219 seqq.; positive element in Science, 26. Possibility, 259. Practical Reason, 110, 403. Predication, 300 seqq. Preformation, 289, 425. Problematical judgment, 313. Proclus, 386. Progress: its meaning, 169. Properties (of a thing), 233. Proposition, 65, 300, 395. Protagoras, 149 (cf. 409). Proverbs quoted, 150. Providence, 268. Psychology, 68 seqq., 95 seqq., 338, (cf. 428). Punctum Sailens,426. Pure thought, 30, 49. Pythagoras, 197, 416. Q. Qualitative judgment, 304; syllogism, 317. Quality, 158 seqq., 170. Quantity, 185. Quantum, 190. R. Raisonnement,229. Ratio (quantitative), 199. Reality: opposed to negation, 171; to ideality, 180. Reason: faculty of the unconditioned, 92, 400 seqq.; as merely critical, 109; practical, 110; negative, 152 seqq.; as syllogism, 314. Reciprocity, 279. Reflection, 5, 8, 41, 53, 208, 275; distinct from dialectic, 147; judgments of, 307. Reinhold: his method, 17, 385. Religion (and philosophy), 3, 43, 64; its nature, 132 seqq. Reminiscence (Platonic), 130, 289. Repulsion, 181. Roman religion, 335. Rousseau, 293. Rule, 202. S. Scepticism: ancient, 53; opposed to dogmatism, 66; modern, 82; its function in philosophy, 141, 151. Schelling, 46 (cf. 392, 393), 367 (cf. 429). Schiller, 112 (cf. 405). Scholasticism, 40, 66, 75, 80; definition of God, 69. Schopenhauer, 401, 408, 424. Sciences and philosophy, 19, 22; science and religion, 350. Scotch philosophers, 131. Scotus Erigena, 387. Self-determination, in. Self-identity, 212. Sensation, 36 seqq. Sensas eminentior, 73, 397. Sex, 361. Sin (original), 55. Slavery (abolition of), 293. Socrates, his dialectic, 149, 228. Solon, 43. Somewhat, 171. Sophists: theory of education, 131; essence of sophistry, 148, 228; opposed to Socrates, 149, 419. Sorites,203, 417. Soul: as object of psychology, 69, 77; (rationalist theory of,) criticised by Kant, 96; soul and Spirit, 69. Speculation, 16; as opposed to dogmatism, 67; speculative reason, 152 seqq. Spinoza, his alleged atheism and pantheism, 105 seqq., 275; causa sui, 139, 277; his God, 159, 402; on determination, 171; amor intellectualis, 283 (cf. 424); on imagination, 196 (cf. 415); his method, 367 seqq.(cf. 429). Spirit, see Mind. State (mechanical theories of the), 182, 340. Subject (and predicate), 301, 395, 428. Subjective (and objective), 85, 270. Substance, 273 seqq. Sufficient Reason (principle of), 224 seqq. (cf. 418). Syllogism, 314 seqq.; as a universal form of things, 314; in mechanism, 340; in teleology, 348. Synthetic method, 366. System (in philosophy), 23 seqq., 159. T Taste, defined by Kant, 113. Teleology, 343 seqq. Terms (of syllogism), 317. Theology (natural), 71 seqq., 101 seqq., 397. Theorem, 368. Theoretical Reason (Kant on), 86 seqq. Thing, 69, 233; thing in or by itself, 91, 231. Thought, its meaning and activity, 35 seqq.; subjective, 36; objective, 45, 47; distinguished from pictorial representation, 3, 37. Transcendent, 89; transcendental, 87, 400. Truth, object of philosophy, 3; and of logic, 32; its meaning, 51, 387; distinguished from correctness, 305, 352, 354. U. Unconditioned (the), 92, 410. Understanding, as faculty of the conditioned, 58, 92; as a principle of limitation, 143 seqq., 400. Unessential, 211. Universal (the), 35, 42, 143; moment of the notion, 291 seqq.; universality and necessity, 12, 15, 82. Untrue, 245. Urtheil, 297. Utilitarianism in Science, 346. V. Variety, 215. Verstand and Vernunft, 400 seqq. Volition, 364, 371 seqq. W. Wesen, 209. Whole (and parts), 245. Will 371; as practical reason, 110; its freedom, 264. Wolff (Christian), his philosophy, 60 seqq., 395, 396; method, 369. World (the), as object of Cosmology, 97. Z. Zeno (of Elea), 169, 195, 415.

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