Volume 2 — FOOTNOTES: (continued 2)

[Footnote 452: Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xvi.; "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 442. Alison wrongly says that Napoleon chose Elba.]

[Footnote 453: Martens, vol. ix., p. 696.]

[Footnote 454: Thiers and Constant assign this event to the night of 11th-12th. I follow Fain and Macdonald in referring it to the next night.]

[Footnote 455: Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon."]

[Footnote 456: Sir Neil Campbell's "Journal," p. 192.]

[Footnote 457: Ussher, "Napoleon's Last Voyages," p. 29.]

[Footnote 458: A quondam Jacobin, Pons (de l'Hérault), Commissioner of Mines at Elba, has left "Souvenirs de l'Ile d'Elbe," which are of colossal credulity. In chap. xi. he gives tales of plots to murder Napoleon—some of them very silly. In part ii., chap, i., he styles him "essentiellement réligieux," and a most tender-hearted man, who was compelled by prudence to hide his sensibility! Yet Campbell's official reports show that Pons, at that time, was far from admiring Napoleon.]

[Footnote 459: "F.O.," Austria, No. 117. Talleyrand, in his letters to Louis XVIII., claims to have broken up the compact of the Powers. But it is clear that fear of Russia was more potent than Talleyrand's finesse. Before the Congress began Castlereagh and Wellington advised friendship with France so as to check "undue pretensions" elsewhere.]

[Footnote 460: Stanhope's "Conversations," p. 26. In our archives ("Russia," No. 95) is a suspicious letter of Pozzo di Borgo, dated Paris, July 10/22, 1814, to Castlereagh (it is not in his Letters) containing this sentence: "L'existence de Napoléon, comme il était aisé à prévoir, est un inconvénient qui se rencontre partout." For Fouché's letter to Napoleon, begging him voluntarily to retire to the New World, see Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. iv. Lafayette ("Mems.," vol. v., p. 345) asserts that French royalists were plotting his assassination. Brulart, Governor of Corsica, was suspected by Napoleon, but, it seems, wrongly (Houssaye's "1815," p. 172).]

[Footnote 461: Pallain, "Correspondance de Louis XVIII avec Talleyrand," pp. 307, 316.]

[Footnote 462: "Recollections," p. 16; "F.O.," France, No. 114. The facts given above seem to me to refute the statements often made that the allies violated the Elba arrangement and so justified his escape. The facts prove that the allies sought to compel Louis XVIII. to pay Napoleon the stipulated sum, and that the Emperor welcomed the non-payment. His words to Lord Ebrington on December 6th breathe the conviction that France would soon rise.]

[Footnote 463: Fleury de Chaboulon's "Mems.," vol. i., pp. 105-140; Lafayette, vol. v., p. 355.]

[Footnote 464: Campbell's "Journal"; Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 275.]

[Footnote 465: Houssaye's "1815," p. 277.]

[Footnote 466: Guizot, "Mems.," ch. iii.; De Broglie, "Mems.," bk. ii., ch. ii.; Fleury, vol. i., p. 259.]

[Footnote 467: Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 277.]

[Footnote 468: As Wellington pointed out ("Despatches," May 5th, 1815), the phrase "il s'est livré à la vindicte publique" denotes public justice, not public vengeance. At St. Helena, Napoleon told Gourgaud that he came back too soon from Elba, believing that the Congress had dissolved! (Gourgaud's "Journals," vol. ii., p. 323.)]

[Footnote 469: "Diary," April 15th and 18th, 1815.]

[Footnote 470: "Parl. Debates"; Romilly's "Diary," vol. ii., p. 360.]

[Footnote 471: Napoleon told Cockburn during his last voyage that he bestowed this constitution, not because it was a wise measure, but as a needful concession to popular feeling. The continental peoples were not fit for representative government as England was ("Last Voyages of Nap.," pp. 115, 137). So, too, he said to Gourgaud he was wrong in summoning the Chambers at all "especially as I meant to dismiss them as soon as I was a conqueror" (Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 93).]

[Footnote 472: Mercer's "Waterloo Campaign," vol. i., p. 352. For Fleury de Chaboulon's mission to sound Austria, see his "Mems.," vol. ii., and Madelin's "Fouché," ch. xxv.]

[Footnote 473: In the "English Hist. Review" for July, 1901, I have published the correspondence between Sir Hudson Lowe (Quartermaster-General of our forces in Belgium up to May, 1815) and Gneisenau, Müffling, and Kleist. These two last were most reluctant to send forward Prussian troops into Belgium to guard the weak frontier fortresses from a coup de main: but Lowe's arguments prevailed, thus deciding the main features of the war.]

[Footnote 474: "F.O.," France, No. 116. On June 9th the Duke charged Stuart, our envoy at Ghent, to defend this course, on the ground that Blücher and he had many raw troops, and could not advance into France with safety and invest fortresses until the Russians and Austrians co-operated.]

[Footnote 475: Sir H. Vivian states ("Waterloo Letters," No. 70) that the Duke intended to give a ball on June 21st, the anniversary of Vittoria. See too Sir E. Wood's "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign," ch. ii.]

[Footnote 476: "F.O.," France, No. 115. A French royalist sent a report, dated June 1st, recommending "point d'engagement avec Bonaparte…. Il faut user l'armée de Bonaparte: elle ne peut plus se recruter."]

[Footnote 477: Ropes's "Campaign of Waterloo," ch. v.; Chesney, "Waterloo Lectures," p. 100; Sir H. Maxwell's "Wellington" (vol. ii., p. 14); and O'Connor Morris, "Campaign of 1815," p. 97.]

[Footnote 478: Janin, "Campagne de Waterloo," p. 7.]

[Footnote 479: Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 195.]

[Footnote 480: Credit is primarily due to Constant de Rebecque, a Belgian, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, for altering the point of concentration from Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington, to Quatre Bras; also to General Perponcher for supporting the new movement. The Belgian side of the campaign has been well set forth by Boulger in "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901).]

[Footnote 481: Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," ch. iv.]

[Footnote 482: Houssaye, "1815," pp. 133-138, 186, notes.]

[Footnote 483: Hamley, "Operations of War," p. 187.]

[Footnote 484: For Gérard's delays see Houssaye, p. 158, and Horsburgh, "Waterloo," p. 36. Napoleon's tardiness is scarcely noticed by Houssaye or by Gourgaud; but it has been censured by Jomini, Charras, Clausewitz, and Lord Wolseley.]

[Footnote 485: Ollech (p. 125) sees in it a conditional offer of help to Blücher. But on what ground? It states that the Prince of Orange has one division at Quatre Bras and other troops at Nivelles: that the British reserve would reach Genappe at noon, and their cavalry Nivelles at the same hour. How could Blücher hope for help from forces so weak and scattered? See too Ropes (note to ch. x.). Horsburgh (ch. v.) shows that Wellington believed his forces to be more to the front than they were: he traces the error to De Lancey, chief of the staff. But it is fair to add that Wellington thought very highly of De Lancey, and after his death at Waterloo severely blamed subordinates.]

[Footnote 486: Stanhope, "Conversations," p. 109.]

[Footnote 487: Reiche, "Memoiren," vol. ii., p. 183.]

[Footnote 488: The term corps is significant. Not till 3.15 did Soult use the term armée in speaking of Blücher's forces. The last important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not given by Houssaye (p. 159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), Siborne (vol. i., p. 453), Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech (p. 131). It proves that as late as 2 p.m. Napoleon expected an easy victory over the Prussians.]

[Footnote 489: The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and the French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of Lobau, 10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.]

[Footnote 490: I follow Houssaye's solution of this puzzle as the least unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been so perplexed. D'Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin exactly where he might have been expected. Was Napoleon puzzled because the corps was heading south-east instead of east?]

[Footnote 491: Delbrück ("Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the storm favoured the attack.]

[Footnote 492: I here follow Delbrück's "Gneisenau" (vol. ii., p. 194) and Charras (vol. i., p. 163). Reiche ("Mems.," vol ii., p. 193) says that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th: he notes that Blücher and Nostitz probably owed their escape to the plainness of their uniforms and headgear.]

[Footnote 493: "Waterloo Letters," Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the time was 3 p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid's account in Fitchett's "Wellington's Men" (p. 120).]

[Footnote 494: "Waterloo Letters," No. 169.]

[Footnote 495: See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these events.]

[Footnote 496: Ollech, pp. 167-171. Colonel Basil Jackson, in his "Waterloo and St. Helena" (printed for private circulation), p. 64, states that he had been employed in examining and reporting on the Belgian roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre. This report had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater confidence on the night of the 16th.]

[Footnote 497: O'Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon's criticism, and censures Gneisenau's move on Wavre: but surely Wavre combined more advantages than any other position. It was accessible for the whole Prussian army (including Bülow); it was easily defensible (as the event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for the defence of Brussels. Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did not at once foresee the immense consequences of his action. Of course he did not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he took all the steps that might lead to immense consequences, if all went well.]

[Footnote 498: Müffling, "Passages," p. 238: Charras, vol. i., p. 226, discredits it.]

[Footnote 499: Basil Jackson, op. cit., p. 24; Cotton, "A Voice from Waterloo," p. 20.]

[Footnote 500: Grouchy suppressed this despatch, but it was published in 1842.]

[Footnote 501: Mercer, vol. i., p. 270.]

[Footnote 502: Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 204.]

[Footnote 503: Ropes, pp. 212, 246, 359. I follow the "received" version of this despatch. For a comparison of it with the "Grouchy" version see Horsburgh, p. 155, note.]

[Footnote 504: Ropes, pp. 266, 288; Houssaye, p. 316, with a good note.]

[Footnote 505: Ollech, pp. 187-192; Delbrück's "Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 205. I cannot credit the story told by Hardinge in 1837 to Earl Stanhope ("Conversations," p. 110), that, on the night of the 16th June, Gneisenau sought to dissuade Blücher from joining Wellington. Hardinge only had the story at second hand, and wrongly assigns it to Wavre. On the afternoon of the 17th Gneisenau ordered Ziethen to keep open communications with Wellington (Ollech, p. 170). The story that Wellington rode over to Wavre on the night of the 18th on his horse "Copenhagen" is of course a myth.]

[Footnote 506: "Blackwood's Magazine," October, 1896; "Cornhill," January, 1901.]

[Footnote 507: Beamish's "King's German Legion," vol. ii., p. 352. Sir Hussey Vivian asserts that the allied position was by no means strong; but General Kennedy, in his "Notes on Waterloo" (p. 68), pronounces it "good and well occupied." A year previously Wellington noted it as a good position. Sir Hudson Lowe then suggested that it should be fortified: "Query, in respect to the construction of a work at Mt. Jean, being the commanding point at the junction of two principal chaussées" ("Unpublished Memoirs").]

[Footnote 508: Wellington has been censured by Clausewitz, Kennedy and Chesney for leaving so large a force at Hal. Perhaps he desired to protect the King of France at Ghent, though he was surely relieved of responsibility by his despatch of June 18th, 3 a.m., begging the Duc de Berri to retire with the King to Antwerp. It seems to me more likely that he was so confident of an early advance of the Prussians (see his other despatch of the same hour and Sir A. Frazer's statement—"Letters," p. 553—"We expected the Prussian co-operation early in the day") as to assume that Napoleon would stake all on an effort against his right; and in that case the Hal force would have crushed the French rear, though it was very far off.]

[Footnote 509: Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 25th, 1815. The Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote under the Duke's influence, stated that not more than 7,000 of the British troops had seen a shot fired. This is incorrect. Picton's division, still 5,000 strong, was almost wholly composed of tried troops; and Lambert's brigade counted 2,200 veterans; many of the Guards had seen fire, and the 52nd was a seasoned regiment. Tomkinson (p. 296) reckons all the 5,220 British and 1,730 King's German troopers as "efficient," and Wellington himself, so Mercer affirms, told Blücher he had 6,000 of the finest cavalry in the world.]

[Footnote 510: "A British Rifleman," p. 367.]

[Footnote 511: I distrust the story told by Zenowicz, and given by Thiers, that Napoleon at 10 a.m. was awaiting Grouchy with impatience; also Marbot's letter referred to in his "Memoirs," ad fin., in which he says the Emperor bade him push on boldly towards Wavre, as the troops near St. Lambert "could be nothing else than the corps of Grouchy." Grouchy's despatch and the official reply show that Napoleon knew Grouchy to be somewhere between Gembloux and Wavre. Besides, Bülow's report (Ollech, p. 192) states that, while at St. Lambert, he sent out two strong patrols to the S.W., and was not observed by the French, "who appeared to have no idea of our existence." This completely disposes of Marbot's story.]

[Footnote 512: Houssaye, ch. vii. In the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October, 1900, p. 815, Mr. H. George gives a proof of this, citing the time it took him to pace the roads by which Grouchy might have advanced.]

[Footnote 513 "Waterloo Letters," pp. 60-63, 70-77, 81-84, 383. The whole brigade was hardly 1,000 sabres strong. Sir E. Wood, pp. 126-146; Siborne, vol. ii., pp. 20-45.]

[Footnote 514: Houssaye, pp. 354, 499, admits the repulse.]

[Footnote 515 B. Jackson, p. 34. Müffling says the defaulters numbered 10,000! While sympathizing with the efforts of Dutch-Belgian writers on behalf of their kin, I must accept Jackson's evidence as conclusive here. See also Mr. Oman's article in "Nineteenth Century," Oct., 1900.]

[Footnote 516: B. Jackson, p. 35; "Waterloo Letters," pp. 129-144, 296; Cotton, p. 79.]

[Footnote 517: Houssaye, pp. 365, 371-376; Kennedy, pp. 117-120; Mercer, vol. i., pp. 311-324.]

[Footnote 518: Gourgaud (ch. vi.) states that the time of Lobau's move was 4.30, though he had reconnoitred on his right earlier. Napoleon's statements on this head at St. Helena are conflicting. One says that Lobau moved at 1.30, another at 4.30. Perhaps Janin's statement explains why Lobau did nothing definite till the later hour.]

[Footnote 519: Baring's account ("King's German Legion," App. xxi.) shows that the farm was taken about the time of the last great cavalry charge. Kennedy (p. 122) and Ompteda (ad fin.) are equally explicit; and the evidence of the French archives adduced by Houssaye (p. 378) places the matter beyond doubt.]

[Footnote 520: Ollech, pp. 243-246. Reiche's exorbitant claims (vol. ii., pp. 209-215) are refuted by "Waterloo Letters," p. 22.]

[Footnote 521: Lacoste (Decoster), Napoleon's Flemish guide, told this to Sir W. Scott, "Life of Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 496.]

[Footnote 522: See Boulger's "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901), p. 33.]

[Footnote 523: The formation and force of the French Guards in this attack have been much discussed. Thiers omits all notice of the second column; Houssaye limits its force to a single battalion, but his account is not convincing. On p. 385 he says nine battalions of the Guard advanced into the valley, but, on p. 389, he accounts only for six. Other authorities agree that eight joined in the attack. As to their formation, Houssaye advances many proofs that it was in hollow squares. Here is one more. On the 19th Basil Jackson rode along the slope and ridge near the back of Hougoumont and talked with some of the wounded of the Imperial Guard. "As they lay they formed large squares, of which the centres were hollow" (p. 57). Maitland ("Waterloo Letters," p. 244.) says: "There was one great column at first, which separated into two parts." Gawler (p. 292) adds that: "The second column was subdivided in two parts, close together, and that its whole flank was much longer than the front of our 52nd regiment." It is difficult to reconcile all this with the attack in hollow squares; but probably the squares (or oblongs?) followed each other so closely as to seem like a serried column. None of our men could see whether the masses were solid or hollow, but naturally assumed them to be solid, and hence greatly over-estimated their strength. A column made up of hollow squares is certainly an odd formation, but perhaps is not unsuitable to withstand cavalry and overthrow infantry.

I cannot accept Houssaye's statement (p. 393) that the French squares attacked our front at four different places, from the 52nd regiment on our right to the Brunswickers in our centre, a quarter of a mile to the east. The only evidence that favours this is Macready's ("Waterloo Letters," p. 330); he says that the men who attacked his square (30th and 73rd regiments) were of the Middle Guard; for their wounded said so; but Kelly, of the same square, thought they were Donzelot's men, who certainly attacked there. Siborne, seemingly on the strength of Macready's statement, says that part of the Guards' column diverged thither: but this is unlikely. Is it credible that the Guards, less than 4,000 strong, should have spread their attacks over a quarter of a mile of front? Was not the column the usual method of attack? I submit, then, that my explanation of the Guard attacking in hollow oblongs, formed in two chief columns, harmonizes the known facts. See Petit's "Relation" in "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1903.]

[Footnote 524: Janin, p. 45.]

[Footnote 525: Bertrand at St. Helena said he heard Michel utter these words (Montholon, vol. iii., ch. iv.).]

[Footnote 526: Maitland's "Narrative," p. 222. Basil Jackson, who knew Gourgaud well at St. Helena, learnt from him that he could not finish his account of Waterloo, "as Napoleon could never decide on the best way of ending the great battle: that he (Gourgaud) had suggested no less than six different ways, but none were satisfactory" ("Waterloo and St. Helena," p, 102). Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that Napoleon blamed in turn the rain, Ney, Grouchy, Vandamme, Guyot, and Soult; but he ends—"it was a fatality; for in spite of all, I should have won that battle."]

[Footnote 527: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon."]

[Footnote 528: Gourgaud, "Journal inédit de Ste. Hélène," vol. ii., p. 321, small edit.]

[Footnote 529: Lucien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 327.]

[Footnote 530: Stuart's despatch of June 28th, "F.O.," France, No. 117; Gneisenau to Müffling, June 27th, "Passages," App.]

[Footnote 531: Croker ("Papers," vol. iii., p. 67) had this account from Jaucourt, who had it from Becker.]

[Footnote 532: Ollech, pp. 350-360. The French cavalry success near Versailles was due to exceptional circumstances.]

[Footnote 533: Maitland's "Narrative," pp. 23-39, disproves Thiers' assertion that Napoleon was not expected there. Maitland's letter of July 10th to Hotham ("F.O.," France, No. 126, not in the "Narrative") ends: "It appears to me from the anxiety the bearers express to get away, that they are very hard pressed by the Government at Paris." Hotham's instructions of July 8th to Maitland were most stringent. See my Essay in "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).]

[Footnote 534: The date of the letter disproves Las Cases' statement that it was written after his second interview with Maitland, and in consequence of the offers Maitland had made!

Napoleon's reference to Themistocles has been much admired. But why? The Athenian statesman was found to have intrigued with Persia against Athens in time of peace; he fled to the Persian monarch and was richly rewarded as a renegade. No simile could have been less felicitous.]

[Footnote 535: "Narrative," p. 244. [This work has been republished by Messrs. Blackwood, 1904.]]

[Footnote 536: "F.O.," France, No. 126; Allardyce, "Mems. of Lord Keith."]

[Footnote 537: Maitland, pp. 206, 239-242; Montholon, vol. i., ch. iii.]

[Footnote 538: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp. 434,438. Beatson's Mem. is in "F.O.," France, No. 123. This and other facts refute Lord Holland's statement ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 196) that the Government was treating for the transfer of St. Helena from the East India Company early in 1815.—Why does Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: last Phase," p. 58, write that Lord Liverpool thought that Napoleon should either (1) be handed over to Louis XVIII. to be treated as a rebel; or (2) treated as vermin; or (3) that we would (regretfully) detain him? In his letters to Castlereagh at Paris, Liverpool expressly says it would be better for us, rather than any other Power, to detain him, and writes not a word about treating him as vermin. Lord Rosebery is surely aware that our Government and Wellington did their best to preclude the possibility of the Prussians treating him as vermin.]

[Footnote 539: Keith's letter of August 1st, in "F.O.," France, No. 123: "The General and many of his suite have an idea that if they could but put foot on shore, no power could remove them, and they are determined to make the attempt if at all possible: they are becoming most refractory."]

[Footnote 540: In our Colonial Office archives, St. Helena, No. 1, is a letter of August 2nd, 1815, from an Italian subject of Napoleon (addressed] to Mme. Bertrand, but really for him), stating that £16,000 had been placed in good hands for his service, one-fourth of which would be at once intrusted to firms at New York, Boston, "Philadelfi," and Charlestown, to provide means for effecting his escape, and claiming again "le plus beau trône de l'univers." It begs him to get his departure from Plymouth put off, for a plot had been formed by discontented British officers to get rid of the Premier and one other Minister. Napoleon must not build any hopes on the Prince Regent: "Le Silène de cette isle…. Je fonds donc mon espoir avant tout sur les navires marchands, Anglais comme autres, par l'apas du gain." The writer's name is illegible: so is the original postmark: the letter probably came from London: it missed Mme. Bertrand at Plymouth, followed her to St. Helena, and was opened by Sir G. Cockburn, who sent it back to our Government. I have published it in extenso in my volume, "Napoleonic Studies " (1904), as also an accompanying letter from Miss McKinnon of Binfield, Berks, to Napoleon, stating that her mother, still living, had known him and given him hospitality when a lieutenant at Valence.]

[Footnote 541: Las Cases, "Mémorial," vol, i., pp. 55, 65.]

[Footnote 542: I wish I had space to give a whole chapter to the relations between Napoleon and the Whigs, and to show how their championship of him worked mischief on both sides in 1803-21, enticing him on to many risky ventures, and ruining the cause of Reform in England for a generation.]

[Footnote 543: "F.O.," France, No. 123. Keith adds: "I accompanied him to look at the accommodation on board the 'Northumberland,' with which he appeared to be well satisfied, saying, 'the apartments are convenient, and you see I carry my little tent-bed with me.'" The volume also contains the letter of Maingaud, etc. Bertrand requested permission from our Government to return in a year; Gourgaud, when his duty to his aged mother recalled him; O'Meara stipulated that he should still be a British surgeon on full pay and active service.]

[Footnote 544: "Extract from a Diary of Sir G. Cockburn," pp. 21, 51, 94.]

[Footnote 545: "Napoleon's last Voyages," p. 163.]

[Footnote 546: I found this return in "Admiralty Secret Letters," 1804-16.

Lord Rosebery, in his desire to apologize for our treatment of Napoleon at every point, says ("Nap.: last Phase," p. 64): "They [the exiles] were packed like herrings in a barrel. The 'Northumberland,' it was said, had been arrested on her way back from India in order to convey Napoleon: all the water on board, it was alleged, had also been to India, was discoloured and tainted, as well as short in quantity."—On the contrary, the diary of Glover, in "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 91, shows that the ship was in the Medway in July, and was fitted out at Portsmouth (where it was usual to keep supplies of water): also (p. 99) that Captain Ross gave up his cabin to the Bertrands, and Glover his to the Montholons: Gourgaud and Las Cases slept in the after cabin until cabins could be built for them. We have already seen (p. 529) that Napoleon was well satisfied with his own room. Water, wine, cattle, and fruit were taken in at Funchal in spite of the storm.]

[Footnote 547: Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 47, 59 (small edition); "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 198.]

[Footnote 548: Sir G. Bingham's Diary in "Blackwood's Mag.," October, 1896, and "Cornhill," January, 1901.]

[Footnote 549: Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 64.]

[Footnote 550: "Last Voyages," p. 130.]

[Footnote 551: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp. 423, 433, 505; Seeley's "Stein," vol. iii., pp. 333-344.]

[Footnote 552: See Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., p. 315, for Napoleon's view as to our stupidity then: "In their place I would have stipulated that I alone could sail and trade in the eastern seas. It is ridiculous for them to leave Batavia (Java) to the Dutch and L'Ile de Bourbon to the French."]

[Footnote 553: Forsyth, "Captivity of Napoleon," vol. i., p. 218. Plantation House was also the centre of the semaphores of the island.]

[Footnote 554: Mrs. Abell ("Betsy" Balcombe), "Recollections," ch. vii. These were compiled twenty-five years later, and are not, as a rule, trustworthy, but the "blindman's buff" is named by Glover. Balcombe later on infringed the British regulations, along with O'Meara.]

[Footnote 555: Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 77, 94, 136, 491.]

[Footnote 556: Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 135, 298. See too "Cornhill" for January, 1901.]

[Footnote 557: Surgeon Henry of the 66th, in "Events of a Military Life," ch. xxviii., writes that he found side by side at Plantation House the tea shrub and the English golden-pippin, the bread-fruit tree and the peach and plum, the nutmeg overshadowing the gooseberry. In ch. xxxi. he notes the humidity of the uplands as a drawback, "but the inconvenience is as nothing compared with the comfort, fertility, and salubrity which the clouds bestow." He found that the soldiers enjoyed far better health at Deadwood Camp, behind Longwood, than down in Jamestown.]

[Footnote 558: Despatch of Jan. 12th, 1816, in Colonial Office, St. Helena, No. 1.]

[Footnote 559: Lord Rosebery ("Napoleon: last Phase," p. 67), following French sources, assigns the superiority of force to Lowe; but the official papers published by Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 397-416, show that the reverse was the case. Lowe had 1,362 men; the French, about 3,000.]

[Footnote 560: From a letter in the possession of Miss Lowe.]

[Footnote 561: Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 139-147.]

[Footnote 562: See the interview in "Monthly Rev.," Jan., 1901.]

[Footnote 563: Bingham's Diary in "Cornhill" for Jan., 1901; Gourgaud, vol. i., pp. 152, 168.]

[Footnote 564: Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 171-177.]

[Footnote 565: Lowe's version (Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 247-251) is fully borne out by Admiral Malcolm's in Lady Malcolm's "Diary of St. Helena," pp. 55-65; Gourgaud was not present.]

[Footnote 566: B. Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena," pp. 90-91. The assertion in the article on B. Jackson, in the "Dict. of Nat. Biography," that he was related to Lowe, and therefore partial to him, is incorrect. Miss Lowe assures me that he did not see her father before the year 1815.]

[Footnote 567: "Mems. of a Highland Lady," p. 459.]

[Footnote 568: In "Blackwood's," Oct., 1896, and "Cornhill," Jan., 1901. I cannot accept Stürmer's hostile verdict on Lowe as that of an impartial witness. The St. Helena Records show that Stürmer persisted in evading the Governor's regulations by secretly meeting the French Generals. He was afterwards recalled for his irregularities. Balmain, the Russian, and Montchenu, the French Commissioner, are fair to him. The latter constantly pressed Lowe to be stricter with Napoleon! See M. Firmin-Didot's edition of Montchenu's reports in "La Captivité de Ste. Hélène," especially App. iii. and viii.]

[Footnote 569: "Waterloo and St. Helena," p. 104.]

[Footnote 570: Lowe had the "Journal" copied out when it came into his hands in Dec., 1816. This passage is given by Forsyth, vol. i., p. 5, and by Seaton, "Sir H. Lowe and Napoleon," p. 52.]

[Footnote 571: An incident narrated to the present writer by Sir Hudson Lowe's daughter will serve to show how anxious was his supervision of all details and all individuals on the island. A British soldier was missed from the garrison; and as this occurred at the time when Napoleon remained in strict seclusion, fear was felt that treachery had enabled him to make off in the soldier's uniform. The mystery was solved a few days after, when a large shark was caught near the shore, and on its being cut open the remains of the soldier were found!

It should be remembered that Lowe prevailed on the slave-owners of the island to set free the children of slaves born there on and after Christmas Day, 1818.]

[Footnote 572: Quoted by Forsyth, vol. i., p. 289. This letter of course finds no place in O'Meara's later malicious production, "A Voice from St. Helena"; the starvation story is there repeated as if it were true!—That Napoleon was fastidious to the last is proved by the archives of our India Office, which contain the entry (Dec. 11th, 1820): "The storekeeper paid in the sum of £105 on account of 48 dozen of champagne rejected by General Bonaparte" (Sir G. Birdwood's "Report on the Old Records of the India Office," p. 97).]

[Footnote 573: Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 330-343, 466-475.]

[Footnote 574: I have quoted this in extenso in "The Owens College Historical Essays." May not the words "domiciled" and "employed" have aroused Lowe's suspicions of Balcombe and O'Meara? Napoleon always said that he did not wish to escape, and hoped only for a change of Ministry in England. But what responsible person could trust his words after Elba, where he repeatedly told Campbell that he had done with the world and was a dead man?]

[Footnote 575: Forsyth, vol. i., p. 310, vol. ii., p. 142, vol. iii., pp. 151, 250; Montholon, "Captivity of Napoleon," vol. iii., ch. v.; Firmin-Didot, App. vi. The schemes named by Forsyth are ridiculed by Lord Rosebery ("Last Phase," p. 103). But would he have ignored them, had he been in Bathurst's place?]

[Footnote 576: Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 105.]

[Footnote 577: He said to Gourgaud that, if he had the whole island for exercise he would not go out (Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., p. 299).]

[Footnote 578: Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. i., pp. 262-270, 316. Yet Montholon ("Captivity of Napoleon," vol. i., ch. xiii.), afterwards wrote of Las Cases' departure: "We all loved the well-informed and good man, whom we had pleasure in venerating as a Mentor…. He was an immense loss to us!"]

[Footnote 579: Gourgaud, vol. i., p. 278; Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 381-384, vol. ii., p. 74. Bonaparte wanted this "Journal" to be given back to him: but Las Cases would not hear of this, as it contained "ses pensées." It was kept under seal until Napoleon's death, and then restored to the compiler.]

[Footnote 580: Henry, vol. ii., p. 48; B. Jackson, pp. 99-101; quoted by Seaton, pp. 159-162.]

[Footnote 581: Forsyth, vol. iii., p. 40; Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., pp. 531-537.]

[Footnote 582: "Apostille" of April 27th, 1818. As to the new house, see Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 212, 270; vol. iii., pp. 51,257; it was ready when Napoleon's illness became severe (Jan., 1821).

If the plague of rats was really very bad, why is it that Gourgaud made so little of it?]

[Footnote 583: "Journal" of Oct. 4th, 1817. On the return voyage to England Mme. Bertrand told Surgeon Henry that secret letters had constantly passed between Longwood and England, through two military officers; but the passage above quoted shows who was the culprit.]

[Footnote 584: Forsyth, vol. iii., pp. 153, 178-181.]

[Footnote 585: Stürmer's "Report" of March 14th, 1818; Gourgaud's "Journal" of Sept. 11th and 14th, 1817.]

[Footnote 586: Described by Bertrand to Lowe on May 12th, 1821 ("St. Helena Records," No. 32).]

[Footnote 587: Lord Holland, "Foreign Reminiscences," p. 305.]

[Footnote 588: Gourgaud, vol. i., pp. 297, 540, 546; vol. ii., pp. 78, 130, 409, 425. See Las Cases, "Mémorial," vol. iv., p. 124, for Napoleon's defence of polygamy. See an Essay on Napoleon's religion in my "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).]

[Footnote 589: Lord Holland's "Foreign Reminiscences," p. 316; Colonel Gorrequer's report in "Cornhill" of Feb., 1901.]

[Footnote 590: "Colonial Office Records," St. Helena, No. 32; Henry, "Events of a Military Life," vol. ii., pp. 80-84: h also states that Antommarchi, when about to sign the report agreed on by the English doctors, was called aside by Bertrand and Montholon, and thereafter declined to sign it: Antommarchi afterwards issued one of his own, laying stress on cancer and enlarged liver, thus keeping up O'Meara's theory that the illness was due to the climate of St. Helena and want of exercise. In our records is a letter of Montholon to his wife of May 6th, 1821, which admits the contrary: "C'est dans notre malheur une grande consolation pour nous d'avoir acquis la preuve que sa mort n'est, et n'a pu être, en aucune manière le résultat de sa captivité." Yet, on his return to Europe, Montholon stoutly maintained that the liver complaint endemic to St. Helena had been the death of his master. It is, however, noteworthy that on his death-bed Napoleon urged Bertrand to be reconciled to Lowe. He and Montholon accordingly went to Plantation House, where, according to all appearance, the dead past was buried.]