Volume 1 — CHAPTER XXIV.

THE CHASSE AUX KHAMÍRS.

Before M. Roustan had managed to convert the French Protectorate over Tunis into a personal dictatorship, France was already heartily tired of the Khamírs. The expedition which began in the enthusiasm of credulity was destined to end amidst a storm of universal ridicule. No amount of press restrictions could conceal the patent fact that the Khamírs were difficult to find and still more difficult to catch, and early in June the comic papers of Paris and Lyons were either representing Generals Vincendon and Forgemol engaged in a minute examination of the Tabarca mountains with Brobdignagian magnifying glasses, or portrayed the Commander-in-chief carefully searching a bush with a lantern, and singing to a popular refrain:—

“Forgemol dit la lanterne à la main

—J’ai beau chercher. Où diable est le Kroumir?

Il etait là, disait on, hier matin

Sœur Vincendon, ne vois tu rien venir?”

The question was then, Où est le Khamír? It has never been answered yet, and there seems little probability of its being ever entirely cleared up. An enterprising Paris manufacturer patented a mechanical toy which consisted in the perpetually revolving figures of a mounted Arab pursued by a French hussar, and called it the “Chasse aux Kroumirs” (Khamírs). This man at least understood the humour of the situation, and the movements of the toy are hardly more monotonous than the details of the enterprise it so fairly represents.

M. Albert de la Berge has devoted twenty pages of his “History of the Tunisian Expedition” to the events in Khamír-land between the 27th April and the 16th June, but even he begins his narrative with an apology for its barrenness of any notable event:—“The attack on the Khamírs,” he writes, “is rather a great military manœuvre, or a voyage of topographical discovery, than a war in the ordinary sense of the term.” Although I can hardly agree with M. De la Berge, in the absence of any precise information as to the scientific result attained by the enterprise, I should certainly advise my readers to skip over this chapter as inevitably dull and uninteresting.

Up to the night in which Ali Bey made good his retreat to Ben Bachir (April 27th), very little progress had been made by the invading columns. The Vincendon brigade, which formed both the centre and the advanced guard, was then encamped on the Kef-Cheraga plateau close to the frontier, and from which reconnoitring parties were despatched to operate in two directions. The column of General Galland was to the left, on the ridge known as Reched Mankoura, but the brigade Ritter, now commanded by General Caillot, had returned to the camp at El Aioun. This force had encountered severe resistance, and the cause of its retrograde movement has never been satisfactorily explained. Torrential rain now impeded any further progress; the soldiers, encamped in a thick fog, were severely tried both by wet and cold; and after the first day’s fighting the main body of the Khamírs had disappeared to the north. The huts of the Ouled Cedra were given up to the goumiers of their Algerian rivals, the Ouled Nehed, who completely destroyed them. During the two following days the neighbouring valleys were explored en reconnaissance; at times a brush with the Khamírs took place, but oftener nothing was found but abandoned villages. On the 1st May all the three brigades received orders to unite at El Hammam and to move eastwards towards Fernana. Meanwhile the force under General Brem occupied the station at Souk el Arba, while General Logerot led his column northwards, also to take up a position at Fernana. The object of this combined movement was to surround the Khamírs, who were supposed to be concentrated around a famous kouba or sanctuary, on the summit of a lofty mountain, called Djebel Sidi Abdallah Ben Djemel. On the 5th May the three brigades arrived at Feldj-Mana, close to the foot of the Djebel Abdallah, and the camp was established upon three hills, and there some few of the Khamírs gave in their submission.

General Logerot had by this time arrived at Ali Bey’s old camping ground at Sidi Saleh, and on the evening of May 6th General Forgemol was able to join him there from Feldj-Mana, to decide on a plan for the attack on Djebel Abdallah, where several thousand Khamírs were still believed to be assembled. At dawn, on the 8th May, twelve battalions from the three columns Caillot, Vincendon, and Galland, left their knapsacks in the camp, and started for the marabout of Sidi Abdallah Djemel. The white dome of the saint’s tomb could be seen five miles off, but the advancing troops only came across recently abandoned douars, in some of which the embers were still smouldering. As the summit of the mountain was gained, the Khamírs were perceived disappearing on the other side of it. Three hundred head of cattle, however, fell into the hands of the troops. At eleven o’clock A.M. the General arrived at the marabout itself, where he was received by a very old and dirty Khamír, who declared he was the guardian of the place, which was of the meanest description, although revered for a long distance on both sides of the frontier. With the exception of this solitary ecclesiastic, not another living soul was visible. The immediate vicinity of the kouba seemed to be the necropolis of all Khamír-land. The corpses were covered with the thinnest layer of earth, and an opening was actually left above the head. Many of the unfortunate victims of the 26th April had evidently been buried there in the odour of sanctity, and the poisoned atmosphere about the spot rendered the marabout a most undesirable abiding place.

While the flying column under General Delebecque was climbing up to the great Khamír shrine, bent on the hopeless chasse aux Khamírs, General Logerot had pushed on to a position about seven miles north-east of Fernana, in the direction of Ben or Bou Matir, but found that it would be necessary to carry out somewhat extensive works before the country could be made accessible to cavalry and artillery. Then followed another series of reconnaissances, but all attempts to come up with any number of Khamírs seemed fruitless. One day a few of them were dislodged from a ravine by firing the brushwood, but on the morrow (May 10th) they came back close to the camp and killed three soldiers before their presence was discovered. On the following morning the French moved to a position between Sidi Abdallah and the Meridj mountain, in the direction of Ain Drahan (“the silver spring”), where a junction with General Logerot was to be effected. “Our soldiers,” writes M. De la Berge, “found the dead bodies of some Khamírs in the forest, several deserted huts were burned, the barley crops on the march were reaped, and the engineers received orders to destroy the marabout of Sidi Abdallah.” The same afternoon General Logerot reached El Fedj, and while the camp was being pitched, the Algerian irregular cavalry were sent ahead towards Ben Matir. They suddenly came upon the enemy, and although strong reinforcements were sent to the front, the Khamírs for a long time managed to hold their own, till dislodged from their position by the fire of the mountain guns. Ten soldiers were placed hors de combat on the side of the French, of whom five were killed. Stations were now permanently established at Ain Drahan and Fernana, and strongly garrisoned. On the 14th May the columns Caillot and Vincendon marched towards Ben Matir, which was evidently the strategic stronghold of that country. The way lay through woody defiles, which the Khamírs had endeavoured to make impregnable by throwing down huge oak-trees across the paths, and the passage was undoubtedly a task of serious difficulty. It was however accomplished, with the loss of some of the baggage mules, and a junction effected with General Logerot’s troops coming from El Fedj. The column commanded by Colonel O’Neill sustained an engagement with the Khamírs in the woods during some hours, but with the exception of this comparatively unimportant resistance, the rich valley of Ben Matir, the most fertile spot in the whole country, was occupied without a blow being struck. Here a certain number of tribes made their formal submission, but other clans continued to hold out. The Mekna only yielded after two engagements, and the Ouled Yahia never asked for the aman till they had lost both homes and herds (June 1st).

This is a brief outline of the operations which the summer heat now brought abruptly to a close. The razzias and reconnaissances which were necessary up to the very day of their termination, afford the best proof of their incompleteness and insufficiency, except so far as to give a tangible colour to the invasion of the country. The plague-stricken post at Fernana has been abandoned, and French garrisons now only remain at Ain Drahan and Tabarca. As far as I could ascertain from M. Panariello, during my visit to La Calle four months later, the practical result of the campaign has been to give the Khamírs at least a semi-independence. In September they were in a position to declare that unless an obnoxious Caid was removed, they would no longer pay any taxes, and Sidi Yusef (Colonel Allegro) has never even attempted to join his post as their governor. M. Panariello declares that the entire subjugation of the frontier tribes must be the gradual task of years, and will require engineering works upon a large scale before it can be completed.

By the 20th June only about 6000 men remained in the country, comprising the garrisons at Bizerta, Kef, Tabarca, Manouba, Ghardimaou, Fernana, and Ain Drahan. It now only remained for General Farre to congratulate the country, the army, and himself—a task which he hastened to perform in the following “order of the day:”—

Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers,—At the moment when the operations on the frontiers have ceased, I am happy to recognise the services which the troops engaged in them have rendered, and to congratulate them on the results obtained.

They have amply justified the confidence expressed by the President of the Republic when not a year ago he presented their colours to each army corps.

In all ranks unrivalled zeal and patriotism have been displayed during this arduous campaign. The soldiers have endured untold privations in the midst of an impenetrable country and under the disadvantages of an unfavourable climate and constant bad weather. Nevertheless, their ardour has surmounted all obstacles, and I am rejoiced to congratulate them.

But I must not the less congratulate their chiefs,—the officers of all grades, the functionaries of all classes, the zeal, intelligence, ardour, and capacity of whom have contributed to obtain such satisfactory results from our young troops.

Their incessant care and paternal vigilance have preserved sanitary conditions which are really surprising, when the circumstances and difficulties of the operations themselves are considered.

I must address special congratulations to General Forgemol, whose supreme command has been exercised with rare wisdom; to General Delebecque, who led the column which took the principal part in the operations; to General Logerot, who knew how to give une energigue impulsion to his soldiers; to General Bréart, who represented our country under difficult circumstances, as well as to the generals and superior officers under their orders.

These services will not be forgotten. Every one who has taken part in the campaign has earned the gratitude of the Republic.

The Minister of War,

(Signed) Farre.

At the very time when General Farre’s proclamation was issued, the streets of Marseilles were witnessing the unedifying spectacle of a chasse aux Italiens as a melancholy sequel to the chasse aux Khamírs. On the evening of the 17th June, as a portion of the expeditionary corps were defiling in triumphal procession through the “capital of the South,” General Vincendon heard, or thought he heard, furtive hisses issue from the Italian Club. Turning towards the building he exclaimed aloud, “Merci, Messieurs les Italiens.” This incautious expression bore disastrous fruit, and for three days not an Italian’s life was safe in Marseilles. It was afterwards proved that the Italian hisses were as imaginary as the Khamír raids. A French gentleman, who was on the balcony of the building in question at the time (M. Gibon), hastened to publish an emphatic refutation of General Vincendon’s ill-timed accusation in the following terms:—

I, the undersigned, a Frenchman standing on the balcony of the Italian National Club on the afternoon of the 17th, when the troops passed, formally protest, out of respect for the truth, against the accusation that the hisses were given from that balcony. Neither I nor any other person in my company made any manifestation hostile to our valorous soldiers, and I should have been the first to repress any such act, and to denounce its author. I declare that the rooms of the Club were empty at that moment, and that the only persons present were Signor Tonietti and his son Enrico Pierruzzini and Raffaello Pirri, who were on the balcony with me.

But it was too late. Signor Oddo, an unoffending Italian dentist, who, after a quarter of a century passed in curing the toothache of successive Beys of Tunis, had come to settle in Marseilles, was one of the first to be knocked down and brutally kicked. He at last escaped with his life by a miracle, but only to break up his establishment and seek refuge in Naples. Several Italians and Frenchmen were killed, and Italy’s cup of vengeance fairly ran over. Anti-French demonstrations spread from one end of the Peninsula to the other; and the word “Marseilles” has become the watchword of Italian vendetta, effacing the memory of half a century of friendship, and blotting out the recollection of Magenta and Solferino. Behind the real grievance of the riots of Marseilles the militant policy of Signor Maccio will be forgotten. Two weeks later the French fleet was bombarding the city of Sfax in Southern Tunis, and three parts of the Regency were in open revolt.

The French papers were not the only ones to realise the grim humour of the whole business. A few verses from Punch, in explanation of a cartoon in which the Republic of Peace is seen trying on the garb of war, sums up the first epoch of the French Invasion with caustic correctness:—

France (trying on Casque) loquitur—

Becomes me! La République c’est la paix?

Oh yes, precisely.

And yet this Mars-like headpiece, I must say,

Fits rather nicely.

Revanche? La Guerre? La Gloire? Powder and Steel?

Oh never, never!

I do thank Heaven that I no longer feel

War’s scarlet fever.

I chose this fashion, and have no desire

For hasty changing,

Only just now and then dress does require

Some re-arranging.

I grow pugnacious? Such reports are wild,

Mendacious rumours;

Although of course I’m not to be reviled

By rascal Kroumirs.

Fancy! I’m not a Caquet Bonbec quite,

A barnyard scratcher;

And if la France had a desire to fight,

How few could match her!

That Bey’s a bit too bounceable; he’ll find

Swelling brings dizziness.

The Powers? Perhaps they will be pleased to mind

Their proper business.

Confound—— But stay—no temper; that an old

Imperial lune is,

But which of them will have the cheek to scold

Concerning Tunis?

The notion stirs my blood, makes my tint turn,

My voice swell louder;

They think me tame? Then I shall have to burn

A little powder;

A shot or two perhaps might tend to strengthen

My moral fibres,

And cause the physiognomies to lengthen

Of foreign gibers.

Eh? What? That Circular of Saint-Hilaire

Causes hilarity?

Disgusting! Foreign critics, I declare,

Are void of charity.

I’ve been a Saint in patience all men know—

Almost too saintly;

Astonished Europe thinks my blood must flow

Feebly and faintly—

Let those who doubt me read the declaration

Of mon cher Ferry.

“Respect for law, strict justice, moderation”—

True, true—oh, very!

Annex? Fi donc! I solemnly proclaim

’Tis false, completely.

But—— Well this jaunty head piece, all the same,

Becomes me sweetly.

(Left admiring herself.)

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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