The comprehension of mediation lies at the basis of the distinction of sensuous knowing from the understanding. The transition from intuition to abstract thinking is made at first unconsciously, and for this reason the one who has begun the process of mediation handles the “mental spectres” created by abstraction with the utmost naïveté, assuming for them absolute validity in the world at large. It is only 189the speculative insight that gains mastery over such abstractions, and sees the Truth. If this view could be unfolded in a popular form, it would afford a series of solvents for the thinker which are applicable to a great variety of difficult problems. For it must be remembered that the abstract categories of the understanding—such as essence and phenomenon, cause and effect, substance and attribute, force and manifestation, matter and form, and the like, give rise to a series of antinomies, or contradictory propositions, when applied to the Totality. From the standpoint of mediation—that of simple reflection, “common sense” so called—these antinomies seem utterly insoluble. The reason of this is found in the fact that “common sense” places implicit faith in these categories (just mentioned), and never rises to the investigation of them by themselves. To consider the validity of these categories by themselves is called a transcendental procedure, for it passes beyond the ordinary thinking which uses them without distrust.

The transcendental investigation shows that the insolubility attributed to these antinomies arises from the mistake of the thinker, who supposes the categories he employs to be exhaustive. Speculative insight begins with the perception that they are not exhaustive; that they have by a species of enchantment cast a spell upon the mind, under which every thing seems dual, and the weary seeker after Truth wanders through a realm of abstractions each of which assumes the form of a solid reality—now a giant, and now a dwarf, and now an impassible river, impenetrable forest, or thick castle wall defended by dragons.

The following questions will illustrate the character of the problems here described:

“Why deal with abstractions—why not hold fast by the concrete reality?”

(This position combats mediation under its form of abstraction.)

“Can we not know immediately by intuition those objects that philosophy strives in vain to comprehend? in short, are not God, Freedom and Immortality certain to us and yet indemonstrable?”

(This position combats mediation as involved in a system of Philosophy.)

These questions arise only in the mind that has already gone beyond the doctrine that it attempts to defend, and hence a self refutation is easily drawn out of the source from whence they originate.

ABSTRACTION.

(a) It will be readily granted that all knowing involves distinction. We must distinguish one object from another.

(b) But the process of distinguishing is a process that involves abstraction. For in separating this object from that, I contrast its marks, properties, attributes, with those of the other. In seizing upon one characteristic I must isolate it from all others, and this is nothing more nor less than abstraction.

(d) Nor is this a subjective defect, an “impotency of our mental structure,” as some would be ready to exclaim at this point. For it is just as evident that things themselves obtain reality only through these very characteristics. One thing preserves its distinctness from another by means of its various determinations. Without these determinations all would collapse into one, nay, even “one” would vanish, for distinction being completely gone, one-ness is not possible. This is the “Principle of Indiscernibles” enunciated by Leibnitz. Thus distinction is as necessary objectively as subjectively. The thing abstracts in order to be real. It defends itself against what lies without it by specializing itself into single properties, and thus becoming in each a mere abstraction.

(e) Moreover, besides this prevalence of abstraction in the theoretic field, it is still more remarkable in the practical world. The business man decries abstractions. He does not know that every act of the will is an abstraction, and that it is also preceded by an abstraction. When he exhorts you to “leave off abstractions and deal with concrete realities,” he does this: (1.) he regards you as he thinks you are; (2.) 190he conceives you as different, i. e. as a practical man; (3.) he exhorts you to change from your real state to the possible one which he conceives of (through the process of abstraction). The simplest act with design—that of going to dinner, for example—involves abstraction. If I raise my arm on purpose, I first abstract from its real position, and think it under another condition.

(f) But the chief point in all this is to mark how the mind frees itself from the untruth of abstraction. For it must be allowed that all abstractions are false. The isolation of that which is not sufficient for its own existence, (though as we have seen, a necessary constituent of the process of knowing and of existing,) sets up an untruth as existent. Therefore the mind thinks this isolation only as a moment of a negative unity, (i. e. as an element of a process). This leads us to the consideration of mediation in the more general form, involved by the second question.

IMMEDIATE KNOWING.

(a) Definition.—“Immediate” is a predicate applied to what is directly through itself. The immediateness of anything is the phase that first presents itself. It is the undeveloped—an oak taken immediately is an acorn; man taken immediately is a child at birth.

(b) Definition.—“Mediation” signifies the process of realization. A mediate or mediated somewhat is what it is through another, or through a process.

(c) Principle.—Any concrete somewhat exists through its relations to all else in the universe; hence all concrete somewhats are mediated. “If a grain of sand were destroyed the universe would collapse.”

(d) Principle.—An absolutely immediate somewhat would be a pure nothing, for the reason that no determination could belong to it, (for determination is negative, and hence mediation). Hence all immediateness must be phenomenal, or the result of abstraction from the concrete whole, and this, of course, exhibits the contradiction of an immediate which is mediated (a “result.”)

(e) The solution of this contradiction is found in “self-determination,” (as we have seen in former chapters). The self-determined is a mediated; it is through the process of determination; but is likewise an immediate, for it is its own mediation, and hence it is the beginning and end—it begins with its result, and ends in its beginning, and thus it is a circular process.

This is the great aperçu of all speculative philosophy.

(f) Definition.—Truth is the form of the Total, or that which actually exists.

(g) Hence a knowing of Truth must be a knowing of the self-determined, which is both immediate and mediate. This is a process or system. Therefore the knowing of it cannot be simply immediate, but must be in the form of a system. Thus the so-called “immediate intuition” is not a knowing of truth unless inconsistent with what it professes.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BAADER.

[The following letter from Dr. Franz Hoffmann to the St. Louis Philosophical Society has been handed us for publication. It gives us pleasure to lay before our readers so able a presentation of the claims of Baader, and we trust that some of our countrymen will be led by it to investigate the original sources herein referred to.

We are requested to correct a misstatement that occurs in the first paragraph regarding the objects of the Philosophical Society. It was not founded for the special purpose of “studying German Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” although it has many members who are occupied chiefly in that field. The Society includes among its members advocates of widely differing systems, all, however, working in the spirit of the Preamble to the Constitution, which says: “The object of this Society is to encourage the study and development of Speculative Philosophy; to foster an application of its results to Art, Science, and Religion; and to establish a philosophical basis for the professions of Law, Medicine, Divinity, Politics, Education, Art, and Literature.” We are indebted to Dr. A. Strothotte for the translation of the letter.—Editor.]

Würzburg, Dec. 28, 1866.

Mr. President: In the first number of Vol. XLIX of the “Zeitschrift für Philosophie,” published at Halle, in Prussia, edited by Fichte, Ulrici and Wirth, notice is taken of a philosophical society, organized at St. Louis, with the object of pursuing the study of German philosophy from Kant to Hegel.

This fact promises a correlation of philosophical movements between North America and Germany which is of great importance. I presume, however, that you have already been led, or that you will be led, to go back beyond Kant to the first traces of German philosophy, and proceed from Hegel to the present time.

Now, although a thorough and comprehensive 191view of Hegel’s philosophy is in the first place to be recommended, yet the other directions in the movement of thought must not be lost sight of.

In the Berlin organ of the Philosophical Society of the Hegelians—Der Gedanke—edited by Michelet, may be found, as you perhaps know, an index of the works of Hegel’s school, by Rosenkranz, whereas on the other hand the rich literature of the anti-Hegelian writers is nowhere met with in any degree of completeness. Many of them, however, are noticed in Fichte’s journal, and in the more recent works on the history of philosophy, particularly in those of Erdmann, and still more in those of Ueberweg.

Among the prominent movements in philosophical thinking, during and after the time of Hegel, the profound utterances of a great and genial teacher, Franz Baader, reach a degree of prominence, even higher than is admitted by Erdmann and Ueberweg. This may be readily perceived by referring to the dissertation on Franz Baader, by Carl Philipp Fischer, of Erlangen, and still more by having recourse to Hamberger, Lutterbeck, and to my own writings.

I take the liberty of recommending to you and to the members of the Philosophical Society of St. Louis, the study of the works of a philosopher who certainly will have a great future, although his doctrines in the progress of time may undergo modifications, reforms and further developments. If Hegel had lived longer, the influence of Baader upon him would have been greater yet than became visible during his last years. He has thrown Schelling out of his pantheism, and pressed him towards a semi-pantheism, or towards a deeper theism. The influence of Baader on the philosophers after Hegel—J. H. Fichte, Weisse, Sempler, C. Ph. Fischer and others—is much greater than is commonly admitted. Whether they agree to it or not, still it is a fact that Baader is the central constellation of the movement of the German spirit, from pantheism to a deeper ideal-realistic theism. Such a genius, whatever position may be taken with regard to him, cannot be left unnoticed, without running the risk of being left behind the times. I ask nothing for Baader, but to follow the maxim—“Try all and keep the best.” I regret that so great a distance prevents me from sending your honorable Society some of my explanatory writings, which are admitted to be clear and thorough. It may suffice if I add a copy of my prospectus; and let me here remark, that a collection of my writings, in four large volumes, will be published by Deichert, in Erlangen. The first volume, perhaps, will be ready at Easter, 1867.

Erdmann, in his elements of the history of philosophy, has treated of the doctrines of Baader, too briefly it is true, but with more justice than he has used in his former work on the history of modern philosophy, and he bears witness that his esteem of Baader increases more and more. But he evidently assigns to him a wrong position, by considering Oken and Baader as extremes, and Hegel as the mean, while Oken and Hegel are the extremes, and Baader the mean. The most important phenomenon in the school of Hegel is the Idee der Wissenschaft of Rosenkranz, (Logik und Metaphysik,) which represents Hegel in a sense not far distant from the standpoint of Baader. * * * * * * * C. H. Fischer’s Characteristics of Baader’s Theosophy speaks with high favor of him, but still I have to take several exceptions. According to my opinion, all the authors by him referred to, as Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dauber and Baader, we must call theosophers—or call none of them so, but philosophers, in order to avoid misunderstanding. Then I do not see how Schelling can be called the “most genial philosopher of modern times,” and yet Baader the more, yea, the most profound. Finally, a want of system must be admitted, but too great importance is attributed to this. If, however, systematism could decide here, then not Schelling but Hegel is the greatest philosopher of modern times. At all events Fischer’s Memorial at the Centennial Birthday of Baader is significant, and is written with great spirit and warmth. The most important work of C. Ph. Fischer, bearing on this subject, is his elements of the system of philosophy, or Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. This is one of the most important of the works of the philosophers after Hegel and Baader. The Athenäum of Froschhammer, (Journal for Philosophy), appeared only for three years. It had to cease its publication, because on the one side the Ultramontanist party agitated against it, and on the other side it met with insufficient support. Its reissue would be desirable, but just now not practicable, for want of interest on the part of the public, although it could bear comparison with any other philosophical journal.

Here let me say, that from Baader there proceeded a strong impulse toward the revival of the study of the long-forgotten spiritual treasures of the mystics and theosophers of the middle ages, and of the time of the Reformation. From this impulse monographs have made their appearance about Scotus Erigena, Albertus Magnus—at 192least biographies of them—Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, Nicholas Cusanus, Weigel, J. Böhme, Oettinger, etc. The most important of these I deem to be Scotus Erigena, by Joh. Huber, Christlieb and Kaulich; Meister Eckhart, by Bach, and J. Böhme, by J. Hamberger. Bach on Eckhart is especially instructive with respect to the connection between modern philosophy and the theosophy of Eckhart and his school, to which also Nicholas Cusanus belonged.

I presume that it will yet be discovered that Copernicus was at least acquainted with Nicholas Cusanus, if he did not even sympathize with his philosophy. The director of the observatory at Krakau, Kerlinski, is at present preparing a monograph on Copernicus, which will probably throw light on this subject. Prowe’s pamphlet on Copernicus, which I have noticed in Glaser’s journal, refers to the investigations of Kerlinski, who has recently published a beautiful edition of the works of Copernicus. As in the early ages, first in the Pythagorean school, they approached the true doctrine of the Universe, so in the middle ages it appears in the school of Eckhart, for in a certain sense, and with some restriction, Nicholas Cusanus was the precursor of Copernicus.

I beg you, my dear sir, to communicate this letter to your honorable Society: should you see fit to publish it in a journal, you are at liberty to do so.

I remain, Sir, with great respect,

Truly, yours,

Dr. Franz Hoffmann,

Prof. of Philos. at the University of Würzburg.

IN THE QUARRY. By A. C. B.

Impatient, stung with pain, and long delay,

I chid the rough-hewn stone that round me lay;

I said—“What shelter art thou from the heat?

What rest art thou for tired and way-worn feet?

What beauty hast thou for the longing eye?

Thou nothing hast my need to satisfy!”

And then the patient stone fit answer made—

“Most true I am no roof with welcome shade;

I am no house for rest, or full delight

Of sculptured beauty for the weary sight;

Yet am I still, material for all;

Use me as such—I answer to thy call.

Nay, tread me only under climbing feet,

So serve I thee, my destiny complete;

Mount by me into purer, freer air,

And find the roof that archeth everywhere;

So what but failure seems, shall build success;

For all, as possible, thou dost possess.”

Who by the Universal squares his life,

Sees but success in all its finite strife;

In all that is, his truth-enlightened eyes

Detect the May-be through its thin disguise;

And in the Absolute’s unclouded sun,

To him the two already are the one.

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