Note 75 — Western Indians

The Battle of Newtown was fought on Sunday, Aug. 29, 1779, near the Indian village of the same name, on the left bank of the Chemung river six miles south east of Elmira. The enemy's force of British regulars, two battalions of Royal Greens, and Tories, were led by Colonel John Butler, with Captains Walter N. Butler and Macdonald as subordinates; the Indians by the great Mohawk Captain Thayendanegea, alias Joseph Brant, Butler being in chief command. The design of the enemy appears to have been primarily, an ambuscade. They had artfully concealed their works, and posted their forces in positions to attack simultaneously, both flanks, front, and rear; the position naturally strong, was admirably adapted to their purposes. From Elmira, extending south easterly for several miles, is a mountainous ridge, running parallel with the river, something over six hundred feet in height near the Indian village, but gradually melting away to the level of the plain where it terminates about a mile below; on this south eastern slope was the battle of Newtown. To the north and east of this ridge is a similar one, which also terminates near the battle field, and between them is a considerable stream, which, running nearly parallel with the river in its general course, enters the Chemung a mile and a quarter below. The river here sweeps around in a graceful curve, making a full semi-circle, enclosing several hundred acres of rich bottom lands, on which were the Indian cornfields; the Wellsburg north and south road dividing it into two nearly equal parts. Rising abruptly from this plain is a sharp, narrow ridge, known locally as the Hog Back, this extends from the river across the plain nearly to the creek, a distance of about a third of a mile. The crest of this ridge was occupied by the enemy in force, protected by rude log breast works and rifle pits, which extended to the eastern extremity, and from thence turning north, connected with the steep banks of the creek above. The lines to be defended were these two sides of a triangle, their right resting on the river, their left on the mountain, the path of the army passing between the two lines, along which was also the enemy's line of retreat. From the angle in the works a thin line extended to the mountain, on which was a body of the enemy and also another small body on the mountain to the east. The results at Chemung a few days previous, led the enemy to hope that a like blunder might be repeated, and that Wyoming and Minnisinks were to be re-enacted. Presuming that the army, after crossing the creek, would follow the Indian trail without discovering their works, they flattered themselves that an unexpected fire on the exposed flanks would create great confusion, which if augmented by simultaneous attacks in front and rear by the forces in that quarter, might result in a panic, and a possible stampede of the pack horses and cattle, which would be quite as disastrous as the defeat of the army. But three companies of Morgan's riflemen, the pride of Washington, were in the advance; these veterans of a hundred battles were in no way inferior to the enemy in Indian craft; the works and position of the enemy were discovered when afar off, and this ingenious device of drawing our forces into an ambuscade was frustrated. The ambuscade failing, the alternative was presented of forcing a direct attack in front, under great disadvantage, or of a flanking movement, over very difficult ground, where nearly the entire force of the enemy could be brought to bear on the attacking force at any point on interior lines, possibly in time to repulse one division of the army before the other could come to its relief. The attack in front was invited by repeated sorties of a body of about four hundred of the enemy, who would deliver their fire, and immediately retreat to their works. After three hours of skirmishing, deliberation, and reconnoitering, General Sullivan determined to divide his force, turn the enemy's left, and attack simultaneously in front and flank.

The artillery was posted on a rising ground, three hundred yards from the enemy, in position to enfilade the main line of their works, and sweep the ground in the rear, Gen. Hand was to support the artillery, the left flanking division to threaten the enemy's right, and Gen. Maxwell's brigade to be held in reserve. Gen. Poor's brigade of four regiments, the right flanking division, and the three companies of riflemen, were to make a circuit of about two miles and turn the enemy's left and attack in flank and rear, to be supported by General Clinton's brigade of four regiments following as a second line. One hour was allowed for this movement, at the expiration of which, the artillery was to open, to be followed by a general assault of the two divisions. Poor almost immediately after commencing his march, found himself involved in a thicket of underbrush, almost impenetrable, but after great difficulty reached the foot of the hill on which the enemy was posted, just at the moment the artillery fire commenced. Forming his line of battle with Lieut. Col. Reid's 2d N.H. on the extreme left, next to him Lieut. Col. Dearborn's 2d N.H., then Alden's 6th Mass., and Col. Cilley's 1st N.H. on the extreme right. To the right of the brigade was the right flanking division of two hundred and fifty men under Col. Dubois, the whole preceded by three companies of riflemen under Maj. Parr. General Clinton's brigade formed line of battle with Col. Gansevoort's 3d N.Y. on the left, next Dubois 5th N.Y., then Livingston's 4th N.Y., with Van Courtlandt's 2d N.Y. on the extreme right, following in the rear of the first line. Poor when about half way up the hill encountered the enemy, but not in sufficient force to materially check the advance of the flanking division, or the regiments on his right; on reaching the summit of the hill, these rapidly pushed forward to seize the defile near the river, a short distance above Newtown, which was the only avenue of escape for the enemy. Almost at the commencement of the cannonade, the main force of the enemy adroitly abandoned their works without being discovered, and precipitated themselves on Col. Reid's regiment in greatly superior numbers. They swarmed about him in a semi-circle, and for a few moments made the forest ring with their exultant shouts, but for a few minutes only; for Col. Dearborn having reached the summit of the hill, and missing Col. Reid on his left, on his own responsibility, faced his regiment to the rear and moved to his assistance. At the same moment the two regiments on the left of Clinton's brigade by a left oblique movement, came up from the rear to Reid's support, and the enemy soon found themselves dangerously threatened. The conflict was short, sharp and decisive, and the war whoop soon gave place to the retreat halloo. Poor with the remainder of his brigade, followed by the two regiments on the right of Clinton, had pushed rapidly for the defile. In the meantime Hand had advanced in front, and the left flanking division under Col. Ogden had worked its way along the river on the enemy's flank, when, the enemy admirably commanded, and wisely discreet, sounded the signal for retreat just in time to escape. A British account says: "In this action Col. Butler and all his people was surrounded, and very near being taken prisoners. On the same day a few miles from this he attempted again to stop them, but in vain. The Colonel lost four rangers killed, two taken prisoners and seven wounded." Twelve Indians were found dead on the field, the number of wounded unknown. The enemy were pursued for two or three miles above Newtown by the light troops, where Salmon says they made another stand, which appears to be confirmed by the account above quoted, but no details are given, and the matter is not alluded to in Gen. Sullivan's official report. The loss in killed according to the Indian official account, found four days after, near Catharine's town is as follows: "Sept. 3d.—This day found a tree marked 1779, Thandagana, the English of which is Brant, 12 men marked on it with arrows pierced through them, signifying the number they had lost in the action of the 29th ultimo. A small tree was twisted round like a rope and bent down which signified that if we drove and distressed them, yet we would not conquer them."