Front matter (continued 4)
Reading edition
The Justificatory Memorandum to the Navy Law (of 1898) left no doubt as to the military significance of the Battle Fleet. It is therein expressly stated:
"Against greater sea-powers the Battle Fleet would have importance merely as a sortie fleet."
That is to say, the fleet would have to withdraw into the harbour and there wait for a favourable opportunity for making a sortie. Even if it should obtain a success in such a sortie, it would nevertheless, like the enemy, suffer considerable loss of ships. The stronger enemy could make good his losses, we could not. In war with a substantially superior sea-power, the Battle Fleet provided for by the Navy Law would render a blockade more difficult, especially in the first phase of the war, but would never be able to prevent it. To subdue it, or, after it had been considerably weakened, to confine it in its own harbour would always be merely a question of time. So soon as this had happened, no great State could be more easily cut off than Germany from all sea intercourse worthy of the name—of her own ships as also of the ships of neutral Powers. To effect this it would not be necessary to control long stretches of coast, but merely to blockade the few big seaports.
In the same way as the traffic to the home ports, the German mercantile ships on all the seas of the world would be left to the mercy of an enemy who was more powerful on the sea. Hostile cruisers on the main trade-routes, in the Skager-Rack, in the English Channel, off the north of Scotland, in the Straits of Gibraltar, at the entrance to the Suez Canal, and at the Cape of Good Hope, would render German shipping practically impossible.
Also with regard to this the Justificatory Memorandum to the Naval Law (of 1898) speaks unambiguously. In it is observed:
"Protection of sea trade on all the seas would occur principally in time of peace. In case of war it would be the task of the foreign service cruisers to afford their own mercantile ships the 'utmost possible protection.'"
That is to say, the ships would do the "utmost possible." What would be possible in this respect is clear when it is realized that the Navy Law provides altogether for forty-two cruisers, whilst the greatest Naval Power, for example, to-day already possesses 206 cruisers (finished or under construction), and, moreover, has at its disposal bases and coaling stations on all the chief trade-routes.
To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies in the existing circumstances there is only one means—Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea-power a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world.
For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Battle Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.
In order to attain the goal which has been set, the protection of our sea trade and of our colonies by ensuring a peace with honour, Germany requires, according to the standard of the strength-relationships of the great Sea-Powers, and having regard to our tactical formations, two double squadrons of efficient battleships, with the necessary cruisers, torpedo-boats, and so on, pertaining thereto. As the Navy Law (of 1898) provides for only two squadrons, the building of a third and fourth squadron is contemplated. Of these four squadrons two will form a fleet. The second fleet is to be organized in its tactical composition in the same way as the first fleet provided for in the Navy Law.
For the scope of the maintenance in commission in time of peace the following consideration has been decisive: As the ship-establishment of the German Navy, even after the carrying out of the projected increase, will still be more or less inferior to the ship-establishments of some other great Powers, compensation must be sought in the training of the personnel and in tactical training in the larger combinations.
A trustworthy training of the separate ships' crews, as well as an adequate training in the larger tactical combinations, can be ensured only by permanent maintenance in commission in time of peace. To economize in commissioning in time of peace would mean to jeopardize the efficiency of the fleet for the event of war.
The minimum of commissioning is the permanent formation of that fleet which comprises the newest and best ships as an active combination—that is to say, a combination in which all battleships and cruisers are in commission. This fleet would form the school for tactical training in double squadron, and in case of war would bear the first shock. For the second fleet, which will comprise the older battleships, it must suffice if only half of the ships are permanently in commission.[19] For training in the larger combination some further ships must then, it is true, be placed temporarily in commission during the man[oe]uvres. In case of war this second fleet—the Reserve Battle Fleet—will have to make up its arrears in the training of the separate ships' crews and the deficiency of training in the larger combination behind the protection afforded by the Active Battle Fleet.
If Germany possesses four squadrons of efficient battleships, a coast squadron composed of small armoured ships is less important.
Besides the increase of the home Battle Fleet, an increase of the foreign service ships is also necessary. In consequence of the occupation of Kiauchow and the great enhancement of our oversea interests in the last two years, it has already become necessary, at the cost of the scouting ships of the Battle Fleet, to send abroad two large ships more than were provided for by the plan of the Navy Law. Indeed, for an effective representation of our interests it would have been necessary to send out even more ships, if such had only been available. In order to form a judgment of the importance of an increase of the foreign service ships, it must be realized that they are the representatives abroad of the German defence forces, and that the task often falls to them of gathering in the fruits which the maritime potency created for the Empire by the home Battle Fleet has permitted to ripen.
Moreover, an adequate representation on the spot, supported on a strong home Battle Fleet, in many cases averts differences, and so contributes to maintain peace while fully upholding German honour and German interests.
A numerical demonstration of the additional requirements cannot be given for a considerable time in advance in the same manner as for the Battle Fleet, which rests upon an organic foundation.
If the demand is made that the foreign service fleet shall be in a position (1) energetically to uphold German interests everywhere in time of peace, (2) to be adequate for warlike conflicts with oversea States without navies deserving of the name, an increase of at least five large and five small cruisers, as well as of one large and two small cruisers as material reserve, seems called for. The Navy Law foresees as ready for use three large and ten small cruisers, and as material reserve three large and four small cruisers.
A distribution of the foreign service fleet among the foreign stations cannot be given, as this distribution depends upon the political circumstances, and these can only be estimated from case to case.
FOOTNOTES:
APPENDIX II
British and German Shipbuilding Programmes.
The following table shows the British and German ships laid down between 1897 and 1914 and the programmes of subsequent years—the British figures for 1915-18 being based on the Admiralty forecast, and the German on the latest German Fleet Law:
Great Britain. Germany.
Battle ships. Armoured Cruisers. Protected Cruisers. Destroyers. Torpedo Boats. Battle ships. Armoured Cruisers. Protected Cruisers. Destroyers.
Mixed armament period {1897-1898 4 4 3 6 — 1 — — —
{1898-1899 7 8 1 12 — 2 1 2 6
{1899-1900 2 2 1 — 2 3 — 2 6
{1900-1901 2 6 1 5 2 2 — 2 6
{1901-1902 3 6 2 10 5 2 1 3 6
{1902-1903 2 2 6[20] 9 4 2 1 3 6
{1903-1904 5 4 4[20] 15 — 2 1 2 6
{1904-1905 2 3 — — — 2 1 3 6
{1905-1906 — — — — — 2 1 3 6
—— ———— ——— ———— ——— —— ———— ———— ————
Totals 27 35 18 57 13 18 6 20 48
—— ———— ——— ———— ——— —— ———— ———— ————
Dreadnought period {1905-1906 4 — — 6 12[21] — — — —
{1906-1907 3 — — 2 12[21] 2 1 2 12
{1907-1908 3 — 1 5 12[21] 3 — 2 12
{1908-1909 2 — 6 16 — 4 — 2 12
{1909-1910 8 — 6 20 — 4 — 2 12
{1910-1911 5 — 5 20 — 4 — 2 12
{1911-1912 5 — 4 20 — 4 — 2 12
{1912-1913 4 — 8[22] 20 — 2 — 2 12
{1913-1914 5 — 8 16 — 3 — 2 12
{1914-1915 4 — 4 12 — 2 — 2 12
—— ———— ——— ———— ——— —— ———— ———— ————
—— ———— ——— ———— ——— —— ———— ———— ————
Totals authorised (1905-1914) (Dreadnought period) 43 — 42 137 36 28 1 18 108
As is explained elsewhere, Germany has remained faithful to the policy outlined in the Memorandum, but by successive Navy Acts she greatly increased the means for giving effect to it—one legislative measure succeeding another in quick succession, always making an increase in the naval establishment.
FOOTNOTES:
END.