Volume 10 — SALUS PUBLICA—BISMARCK'S ONLY LODE-STAR

February 24, 1881

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[On February 24, 1881, the budget of the empire for the ensuing year was under discussion. The representative, Mr. Richter, made use of this opportunity to attack the home-politics of the chancellor in their entirety. He felt great concern about the growing power of the chancellor, and called upon his liberal colleagues to stem the tide, and to curb the power of the chancellor. "Only if this is done will the great gifts which distinguish the chancellor continue to be fruitful for Germany. If this is not possible, and if we go on as we have been going, the chancellor will ruin himself, and he will ruin the country." Prince Bismarck replied:]

The remarks of the previous speaker have hardly touched on the subject under discussion, the budget, since I have been here. Consequently I am excused, I suppose, from adding anything to what the secretary of the treasury has said. The previous speaker has mainly concerned himself with a critique of my personality. The number of times the word "chancellor" appears in his speech in proportion to the total number of words sufficiently justifies my assertion. Well, I do not know what is the use of this critique, if not to instruct me and to educate me. But I am in my sixty-sixth year and in the twentieth of my tenure of office—there will not be much in me to improve. You will have to use me up as I am or push me aside. I, on my part, have never made the attempt to educate the Honorable Mr. Richter—I do not think I am called upon to do it; nor have I endeavored to force him from his sphere of activity—I should not have the means of doing this, nor do I wish it. But I believe he in his turn will lack the means of forcing me from my position. Whether he will be able to compress me and circumscribe me, as toward the end of his speech he said was desirable, I do not know. I am, however, truly grateful to him for the concern he expressed about my health. Unfortunately, if I wish to do my duty, I cannot take such care of myself as Mr. Richter deems desirable—I shall have to risk my health.

When he said that every evil troubling us, even the rate of interest and I know not what else, was based on the uncertainty of our conditions, and when he quoted the word of a colleague of a "hopeless confusion"—well, gentlemen, then I must repeat what I have said elsewhere and in the hearing of the Honorable Mr. Richter: Make a comparison and look about you in other countries! If our conditions with their ordered activities and their assured future at home and abroad constitute a "hopeless confusion," how shall we characterize the conditions of many another country? I can see in no European country a condition of safety and an assured outlook into the future similar to that prevailing in the German empire. I have already said on the former occasion that my position as minister of foreign affairs made it impossible for me to be specific. But everyone who will follow my remarks with a map in his hand, and a knowledge of history during the past twenty years, will have to say that I am right. I do not know what is the use of these exaggerations of a "hopeless confusion" and "a lack of assurance and uncertainty of the future." Nobody in the country believes it; and isn't that the chief thing? The people in the country know perfectly well how they are off, and all who do not fare as they wish are pleased to blame the government for it. When a candidate comes up for election, and says to them: "The government—or to quote the previous speaker—the chancellor is to blame for all this," he may find many credulous people, but in the majority he will find people who will say: "The chancellor surely has his faults and drawbacks"—but most people will not be convinced that I am to blame for everything. I am faring in this respect like Emperor Napoleon twelve years and more ago, who was accused, not in his own country but in Europe, as the cause of all evils, from Tartary to Spain, and he was not nearly so bad a creature as he was said to be—may I not also claim the benefit of this doubt with Mr. Richter? I, too, am not so bad as I am painted. His attack upon me, moreover, if he will stop to reflect, is largely directed not against me personally, or against that part of my activities in which I possess freedom of action, no—it is directed primarily against the constitution of the German empire. The constitution of the German empire knows no other responsible officer but the chancellor. I might assert that my constitutional responsibility does not go nearly so far as the one actually placed upon me; and I might take things a little easier and say: "I have nothing to do with the home policies of the empire, for I am only the emperor's executive officer." But I will not do this. From the beginning I have assumed the responsibility, and also the obligation, of defending the decisions of the Bundesrat, provided I can reconcile them with my responsibility, even if I find myself there in the minority. This responsibility I will take as public opinion understands it. Nobody, however, can be held responsible for acts and resolves not his own. No responsibility can be foisted on anybody—nor did the imperial constitution intend to do this—for acts which do not depend on his own free will, and into which he can be forced. The responsible person, therefore, must enjoy complete independence and freedom within the sphere of his responsibility. If he does not, all responsibility ceases; and I do not know on whose shoulders it will rest—so far as the empire is concerned it has disappeared completely.

As long, therefore, as Mr. Richter does not change the constitution, you yourselves must insist on having a chancellor who is absolutely free and independent in his decisions, for no man can hold him responsible for those things which he is unable to decide for himself, freely and independently. Mr. Richter has expressed the wish of limiting in several directions this constitutional independence of the chancellor. In the first place, in one direction where it is already limited and where he wishes to have it disappear entirely. This concerns his responsibility for those acts in our political life which the constitution assigns to the emperor in connection with the decisions of the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. There can be no doubt that these acts include also those which have to be performed, as the constitution says, in the name of the emperor; the submission, for instance, to the Reichstag of a resolve of the Bundesrat. Mr. Richter has correctly quoted an incident, mentioned in the North German Gazette, concerning the resolves on some collected cases of accidents, which I considered it incompatible with my responsibility to submit to you in the name of the emperor. I, therefore, did not do it. One may well ask: What has the constitutional law to say on this point? Was I justified in not acting? Was the emperor justified in not acting! Or was His Majesty the Emperor bound by the constitution to submit to you the resolve of the Bundesrat?

At the time when the constitution was being drawn I once discussed this point with an astute jurist, who had long been and still is with us in an important position—Mr. Pape. He said to me: "The emperor has no veto." I replied, "Constitutionally he has not, but suppose a measure is expected of him which he thinks he should not take, and against which his then chancellor warns him, saying: I cannot advocate it, and I shall not countersign it. Well, in this case is the emperor obliged to look for another chancellor, and to dismiss him who opposes the measure? Is he obliged to accept anyone as chancellor, suggested perhaps by the other party? Will he look for a second or third chancellor, both of whom may say: We cannot assume the responsibility for this bill by submitting it to the Reichstag?" Hereupon Mr. Pape replied: "You are right, the emperor possesses an indirect but actual veto."

I do not even go so far, for none of these cases are pressed to their logical conclusion. Let us, however, take a concrete case, which will make these matters perfectly clear. Suppose the majority of the Bundesrat had passed a bill with the approval of Prussia, but Prussia had made the mistake of not calling upon the Prussian minister designated to instruct the Prussian delegation in the Bundesrat; or even—Prussia had consented and the minister had been present, and had been in the minority also in the Prussian cabinet, and the emperor had directed him to submit the resolves of the Bundesrat to the Reichstag, to which the chancellor had replied: "I do not believe that I can answer for this, or that my responsibility permits me to do it." Then there results the possibility of the emperor's saying: "If that is so, I must look for another chancellor." This did not happen; another thing happened, namely—the resolve was not submitted. The ensuing situation is this, that the persons entitled to complain—if there are any—constitute the majority of the governments who passed this resolve in the Bundesrat.

This points the proper way, and I believe in weighty questions it would be taken to the end. In the present case if one were to make a test of what is really right, the majority of the Bundesrat would have to represent to His Majesty as follows: "We have passed a resolve, and our constitutional right demands that the emperor submit it to the Reichstag. We demand that this be done." The emperor might reply: "I will not investigate the law of the case to see whether I am obliged to act. I will assume that I am, and I do not refuse to act, but for the present I have no chancellor willing to countersign the order." In such a case can the chancellor be ordered to sign, because he shall and must do so? Can he be threatened with imprisonment as is done with recalcitrant witnesses? What would then become of his responsibility! If the chancellor continues to refuse, the majority of the Bundesrat may say to the emperor: "You must dismiss this chancellor and get another. We insist that our resolve be laid before the Reichstag. If this is not done, the constitution will be broken." Well, gentlemen, why not wait and see whether this will happen, and whether those entitled to complain will take this course, and if they do, whether His Majesty the Emperor will not be ready to say after all: "All right, I shall try to find a chancellor who is willing to submit the resolve."

I shall, of course, not enter here upon a discussion of the reasons which determined me in this concrete case. They were reasons not found in shut-in offices, but in God's open country, and they induced me to deem the enactment of this law undesirable. I did not possess the certainty that a majority of this house would have seen the impossibility of carrying out the law, but I did not wish to expose the country to the danger—it was a danger according to my way of thinking—of getting this law. The only moment when I could guard against this danger was when the law was to be submitted in the name of the emperor. The constitutional remedy against such a use of an opportunity is a change of chancellors. I can see no other remedy.

Mentioning the Reichstag brings me to my coöperation with it. Mr. Richter's ideal is, it seems to me, a bashful, cautious chancellor who throws out careful feelers whether he may offend here, if he does this, or offend there—one who does not wait for a final vote of the Reichstag, but rushes home excitedly, as I have often seen my colleagues do, exclaiming: "Oh God, the law is lost, this man and that man are opposed to it"—and three weeks later the law has Passed in spite of them. I cannot enter upon such a policy of conjecture and proof by inference of what may be determined in the Reichstag when the tendency of those who talk the loudest, but who are not always the most influential, happens to be against a bill; and if Mr. Richter should succeed in procuring such a timid chancellor anxiously listening for every hint, my advice to you, gentlemen, is to tolerate him in this position as briefly as possible. For if a leading minister—and such he is in the empire—has no opinion his own, and must hear from others what he should believe and do, then you do not need him at all. What Mr. Richter proposes is the government of the State by the Reichstag, the government of the State by itself, as it has been called in France, by its own chosen representatives. A chancellor, a minister who does not dare to submit a bill of the ultimate success of which he is not absolutely sure is no minister. He might as well move among you with the white sign (of a page) inquiring whether you will permit him to submit this or that. For such a part I am not made!

To what extent I am ready to submit to the Bundesrat I have already tried to explain, and I have closed with these words "sub judice lis est" (the case is still in court). I need not say now whether my constitutional conviction would make me yield to the majority of the Bundesrat, if they should demand it. This question has not yet arisen; the majority has not demanded it. Whether I shall maintain my opposition, if the demand is pressed, to this question I reply: non liquet (it is a moot-point); we shall see what happens. Such things are eventually decided by the old law which the Romans were astonished to find with the Germans, and of which they said, "They call it usage." Such a usage has not yet developed in connection with the interpretation of our constitution.

Finally, Mr. Richter has found in me too much independence in a third direction. He has been pleased to believe—if I understood him correctly—that the law concerning ministerial deputies would give me the welcome opportunity of withdrawing to a more ornamental position, to use his own expression, and to leave the duties and activities to those who are deputed to represent me, establishing thus also in the imperial government the famous arcanum of decisions by majorities. But here, too, I must say that Mr. Richter will have to change the constitution before I shall be able to subordinate myself to the highest officials of the empire. How can I appear before you saying: "Well, gentlemen, I am very doubtful whether I can advocate this measure, but the secretary in whose bureau it was worked out thinks so, and following Mr. Richter's advice I have yielded to his authority. If you do not adopt this measure you will gratify me, but not the secretary?" This, too, would be an altogether impossible position, although Mr. Richter is expecting it of me.

The chiefs of the bureaus are not responsible for me, except in so far as the law of deputies substitutes them for me but I am responsible for their actions. I have to guarantee that they are statesmen in general accord with the policy of the empire which I am willing to advocate. If I miss this accord in one of them, not once but continually and on principle, then it is my duty to tell him: "We cannot remain in office, both of us." This, too, is a task which I have never shirked when it has presented itself. It is simply my duty. I have never had need of such artful machinations and pyrotechnics as people claimed I instituted very wilfully last week. You need not think that ministers stick to their posts like many other high officials, whom not even the broadest hints can convince that their time has come. I have not yet found a minister in these days who had not to be persuaded every now and then to continue a little longer in office, and not to be discouraged by his hard and exhausting labor, due to the simultaneous friction with three parliamentary bodies—a House of Representatives, a House of Lords, and a Reichstag—where one relieves another, or two, without waiting to be relieved, are in session at the same time. And when the fight is over and the representatives have returned home well satisfied, then a bureau chief comes to the minister on the day after, saying: "It is time now to get the recommendations for the next session into shape."

The whole business, moreover, while very honorable, is scarcely pleasurable. Is any one obliged to submit to such public, sharp and impolite criticisms as a German minister? Is it true of anyone but him that the behavior customary among people of culture does not prevail when he addressed? Without the least scruple one says things to him publicly which one would be ashamed to say to him privately, if one were to meet him in a drawing-room, for instance. I should not say this here if the Reichstag did not hold an exceptional position in Germany in these matters as well as in everything else. Here I have never had to hear, so far as I remember, as sharp remarks as in other assemblies. At any rate I have a conciliatory memory. But on the whole you will agree with me that the tone of our public debates is less elevated than that of our social gatherings, especially when our ministers are addressed, but at times even among fellow members, although of this I am no competent critic. I do not even criticize the behavior toward the ministers, for I am hardened by an experience of many years and can stand it. I am merely describing the reasons why no minister clings to his post, and why you do me an injustice if you believe that it takes an artful effort to make a minister yield his place. Not many of them have been accustomed to see a totally ignorant correspondent tear an experienced minister to pieces in the press as if he were a stupid schoolboy. We see this in every newspaper every day, but we can stand it. We do not complain. But can anyone say that the members of the government—the bureau chiefs frequently fare even worse—meet in the parliamentary debates with that urbaneness of demeanor which characterizes our best society? I do not say "no," leaving it to you to answer this question. I only say that the business of being a minister is very arduous and cheerless, subject to vexations and decidedly exhausting. This brings it about that the ministers are habitually in a mood which makes them readily give up their places as soon as they have found another excuse than the simple: I have had enough, I do not care for more, I am tired of it.

The changes of ministers, however, have not been so many nor so quick with us as they are in other countries, and this I may mention to Mr. Richter as a proof of my amiability as a colleague. Count, if you will, the number of ministers who have crossed the public stage since I entered office in 1862, and sum up the resignations due to other than parliamentary reasons, and you will find a result exceedingly favorable to the accommodating spirit of the German minister when it is compared with that of any other country. I consider, therefore, the insinuating references to my quarrelsome disposition and fickleness distinctly wide of the mark.

In this connection I shall take the liberty of referring with one more word to the reproaches, often occurring in the press and also in the Reichstag, that I had frequently and abruptly changed my views. Well, I am not one of those who at any time of their life have believed, or believe today, that they can learn no more. If a man says to me: "Twenty years ago you held the same opinion as I; I still hold it, but you have changed your views," I reply: "You see, I was as clever twenty years ago as you are today. Today I know more, I have learned things in these twenty years." But, gentlemen, I will not even rely on the justice of the remark that the man who does not learn also fails to progress and cannot keep abreast of his time. People are falling behind when they remain rooted in the position they occupied years ago. However, I do not at all intend to excuse myself with such observations, for I have always had one compass only, one lode-star by which I have steered: Salus Publica, the welfare of the State. Possibly I have often acted rashly and hastily since I first began my career, but whenever I had time to think I have always acted according to the question, "What is useful, advantageous, and right for my fatherland, and—as long as this was only Prussia—for my dynasty, and today—for the German nation?" I have never been a theorist. The systems which bin and separate parties are for me of secondary importance. The nation comes first, its position in the world and its independence, and above all our organization along lines inch will make it possible for us to draw the free breath of a great nation.

Everything else, a liberal, reactionary, or conservative constitution—gentlemen, I freely confess, all this I consider in second place. It is the luxury of furnishing the house, when the house is firmly established. In the interest of the country I can parley now with one person, now with another in purely party questions. Theories I barter away cheaply. First let us build a structure secure on the outside and firmly knit on the inside, and protected by the ties of a national union. After that, when you ask my advice about furnishing the house with more or less liberal constitutional fittings, you may perhaps hear me say, "Ah well, I have no preconceived ideas. Make your suggestions, and, when the sovereign whom I serve agrees, you will find no objections on principle on my part." It can be done thus, and again thus. There are many roads leading to Rome. There are times when one should govern liberally, and times when one should govern autocratically. Everything changes. Nothing is eternal in these matters. But of the structure of the German empire and the union of the German nation I demand that they be free and unassailable, with not only a passing field fortification on one side. I have given to its creation and growth my entire strength from the very beginning. And if you point to a single moment when I have not steered by this direction of the compass-needle, you may perhaps prove that I have erred, but you cannot prove that I have for one moment lost sight of the national goal.

[Illustration: PRINCE BISMARCK FRANZ VON LENBACH]

* * * * *

PRACTICAL CHRISTIANITY

April 2, 1881

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[Prince Bismarck was trying to fight the revolutionary parties, not only with such restrictive laws as had been passed against the Socialists, but also with constructive measures like the one which had been submitted to the Reichstag on March 8, 1881. It proposed the insurance of the workingman against accidents, and the founding of a governmental insurance company. The bill was severely criticized, notably by Eugen Richter, who did not miss the opportunity of attacking also the chancellor personally. Prince Bismarck's reply made a deep impression in the country at large. The bill itself, however, was so badly amended in the Reichstag, that Bismarck urged the Bundesrat to reject it, which it did. Several changes, thereupon, were made in the bill, and, after having been delayed in committee, it was again brought up for discussion in 1884, when another exhaustive speech by the chancellor, on March 15, brought about its acceptance.]

Before turning to the subject in hand, I wish to reply to some remarks of the previous speaker, lest I forget them—they are of so little weight. He finished by saying that my prestige was waning. If he were right, I should feel like saying "Thank God," for prestige is a very burdensome affair. One suffers under its weight, and quickly gets tired of it. I do not care a farthing for it. When I was very much younger, about as old as the previous speaker is now, and when I was possibly still more ambitious than he, I lived for years without prestige, and was actually disliked, if not hated, by the majority of my fellow-citizens. At that time I felt better and more contented, and was healthier than during the years when I was most popular.

Such things do not mean much to me. I am doing my duty, let come what may.

As proof of his assertion the previous speaker claimed that the workingmen are refusing the help which the Imperial Government is trying to offer them. This he cannot possibly know. He has no idea of what the great mass of the workingmen are thinking. Probably he has some accurate information of what the eloquent place-hunters are thinking of the bill, people who are at the head of the labor movements, and the professional publicists, who need a following of workingmen—dissatisfied workingmen. But as to the workingman in general, we had better wait and see what he is thinking. I do not know whether the full meaning of this question has even yet sufficiently penetrated into his circles to make it a subject of discussion, except in the learned clubs of laborers, and among the leading place-hunters and speakers. In the next election we shall be able to tell whether the workingmen have formed their opinion of the bill by then, not to speak of now.

The legislation on which we are entering with this bill has to do with a question which will probably stay on your calendar for a long while. The previous speaker has correctly said that "it opens up a very deep perspective," and it is not at all impossible that it may also make the moderate Socialists judge more kindly of the government. We have been talking of a social question for fifty years; and, since the passage of the law against the Socialists, I have been constantly reminded, officially, from high quarters, and by the people, that we gave a promise at that time. Something positive should be done to remove the causes for Socialism, in so far as they are legitimate. I have received such reminders daily. Nor do I believe that this social question, which has been before us for fifty years now, will be definitely settled even by our children and children's children. No political question ever reaches so complete a mathematical solution that the books can be balanced. Such questions arise, abide a while and finally give way to other historical problems. This is the way of organic developments.

I deem it my duty to take up this question quietly and without party vehemence, because I do not know who else could do this successfully if not the Imperial Government. It is a pity that party questions should be mixed up in it. The previous speaker has referred to a supposedly active exchange of telegrams between "certain parties" and "an high official," which in this case, I must believe, means me. I am mentioning this, in passing, because he said the same thing a few days ago in another speech. Gentlemen, this is a very simple matter. I receive thousands of telegrams; and, being a polite man, I should probably reply also to a telegram from Mr. Richter, if he were to honor me with a friendly despatch. When I am cordially addressed in a message, I have to reply in cordial terms. I cannot possibly have the police ascertain to what party the senders belong. Nor am I so diffident in my views that I should wish to catechize the senders as to their political affiliations. If anybody takes pleasure in making me appear to be a member of anti-semitic societies, let him do so. I have kept away from all undesirable movements, as my position demands, and I could wish that also you gentlemen would refrain more than heretofore from inciting the classes against each other, and from oratorical phrases which fan class-hatred. This refers especially to those gentlemen who have bestowed their kind attention upon the Government and upon me personally. When we heard the representative, Mr. Lasker, say the other day that the policy of the government was aristocratic, this term was bound to render the whole aristocracy and what belongs to it suspected of selfishness in the eyes of the poor men, at whose expense the aristocracy seemingly exists. When such expressions fall on anti-semitic ground, how is it possible to avoid reprisals? The anti-semites will coin their own word with which to designate—as they think appropriately—the policies opposed to ours. The resulting epithet I do not care to mention; every one will think of it himself. When afterwards a newspaper like the Tribune, which is said to be owned by Mr. Bamberger, makes itself the mouthpiece of Mr. Lasker's expression, claiming it to be correct, and hailing the invention of this word as a discovery worthy of Columbus, and when the Tribune finally asserts that "care for the poor" and "aristocracy" cannot exist in the same train of thought, can you not imagine what will happen when all this is turned around, and altered by an anti-semite? Are you in doubt what he will substitute for "aristocracy," and do you not know that he will repeat every twist and turn of speech with which Mr. Bamberger's sheet imputes selfish injustice to the aristocracy?

The representative Mr. Richter has called attention to the responsibility of the State for everything it does in the field on which it is entering today. Well, gentlemen, I feel that the State may become responsible also for the things it does not do. I do not believe that the "laissez faire, laissez aller, theory," and the unadulterated political theories of Manchester, such as "let each one do what he chooses, and fare as he will," or "who is not strong enough to stand, let him be crushed," or "he who has will receive more, and he who has not from him let us take," can be practised in any State, least of all in a monarchical State, governed by the father of his country. On the contrary, I believe that those who shudder at the State exerting its influence for the protection of the weaker brethren, themselves intend to capitalize their strength—be it financial, rhetorical, or what not—that they may gain a following, or oppress the rest, or smooth their own way to party control. They become angry, of course, as soon as their plans are spoiled by the rising influence of the State.

The representative Mr. Richter says this legislation does not go far enough. If he will have patience, we may perhaps be able to satisfy him a little later—one should not be hasty or try to do everything at once! Such laws are not made arbitrarily out of theories and as the result of asking "what kind of law would it be wise to make now?" They are the gradual outgrowth of earlier events. The reason why we come to you today only with an accident-insurance law is because this branch of the care of the poor and the weak was especially vigorous even before I seriously concerned myself with such matters. Bequests, suggestions, and notes for such a bill were on file when I assumed office. According to the records this bill was needed more than any other. When I began to study it, I must confess that it did not seem to me to go far enough in theory, and that I was tempted to change the words which occur, I believe in the first paragraph, "every workingman who" and "shall be reimbursed in such and such a way," to read, "every German." There is something ideal in this change. If one thinks of it more seriously, however, and especially if one plans to include also the independent workmen, who meet with an accident at no one's behest but their own, the question of insurance is even more difficult. No two hours' speech of any representative can give us so much concern as this problem has given us: "How far is it possible to extend this law without creating at the very start an unfavorable condition, or reaching out too far and thus overreaching ourselves?" As a farmer I was tempted to ask, whether it would be possible to extend the insurance, for instance, also to the farmhands, who constitute the majority of the workingmen in our eastern provinces. I shall not give up hope that this may be possible, but there are difficulties, which for the time being have prevented us from doing this; and concerning these I wish to say a few words.

The farming industry, in so far as it has to do with machinery and elemental forces, is, of course, not excluded from the law. But the remaining great majority of the country population also comes in frequent contact with machines, although these are set in motion not by elemental forces, but by horses or fellow-laborers. Such occupations are often dangerous and unwholesome, but it is exceedingly difficult to gather statistics and percentages, and to define the necessary amount of contributions to an insurance fund. The representative Mr. Richter knows, apparently from experience, the proper percentage in every branch of human occupation, for he has quoted his figures with much assurance. I should be grateful to him if he would mention also the source of his valuable information. We have done the best we could. The preliminary drafts of the bill were based on carefully selected facts—notice please, selected facts, and not arbitrary statistics based on conjecture. If we had discovered those figures, which the quicker eye of the honorable Mr. Richter seems to have detected at a glance, and if we had believed them to be accurate, we should have gone further in this bill.

When I say that I do not give up hope that the farming industry may yet be included, I am thinking of an organization which cannot be created at one session of the Reichstag. Like the child which must be small if it is to be born at all, and which gradually assumes its proper proportions by growth, so also this organization will have to develop gradually. Eventually the various branches of industry which have insured their laborers should be formed into incorporated associations, and each association should raise among its own members the premiums needed for the proper insurance of its laborers. It should at the same time exercise supervision over its members to the extent that the dues should be as low as possible. Or, to put it differently, the personal interest of the contributing members should see to it that adequate means for the prevention of accidents are adopted. If this can be accomplished by a gradual advance based on experience, we may also hope to find, by experience, the proper percentage as regards that branch of farming which does not employ elemental forces.

Our lack of experience in these matters has also induced us to be very careful about the assessment of the necessary contributions. I certainly should not have the courage to press this bill if the expenses which it entails were to be borne exclusively by the various industries. If the assistance which the State would render—either by provincial or county associations, or directly—were to be entirely omitted, I should not dare to answer to our industries for the consequences of this law. Perhaps this can be done, and after a few years of experience we may be able to judge whether it is possible. The State contribution, therefore, may be limited at first to three years, or to whatever period you wish. But without any actual experience, without any practical test of what we are to expect, I do not dare to burden our industries with all the expenses of this government-institution, and to add to their taxes. I do not dare to place upon them the whole burden of caring for the injured factory or mill hands. The county associations used to do this, and in the future it will be done more fully and in a more dignified way by the insurers and the State.

No entirely new charges are here contemplated; the charges are merely transferred from the county associations to the State. I do not deny that the tax of him who pays and the advantages which accrue to the laborer will be increased. The increase, however, does not equal the full third which the State is to bear, but only the difference between what at present the county associations are obliged to do for the injured workingmen, and what these men will receive in future. You see, it is purely a question of improving the lot of the laboring man. This difference, therefore, is the only new charge on the State, with which you have to reckon. And you will have to ask yourselves: "Is the advantage gained worth this difference,—when we aim to procure for the laborer who has been injured a better and more adequate support, and relieve him of the necessity of having to fight for his right in court, and when he will receive without delay the moderate stipend which the State decrees?" I feel like answering the question with a strong affirmative.

Our present poor laws keep the injured laboring man from starvation. According to law, at least, nobody need starve. Whether in reality this never happens I do not know. But this is not enough in order to let the men look contentedly into the future and to their own old age. The present bill intends to keep the sense of human dignity alive which even the poorest German should enjoy, if I have my way. He should feel that he is no mere eleemosynary, but that he possesses a fund which is his very own. No one shall have the right to dispose of it, or to take it from him, however poor he may be. This fund will open for him many a door, which otherwise will remain closed to him and it will secure for him better treatment in the house where he has been received, because when he leaves he can take away with him whatever contributions he has been making to the household expenses.

If you have ever personally investigated the conditions of the poor in our large cities, or of the village paupers in the country, you have been able to observe the wretched treatment which the poor occasionally receive even in the best managed communities, especially if they are physically weak or crippled. This happens in the houses of their stepmothers, or relatives of any kind, yes also in those of their nearest of kin. Knowing this, are you not obliged to confess that every healthy laboring man, who sees such things, must say to himself: "Is it not terrible that a man is thus degraded in the house which he used to inhabit as master and that his neighbor's dog is not worse off than he?" Such things do happen. What protection is there for a poor cripple, who is pushed into a corner, and is not given enough to eat? There is none. But if he has as little as 100 or 200 marks of his own, the people will think twice before they oppress him. We have been in a position to observe this in the case of the military invalids. Although only five or six dollars are paid every month, this actual cash amounts to something in the household where the poor are boarded, and the thrifty housewife is careful not to offend or to lose the boarder who pays cash.

I, therefore, assure you that we felt the need of insisting by this law on a treatment of the poor which should be worthy of humanity. Next year I shall be able fully to satisfy Mr. Richter in regard to the amount and the extent of attention which the State will give to a better and more adequate care of all the unemployed. This will come as a natural consequence, whether or no the present bill is passed. Today this bill is a test, as it were. We are sounding to see how deep the waters are, financially, into which we are asking the State and the country to enter. You cannot guard yourselves against such problems by delivering elegant and sonorous speeches, in which you recommend the improvement of our laws of liability, without in the least indicating how this can be done. In this way you cannot settle these questions, for you are acting like the ostrich, who hides his head lest he see his danger. The Government has seen its duty and is facing, calmly and without fear, the dangers which we heard described here a few days ago most eloquently and of which we were given convincing proofs.

We should, however, also remove, as much as possible, the causes which are used to excite the people, and which alone render them susceptible to criminal doctrines. It is immaterial to me whether or no you will call this Socialism. If you call it Socialism, you must have the remarkable wish of placing the Imperial Government, in so far as this bill of the allied governments is concerned, in the range of the very critique which Mr. von Puttkamer passed here on the endeavors of the Socialists. It would then almost seem that with this bill only a very small distance separated us from the murderous band of Hasselmann, the incendiary writings of Most, and the revolutionary conspiracies of the Congress of Wyden; and that even this distance would soon disappear. Well, gentlemen, this is, of course, the very opposite of true. Those who fight with such oratorical and meaningless niceties are counting on the many meanings of the word "socialism." As a result of the kind of programs which the Socialists have issued, this term is, in our public opinion today, almost synonymous with "criminal." If the government endeavors to treat the injured workingmen better in the future, and especially more becomingly, and not to offer to their as yet vigorous brethren the spectacle, as it were, of an old man on the dump heap slowly starving to death, this cannot be called socialistic in the sense in which that murderous band was painted to us the other day. People are playing a cheap game with the shadow on the wall when they call our endeavors socialistic.

If the representative Mr. Bamberger, who took no offense at the word "Christian," wishes to give a name to our endeavors which I could cheerfully accept, let it be: "Practical Christianity," but sans phrase, for we shall not pay the people with words and speeches, but with actual improvements. Yet, death alone is had for the asking. If you refuse to reach into your pocketbook, or that of the State, you will not accomplish anything. If you should place the whole burden on the industries, I do not know whether they could bear it. Some might be able to do it, but not all. Those who could do it are the industries where the wages are but a small fraction of the total cost of production. Among such I mention the chemical factories, and the mills which with twenty mill hands can do an annual business of several million marks. The great mass of laborers, however, does not work in such establishments, which I am tempted to call aristocratic—without wishing to excite any class-hatred. They are in industries where the wages amount to 80 or 90 per cent, of the cost of production. Whether the latter can bear the additional burden I do not know.

It is, moreover, perfectly immaterial whether the assessment is made on the employer or on the employee. In either case the industry will have to bear it, for the contribution of the laborer will eventually, and of necessity, be added to the expenses of the industry. There is a general complaint that the average wages of the laborers make the saving of a surplus impossible. If you wish, therefore, to add a burden to the laborers whose present wages are no more than sufficient, the employers will have to increase the wages, or the laborers will leave them for other occupations.

The previous speaker called the bill defective, because the principle of relieving the laborer from all contributions had not been consistently followed; and he spoke as if this principle had not been at all followed. Laborers, receiving more than 750 marks in three hundred working days, are, it is true, not affected by it; and this is due to the origin of the bill. The first draft read that one-third of the contributions should be made by those county associations which would have to support the injured man in conformity with the poor-laws of the State. We did not wish merely to make a gift to these associations, which at present are responsible for 80 per cent. of all injured working-men, that is for those who do not come under the law of liability. We, therefore, accepted as just the proposition that these associations should pay one-third toward the insurance of those men who formerly would have become their charges. Laborers, however, whose pay is large enough to keep them from becoming public charges, when they meet with an accident, hold an exceptional position. I am, nevertheless, perfectly willing to drop this exception in the bill, as I have said repeatedly. But since the Reichstag in its entirety has thus far placed itself on record as opposed to any contribution from the State, I should not gain thereby any votes for the bill. I wish to declare, however, that this limit of 750 marks is of no consequence compared with the theory on which the bill is based. It arose from a sense of justice toward the county associations, which were not to be burdened with higher taxes than would equal their savings under this bill. Later it was discovered from many actual examples that the insurance according to the existing county associations was impossible, because the State, which really is responsible for the care of the poor, had distributed it in an arbitrary and unjust way on the various county associations. Small and weak country communities are often overburdened with the care of poor people, while large and wealthy communities may have practically no charges, since the geographical position alone has determined the membership in the various county associations. The result, therefore, of levying the necessary contributions on these associations would have been a very uneven distribution of the assessments. Being convinced of this, I suggested the substitution of "provincial association" for "county association"; and thus the bill read for several weeks, until we yielded to the wishes of the allied states and of the Economic Council, and left to each state the question whether it wished to take the place of these various associations or preferred to call upon them in any way it chose. These are the steps by which we reached the 750 mark exemption, and the unconditional share which is to be paid by the State. This share is nothing but a hint to the legislature how to distribute the care of the poor to the various county—and other associations. Whatever is done, you will agree with me that we need a revision of our poor-laws. Just how this will eventually be accomplished is immaterial to me.

I am not astonished that the most divergent views are held on this new subject, which touches our lives very intimately, and which no experience has as yet illuminated. Because of this divergence of opinion I am also aware that we may be unable to pass an acceptable law at this session. My own interest in this entire work would be very much lessened if I were to notice that the principle of a State contribution were to be definitely rejected, and that the legislative assembly of the country were to vote against State-contributions. This would transfer the whole matter to the sphere of open commerce, if I may say so, and in that case it might be better to leave the insurance to private enterprise rather than to establish a State-institution without any compulsion. I should certainly not have the courage to exercise compulsion, if the State did not at the same time make a contribution.

If compulsion is exercised, it is necessary for the law to establish a department of insurance. This is cheaper and safer than any company. You cannot expose the savings of the poor to possible insolvency, nor can you allow any part of the contributions to be used for the payment of dividends or interest on stocks and bonds. The representative Mr. Bamberger based his opposition to the bill—you remember his strong words—largely on his sorrow at the impending ruin of the insurance companies. He said they would be crushed and annihilated, and he added, that they were soliciting the gratitude of their fellow-citizens. I always thought they were soliciting the money of their fellow-citizens. If in addition they can get their gratitude, they are turning a very clever trick. That they should be willing, like good souls, to sacrifice themselves in the interest of the workingmen, and establish their institutions of insurance without issuing any shares, I have never believed, and it would be difficult to convince me of it. According to my feeling of right and wrong, we cannot force anybody to join private insurance companies which may become bankrupt even under good management, owing to fluctuations in the market, or to panics, and which have to arrange their premiums so that dividends are realized for those who are investing their capital, or at least interest on the invested money and the hope of dividends. To this I cannot lend my assistance. If the State is going to exercise compulsion, it must, I believe, undertake the insurance itself. It may be the empire for all, or the individual State—but, without this, no compulsion!

Nor have I the courage, as I have already said, to exercise any compulsion if I cannot offer something in return. This contribution of a third is, as I said before, much smaller than it looks, because the associations will be greatly relieved of the old burdens which the State had imposed on them. If this is communism, as the last speaker called it, and not socialism, I do not care one iota. I shall call it again and again "practical Christianity legally demonstrated." If, however, it is communism, then communism has been extensively practised in the districts for a long while, and actually under State compulsion.

The previous speaker said that by our method the lower classes would be oppressed with indirect taxes in order to collect the funds for the care of the poor. But I ask you, gentlemen, what is being done in the large cities, in Berlin for instance, which the speaker thinks is splendidly governed by the liberal ring? Here the poor man is taken care of with the proceeds of the tax on rents, which is exacted of his slightly less poor brother; and to-morrow he may have this brother as his companion in misery, when a warrant is executed against the latter for the non-payment of this tax. That is more cruel than if the payment were made from the tax on tobacco or on alcohol.

The previous speaker said that I had spoken against the tax on alcohol. I really do not remember this, and I should be grateful if he would prove this by quoting one word. I have always mentioned tobacco and alcohol as commodities on which larger taxes should be levied, but I have expressed a doubt whether it is right to tax the alcohol in factories while it is being made. Many States, as for instance France, do not levy any tax on alcohol, or assess it at a different time. The representative, therefore, has made a mistake—no doubt unintentionally. When, however, this mistake will be printed, without refutation, in many papers, which are under his influence, it will, I am sure, make no mean impression.

I will not dilate on the defects of the law of liability, which will be discussed by experienced men, who have had more to do with it than I. These defects, however, added their weight to the promise we made when the law against the Socialists was promulgated—you undoubtedly remember it and I have been reminded of it often enough—and were my chief reasons for submitting to you the present bill. Our present law of liability has shown surprisingly bad results. I have convinced myself, by actual occurrences, that the suits arising under this law often terminate unexpectedly and unfairly, if they are successful. And if they are unsuccessful, they are frequently equally unfair. I have been assured by many creditable people that this law does not improve the relations between the employer and the employees. On the contrary, the bitter feeling between them is increased, wherever there are many such suits, especially where there are shyster-lawyers who like to sow discord with an eye to the elections. This is in strong contrast to the good intentions of the law. The workingmen, however, consider themselves injured by it, because not even a decree of the court will convince them that they are wrong, especially if they have lawyers who tell them they are right, and that they should appeal their cases to four or five higher courts, if there were as many.

These observations made me wish to introduce a system which would work smoothly, and in which there would be no question of suits-at-law, or investigations into anyone's culpability. The latter is quite immaterial for him who has been injured. He remains unfortunate, crippled, and unable to earn a living, if this has been his lot, or, if he has been killed, his family is left without its bread-winner, whether the accident was due to criminal neglect, carelessness, or unavoidable circumstances. These are not questions of corrective or distributive justice, but of protection. Without a proper law a great part of our population is helpless before the hardships of life, or the consequences of an accident. Without any capital of their own these people have no redress against the cruelties which are the lot of the pauper who has become a public charge.

I will not reply at length to the reproach that this is communism, but I should like to ask you not to discuss everything from the point of view of party-strategy, or faction-strategy, or from the feeling "away with Bismarck." We have to do here with matters where not one of us can see his way clearly, and where we must search for the right road with sticks and sounding-rods. I should like to see another man in my place as speedily as possible, if he would continue my work. I should gladly say to him, "Son, take up your father's spear," even if he were not my own son. This undesirable way of discussing matters showed itself the other day, when the gentlemen fought for "the poor man," as if they had to do with the body of Patroclus. Mr. Lasker took hold of him at one end, and I tried to snatch him away from Mr. Lasker as best I could. But where do imputed motives, and class-hatred, and the excitement of misery and suffering lead us? Such behavior comes too near being socialism in the sense in which Mr. von Puttkamer exposed it the other day.

Alms constitute the first step of Christian charity, such as must exist in France, for instance, to a great extent. There are no poor-laws in France, and every poor man has the right to starve to death if charitable people do not prevent him from doing so. Charity is the first duty, and the second is, the assistance given by districts and according to law. A State, however, which is composed very largely of Christians—even if you are horrified at hearing it called a Christian State,—should let itself be permeated with the principles which it confesses, and especially with those which have to do with the help of our neighbors, and the sympathy one feels for the lot which threatens the old and the sick.

The extensive discussions, which I have partly heard, and partly read in the Parliamentary extracts of yesterday, compel me to make some further observations. The representative Mr. Richter has said that the whole bill amounted to a subsidy of the big industries. Well, here again, you have an instance of class-hatred, which would receive new fuel if his words were true. I do not know why you assume that the Government cherishes a blind and special love for the big industries. The big manufacturers are, it is true, children of fortune, and this creates no good will toward them among the rest of the people. But to weaken or to confine their existence would be a very foolish experiment. If we dropped our big industries, making it impossible for them to compete with those of other countries, and if we placed burdens on them which they have not yet been proved able to bear, we might meet with the approval of all who are vexed at seeing anybody richer than other people, most especially than themselves. But, if we ruin the big industries, what shall we do with the laborers? In such a case we should be facing the problem, to which the representative Mr. Richter referred with much concern, of the organization of labor. If a business, employing twenty thousand laborers and more, goes to pieces, and if the big industries go to pieces, because they have been denounced to public opinion and to the legislature as dangerous and liable to heavier taxes, we could not let twenty thousand, and hundreds of thousands of laborers starve to death. In such a case we should have to organize a genuine State-socialism, and find work for these laborers, similar to what we have been doing during every panic.

If the objections of the representative Mr. Richter, who claimed that we must guard ourselves against State-socialism as against some disease, were well taken, how does it happen that we are providing work whenever a calamity has afflicted one or another of the provinces? Such work would not be provided, if the workingmen could find other remunerative occupations. In such cases we build railways of doubtful productivity, and make improvements, which under ordinary circumstances are left to the individual citizens to make. If this is communism, I am by no means opposed to it. But the use of such catch-words does not advance the solution of any problem.

I have already commented on Mr. Bamberger's defence of the private insurance companies. I am, however, convinced that we are not called upon to espouse their cause of all others when we are confronted by tremendous economic needs. He has also referred to the "four weeks" which have to elapse before the insurance takes effect. This was done in the hope that the unions and societies would wish to do something themselves. We are always told that the laborers deem insurance to be contrary to their honor, unless they contribute something toward it. For this reason we have left the first four weeks uninsured. I am not certain on this point, but if another solution seems better, I believe that the law should cover also this hiatus. There is no fundamental objection to this.

One single fact will throw much light on the considerable burdens of which the county communities will be relieved when the care of their poor will pass, according to this bill, to the community of the State. I have been unable to ascertain the number of persons to whom assistance is given in the empire or in the kingdom of Prussia, and even less to discover the amount of money spent for this purpose. In the country, and elsewhere, private charity and public help are so intermingled that it is impossible to separate them, or to keep accurate accounts. The one hundred and seventy cities, however, which have more than ten thousand inhabitants expend on the average four marks per capita for the care of their poor. This item varies between 0.63 mark and 12.84 marks—a great variation as you see. The most remarkable results are found where the majority of laborers are banded together in unions or similar associations. It would be natural to think that places like Oberneunkirchen and Duttweiler with large factory populations would have a very large budget for the poor; and that Berlin, which is only in part an industrial centre, would be an average locality, for our purposes, if its finances were well managed. As a matter of fact it pays far more than the average for the care of its poor without doing this exceptionally well. Anyone who is interested in private charities, and cares to visit the poor of Berlin, will be convinced of their pitiful condition.

Nevertheless, the Berlin budget for the poor amounts to 5,000,000 marks—these are the latest figures—and for the care of the sick poor to 1,900,000 marks. Why these two items should be separated I do not know. Together, therefore, they amount to about 7,000,000 marks, or 7 marks per capita, while the average of the large cities is 4 marks. If such a poor-tax of 7 marks per capita were extended to the whole empire, it would yield 300,000,000 marks; and if the direct taxes of Berlin, amounting to 23 marks per capita, were levied on the empire, we should receive more than one milliard marks in direct taxes, including those on rents and incomes. Fortunately not all the people of the empire are living under a liberal ring, and least of all the inhabitants of cities where the majority of the workingmen have joined unions or similar associations. We have discovered the remarkable fact that Oberneunkirchen with its large factory population pays only 0.58 mark, and Duttweiler 0.72 mark per capita for the care of their poor.

These are instances which throw light on the relief of the communities if a system similar to that of the unions would be introduced. I do not at all intend to make so expensive a proposition to you, and I have already said that we shall have to work on this legislation for at least a generation. But look at the glaring examples of Duttweiler and Oberneunkirchen. Without their unions their budgets for the poor would perhaps not rise to the Berlin figure, but they would easily amount to 5 marks per capita. Actually, however, they are less than 1 mark, and almost as low as 1/2 mark. What a tremendous burden will be taken from the charity departments of a city of ten thousand inhabitants by a law like the one under discussion! Why, then, should they not be asked to make some kind of a contribution to the insurance fund? But the contributions should not be made by the districts, but by larger units, and, since the State is the largest, I insist that the contributions should be made by the State. If you do not yield in this point to the allied governments, I shall look placidly, and without being offended, toward further discussions and another session of the Reichstag. This I consider to be the all-important part of the law, and without it the bill would no longer appear to me to be as valuable as I have thought it was, and would seem to lack the chief characteristic which induced me to become its sponsor.

The previous speaker and the Honorable Mr. Bamberger have looked askance at the Economic Council. This, gentlemen, was perfectly natural, for competition in eloquence is as much disliked as in business; and there are in this Council not only men of exceptionally great practical knowledge, but also some very good speakers. When the Council has been more firmly established these men will perhaps deliver as long and expert speeches as those representatives are doing who pass themselves off as the expert spokesmen of labor. I really do not consider it to be polite, or politically advantageous, to refer to the councillors who have come here, at the call of their king, to voice their honest opinions with as much contempt as the representatives whom I have mentioned have done. Most woods return the echo of what we call into them; and why should the representative Mr. Richter unnecessarily make for himself even more enemies than he has? He is like me, in that the number of his opponents is growing, and is no longer small. His ear, however, is not so keen as mine to detect the existence of an opponent, and I am satisfied to wait and see which one of us in the long run will appear to have been right. Possibly, this may not be decided in our lifetime. That also will be agreeable to me.

The representative Mr. Bamberger has expressed his astonishment, in discussing matters with the Council, that the delegates of the sea-coast cities had been granted the right to decide about questions relating to gunpowder and playing-cards. Well, gentlemen, the delegates from the inland districts are far more numerous than those from the seacoast, and we have not made this division arbitrarily. Since we look upon the free-trade theory as an epidemic, which is afflicting us like the Colorado Beetle, or similar evils, you cannot possibly expect that we should ask the free traders to represent the whole country in matters where we happen to have the choice. Generally speaking, the free traders represent the interests of maritime commerce, of merchants, and of a very few other people. Opposed to them is the much greater weight of all the inland districts. The more, therefore, the Economic Council will be perfected, the more the propriety and reasonableness of the present arrangement will be appreciated. The Council has, to my great delight, excellent chances of extending its usefulness over the whole empire. These remarks will scarcely win me, I believe, the good graces of Messrs. Richter and Bamberger. If they did, it would be for me an argumentum e contrario. I am always of the opinion that the very opposite of their views is serviceable for the State and the interests of the fatherland, as I understand them.

I have already replied to the reproach of home-socialism. One of the previous speakers, however, goes so far as to identify me with foreigners, because I am glad to assume the responsibility for this law and its intellectual origin. These foreigners are, no doubt, excellent men, but they have nothing to do with our affairs. They are men like Nadaud, Clemenceau, Spuller, Lockroy, and others. I believe this was intended to be a complicated reproach of both socialism and communism. You see, it is always the same tune. Then he mentioned the "intrepidity," which I translate for myself to mean the "frivolous levity," of the government in suggesting such matters. The considerate politeness of the speaker induced him to call it "intrepidity." Gentlemen, our intrepidity springs from our good conscience. We are convinced that what we are proposing is the result of dutiful and careful consideration, and is not in the least tinged with party-politics. In this we are superior to our opponents, who will never be able to free themselves from the soil of party-warfare which clings to their boots.

The previous speaker compared us also with the Romans. You see he made his historical excursions not only into France, but also into the past. The difference between Mr. Bamberger's and our point of view—which Mr. Lasker may call aristocratic, if he chooses—appears in his very choice of words. Mr. Bamberger spoke of theatres which we were erecting for the "sweet rabble." Whether there is anything sweet in the rabble for Mr. Bamberger I do not know. But we are filled with satisfaction at the thought that we may be able to do something in the legislature for the less fortunate classes—whom he designates as rabble—and to wrest them, if you will grant the money, from the evil influences of place-hunters whose eloquence is too much for their intelligence.

The expression "rabble" did not fall from our lips, and if the representative spoke of the "rabble" first, and afterwards of "those who cut off coupons," I deny having used also this word. "To cut off coupons" is linguistically not familiar to me. I believe I said "those who cut coupons." The meaning, of course, remains the same. But let me remark that I consider this class of people to be highly estimable, and from a minister's point of view exceedingly desirable, because they combine wealth with that degree of diffidence which keeps them from all tainted or dangerous enterprises. The man who pays a large tax and loves peace is from the ministerial point of view the most agreeable of citizens. He must, of course, not try to escape the burdens which his easily collected income should bear in comparison with others. And you will see that he really does not do it. He is an honest man, and when we shall at last have outgrown the finance-ministerial mistrust of olden times—which my present colleagues no longer share—we shall see that not everybody is willing to lie for his own financial benefit, and that even the man who cuts coupons will declare his wealth honestly, and pay his taxes accordingly. The Honorable Mr. Bamberger also asked: "Where will you find the necessary money?" This law really implies few new expenses, as I have already said, because all the government asks is to be permitted to substitute the State for the communities, which at present are taking care of the poor, and to make a very modest allowance to those who cannot earn their living. This allowance should be entirely at the disposal of the recipient and be inalienable from him. It will thus secure for him independence even when he is an invalid. The increase over the present cost of caring for the poor is slight. I do not know whether it should be estimated at half of one-third—one sixth—or even at less.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that a State which is at war with the infernal elements recently described to you here in detail, and which possesses among its citizens an overwhelming majority of sincere adherents of the Christian religion, should do for the poor, the weak, and the old much more than this bill demands—as much as I hope to be able to ask of you next year. And such a State, especially when it wishes to demonstrate its practical Christianity, should not refuse our demands, for its own sake and for the sake of the poor!

* * * * *

WE GERMANS FEAR GOD, AND NOUGHT ELSE IN THE WORLD

February 6, 1888

TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.

[In view of the constantly increasing armaments in France, the government had secured from the Reichstag of 1887 an increase also of the German army. Danger, however, was threatening from Russia as well as from France, and it became necessary to arrange matters in a way which would place the full strength of the German people at the disposal of the government. A bill to this effect was introduced in the Reichstag on December 9, 1887, and another bill, which was to procure the money for this increase in armaments, was introduced on January 31, 1888. Both bills were on the calendar of February 6. Prince Bismarck opened the discussion with the following speech, the effect of which was electric, and resulted in the Reichstag passing both bills by a unanimous vote.]

In addressing you today I do not intend to recommend to you the acceptance of the bill which your president has just mentioned. I have no fear concerning its acceptance, nor do I believe that I can do anything to increase the majority with which it will be passed, although this is, of course, of great importance both at home and abroad. The representatives of the various parties have, no doubt, decided how they will vote, and I am confident that the German Reichstag will grant us again an increase in our armed force and thus reëstablish the standard which we gradually gave up between 1867 and 1882, and will do so, not on account of the position in which we happen to find ourselves, nor of any fears which may be swaying the stock exchange and public opinion, but because of an anticipatory estimate of the general conditions of Europe. In addressing you, therefore, I shall have to say more about these conditions than about the bill.

I do not like to do this, for in these matters one unskilful word can do great harm, and many words can do small good beyond making people understand the situation at home and abroad, which they will do in due time anyhow. I do not like to speak, but if I should keep silence the nervous excitement of public opinion at home and abroad will be increased rather than decreased, I fear, in view of the expectations which have been based on today's debate. People would believe the situation to be so difficult and critical that a minister of foreign affairs did not even dare to touch upon it. For these reasons I am addressing you, but I must say that I am doing it reluctantly.

I might be satisfied with a reference to what I said here just about a year ago, for matters are but slightly changed. A newspaper clipping has been handed to me containing a summary in the Liberal News, an organ which has closer relations, I believe, with my political friend, the Honorable Mr. Richter, than with myself. This clipping might offer me a starting point from which to develop the situation as a whole, but I can refer to it, and the chief points made there, only with the general declaration that the situation has been improved rather than otherwise, if it has been changed at all.

A year ago we were largely concerned with the possible cause of war emanating from France. Since then a peace-loving president has dropped the reins of government, and another peace-loving president has succeeded him. It is a favorable sign that the French government did not dip into Pandora's box in calling to office another chief magistrate, and that we may be assured of the continuance under President Carnot of the peaceful policy which President Grévy was known to represent. Changes in the French cabinet are even more reassuring than the change in the presidency, where a great many different reasons had to be considered. The ministers who might have been ready to subordinate the peace of their own country and of Europe to their personal plans have resigned, and others have taken their places of whom we need not fear this. I believe, therefore that I may state that our outlook toward France is more peaceful and less explosive today than it was a year ago and I am glad to do this, because I wish to quiet, not to excite, public opinion.

The fears which have sprung up during the last twelve months have had to do more with Russia than with France, or I may say with the exchange of mutual excitement, threats, insults, and challenges in the French and Russian papers during the past summer.

Nevertheless, I believe that our relations with Russia have not changed from what they were last year. The Liberal News has stated, in especially heavy type, that I said a year ago: "Our friendship with Russia has suffered no interruption during our wars, and is today beyond a doubt. We expect of Russia neither an attack nor a hostile policy." The reason why this was printed in heavy type may have been either to give me an easy starting point, or because the writer hoped that I had changed my mind since I said these things, and was at present convinced that I had erred in my confidence in the Russian policy a year ago. This is not the case. The only events which could have occasioned a change of opinion are the attitude of the Russian press and the allocation of the Russian troops.

As regards the press, I cannot assign any importance to it per se. People say that it is of greater consequence in Russia than in France. I believe the very opposite to be true. In France the press is a power influencing the decisions of the government. In Russia it is not, nor can it be. In both cases, however, the press is, so far as I am concerned, mere printer's ink on paper, against which we do not wage war. It cannot contain a challenge for us. Back of each article in the press there stands after all only the single man who guided the pen which launched this particular article into the world. Even in a Russian sheet—suppose it to be an independent Russian sheet, one which maintains relations with the French secret funds, it is of no consequence. The pen which there indites an anti-German article is backed by no one but him who is guiding it, the solitary man who is concocting the sad stuff in his office, and the protector which every Russian sheet is accustomed to have. He is some kind of a higher official, run wild in party politics, who happens to bestow his protection on this particular paper. Both weigh like feathers in the scale against the authority of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

In Russia the press has not the same influence on public opinion as in France. At best its declarations are the barometer by which to gauge how much can be printed according to the Russian press-laws, but they do not obligate the Russian government or His Majesty the Emperor of Russia in any way. In contrast with the voices of the Russian press I have the immediate testimony of Emperor Alexander himself, when a few months ago I had again the honor of being received by him in audience after the lapse of several years. I was then able to convince myself afresh that the emperor of Russia harbors no hostile feelings against us and does not intend to attack us, or to wage any aggressive wars at all. What the Russian press says, I do not believe, what Emperor Alexander says, I believe; I have absolute confidence in it. When both are in the scales, the testimony of the Russian press, with its hatred of Germany, rises light as a feather, and the personal testimony of Emperor Alexander has the only effective weight, so far as I am concerned. I repeat, therefore, the press does not induce me to consider our relations with Russia to be worse today than they were a year ago.

I now come to the other point, the allocation of the troops. It used to take place on a big scale, but only since 1879, when the Turkish war was concluded, has it assumed the proportions which today seem threatening. It may easily appear as if this accumulation of Russian troops near the German and Austrian frontiers—where their support is more difficult and more expensive than farther inland—could only be dictated by the intention of surprising and attacking one of the neighbors unprepared, sans dire gare! (I cannot for the moment think of the German expression.) Well, I do not believe this. In the first place, it would be contrary to the character of the sovereign and his own words, and secondly its object could not easily be understood. Russia cannot intend to conquer any Prussian provinces, nor, I believe, any Austrian provinces. Russia has, I believe, as many Polish subjects as it cares to have, and has no desire to increase their numbers. To annex anything but Polish districts from Austria would be even more difficult. No reason exists, no pretense which could induce a European monarch suddenly to assail his neighbors. I even go so far in my confidence as to be convinced that a Russian war would not ensue if we should become involved in a French war because of some explosive happenings in France, which no one can foresee and which surely are not intended by the present French government. A French war, on the other hand, would be an absolute certainty if we should be involved in a Russian war, for no French government would be so strong that it could prevent it, even if it was inclined to do so. But as regards Russia I still declare that I am not looking for an attack; and I take back nothing from what I said last year.

You will ask: "If that is so, what is the use of this expensive allocation of the Russian troops?" That is one of the questions for which one hardly can expect an answer from a ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally interested. If we should begin to ask for explanations, we might receive forced replies, and our surrejoinders would also have to be forced. That is a dangerous path which I do not like to tread. Allocations of troops are things for which one does not take the other country to task, asking for categorical explanations, but against which one takes counter precautions with equal reserve and circumspection. I cannot, therefore, give an authentic declaration concerning the motives of this Russian allocation, but, having been familiar through a generation with foreign politics and the policy of Russia, I can form my own ideas concerning them. These ideas lead me to assume that the Russian cabinet is convinced, probably with good reason, that the weight of the Russian voice in the diplomatic Areopagos of Europe will be the weightier in the next European crisis, the stronger Russia is on the European frontier and the farther west the Russian armies stand. Russia is the more quickly at hand, either as an ally or as a foe, the nearer her main army, or at least a large army, is to her western frontier.

This policy has directed the Russian allocation of troops for a long while. You will remember that the army assembled in the Polish kingdom during the Crimean War was so large that this war might have ended differently if the army had started on time. If you think farther back, you will see that the events of 1830 found Russia unprepared and not ready to take a hand, because she had an insufficient number of troops in the western part of her empire. I need not, therefore, draw the conclusion from the accumulation of Russian troops in the western provinces (sapadnii Gubernii, as the Russians say), that our neighbors mean to attack us. I assume they are waiting, possibly for another Oriental crisis, intending then to be in the position of pressing home the Russian wishes by means of an army situated not exactly in Kasan, but farther west.

When may such an Oriental crisis take place, you ask. Forsooth, we have no certainty. During this century we have had, I think, four crises, if I do not include the smaller ones and those which did not culminate. One was in 1809 and ended with the treaty which gave Russia the Pruth-frontier, and another in 1828. Then there was the Crimean War of 1854, and the war of 1877. They have happened, therefore, at intervals of about twenty years and over. Why, then, should the next crisis take place sooner than after a similar interval, or at about 1899, twenty years after the last one? I for one should like to reckon with the possibility of its being postponed and not occurring immediately.

Then there are other European events which are wont to take place at even intervals, the Polish uprisings, for instance. Formerly we had to expect one every eighteen or twenty years. Possibly this is one reason why Russia wishes to be so strong in Poland that she may prevent them. Then there are the changes of government in France which also used to happen every eighteen or twenty years; and no one can deny that a change of government in France may bring about such a crisis that every interested nation may wish to be able to intervene with her full might—I mean only diplomatically, but with a diplomacy which is backed by an efficient army close at hand.

I assume on the strength of my purely technical-diplomatic judgment, which is based on my experience, that these are the intentions of Russia and that she has no wish to comply with the somewhat uncouth threats and boastings of the newspapers. And, if this is so, then there is surely no reason why we should look more gloomily into the future now than we have done at any time during the past forty years. The Oriental crisis is undoubtedly the most likely to occur, and in this our interests are only secondary. When it happens, we are in a position to watch whether the powers, who are primarily interested in the Mediterranean and the Levante, will make their decisions and come to terms, if they choose, or go to war with Russia about them. We are not immediately called upon to do either. Every great power which is trying to influence or to restrain the policies of other countries in matters which are beyond the sphere of its interests is playing politics beyond the bounds which God has assigned to it. Its policy is one of force and not of vital interests. It is working for prestige. We shall not do this. If Oriental crises happen, we shall wait before taking our position until the powers who have greater interests at stake than we have declared themselves. There is, therefore, no reason, gentlemen, why you should look upon our present situation with unusual gravity, assuming this to be the cause of our asking for the mighty increase of our armaments which the military bill contemplates. I should like to separate the question of reëstablishing the Landwehr of the second grade, in short the big military bill and the financial bill, from the question of our present situation. It has to do, not with a temporary and transient arrangement, but with the permanent invigoration of the German empire.

That no temporary arrangement is contemplated will be perfectly clear, I believe, when I ask you to survey with me the dangers of war which we have met in the past forty years without having become nervously excited at any one time.

In the year 1848, when many dikes and flood gates were broken, which until then had directed the peaceful flow of countless waters, we had to dispose of two questions freighted with the danger of war. They concerned Poland and Schleswig-Holstein. The first shouts after the Martial days were: war with Russia for the rehabilitation of Poland! Soon thereafter the danger was perilously near of being involved in a great European war on account of Schleswig-Holstein. I need not emphasize how the agreement of Olmütz, in 1850, prevented a great conflagration—a war on a gigantic scale. Then there followed two years of greater quiet out of general ill feeling, at the time when I first was ambassador in Frankfort. In 1853 the earliest symptoms of the Crimean War made themselves felt. This war lasted from 1853 to 1856, and during this whole time we were near the edge of the cliff, I will not say the abyss, whence it was intended to draw us into the war. I remember that I was obliged at that time, from 1853 to 1855 to alternate like a pendulum, so to speak, between Frankfort and Berlin because the late king, thanks to the confidence he had in me, used me as the real advocate of his independent policy whenever the insistence of the western powers that we too should declare war on Russia grew too strong, and the opposition of his cabinet too flabby for his liking. Then the play was staged—I do not know how often—when I was called back here and ordered to write for His Majesty a more pro-Russian dispatch, and Mr. von Manteuffel resigned, and I requested to be instructed by His Majesty to follow Mr. von Manteuffel, after the dispatch was gone, into the country or anywhere else, and to induce him to resume his office. Yet each time Prussia, as it was then constituted, was hovering on the brink of a great war. It was exposed to the hostility of the whole of Europe, except Russia, if it refused to join in the policies of the west European powers, and, if it did, it was forced to break with Russia, possibly for a very long while, because the defection of Prussia would probably have been felt very painfully in Russia.

During the Crimean War, therefore, we were in constant danger of war. The war lasted till 1856, when it was at last concluded by the treaty of Paris, and we found, in the Congress of Paris a sort of Canossa prepared for us, for which I should not have assumed the responsibility, and against which I vainly counseled at the time. We were not at all obliged to play the part of a greater power than we were, and to sign the treaties made there. But we were dancing attendance with the view of being permitted to sign the treaty. This will not again happen to us.

That was in 1856, and as early as in 1857 the problem of Neuchâtel was again threatening us with war. This did not become generally known. In the spring of that year I was sent to Paris by the late king to negotiate with Emperor Napoleon concerning the passage of Prussian troops in an attack upon Switzerland. Everyone who hears this from me will know what this would have meant in case of an understanding, and that it could have become a far-reaching danger of war, and might have involved us with France as well as with other powers. Emperor Napoleon was not unwilling to agree. My negotiations in Paris, however, were terminated because his majesty the king in the meanwhile had come to an amicable understanding in the matter with Austria and Switzerland. But the danger of war, we must agree, was present also during that year.

While I was on this mission in Paris, the Italian War hung in the air. It broke out a little more than a year later and came very near drawing us into a big general war of Europe. We went so far as to mobilize, and we should undoubtedly have taken the field, if the peace of Villafranca had not been concluded, somewhat prematurely for Austria, but just in time for ourselves, for we should have been obliged to wage this war under unfavorable circumstances. We should have turned this war, which was an Italian affair, into a Franco-Prussian war, and its cessation, outcome, and treaty of peace would no longer have depended on us, but on the friends and enemies who stood behind us.

Thus we came into the sixties without the clouds of war having cleared from the horizon for even one single year.

Already in 1863 another war threatened hardly less ominously, of which the people at large knew little, and which will only be appreciated when the secret archives of the cabinets will be made public. You may remember the Polish uprising of 1863, and I shall never forget the morning calls which I used to receive at that time from Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English ambassador, and Talleyrand, the French representative, who tried to frighten me out of my wits by attacking the Prussian policy for its inexcusable adherence to Russia, and who used rather a threatening language with me. At noon of the same days I then used to have the pleasure of listening in the Prussian diet to somewhat the same arguments and attacks which the foreign ambassadors had made upon me in the morning. I suffered it quietly, but Emperor Alexander lost his patience, and wished to draw his sword against the plotting of the western powers. You will remember that the French forces were then engaged with American projects and in Mexico, which prevented France from taking a vigorous stand. The Emperor of Russia was no longer willing to stand the Polish intrigues of the other powers, and was ready to face events in our company and to go to war. You will remember that Prussia was struggling at that time with difficult interior problems, and that in Germany the leaven had begun to work in the minds of the people, and the council of the princes in Frankfort was under contemplation. It may be readily granted, therefore, that the temptation for my gracious master was very strong to cut, and thus to heal, his difficult position at home by agreeing to a military undertaking on a colossal scale.

At that time war of Prussia and Russia together against those who were protecting the Polish insurrection against us would undoubtedly have taken place if his majesty had not recoiled from the thought of solving home difficulties, Prussian as well as German, with foreign help. We declined in silence, and without revealing to the other German powers who had hostile projects against us the reasons which had determined our course. The subsequent death of the King of Denmark changed the trend of thought of everybody interested. But all that was needed to bring about the great coalition war in 1863 was a "Yes" instead of a "No" from His Majesty the King in Gastein. Anybody but a German minister would perhaps have counseled affirmatively, from reasons of utility and opportunism in order to solve thereby our home difficulties. You see neither our own people nor foreigners really have a proper appreciation of the amount of national loyalty and high principles which guides both the sovereign and his ministers in the government of German states.

The year 1864—we just spoke of 1863—brought a new pressing danger of war. From the moment when our troops crossed the Eider, I was ready every week to see the European Council of Elders interfere in this Danish affair, and you will agree with me that this was highly probable. But in those days we could observe that it is not so very easy for Europe to attack Austria and Prussia when they are united; and remember that the German federation which supported these two states at that time had not nearly the same military importance which the identical countries possess today. The difficulty of an attack on Austria and Prussia showed itself even then, but the danger of a war remained the same.