A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY FROM ANTECEDENT AND EXTRINSICAL NECESSITY. (continued 5)

The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free from compulsion, and free from necessitation, he says, is that ‘God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we’. This reason, though I had no need of it, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true that God and good angels do good necessarily, and yet are free. But because I find not in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point; and am content that there may be a freedom from compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, as hath been proved in that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and without fear of danger. But how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good angels are freer than men and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examine.

“I confess,” saith he, “that God and good angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, not of specification.” Again we have here two distinctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented, by I know not whom, to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the reader. For it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he will. One 250heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at all. Also liberty (as he says the Schools call it) of exercise, which is, as I have said before, a liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a liberty, which they call of specification; that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceive, that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no license at all?

You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools; and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority of doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition and evil courses, to shake them off; for, nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over man’s reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scripture, but by pretence of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.

J. D. “He who will speak with some of our great undertakers about the grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an interpreter, or to learn a new language (I dare not call it jargon or canting) lately devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falsehood. He must learn a new liberty, a new necessity, a new contingency, a new sufficiency, a new spontaneity, a new kind of deliberation, 251a new kind of election, a new eternity, a new compulsion, and in conclusion, a new nothing. (a) This proposition, the will is free, may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated; for if it be ordinarily, or at any time free from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from necessity. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable: voluntas non cogitur. For if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time, under the same notion; but this implies a contradiction. Yet this author, like the good woman whom her husband sought up the stream when she was drowned upon pretence that when she was living she used to go contrary courses to all other people, holds, that true compulsion and fear may make a man will that which he doth not will, that is, in his sense may compel the will: “as when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed”. I answer, that T. H. mistakes sundry ways in this discourse.

(b) “First, he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions: which in truth are not only voluntary, but free actions; neither compelled, nor so much as physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man otherwise advised might choose not, to throw his goods overboard. It is the man himself, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It 252is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the sea, nor the submitting to his enemy. But considering the present exigence of his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither doth he will this course as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what fear doth in these cases, love, hope, hatred, &c. may do in other cases; that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob, to serve seven years more, rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel. The merchant, to hazard himself upon the rough seas in hope of profit. Passions may be so violent, that they may necessitate the will, that is, when they prevent deliberations; but this is rarely, and then the will is not free. But they never properly compel it. That which is compelled, is against the will; and that which is against the will, is not willed.

(c) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an action’: as if force were not more prevalent with a man, than fear. We must know therefore, that this word compelled is taken two ways: sometimes improperly, that is, when a man is moved or occasioned by threats or fear, or any passion, to do that which he would not have done, if those threats or that passion had not been. Sometimes it is taken properly; when we do any thing against 253our own inclination, moved by an external cause, the will not consenting nor concurring, but resisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol’s temple. Or as in the case of St. Peter (John xxi. 18): Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not. This is that compulsion, which is understood when we say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that the imperate actions of the will, that is the actions of the inferior faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will, may be compelled: but that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled; because it is the nature of an action properly compelled, to be done by an extrinsical cause, without the concurrence of the will.

(d) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so sudden and violent, that they surprise a man, and betray the succours of the soul, and prevent deliberation; as we see in some motus primo primi, or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects, upon the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not ordinary, so they are not free; because there is no deliberation nor election. But where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods overboard to save the ship, or submits to his enemy to save his life, there is always true liberty.

“Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I 254produce in favour of his cause, yet they who urged them deserved not to be slighted, unless it were because they were School-men. The former reason is thus framed: a necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty. But that necessity which flows from the natural and extrinsical determination of the will, is a necessity of supposition. To this, my answer is in effect, that (e) a necessity of supposition is of two kinds. Sometimes the thing supposed is in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. As for a Romish priest to vow continence, upon supposition that he be a Romish priest, is necessary; but because it was in his power to be a priest or not to be a priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So supposing a man to have taken physic, it is necessary that he keep at home; yet because it was in his power to take a medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing supposed is not in the power of the agent to do, or not to do. Supposing a man to be extremely sick, it is necessary that he keep at home; or supposing that a man hath a natural antipathy against a cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees her: because this antipathy, and this sickness, are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his sons, Balaam blessed Israel; these two acts being done, are both necessary upon supposition. But it was in Jacob’s power, not to have blessed his sons; so was it not in Balaam’s power, not to have blessed Israel (Numb. xxii. 38). Jacob’s will was determined by himself; Balaam’s will was physically determined by God. Therefore Jacob’s benediction 255proceeded from his own free election; and Balaam’s from God’s determination. So was Caiphas’ prophecy (John xi. 51): therefore the text saith, he spake not of himself. To this T. H. saith nothing; but only declareth by an impertinent instance, what hypothetical signifies; and then adviseth your Lordship, to take notice how errors and ignorance may be cloaked under grave scholastic terms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship to take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating lurks commonly under the pretence of plain dealing. We see jugglers commonly strip up their sleeves, and promise extraordinary fair dealing, before they begin to play their tricks.

“Concerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of God and the good angels; as I cannot but approve his modesty, in ‘suspending his judgment concerning the manner how God and the good angels do work necessarily or freely, because he finds it not set down in the Articles of our faith, or the decrees of our Church’, especially in this age, which is so full of atheism, and of those scoffers which St. Peter prophesied of, (2 Pet. iii. 3), who neither believe that there is God or angels, or that they have a soul, but only as salt, to keep their bodies from putrifaction; so I can by no means assent unto him in that which follows, that is to say, that he hath proved that liberty and necessity of the same kind may consist together, that is, a liberty of exercise with a necessity of exercise, or a liberty of specification with a necessity of specification. Those actions which he saith are necessitated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, either truly or apparently right, 256and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles him, that I say that God and the good angels are more free than men, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specification: which he saith are no distinctions, but terms invented to cover ignorance. Good words. Doth he only see? Are all other men stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distinctions; and if he alone do not conceive them, it is because distinctions, as all other things, have their fates, according to the capacities or prejudices of their readers. But he urgeth two reasons. ‘One heat,’ saith he, ‘may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another.’ Why not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man than reason; yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more rational than another, that is, in respect of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty. The good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not hindered with passions as we, and by consequence they have more use of liberty than we. (f) His second reason is: ‘he that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty’. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty to do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot, or not to shoot, although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctance than the good spirits. The more rational, and the less sensual 257the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty. His other exception against liberty of exercise, and liberty of specification, is a mere mistake, which grows merely from not rightly understanding what liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A liberty of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise, to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects or to diverse kind of things. So his reason to prove that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground: and he may lay aside his lenten licence for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these things, which are so evident that no man can question them who doth understand them.

(g) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and scholastical expressions, and the ‘doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the understandings of other men.’ What a presumption is this, for one private man, who will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to himself such a licence to control so magistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over men’s judgments, yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the world, the doctors of the Church in general, who have 258flourished in all ages and all places, only for a few necessary and innocent distinctions. Truly, said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light of the sun. (h) What then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes, their subjects and predicates, their modes and figures, their method synthetic and analytic, their fallacies of composition and division, &c.? Must the moral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his principia congenita et acquisita, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.? Must the natural philosopher give over his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient, his receptive and eductive power of the matter, his qualities infusæ or influxæ, symbolæ or dissymbolæ, his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam, his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous, his sympathies and antipathies, his antiperistasis, &c.? Must the astrologer and the geographer leave their apogæum and perigæum, their artic and antartic poles, their equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones, &c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine, relinquish all their terms of art and proper idiotisms, because they do not relish with T. H.’s palate? But he will say, they are obscure expressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more obscure? Let him put them into as plain English as he can, and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration: yet let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he will hold it to be as T. H. terms 259these distinctions, plain fustian or jargon. Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons of art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with navigators; and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their starboard and larboard, because they please not him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no: it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. (i) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, De Cive, cap. XII.: ‘that it is a seditious opinion, to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons’: and cap. XVII. ‘that in questions of faith, the civil magistrates ought to consult with ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition of hands so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised infallibility.’ These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he takes too much upon him; (1 Cor. xiv. 32): The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIX.

(a) “This proposition, the will is free, may be understood in two senses; either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not always necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the will is not 260compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable.” I never said the will is compelled, but do agree with the rest of the world in granting that it is not compelled. It is an absurd speech to say it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary effect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compel heat; so likewise when some cause maketh the will to anything, it doth not compel it. Many things may compel a man to do an action, in producing the will; but that is not a compelling of the will, but of the man. That which I call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that will which was not before, not a compelling of a will already existent. The necessitation or creation of the will, is the same thing with the compulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion, in those actions which proceed from terror. And therefore this distinction is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately after it, is nothing to the question, whether the will be free, though it be to the question, whether the man be free.

(b) “First he erreth in this, to think that actions proceeding from fear are properly compulsory actions; which in truth are not only voluntary, but free actions.” I never said nor doubted, but such actions were both voluntary and free; for he that doth any thing for fear, though he say truly he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that he had election to do or not to do, and consequently that he was a voluntary and free agent. But this hinders not, but that the terror might be a necessary cause of his election of that which otherwise he would not have elected, unless some 261other potent cause made it necessary he should elect the contrary. And therefore, in the same ship, in the same storm, one man may be necessitated to throw his goods overboard, and another man to keep them within the ship; and the same man in a like storm be otherwise advised, if all the causes be not like. But that the same individual man, as the Bishop says, that chose to throw his goods overboard, might chose not to throw his goods overboard, I cannot conceive; unless a man can choose to throw overboard and not to throw overboard, or be so advised and otherwise advised, all at once.

(c) “Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that ‘a man is then only said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to an action.’ As if force were not more prevalent with a man than fear,” &c. When I said fear, I think no man can doubt but the fear of force was understood. I cannot see therefore what quarrel he could justly take, at saying that a man is compelled by fear only; unless he think it may be called compulsion when a man by force, seizing on another man’s limbs, moveth them as himself, not as the other man pleaseth. But this is not the meaning of compulsion: neither is the action so done, the action of him that suffereth, but of him that useth the force. But this, as if it were a question of the propriety of the English tongue, the Bishop denies; and says when a man is moved by fear, it is improperly said he is compelled. But when a man is moved by an external cause, the will resisting as much as it can, then he says, he is properly said to be compelled; as in a rape, or when a 262Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the idol’s temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it were very proper English to say, that a stone were compelled when it is thrown, or a man when he is carried in a cart. For my part, I understand compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures only, which are moved only by their own animal motion, in such manner as they would not be moved without the fear. But of this dispute the English and well-bred reader is the proper judge.

(d) “Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free.” Is it impossible for the Bishop to remember the question, which is whether a man be free to will? Did I ever say, that no actions of a man are free? On the contrary, I say that all his voluntary actions are free, even those also to which he is compelled by fear. But it does not therefore follow but that the will, from whence those actions and their election proceed, may have necessary causes, against which he hath never yet said anything. That which followeth immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as explication, how the passions of a man surprise him; therefore I let it pass, noting only that he expoundeth motus primo primi, which I understood not before, by the word antipathy.

(e) “A necessity of supposition is of two kinds; sometimes a thing supposed, is in the power of the agent to do or not to do, &c.; sometimes a thing supposed, is not in the power of the agent to do or not to do,” &c.

When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition, then, he says, freedom may consist with 263this necessity, in the latter sense that it cannot. And to use his own instances, to vow continence in a Romish priest, upon supposition that he is a Romish priest, is a necessary act, because it was in his power to be a priest or not. On the other side, supposing a man having a natural antipathy against a cat; because this antipathy is not in the power of the party affected, therefore the running away from the cat is no free act.

I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish priest to vow continence, not upon the supposition that he was a Romish priest, but because he had not done it unless he would; if he had not been a Romish priest, it had been all one to the freedom of his act. Nor is his priesthood anything to the necessity of his vow, saving that if he would not have vowed he should not have been made a priest. There was an antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical; first, that he should have the will to be a priest, and then consequently that he should have the will to vow. Against this he allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the man’s running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, and arising from a false apprehension (which nevertheless he cannot help) of some hurt or other the cat may do him. And therefore the act is as free as the act of him that throweth his goods into the sea. So likewise the act of Jacob in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in blessing Israel, are equally free and equally voluntary, yet equally determined by God, who is the author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul saith, cannot be resisted. Therefore both their 264actions were necessitated equally; and, because they were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas’ his prophecy, which the text saith he spake not of himself, it was necessary; first, because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as from the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly, whensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was nevertheless necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been silent if he would, but because his will to speak was antecedently determined to what he should speak from all eternity, which he hath yet brought no argument to contradict.

He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner how the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I find it not set down in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our Church. But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can apprehend neither the nature of God nor of angels, nor conceive what kind of thing it is which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless takes upon him to attribute to them liberty of exercise, and to deny them a liberty of specification; to grant them a more intensive liberty than we have, but not a more extensive; using, not incongruously, in the incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as liberty of exercise and liberty of specification, and degrees of intension in liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive than another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a 265straight prison, but one of those liberties is not more intense than the other.

(f) “His second reason is, he that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty.” It is one thing to say a man hath liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say he hath power to do what he will. A man that is bound, would say readily he hath not the liberty to walk; but he will not say he wants the power. But the sick man will say he wants the power to walk, but not the liberty. This is, as I conceive, to speak the English tongue: and consequently an Englishman will not say, the liberty to do what he will, but the power to do what he will, is omnipotence. And therefore either I or the Bishop understand not English. Whereas he adds that I mistake the meaning of the words liberty of specification, I am sure that in that way wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity. But if he say, I understand not what the Schoolmen mean by it, I will not contend with him; for I think they know not what they mean themselves.

(g) “And here he falls into another invective against distinctions and scholastical expressions, and the doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the understanding of other men. What a presumption is this, for one private man,” &c. That he may know I am no enemy to intelligible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence of myself against this his accusation. 266I say therefore that some distinctions are scholastical only, and some are scholastical and sapiential also. Against those that are scholastical only, I do and may inveigh. But against those that are scholastical and sapiential also, I do not inveigh. Likewise some doctors of the Church, as Suarez, Johannes à Duns, and their imitators, to breed in men such opinions as the Church of Rome thought suitable to their interest, did write such things as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confess I have a little slighted. Other doctors of the Church, as Martin Luther, Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, William Perkins, and others, that did write their sense clearly, I never slighted, but always very much reverenced and admired. Wherein, then, lieth my presumption? If it be because I am a private man, let the Bishop also take heed he contradict not some of those whom the world worthily esteems, lest he also (for he is a private man) be taxed of presumption.

(h) “What then, must the logicians lay aside their first and second intentions, their abstracts and concretes &c.: must the moral philosopher quit his means and extremes, his principia congenita et acquisita, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, &c.: must the natural philosopher give over his intentional species, &c.: because they do not relish with T. H.’s palate?” I confess that among the logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, &c. are terms of art. But if the Bishop think that words of first and second intention, that abstract and concrete, that subjects and 267predicates, moods and figures, method synthetic and analytic, fallacies of composition and division, be terms of art, I am not of his opinion. For these are no more terms of art in logic, than lines, figures, squares, triangles, &c. in the mathematics. Barbara, Celarent, and the rest that follow, are terms of art, invented for the easier apprehension of young men, and are by young men understood. But the terms of the School with which I have found fault, have been invented to blind the understanding, and cannot be understood by those that intend to learn divinity. And to his question whether the moral philosopher must quit his means and extremes, I answer, that though they are not terms of art, he ought to quit them when they cannot be understood; and when they can, to use them rightly. And therefore, though means and extremes be terms intelligible, yet I would have them quit the placing of virtue in the one, and of vice in the other. But for his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his necessity absolute and hypothetical, if any moral philosopher ever used them, then away with them; they serve for nothing but to seduce young students. In like manner, let the natural philosopher no more mention his intentional species, his understanding agent and patient, his receptive and eductive power of the matter, his qualities infusæ or influxæ, symbolæ or dissymbolæ, his temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam. He may keep his parts homogeneous and heterogeneous; but his sympathies and antipathies, his antiperistasis and the like names of excuses rather than of causes, I would have him fling away. And for the astrologer, (unless 268he means astronomer), I would have him throw away his whole trade. But if he mean astronomer, then the terms of apogæum and perigæum, artic, antartic, equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones, &c. are no more terms of art in astronomy, than a saw or a hatchet in the art of a carpenter. He cites no terms of art for geometry; I was afraid he would have put lines, or perhaps equality or inequality, for terms of art. So that now I know not what be those terms he thinks I would cast away in geometry. And lastly, for his metaphysician, I would have him quit both his terms and his profession, as being in truth (as Plutarch saith in the beginning of the life of Alexander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, but made only for an essay to the learner; and the divine to use no word in preaching but such as his auditors, nor in writing but such as a common reader, may understand. And all this, not for the pleasing of my palate, but for the promotion of truth.

(i) “T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, De Cive, cap. XII., that it is ‘a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons’: and cap. XVII, that ‘in questions of faith the civil magistrates ought to consult with the ecclesiastical doctors, to whom God’s blessing is derived by imposition of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths,’ &c. There he attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little; both there and here he takes too much upon him. The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” He thinks he hath a great advantage against me from 269my own words in my book De Cive, which he would not have thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evil is judicature, which in Latin is cognitio causarum, not scientia. Every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evil in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evil in others, belongs not to him, but to those whom the sovereign power appointeth thereunto. But the Bishop not understanding, or forgetting, that cognoscere is to judge, as Adam did of God’s commandment, hath cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the ecclesiastical doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they cannot be deceived, but that a subject cannot be deceived in obeying them when they are our lawfully constituted doctors. For the supreme ecclesiastical doctor, is he that hath the supreme power: and in obeying him no subject can be deceived, because they are by God himself commanded to obey him. And what the ecclesiastical doctors, lawfully constituted, do tell us to be necessary in point of religion, the same is told us by the sovereign power. And therefore, though we may be deceived by them in the belief of an opinion, we cannot be deceived by them in the duty of our actions. And this is all that I ascribe to the ecclesiastical doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon them less. Too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for a burthen. And for them who seek it as a worldly preferment, it is too much. I take, he says, too much upon me. Why so? Because the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. 270This is it that he finds fault with in me, when he says that I am a private man, that is to say, no prophet, that is to say, no bishop. By which it is manifest, that the Bishop subjecteth not his spirit but to the Convocation of bishops. I admit that every man ought to subject his spirit to the prophets. But a prophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledge none to do, but him that hath due authority so to do. And no man hath due authority so to do immediately, but he that hath the supreme authority of the commonwealth; nor mediately, but they that speak such things to the people, as he that hath the supreme authority alloweth of. And as it is true in this sense, that the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets; so it is also true that we ought not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world (1 John iv. 1). Therefore I that am a private man, may examine the prophets; which to do, I have no other means but to examine whether their doctrine be agreeable to the law; which theirs is not, who divide the commonwealth into two commonwealths, civil and ecclesiastical.

NO. XX.

The Bishop’s reply.

J. D. “Now to the distinction itself, I say, first, that the proper act of liberty is election, and election is opposed, not only to coaction, but also to coarctation, or determination to one. Necessitation or determination to one, may consist with spontaneity, but not with election or liberty; as hath been showed. The very Stoics did acknowledge 271a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of the Stoics.

“Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools. There is a double act of the will: the one more remote, called imperatus, that is, in truth the act of some inferior faculty, subject to the command of the will, as to open or shut one’s eyes; without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act is nearer, called actus elicitus, an act drawn out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect. This may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air; for that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same time, which implies a contradiction. Therefore to say the will is necessitated, is to say, the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, hæc quidem vis est, this is violence; the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline, but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act: is not the case the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her, but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her 272effectually, and draw her inevitably and irresistibly, to follow him spontaneously, Lucretia in both these conditions is to be pitied. But the latter person is more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also, so much as in him lies, to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only: take heed how we defend those secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from coaction.

“These are their fastnesses.”

T. H. In the next place, he bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between being free from compulsion, and free from necessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not only to coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it. And to those brought formerly, I have already answered; and in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either. For when a man is compelled, for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure; and he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate, whether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet.

Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily determines him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the 273motives to forbear, are working on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes, but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well say fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. The second argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction, to show in what sense it may be said that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of the Schools and that which “rippeth up the bottom of the question”, that there is a double act of the will. The one, he says, is actus imperatus, an act done at the command of the will by some inferior faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one’s eyes: and this act may be compelled. The other, he says, is actus elicitus, an act allured, or an act drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect: this, he says, cannot be compelled. Wherein letting pass that metaphorical speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the question: you may observe first, that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it. For it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to 274shut mine eyes. So that actus imperatus here, might as easily have been said in English, a voluntary action, but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified. Secondly you may observe, that actus elicitus is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are all one; and so to will is here made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a faculty or power of a man’s soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called the will. Howsoever it be, the sum of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means; but to will that or any act cannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements, produce the action which they do produce as necessarily as threatening and foul means, it follows, that to will may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of actus imperatus, and actus elicitus, are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

J. D. “In the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the same distinction, the one taken from the former grounds, that election cannot consist with determination to one. To this, he saith, he hath answered already. No; truth is founded upon a rock. He hath been so far from prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it. (a) Now again he tells us, 275that ‘election is not opposite to either’, necessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally; or that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent takes away the rape. This is the strangest liberty that ever was heard of, that a man is compelled to do what he would not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old score, that ‘he who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit’. But we have seen formerly, that this which he calls compulsion, is not compulsion properly, nor that natural determination of the will to one, which is opposite to true liberty. He who submits to an enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, and then there is no will to submit; (this disguise is no more than a stepping aside to avoid a present blow); or else he doth sincerely will a submission, and then the will is changed. There is a vast difference between compelling and changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise: but compelled it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will this and not will this, as it is invested with the same circumstances; though, if the act were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely which now it wills freely. (b) Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary. That which is compelled in a man’s present condition or distress, that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, as the remedy of its distress, that is voluntary. So hypothetically, supposing a man were 276not in that distress, they are involuntary; but absolutely without any supposition at all, taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. (c) His other instance of ‘a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground, or walk upon his feet,’ is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk; and if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged. (d) Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that ‘other passions do necessitate as much as fear’. But he errs doubly; first, in his foundation. Fear doth not determine the rational will naturally and necessarily. The last and greatest of the five terrible things is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God. It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dangers, because they are nearer our senses; as little children fear a mouse or a visard more than fire or weather. But as a fit of the stone takes away the sense of the gout for the present, so the greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of God’s wrath and eternal torments doth expel corporeal fear: fear not them who kill the body, but fear him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell (Luke xii. 4). (e) Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur.--Excuse me, O emperor, thou threatenest men with prison, but 277he threatens me with hell. (f) Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying, or not justifying an action, between force and fear, and other passions. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away. He who forced a betrothed damsel was to die; ‘but unto the damsel,’ saith he, ‘thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no fault worthy of death’ (Deut. xxii. 26). Tamar’s beauty, or Ammon’s love, did not render him innocent; but Ammon’s force rendered Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed if fear be great and justly grounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense with the transgression of the negative precepts of God or nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence even against them, and pleads for pardon. But it dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the positive law, either divine or human; because it is not probable that God or the law would oblige man to the observation of all positive precepts, with so great damage as the loss of his life. The omission of circumcision was no sin, whilst the Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H.’s permission, (g) I will propose a case to him. A gentleman sends his servant with money to buy a dinner; some Russians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force; the servant cried for help, and did what he could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he were to be tried before a court of Areopagites. Or suppose the Russians did not take it from him by force, but drew their swords and threatened to 278kill him except he delivered it himself; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the master’s intention or the servant’s duty to hazard his life or limbs for saving of such a trifling sum. But on the other side, suppose this servant, passing by some cabaret or tennis-court where his comrades were drinking or playing, should stay with them, and drink or play away his money, and afterwards plead, as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by the mere strength of temptation. I trow, neither T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, but punish him for it: because neither was he necessitated by the temptation, and what strength it had was by his own fault, in respect of that vicious habit which he had contracted of drinking or gaming: (James i. 14): Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Disordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but they aggravate it, and render it much greater.

(h) “He talks much of the ‘motives to do and motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine a man’; as if a reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes; as if the will had no power to move itself, but were merely passive, like an artificial popingay removed hither and thither by the bolts of the archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are motives, but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding, and freely moved by the will? What are the will and the understanding, but faculties of the same 279soul? And what is liberty but a power resulting from them both? To say that the will is determined by these motives, is as much as to say that the agent is determined by himself. If there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsical necessitation at all. (i) All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine not naturally, but morally; which kind of determination may consist with true liberty. But if T. H.’s opinion were true, that the will were naturally determined by the physical and special influence of extrinsical causes, not only motives were vain, but reason itself and deliberation were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, because they are the means. Yes, if the means be superfluous, they are vain. What needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already determined extrinsically what must be done?

(k) “He saith, ‘that the ignorance of the true causes and their power, is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity’. No such thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the knowledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration nor use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is 280neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exterior senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such a one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs or from a bridge, and break his neck or drown himself; it were a mad jury that would find this man accessary to his own death. Why? Because it was not freely done, he had not then the use of reason.

(l) “Lastly, he tells us, that ‘the will doth choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of necessity’. If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of the will as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man as visibility, he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for, the question is not now of the elective power, in actu primo, whether it be an essential faculty of the soul, but whether the act of electing this or that particular object, be free and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsical causes. But if he intend it in this other sense, that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is put unto it necessarily, if it be combustible; so the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite: he errs grossly. The will hath power either to will or nill, or to suspend, that is, neither to will nor nill the same object. Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth. (m) Two things are required to make an 281effect necessary. First, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is; secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, began his book thus: ‘Concerning the Gods, I have nothing to say, whether they be or they be not’: for which his book was condemned by the Athenians to be burned. The fire was a necessary agent, but the sentence or the application of the fire to the book was a free act; and therefore the burning of his book was free. Much more the rational will is free, which is both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily.

(n) “My second reason against this distinction, of liberty from compulsion but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, and ought rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicite and imperate acts of the will; first, because the terms are improper; secondly, because they are obscure. What trivial and grammatical objections are these, to be used against the universal current of divines and philosophers. Verborum ut nummorum, it is in words as it is in money: use makes them proper and current. A tyrant at first signified a lawful and just prince; now, use hath quite changed the 282sense of it, to denote either a usurper or an oppressor. The word præmunire is now grown a good word in our English laws, by use and tract of time; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a præmonere. The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were derived at first from those heathenish deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike god of the Germans. Now we use them for distinction sake only, without any relation to their first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a piece of coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We see foreign words are daily naturalized and made free denizens in every country. But why are the terms improper? ‘Because,’ saith he, ‘it attributes command, and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another.’ Therefore, he saith, (o) they who invented this term of actus imperatus, understood not anything what it signified. No; why not? It seemeth to me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew there are mental terms, which are only conceived in the mind, as well as vocal terms, which are expressed with the tongue. They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction to his inferior, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed. Though there be no formal commonwealth or family either in the body or in the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in 283the body, of the inferior members to the head; there is a subordination in the soul, of the inferior faculties to the rational will. Far be it from a reasonable man so far to dishonour his own nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command there is, without all question; though there be some doubt in what faculty this command doth principally reside, whether in the will or in the understanding. The true resolution is, that the directive command or counsel is in the understanding; and the applicative command, or empire for putting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word elicite. For saith he, ‘as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured, or drawn by fair means, out of the ability to dance; so is it absurdly said, that to will or choose, is an act drawn out of the power to will’. His objection is yet more improper than the expression. The art of dancing rather resembles the understanding than the will. That drawing which the Schools intend, is clear of another nature from that which he conceives. By elicitation, he understands a persuading or enticing with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or that. But that elicitation which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the power of the will into act; that drawing which they mention, is merely from the appetibility of the object, or of the end. As a man draws a child after him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd draws his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough: so the end draws the will to it by a metaphorical 284motion. What he understands here by an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any man else, until he express himself in more proper terms; whether he understand the locomotive faculty alone, or the art or acquired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing is drawn out (elicitur) of the locomotive faculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the received phrases of the Schools, should not have let so many improper expressions have dropt from his pen; as in this very passage, he confounds the compelling of a voluntary action, with the commanding of a voluntary action, and willing with electing, which, he saith, ‘are all one’. Yet to will properly respects the end, to elect the means.

(p) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicite and imperate, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith he, ‘have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action.’ Yes, it might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether it be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferior faculties or of the members, is a voluntary action: but neither the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediately out of the will itself; but the members and faculties are applied to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will.

285“And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason with the same faith that the unjust steward did make his accounts (Luke xvi). ‘The sum of J. D.’s distinction is,’ saith he, ‘that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion,’ (just contrary to what I have maintained), ‘that is to say, by foul means: but to will that or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means.’ I confess the distinction is mine, because I use it; as the sun is mine, or the air is mine, that is common to me with all who treat of this subject. (q) But his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind and his own, that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to show him the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, (which he calls foul means), which are sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are, consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions, (which he calls fair means), if they be indeliberated, as in children who want the use of reason, are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from punishment, as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsical agents often do; because the strength of the former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected in the causes of it; but neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will.

286ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XX.

(a) “Now again he tells us, that election is not opposite to either necessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent takes away the rape,” &c. If that which I have told him again, be false, why shows he not why it is false? Here is not one word of argument against it. To say, I might have said as well that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a denial. I will not dispute with him, whether a stone thrown up move naturally or not. I shall only say to those readers whose judgments are not defaced with the abuse of words, that as a stone moveth not upwards of itself, but by the power of the external agent who giveth it a beginning of that motion; so also when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the power of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the eye, is not imperceptible to reason. But because this is not proper discourse for the Bishop, and because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof expressly, I shall say nothing of it here. And whereas he says, ‘consent takes away the rape’; it may perhaps be true, and I think it is; but here it not only inferreth nothing, but was also needless, and therefore in a public writing is an indecent instance, though sometimes not unnecessary in a spiritual court. In the next place, he wonders how “a man is compelled, and yet free to do what he will”; that is to say, how a man is made 287to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he had said, he wondered how a man can be compelled to will, and yet be free to do that which he would have done if he had not been compelled, it had been somewhat; as it is, it is nothing. Again he says, “he who submits to an enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his will is changed,” &c.: all which is true. But when he says he doth counterfeit, he doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully; for that would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should have need of quarter. But how this maketh for him, or against me, I perceive not. “There is a vast difference,” saith he, “between compelling and changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise; but compelled it cannot be,” &c. I say the same; the will cannot be compelled; but the man may be, and is then compelled, when his will is changed by the fear of force, punishment, or other hurt from God or man. And when his will is changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it be by God or man), and that necessarily; and consequently the actions that flow from that will, are both voluntary, free, and necessary, notwithstanding that he was compelled to do them. Which maketh not for the Bishop, but for me.

(b) “Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is partly voluntary, partly involuntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in that distress, they are involuntary.” That some actions are partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For one and the 288same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If therefore parts of an action be actions, he says no more but that some actions are voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude of actions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one action should be partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to. But to say, supposing the man had not been in distress, that then the action had been involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a man’s goods into the sea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary action; which is also an absurdity; for he would not have done it, and therefore it had been no action at all. And this absurdity is his own.

(c) “His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet, is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power.” It is enough for the use I make of that instance, that a man when in the necessity of going to prison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the jail, may nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall walk or be haled thither.

(d) “Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as much as fear. But he errs doubly,” &c. First, he says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines the rational will naturally and necessarily. And first, I answer, that I never used that term of rational will. There is nothing rational but God, 289angels, and men. The will is none of these. I would not have excepted against this expression, but that every where he speaketh of the will and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men’s bellies. Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove the contrary. For that which followeth: “the last and greatest of five terrible things is death; yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest action; the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children to worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God,” &c.: I grant him that the greatest of five (or of fifteen, for he had no more reason for five than fifteen) terrible things doth not always necessitate a man to do a dishonest action, and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat else, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their duty. That the fear of God’s wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well said, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure the lesser evil.

(e) “Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest men with prison, but God threatens me with hell.” This sentence, and that which he saith No. XVII, that neither the civil judge is the proper judge, nor the law of the land is the proper rule of sin, and divers other sayings of his to the same effect, make it impossible for any nation in the world to preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men 290living equally acknowledging, that the High and Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before the greatest emperors; every one may pretend the commandment of God to justify his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands one thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is there to allow the pretence of one more than of another? Or what peace can there be, if they be all allowed alike? There will therefore necessarily arise discord and civil war, unless there be a judge agreed upon, with authority given to him by every one of them, to show them and interpret to them the Word of God; which interpreter is always the emperor, king, or other sovereign person, who therefore ought to be obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the Word of God, belongeth to the clergy; wherein I cannot consent unto him. Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me with that you cannot do; but the emperor threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he threateneth.

(f) “Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action, between force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away, &c.” I know not to what point of my answer this reply of his is to be applied. I had said, the actions of men compelled are, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that he calleth compulsion force; but I call it a fear of force, or of damage to be done by force, by which fear a man’s will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will before. Force taketh away the sin, 291because the action is not his that is forced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion; because, in this case, a man electeth the less evil under the notion of good. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced, and of Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the text, be instances of compulsion, and yet the damsel and Tamar be both innocent. In that which immediately followeth, concerning how far fear may extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it he hath some glimmering of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is true, that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts of God or nature; for they are not dispensable; but it extenuateth the fault, not by diminishing anything in the action, but by being no transgression. For if the fear be allowed, the action it produceth is allowed also. Nor doth it dispense in any case with the law positive, but by making the action itself lawful; for the breaking of a law is always sin. And it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive precepts, though with the loss of their lives, unless the right that a man hath to preserve himself make it, in case of a just fear, to be no law. “The omission of circumcision was no sin,” he says, “whilst the Israelites were travelling through the wilderness.” It is very true, but this has nothing to do with compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin, was this: they were ready to obey it, whensoever God should give them leisure and rest from travel, whereby they might be cured; or at least when God, that daily spake to their conductor in the desert, should appoint him to renew that sacrament.

292(g) “I will propose a case to him,” &c. The case is this. A servant is robbed of his master’s money by the highway, but is acquitted because he was forced. Another servant spends his master’s money in a tavern. Why is he not acquitted also, seeing he was necessitated? “Would,” saith he, “T. H. admit of this excuse?” I answer, no: but I would do that to him, which should necessitate him to behave himself better another time, or at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example.

(h) “He talks much of the motives to do, and the motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the second causes,” &c. May not great things be produced by second causes, as well as little; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball? But the Bishop can never be driven from this, that the will hath power to move itself; but says it is all one to say, that “an agent can determine itself,” and that “the will is determined by motives extrinsical”. He adds, that “if there be no necessitation before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor extrinsical necessitation at all”. I say indeed, the effect is not produced before the last dictate of the understanding; but I say not, that the necessity was not before; he knows I say, it is from eternity. When a cannon is planted against a wall, though the battery be not made till the bullet arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while the bullet was going to it, if the wall stood still: and if it slipped away, the hitting of somewhat else was necessary, and that antecedently.

293(i) “All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause.” Yes, when the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause; and so anything else is what he will have it. But nothing is determined by itself, nor is there any man in the world that hath any conception answerable to those words. But “motives,” he says, “determine not naturally, but morally”. This also is insignificant; for all motion is natural or supernatural. Moral motion is a mere word, without any imagination of the mind correspondent to it. I have heard men talk of a motion in a court of justice; perhaps this is it which he means by moral motion. But certainly, when the tongue of the judge and the hands of the clerks are thereby moved, the motion is natural, and proceeds from natural causes; which causes also were natural motions of the tongue of the advocate. And whereas he adds, that if this were true, then “not only motives, but reason itself and deliberation were vain”; it hath been sufficiently answered before, that therefore they are not vain, because by them is produced the effect. I must also note, that oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in instead of mine, those terms of his own, which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as here he makes me to say, that which I did never say, “special influence of extrinsical causes”.

(k) “He saith, that ‘the ignorance of the true causes and their power, is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge 294a necessity.’ No such thing, but just the contrary.” If he understand the authors which he readeth upon this point, no better than he understands what I have here written, it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the question. I said not, that when we consider the causes of things, but when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity. “No such thing,” says the Bishop, “but just the contrary; the more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the liberty,” &c. Is there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God foreknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, but that he would also see and know the causes which shall bring it to pass, and how they work, and make the effect necessary? For necessary it is, whatsoever God foreknoweth. But we that foresee them not, may consider as much as we will, and understand as clearly as we will, but are never the nearer to the knowledge of their necessity; and that, I said, was the cause why we impute those events to liberty, and not to causes.

(l) “Lastly, he tells us, that the will doth choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of necessity. If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is of the fire &c., he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for the question is not now of the elective power, in actu primo, &c.” Here again he makes me to speak nonsense. I said, “the man chooseth of necessity”; he says I say, “the will chooseth of necessity”. And why: but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say as he does here, that “election is the 295act of the will”. No: election is the act of a man, as power to elect is the power of a man. Election and will are all one act of a man; and the power to elect, and the power to will, one and the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of will, the power of willing in the future; as they also were confounded, that first brought in this senseless term of actus primus. My meaning is, that the election I shall have of anything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire, that now is and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter: or to use his own terms, the will hath no more power to suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning: or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend his will, than the fire to suspend its burning. Which is contrary to that which he would have, namely, that a man should have power to refuse what he wills, and to suspend his own appetite. For to refuse what one willeth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is made much more absurd by his expression. For he saith, the will hath power to refuse what it wills, and to suspend its own appetite: whereas the will, and the willing, and the appetite is the same thing. He adds that “even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth”. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I imagine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall not burn then, 296(for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it, as in the case of the three children), that it is necessary it shall not burn.

(m) “Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first that it be produced by a necessary cause, &c.: secondly, that it be necessarily produced, &c.” To this I say nothing, but that I understand not how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily produced.

(n) “My second reason against this distinction of liberty from compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, &c.” By this second reason, which he says is new, and demonstrates, &c, I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but two, whereof the latter is in these words: “Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote, called imperatus, &c.; the other act is nearer, called actus elicitus,” &c. But I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. For this being the resolution of the Schools, is not new; and being a distinction only, is no demonstration; though perhaps he may use the word demonstration, as every unlearned man now-a-days does, to signify any argument of his own. As for the distinction itself, because the terms are Latin, and never used by any author of the Latin tongue, to shew their impertinence I expounded them in English, and left them to the reader’s judgment 297to find the absurdity of them himself. And the Bishop in this part of his reply endeavours to defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and grammatical objection, to say they are improper and obscure. Is there anything less beseeming a divine or a philosopher, than to speak improperly and obscurely, where the truth is in question? Perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate. It is not the universal current of divines and philosophers, that giveth words their authority, but the generality of them who acknowledge that they understand them. Tyrant and præmunire, though their signification be changed, yet they are understood; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday. And when English readers not engaged in School divinity, shall find imperate and elicit acts as intelligible as those, I will confess I had no reason to find fault.

But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction, between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this argument of his; ‘he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not necessitate the will to evil’. This argument is not to be found in this No. XX., to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that God is the cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the 298Scripture, non est malum, quod ego non feci. I shall say what Micaiah saith to Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into the mouth of all these thy prophets. I shall say that that is true, which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. xvi. 10): Let him curse; because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David. But that which God himself saith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15): The king hearkened not to the people, for the cause was from the Lord: I will not say, least the Bishop exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority to interpret the Scriptures. I say further, that to cause sin is not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some higher power; but to use so unseemly a phrase, as to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth, I can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his. Luther says, we act necessarily; necessarily by necessity of immutability, not by necessity of constraint: that is in plain English, necessarily, but not against our wills. Zanchius says, (Tract. Theol. cap. VI. Thes. I.): The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, that there is no necessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint. Bucer (Lib. de Concordia): Whereas the Catholics say, man has free will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom from necessity. Calvin (Inst. cap. II. sec. VI.): And thus shall man be said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good and evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but willingly. Monsr. du Moulin, in 299his Buckler of the Faith (art. IX): The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will. Witness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely without constraint. And the Synod of Dort: Liberty is not opposite to all kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed opposite to the necessity of constraint: but standeth well enough with the necessity of infallibility. I could add more: for all the famous doctors of the Reformed Churches, and with them St. Augustin, are of the same opinion. None of these denied that God is the cause of all motion and action, or that God is the cause of all laws; and yet they were never forced to say, that God is the cause of sin.

(o) “‘They who invented this term of actus imperatus, understood not’, he saith, ‘any thing what it signified.’ No? Why not? It seemeth to me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew there are mental terms, which are only conceived in the mind, as well as vocal terms, which are expressed with the tongue, &c.” In this place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in philosophy, which is this; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the words of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he fancieth the words without speaking them, that then he conceiveth the things which the words signify: and this is the most general cause of false opinions. For men can never be deceived in the conceptions of things, though they may be, and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or appellations, different from those which are commonly used and constituted to signify their 300conceptions. And therefore they that study to attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use to set down beforehand all the terms they are to express themselves by, and declare in what sense they shall use them constantly. And by this means, the reader having an idea of every thing there named, cannot conceive amiss. But when a man from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the thing signified, but only of the sound and of the letters whereof the word is made, which is that he here calleth mental terms, it is impossible he should conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he doth here, when he says, “that when Tarquin delivered his commands to his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did it by mental terms”; as if to strike off the head of a poppy, were a mental term. It is the sound and the letters, that maketh him think elicitus and imperatus somewhat. And it is the same thing that makes him say, for think it he cannot, that to will or choose, is drawn, or allured, or fetched out of the power to will. For drawing cannot be imagined but of bodies; and therefore to will, to speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or any way to be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be drawn, much less to be drawn out of a power, that is to say, out of an ability; for whatsoever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He that can discourse in this manner in philosophy, cannot probably be thought able to discourse rationally in any thing.

(p) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicit and imperate, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith he, ‘have 301been as easily said in English, a voluntary action?’ Yes it might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor as properly.” He says, actus imperatus is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the command of the will. I say, when a man opens and shuts his eyes according to his will, that it is a voluntary action; and I believe we mean one and the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly or more truly, let the reader judge.

(q) “But his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c.” This is nothing but Tohu and Bohu.

NO. XXI.

The Bishop’s reply.

J. D. “The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, the astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the stars:

----Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni,

Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti.

“I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes swimming beside them in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in heaven; who promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The stars at the most do but incline, they cannot necessitate.

“Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home to a necessity. Socrates, and many others, by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures.”

302T. H. In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura. Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place.

J. D. “Towards the latter end of my discourse, I answered some specious pretences against liberty. The two first were of the astrologer and the physician: the one subjecting liberty to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies; the other to the complexions of men. (a) The sum of my answer was, that the stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate the will: to which all judicious astronomers and physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it. So as to this part, there needs no reply.