Chapter X · THE OPERATION ORDER, ORDERS, LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

Before August, 1914, the Operation order was the English term for our Field order. Both orders had the same functions and about the same form. At times, the term operation order was used by us to include only battle orders, but on the whole, the terms Operation orders and Field orders practically amounted to American and English designations of the same thing.

In the beginning of the present war, after a few weeks of open conflict, this kind of fighting in France gave way to a vast siege. The English found themselves, after some cross-country fighting, in the trenches. There the operation order which had provided for situations of march, halt, bivouac, and battle, was gradually made over to suit the peculiar needs of defenses, raids, and frontal attacks. The barrage fire, bombs, mortars, machine guns, and intricate lines of communication added to the number of details to be considered. Little by little the will of the commander expressed itself in such completeness that the former size of his operation order passed all bounds. It was natural, then, that although the scope and character of the English order steadily changed, its name remained the same.

When the Americans came to take part in the war, the operation order had during the previous years of struggle developed out of all resemblance to its former self. It was no longer a field order as we know the term. It was fully grown to meet the tremendous progress of English experience in the trenches. The consequence was that the American, finding both the state of siege and the order to cover it beyond his experience, associated the English name with the novel warfare. Thus, today, the operation order is a term used in connection with the disposition of troops on the battle fronts of Europe.

We should bear in mind, then, that the operation order is nothing more than a field order fitted to trench conditions. We must not gain the idea that it has supplanted the order which goes with mobile exercises on open ground. Open warfare began this conflict, and will, provided it be ended by martial victory, bring it to a close. Open warfare has been the rule on the long Russian, Italian, Serbian, Turkish, and Roumanian fronts. We must not be led astray in our estimate of the proportions because the front in France and Belgium is the most vital one to us from a strategic standpoint. Field orders, which are the accompaniments of open warfare, should still form the larger part of our study.

Nevertheless, the operation order is the order next in importance to the field order. It must be framed with mathematical precision under fire.

It has the greatest conciseness, but is not brief. It goes into the minutest details, but its details are tersely put. In certain parts it is telegraphic like the field message; in others it has completed sentences like those of the field order. It has an orderly arrangement of paragraphs and brief and unmistakable language. If we are able to compose a good field message and order, we should find, after we have familiarized ourselves with the technique of the trenches, that the construction of the operation order will fall naturally into place in our minds.

Unfortunately, we are forbidden to place an example of one of our own operation orders upon these pages. But we may have the opportunity of viewing a German one, which contains the principles of our own. The example given was issued by a regimental commander for a raid. The action actually took place near La Boisselle, April 11, 1916.

110th Reserve Infantry Regiment. In the field, 6th April, 1916.

Regimental Orders for a Raid on the Spion

1. The raid will probably take place at dusk the 11th of April.

2. Organization of the raiding party—

In command.—Captain Wagener, assisted by Lieutenant Boening, Assistant-Surgeon Wisser, one bugler and six stretcher bearers.

Patrol commanders.—Lieutenants Stradtmann, Freund, Dumas, and Böhlefeld.

Raiding party.—50 men of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment and four Pioneers of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion.

3. Upon the day fixed, the raiding party will be assembled in Dug-outs Nos. 1-10, on the right wing of the left-hand battalion. Dug-out No. 9 will be used as advanced regimental command post.

The assaulting party must not exceed three officers and 30 men. The remaining officers and men will be at Captain Wagener’s disposal for use as supports.

Captain Wagener’s Orders—Appendix 1.

Shortly after dusk the assaulting party will leave the Blaue Stellung by Sap No. 3 with the object of breaking into the enemy’s position in the neighborhood of the Süd Spion, from which point the enemy’s trenches will be cleared northwards, if possible, as far as the Spion. Unless prevented by the enemy’s fire, the raiding party will return to our Blaue Stellung by the same way.

Table of distribution of artillery fire—Appendix 2.

4. For 25 minutes before the commencement of the raid, the artillery will prepare for the assault by shelling the enemy’s trenches between Besenhecke and the Windmühle, and also the Weisse Steinmauer. During the raid the artillery will control by its fire all the enemy’s trenches likely to prove a source of danger to the enterprise.

Special Orders for feint attack—Appendix 3.

5. In order to draw the fire of the enemy’s artillery away from the spot to be raided, a feint attack against the enemy’s position just north of La Boiselle Cemetery will start 15 minutes after the artillery opens fire.

Special Orders for this bombardment—Appendix 4.

6. In order that the registration of the objective by the heavy artillery and Minenwerfer shall not be apparent, on the morning of the day before the raid—probably the 10th April—a feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-79 will be carried out, combined with a mine explosion, with the object of misleading the enemy. The exact time will be fixed beforehand by the artillery commander, Officer Commanding Ersatz Abteilung, 76th Artillery Regiment.

7. The machine gun officer will arrange that, during the whole time of the raid, the enemy’s rear trenches in Target-sectors 76-81 are kept under a constant fire, with a view to causing him all possible loss, and, at the same time, to safeguarding our patrol against counter-attacks.

8. The Officer Commanding 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, will arrange for a gallery of the left-hand minefield to be ready charged by the morning of the day before the raid, and for a gallery of the right-hand minefield to be ready charged by the evening of the raid. The former will be sprung at the conclusion of the feint bombardment, the latter as an introduction to the feint attack.

From today, the “earth mortars” (Erdmörser) will systematically cut the enemy’s wire opposite the Blinddarm. On the day before the raid, they will coöperate with all other close-range weapons to assist in the feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-78. On the evening of the raid, they will assist in the feint attack by bombarding Target-sectors 76 and 77 (see Appendices 3 and 4).

Throughout the raid, the “ Albrecht-Mörser,” in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will heavily bombard the enemy’s trenches in the Nordrondell. Particular care will be taken that the enemy’s machine guns do not interfere with the raid from that quarter (see Appendix 1).

9. The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will register the enemy’s wire at the point of entry with one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer in the course of the feint bombardment on the day before the raid. He will also take part in this bombardment and fire 30 medium Minenwerfer shells at the Weisse Steinmauer (see Appendix 4). On the afternoon of the same day, with both medium Minenwerfer mounted in the Minenwerfer Weg, he will cut the enemy’s wire at 76y, and throughout the whole night and the following day will keep up a desultory fire.

On the evening of the raid, the wire in front of the point of entry of the raiding party will be cut on a width of 50 meters by the heavy and two medium Minenwerfer (see Appendix 1). Meanwhile, the two other medium Minenwerfer will take part in the feint attack against 76y (see Appendix 3). The light Minenwerfer at the disposal of the 228th Minenwerfer Company will take part in the feint bombardment and in the feint attack, in accordance with the orders (para. 8) issued for the close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion (see Appendices 3 and 4). The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will receive further detailed instructions from Captain Wagener.

10. On the evening of the raid, battalions will hold themselves in a state of readiness for an alarm. Arrangements will be made that, in the event of the enemy opening a barrage on our trenches, as may well happen, the number of sentries will be reduced to a minimum. Gas masks and other gas equipment must be held ready for use.

11. I shall be at the regimental command post from the morning of the day before the raid. From 6 p. m. of the evening of the raid, I shall be in the advanced regimental command post in Dug-out No. 9 on the right wing of the left-hand battalion. Captain Wagener will maintain constant communication with me. The artillery liaison officer will also be with me.

(Signed) FRHR. V. VIETINGHOFF.

Distribution

{ Headquarters 2

{ 3 Battalions 3

110th Reserve Infantry Regiment { 12 Companies 12

{ Labor Company 1

{ 1st Machine Gun Company 1

{ 2nd Machine Gun Company 2

{ 55th Machine Gun Section 1

{ Captain Wagener 2

29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 1

Ersatz Abteilung, 176th Field Artillery Regiment 1

1st Abteilung, 29th Regiment Field Artillery 1

1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion 1

228th Minenwerfer Company 1

Division 1

Brigade 1

109th Reserve Infantry Regiment 1

111th Reserve Infantry Regiment 1

Spare copies 5

37

APPENDIX I

Special Orders for the Raid on the Spion

1. Organization of the raiding party—

Commander.—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.

Stradtmann’s patrol.—Lieutenant Stradtmann and 10 men.

Dumas’ patrol.—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.

Supports, at my disposal.—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.

In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening, and Assistant-Surgeon Wiser and six stretcher bearers.

2. Dress and equipment.—Attack order without greatcoat or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be slung and tucked into tunic.

The Stradtmann, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and wire-cutters.

The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry pistols, each man will carry two grenades.

As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of white linen sewn on the breast and back.

Minutes. O′ The time of starting will be communicated, in good time, on the day of the raid.

3. Time table.—The artillery will open fire with gas shells on the enemy’s trenches on both sides of the point of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to take place.

For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy’s trenches likely to prove of importance to the raiding party will be brought under fire. At the same time, the close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, with the two medium and the light Minenwerfer of the 228th Minenwerfer Company, will fire with maximum rapidity on the enemy’s trenches opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle.

7′

The one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer of the 228th Minenwerfer Company will open fire with the object of cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.

14′45″

On the right flank of the minefield a shallow gallery will be fired.

15′

The artillery, which was firing on the southwest corner of La Boiselle, will increase its range and shell the trenches in rear.

The close-range weapons will cease fire.

The machine guns will sweep communication trenches in this sector and in the Galgen.

15′30″

In the Blinddarm and just south of the same, isolated groups of dummies will be exposed in order to make the enemy think an attack is pending. From now on, artillery and Minenwerfer fire will increase to its maximum intensity on the real objective.

The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.

20′

The patrols will leave their dug-outs and take up their positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.

23′

Stradtmann’s patrol will leave the Hohlweg at “a” and crawl forward as far as “b.”

Lieutenant Boening will post the stretcher bearers as connecting files between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.

25′

The artillery will lift its fire from the objective between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy’s trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.

The Minenwerfer will cease fire.

The machine guns will open fire on positions in rear and on the communication trenches which lead to the objective from both sides.

The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue to bombard the Nordrondell. All close-range weapons and the artillery, which from 0′ to 15′ had been bombarding the enemy’s position opposite the southwest corner of La Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed vigor.

25′15″

Stradtmann’s patrol will break into the enemy’s trenches at the Süd Spion and, at point 1 (see Sketch No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction of the enemy.

On orders received from me personally, Dumas’ patrol will follow Stradtmann’s patrol and advance southwards along the enemy’s trench as far as point 2.

On orders received from me personally also, Böhlefeld’s patrol will follow Dumas’ patrol and, once in the enemy’s trench, will push on towards the Spion.

The stretcher bearers will act as connecting files between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.

The supports will hold themselves in readiness at 4, so as to be able to push on after the other patrols immediately on receipt of an order from me.

If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the Hohlweg before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I shall either lead the patrol to the enemy’s position by another route, or cancel the raid.

4. Duty of the patrols.—As many of the enemy as possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles, machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc., as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as regards the enemy’s fire it could be done, report will be passed on to me by Stradtmann’s patrol.

5. Return.—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtmann, or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding party will make its way back from the Süd Spion to the Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and booty will be taken into the dug-outs.

During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg, the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer present will lead the entire party.

6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out as a first aid post and will remain there until the conclusion of the raid.

7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg, which will be connected by telephone with the advanced regimental command post.

(Signed) WAGENER, Captain and Company Commander.

Verbally and in writing to participants in the raid.

Copy to the regiment.

W.

To quote Appendices 2, 3, and 4 would take up too much space and would add very little to the purpose of the example. Number 2 consists of a five-page table of the kinds and time of fire, the batteries of fire, and the targets; number 3, of detailed orders for a feint attack; and number 4, for a feint bombardment.

The object of the quotation is to show the accuracy and detail of an operation order. Since the German subject matter and treatment are about the same as our own, we ought to gain from it a conception of the requirements of framing an operation order.

Note.—The meager space devoted to the Operation Order in this course of lessons should in no way reflect on its relative importance among military communications. Only because the treatment of our own examples is forbidden and because our experience is slight, do we leave it without further practice. Those who are armed with the confidential documents of the War Department may look into our own operation order more closely; and those who have conscientiously applied themselves to the work of the preceding lessons ought to have no trouble with its composition.

THE ORDER

Our Field Service Regulations state[16] that “orders in contra-distinction to field, general, and special orders, are used by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the movements and resupply of the field trains, fixing the position of distributing points (rations and forage), authorizing the use of reserve rations, providing for the refilling of combat trains after combat or a march, providing for ambulance or hospital service in camps, and for furnishing such other similar information or instructions as it is desired to communicate to troops. They also include such instructions as may be sent to the commander of trains, relative to the movements and disposition of the trains and information with regard to the arrangements made with the line of communication relative to the positions of refilling, rendezvous, and evacuation points.”

Thus, when separate orders are necessary for such conditions as cited, they are called simply orders. They may be transmitted as field messages between commanders or as more formal documents. In either case they are usually addressed to the person concerned.

Examples of orders follow:

51st Division, 9th Corps, Gettysburg, 3 June ’19, 6-30 p. m.

To Commander of Trains:

Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near EPPLEY at 8 p. m.

Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.

Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.

Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw or hay.

MABIE, Chief of Staff.

Telegraphed to Commander of Trains. Copies to Regimental Commanders.

19th Division, Marysville, 5 Oct. ’22, 6-45 p. m.

To Officer in Charge of Trains:

You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.

Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition, one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column, field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.

On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.

Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.

On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains of the troops, you will assume command.

Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM. SMITH, Chief of Staff.

Copies to all Commanders. By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.

Birmingham, 8 Sept. ’25, 9-50 a. m.

To Captain Mott, commanding trains:

Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry at GARLINGTON.

Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.

NORTON, Colonel, commanding.

The first two examples are of the formal type. The third one is less so.

Verbal orders are usually transmitted by officers. However, if the order consists of a single sentence such as, “The trains will halt two hours at Bingham,” it may be transmitted by an enlisted man.

Although there is more latitude in the form of written order than in that of the field order, the one should be as brief and unmistakable in its construction as the other. The paragraph structure and sequence should be as logical and unified as English composition can make them.

With your book open at the extract from Field Service Regulations in regard to the order, compose enough imaginary orders to cover all the instances therein given.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

Letters of Instruction chiefly differ from orders, operation orders, and field orders in their lack of definition of specific tactical duties. They are truly instructions. They deal mainly with strategic considerations and general plans, because the writer is usually far away from, or not in direct command of, the units which are going to carry out the general plans.

At the beginning of campaigns letters of instruction enumerate the troops of the various commands and the corresponding leaders.

“In armies, combat orders will often be in the form of, or a part of, letters of instruction to the commanding generals in the field armies composing the army. But where the field armies are within supporting distance of each other and can mutually coöperate in the task assigned them, formal combat orders may be issued. Such orders are necessarily general in character and consist of a statement of the objective sought by the army commander, and of the part he expects each field army to play in attaining this objective. The army commander, either by means of letters of instruction or by personal conferences with his field army commanders, fully acquaints them not only with the immediate end in view, but also with so much of his future plans as may be necessary to insure thorough cooperation on their part.”[17]

In the illustration which follows, President Lincoln outlines a general offensive to the various armies. As commander-in-chief he issues the substance of a letter of instructions in the form of an executive order. In it we shall notice that he does not prescribe any specific movement of troops.

Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.

President’s General War Order, No. 1.

Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

That, especially,

The army at and about Fortress Monroe,

The army of the Potomac,

The army of West Virginia,

The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,

The army and flotilla at Cairo,

And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions. This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the general-in-chief:

May 24, 1862. From Washington, 24th.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—

I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first (21st).

A. LINCOLN, President.

As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General McClellan from a strategic standpoint certain courses open to him. The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.

To progress in our examples, let us take one issued by the general-in-chief to one of his subordinate generals.

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler, U. S. Volunteers,—

General:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to coöperate with the navy, in the attack upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).

The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Monroe.

Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will be sufficient for your purposes.

After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one without horses, will be all that are necessary.

This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery; total 15,255 men.

The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.

The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured.

Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault.

The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and coöperate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.

A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city.

In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves.

I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are: First, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches: then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans.

I am, etc., GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Com’g U. S. A.

General McClellan goes more into detail than does the President. He is considering the situation on more technical lines. Yet he does not go beyond the limits of strategy in outlining the general plan. He still conforms to the principles of letters of instruction. If we were to follow General Butler in his journey to the Gulf, we should perceive in his orders the disappearance of the strategic and the appearance of the tactical idea. Later we should discover one of his brigade commanders actually issuing a field order.

Notice in the last example how, on account of its length, General McClellan has made a neat summary of the whole. Notice that in all of these letters the writers have adhered to the principles of rhetoric; and that they have given to the recipient a unified and coherent production. Why? Because the will of the commander is transmitted more quickly in that way.

We have now completed the consideration of the expression which directly affects troops in the field. We have written the field message which brings information to commanders and which helps them to make an estimate of a situation. We have framed the field order which grows out of that estimate and which transforms the decision into action. We have viewed the operation order which is no more than a field order made to fit trench warfare. We have seen orders which are issued in connection with combat so as to govern the movement of trains. We have read letters of instruction which are written by higher commanders in order to regulate in a general way extensive movements. All of these communications bear specifically upon the effort of troops toward success in battle—the ultimate object of all military training.

In leaving this most important part of our professional work, we might take with us this one idea. We can best express ourselves in any of the communications we have studied by having all the thoughts of one kind together and the different kinds in an orderly arrangement. Whenever it is possible we should keep the paragraph sequence,

(a) Enemy. (b) Own troops. (c) Plan.