THE CRISIS, AND HOW TO MEET IT.

In the government of nations there are, sometimes, crises of the most momentous importance. They either promote stability or terminate in ruin. The result depends upon the virtue and patriotism of the mass of the people, and the wisdom, prudence and unflinching firmness of their rulers and statesmen.

The United States of America are in the midst of just such a crisis at present, and nothing is more important than correct views with regard to that crisis on the part of the people. To aid in the dissemination of such views, in order to produce unity of action among all classes of the people is the object of this publication, in which we shall ignore mere partisanship and take large and patriotic and comprehensive views of the genius and principles of our government.

One of the gravest questions for the consideration of the people of this nation, and for their enlightened solution, has just arisen, that has ever been presented for an answer since the formation of our republican government. It is this: Has any State in the Union a right, under the present Constitution, peaceably to withdraw itself from that Union, for the purpose of setting up a separate, distinct, and, necessarily, conflicting nationality?

Very important is it that this question should be correctly answered in the present juncture, and that the people should be fully prepared to act understandingly. Vast and immeasurable results depend upon it.

If this vital question could be answered in the affirmative, as some seem to think, then would the federal compact, by which these States are held together, be a mere rope of sand, without strength or tenacity, subject to be ruptured by the slightest discord. Such a solution of the question, if acted upon practically, would carry us back to the old confederation, by the articles of which these States were connected in their associated capacity previous to the adoption of the present constitution. And what was that confederation? Merely a league of States, in which each individual member of that league was at liberty to act in her sovereign capacity, without any binding restrictions. Each individual member of that confederation could levy taxes, raise revenue, make alliances, declare war, make peace, and do whatever else she chose without consultation with the rest of the members, and without being held amenable for her action, except just so far as the general law of nations held her amenable. From that confederation she could at any time withdraw or secede, without being rebellious or traitorous to the other members.

Experience proved to the satisfaction of the wise, patriotic and far seeing fathers of the republic, that such a confederation was entirely ineffectual for the accomplishment of the great purposes for which it was formed. It possessed not the concentrated power of binding and irrepealable unity to protect the common flag of a common Union. It could not, therefore, command the respect and the honor of other nations, nor promote its own stability and permanence.

Is the present Union similar to that? Can a South Carolina, or a Massachusetts, or any other disaffected State withdraw or secede at will, as she could from the Old Confederation, and set up, if she choose, an independent nationality? No such thing. The present compact and constitution grew out of the absolute necessities consequent upon the inefficiency of the old confederation. They were established solely to prevent or obviate that inefficiency, and provide a common flag and a common government capable of commanding respect. An examination of the present Constitution will show that fact. We will, therefore, present those provisions of that instrument which have a direct bearing upon the decision of this question, and then show by the record how the fathers of that Constitution understood its powers, and how that understanding has been confirmed by all the precedents in the history of the government to the present time.

The very preamble of the Constitution itself shows that it was formed for the purpose of establishing a government stronger and more efficient than the old confederation. It is in these words:

“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Among other things, this preamble declares that the present constitution was “ordained and established” “in order to form a union more perfect” than existed under the provisions of the old confederation—a union that could not be dissolved at the pleasure or choice of any State or any number of States without the consent of three-fourths of the sovereign people. It conceded to a general government certain powers and rights, which were, of course, subtracted from the powers and rights of the separate State sovereignties, and these powers and rights were vested solely in the hands of a President, “a Congress of the United States,” and a Supreme Court created and elected according to the provisions of that constitution. And now, to understand this matter, what were those particular powers and rights which were thus abstracted from the separate State sovereignties and vested in a general government? They are very emphatically, clearly and forcibly declared in article I, section 8, of the constitution of the United States. They are thus expressed:

“The Congress shall have power—

“1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

“2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

“3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;

“4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

“5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

“6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;

“7. To establish post offices and post roads;

“8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

“9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations;

“10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

“11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriations of money to that use, shall be for a longer term than two years;

“12. To provide and maintain a navy;

“13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

“14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

“15. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

“16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings:—And

“17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”

The powers enumerated in this section are very definite, and nothing we could say would make that fact appear more apparent. Now if these powers are conferred upon the general government by the common consent of all the States of the Union, or more especially by all the people of all the States, can any one State exercise any of those reserved powers? Most certainly not. But the framers of the constitution did not leave this to be inferred. They settled the question definitely in section ten. Here it is:

“1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

“2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what maybe absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tunnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

This section plainly and positively prohibits the States from doing certain things without the consent of Congress. They can neither contract alliances, collect revenue, coin money, nor engage in war in their capacity of States.

To guard the powers of the general government from encroachment on the part of the States, and to preserve them intact and unimpaired, the President of the United States, as the chief Executive officer of the government, takes this oath:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

We have thus far enumerated some of the powers delegated by the Constitution to the federal government in the precise language of that constitution, and have shown that the chief executive of the government is sworn to exercise those powers by enforcing the constitution, and, of course, the laws, &c., which are made under its sanction and by its authority.

This constitution was adopted by a vast majority of the people of every State in the Union—adopted too with the understanding that it was perpetually binding—adopted without any proviso for withdrawal or secession in case of dissatisfaction—adopted when it was known that, even to amend it, either two-thirds of both houses of Congress must “propose amendments, or two-thirds of all the State Legislatures unite in an application to call a convention of States for proposing amendments,” and that, when such amendments were proposed, they must “be ratified” by “the legislatures of three-fourths of all the States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof.” This shows clearly and conclusively that our fathers considered that they were establishing a government indissoluble—a government for all time, incapable of disruption by separate State action or by the violence of local faction.

In the strong light of these facts how are we to regard the present attitude of South Carolina? As treasonable and rebellious to rightful authority, which she herself assisted to establish. She has no right whatever, under the existing compact, to withdraw herself from the Union, or to annul that compact into which she voluntarily entered, when she adopted that constitution. By that adoption she forever signed away such a right—voluntarily she sets her signature to a compact having no such proviso of choice. If she secede then—if she break, or attempt to break, that compact, she engages in a revolution, and revolution is rebellion—revolution is treason. Of that capital crime she, or rather her citizens, are even now guilty. “What constitutes treason? The constitution defines it in Article 3, Section III:

“1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

“2. The congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.”

Now has not South Carolina “levied war?” Has she not collected armies to resist the United States? Has she not obstructed the collection of the revenue of the nation? Has she not even taken the fortifications and arsenals and confiscated the property of the United States? All these things has she done, and if this be not “levying war”—if this be not “treason”—rank “treason,” I know not what is. And yet, strange as it may seem, there are men in all the States so wedded to party that they encourage and justify South Carolina in her mad secession schemes, and by so doing give “aid and comfort” to the sworn “enemies” of the United States. Did they ever think that they too are traitors, and that they are as legally deserving of a halter as the madest secession hotspur of South Carolina?

Like the old tories of the revolution, they are, however, but few in the Northern States, and their number, thanks to the intelligence of the people, is rapidly growing less. Soon will there be but one sentiment in all sane minds upon this subject. All will see that this Union must be preserved, unbroken by rebels, and traitors be brought to condign punishment, unless we would insanely jeopardise all for which our fathers fought and bled and died upon the battle fields of the revolution.

To aid in creating a healthy public sentiment upon this important subject, I will now give some of the arguments in favor of the Union and of the present constitution, advanced by some of the early fathers of the republic. To do this, I shall first draw largely from certain political papers, entitled the “Federalist,” written while the adoption of the present constitution was pending, and addressed to the people of the State of New York, to explain the principles of the new constitution, and to enforce the propriety and necessity of its adoption. They were the united productions of John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, three brilliant political lights.

In the first eight numbers of these papers the dangers of foreign force and influence, and of war between the States, and the effects of internal war in producing standing armies unfriendly to liberty, were portrayed in a very masterly manner. Several other papers follow from which I quote largely, as they are just as appropriate now to show the benefits of a stable and consolidated Union, and the evils of disunion, as then:

“THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTIONS.

“A firm union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.

“It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by which they were kept perpetually vibrating between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrasts to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret arising from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the luster of those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.

“From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partizans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their error.

“But it is not to be denied, that the portraits they have sketched of republican government, were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends of liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges, holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature, by deputies of their own election; these are either wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained, and its imperfections lessoned or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances, that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State, or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place.

“The utility of a confederacy, as well to suppress faction, and to guard the internal tranquility of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the PLAN proposed have with great assiduity cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprized of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

“When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, N. Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned, and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore receive his ideas on this point, as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question, seem to have been aware of the dilemma, and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue; but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.

“Referring the examination of the principle itself to an other place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here, that in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union; but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

“So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

“‘It is very probable, says he,[1] that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution, that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

“‘This form of government is a convention, by which several smaller States agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.

“‘A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

“‘If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate States. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces, independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

“‘Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The State may be destroyed on one side and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

“‘As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies.’

“I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of the other parts of the work were calculated to produce. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

“A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential characteristic of the first, is said to be the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members, has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the course of this investigation, that, as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.

“The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be ‘an assemblage of societies,’ or an association of two or more States into one State. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished, so long as it exists by a constitutional necessity for local purposes, though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact and theory, an association of States, or a confederacy The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State government, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive, and very important, portions of the sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

“In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES, or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to two, and the smallest to one. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be anything that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says, ‘Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia.’ Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened writer, and we shall be led to conclude that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.”

The important paper just quoted from the “Federalist,” is from the gifted pen of James Madison, so long a prominent and leading statesman in the democratic party, and one of the framers of our present government. Had we space we would quote another, equally important, from the same source and upon the same subject.

This paper, its pointed facts and its powerful reasoning in favor of a stable Union, such as was contemplated by the present constitution, and against the defects of the old confederation, we commend to the particular attention of the thinking masses of the present democratic party. Although written before the adoption of the existing constitution, and for the express purpose of inducing the people to ratify that constitution, it contains much that is applicable to the present political juncture, inasmuch as the present secession dogmas of South Carolina and of the Calhoun school of politicians are exactly the loose, inefficient principles of that old confederation, and opposed to those of the present constitution.

We will here make an extract from another paper of the “Federalist,” to show how Jay, Madison and Hamilton regarded the defects of that confederation—to illustrate, with clearness, the absolute necessity of the adoption of our present constitution, considering, as they did, that it would constitute an efficient remedy for those defects:

“CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION, IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES.

“In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot, which binds the people of America together, to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry, through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed.

“In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the ‘insufficiency of the present confederation to the preservation of the Union.’

“It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is neither controverted nor doubted; to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent; and which, in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new constitution? It must in truth be acknowledged, that however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in the opinion, that there are material imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length extorted from those whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we have arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of many of those defects in the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.

“We may indeed with propriety, be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character, of an independent people, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interest not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.[2] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled, by nature and compact, to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers, a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us: Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land, in most parts of the country, is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can be only fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending, is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from a scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befal a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?

“This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those very maxims and councils, which would now deter us from adopting the proposed constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make firm stand for our safety, our tranquility, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.

“It is true, as has been before observed, that facts too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition, that there exist material defects in our national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the confederation necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an alteration in the very elements and main pillars of the fabric.

“The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing confederation, is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends.”

A violation of any of the articles of the old confederation was the act only of the States, as sovereign and independent parties to a contract, and did not implicate individuals in the crime of treason, if acting under the sanction of such a State. Not so, however, with individuals under the present constitution, even though acting under the sanction of particular States; because the present constitution is that of the people and not of the States as States in their sovereign capacity, for the people of the States have delegated to a general government, in the constitution, certain powers, which are taken away from the States, and cannot, therefore, be exercised by those States without subjecting the people of the States so exorcising them to punishment for high treason.

To show that eminent statesmen, even before the adoption of our present constitution, so regarded the principles of the government proposed to be established under it, we will quote another extract from the “Federalist,” commencing on page 102 of vol. I:

“If it be possible to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns, and preserving the general tranquility, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the REVERSE of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed constitution. It must carry its agency to the PERSONS OF THE CITIZENS. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislation; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of INDIVIDUALS, and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have a right to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is entrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the governments of the particular States.”

An argument against the adoption of our present constitution was urged by its enemies to prevent its adoption, that it would create a central government too strong—a government so strong as to endanger the reserved rights of the States. This objection is thus stated and answered upon pages 106 and 107, vol. I, of the “Federalist:”

“It may be said, that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power, which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons entrusted with the administration of the general government, could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State; the supervision of agriculture, and of other concerns of a similar nature; all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is, therefore, improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise them would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national government.”

We will close our extracts from the luminous papers of the “Federalist,” with the following, premising, however, that, in these fearful times of raging secession madness, it would be well if the whole two volumes could be put in the hands of every intelligent individual in the nation. This extract refers again to the defects and the lamentable inefficiency of the old confederation, as contrasted with the proposed efficiency and stability of the government under the new constitution, a subject which cannot be too deeply engraven upon the mind of every patriot to whatever party he may belong. It can be found commencing upon page 131, of vol. 1, of the “Federalist,” and ending on page 133:

“Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which depict the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.

“The next most palpable defect of the existing confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed, have no power to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional means. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by which it is declared, ‘that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.’ The want of such a right involves, no doubt, a striking absurdity, but we are reduced to the dilemma, either of supposing that deficiency, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new constitution; and the omission of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude that the United States affords the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have been cited, that the American confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.

“The want of a mutual guarantee of the State governments, is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guarantee from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion, from the like consideration. The want of a guarantee, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence, as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.

“Without a guarantee, the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers, which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation, from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces, that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the mal-contents had been headed by a Cæsar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?

“The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guarantee to the federal government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from Union, and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guarantee could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the prevention of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions on this head. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretence for the use of violent remedies, in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular representative constitution, is a change of men. A guarantee by the national authority would be as much directed against the usurpations of rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.”

We have thus far briefly enumerated some of the important powers granted by the people of the United States in their sovereign capacity, to the present federal government. We have endeavored to show that the people, having granted certain powers to the general government, such powers are necessarily withdrawn from the several States by the people thereof for the purpose of establishing one grand central power, which, when exercised within its delegated authority, should be recognized as the supreme law of the land; hence the people of the several States having to the extent of the powers granted, surrendered the separate State sovereignty, they became one grand, inseparable, sovereign and independent nation. The very fact that each and every citizen of our entire country has a voice in controlling the policy of the general government, shows conclusively that they owe obedience to its enactments, consequently, our national laws are alike binding upon every individual from Florida to Maine, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.

But independent of our arguments, we have in the foregoing pages presented copious extracts from letters written by Messrs. Madison, Jay and Hamilton pending the adoption of the constitution, all of which must convince the most skeptical, that all parties at that time understood that they were granting certain powers to the general government that could not thereafter be resumed and controlled by the various States. The able manner in which the importance of such an arrangement is argued, the clear and conclusive reasoning, the contrasts drawn between one great and powerful nation and several petty, jealous, contending little sovereignties, should cast into the shade the weak sophism that is palmed off by the political demagogues of the present day for the purpose of dividing the people, under the disguise of what is called State sovereignty.

The arguments already advanced to show that we have a national government whose authority is supreme throughout the length and breadth of this country, (State laws to the contrary notwithstanding,) should be sufficient to convince the most ultra States rights secessionist that his dogma is only a garbled name for treason. Nevertheless, we will now proceed to give in full the celebrated Proclamation issued to the nullifiers of South Carolina twenty-eight years ago by the hero of the battle of New Orleans, recommending its careful perusal by every American citizen who has a spark of patriotism left within him. Its noble, patriotic sentiments will be found decidedly refreshing when contrasted with the crouching imbecility and indecision that has characterized not only James Buchanan but many of our leading politicians in the present dangerous, suffering and distracted condition of our beloved country.

General Jackson, a brave, daring, noble hero, knowing his duty, hastened to perform it in defiance of every obstacle; he resolves to save his country, at every hazard, from falling into the vortex of anarchy, ruin and disgrace.

When the hydra-headed monster, treason, began to make its appearance, the honored son of Tennessee, whose name is held in reverence by every friend of liberty, whose memory will be honored as the savior of his country, actuated by a high sense of his duty, with true Roman firmness, standing upon the temple of liberty, proclaiming to the world that he will maintain the integrity of his country or perish while marching under its glorious banner warning the enemies of the Union, to pause and consider the awful consequences of persisting in their treasonable designs, and decide whether they are prepared to assume such a terrible responsibility.

I will now give his proclamation in full, hoping that the spirit of patriotism, firmness and justice therein contained will cause a heartfelt response by my fellow countrymen.