JEFFERSON DAVIS AND REPUDIATION.

LETTER OF HON. ROBERT J. WALKER.

Soon after my arrival in London from New York, my attention was called, by some English, as well as American friends, to an article which had appeared more than a month previously in the London Times of the 23d of March last. In the money article of that date is the following letter from the Hon. John Slidell, the Minister of Jefferson Davis at Paris.

'My dear Sir:

I have yours of yesterday. I am inclined to think the people of London confound Mr. Reuben Davis, whom I have always understood to have taken the lead on the question of repudiation, with President Jefferson Davis. I am not aware that the latter was in any way identified with that question. I am very confident that it was not agitated during his canvass for Governor, or during his administration. The Union Bank bonds were issued in direct violation of an express constitutional provision. There is a wide difference between these bonds, and those of the Planters' Bank, for the repudiation of which, neither excuse nor palliation can be offered. I feel confident that Jefferson Davis never approved or justified that repudiation. What may have been his private opinions of the refusal to consider the State of Mississippi bound to provide for the payment of the Union Bank bonds, I do not know.

It is due to the editor of the Times here to state, that, in his money article of the 23d March last, he refers to the controversy of that press with Jefferson Davis on that question in 1849, and, as regards the suggestion of Mr. Slidell, that it might have been Reuben Davis who was the repudiator in 1849, instead of Jefferson Davis, the editor remarked, 'it is to be feared that the proof in the other direction is too strong.' Indeed, the editor might well be astonished at the supposition that Jefferson Davis, who subscribed the repudiation letter in question of the 25th May, 1849, as well as a still stronger communication of the 29th August, 1849, should have been confounded, during a period of near fourteen years, by the press of Europe and America, with Reuben Davis, and that the supposed mistake should just now be discovered, especially as Reuben Davis never was a Senator of the United States from Mississippi, or from any other State.

I was asked if it really was Reuben or Jefferson Davis who was the author of the letter in question advocating the repudiation of the Union Bank bonds of Mississippi, their recollection being, that it was the latter. I said that the repudiation letter in question of the 25th May, 1849, was subscribed and published at its date in the Washington Union, by Jefferson Davis, as a Senator of the United States from Mississippi, which position he then held, that he was personally well known to me for nearly a fourth of a century, as was also Reuben Davis, and that the latter never had been a Senator of the United States from Mississippi, or any other State, as was well known to me, and would be shown by reference to the Journals of the United States Senate. I stated, that I had represented the State of Mississippi in the Senate of the United States from January, 1836, until March, 1845, when, having resigned that office, I was called to the Cabinet of President Polk, as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and remained in that position until the close of that administration in March, 1849. I added, that I was in Washington City, the capital of the Union, and residing there as a counsellor at law in the Supreme Court of the United States, when the first repudiation letter of Jefferson Davis, communicated by him to the editor of the Union (a newspaper of that city), was published, on the 25th May, 1849, in that print, and very generally throughout the United States. It was remarked by me, that it was well known to myself personally, and I believed to every prominent public man of that date, especially those then in Washington, that Mr. Jefferson Davis was the author of that letter then published over his signature, and that he defended its doctrines, with all that earnestness and ability for which he was so distinguished. I was also residing in Washington, when Mr. Jefferson Davis published, over his signature, as a Senator of the United States from Mississippi, his well-known second repudiation letter, dated at his residence, 'Brierfield, Miss.,' August 29, 1849. This letter was addressed to the editors of the Mississippian, a newspaper published at Jackson, Mississippi, and was received by me in due course of mail. This letter extended over several columns, and was an elaborate defence of the repudiation of Mississippi. This letter also was generally republished throughout the United States. These views of Mr. Jefferson Davis attracted my most earnest attention, because, after a brief interval, he was one of my successors in the Senate of the United States, from Mississippi. I had always earnestly opposed the doctrine of repudiation in Mississippi, and the Legislature of 1840-'41, by which I was re-elected, passed resolutions by overwhelming majorities (hereafter quoted), denouncing the repudiation either of the Union Bank, or Planters' Bank bonds.

At the period of the conversations before referred to, late in April or early in May last, I was, on this recital of the facts, strongly urged to make them known in Europe, to which my consent was given.

After some investigation, however, the necessary documents fully to elucidate the whole subject could not be obtained here. It was necessary, therefore, to write home and procure them. This has been done, and I now proceed to a narrative of these transactions from the authentic historical public documents.

The first letter of Mr. Jefferson Davis before referred to, of the 25th of May, 1849, was published by him as a Senator of the United States from Mississippi, over his signature, in the Union, a newspaper published at Washington City. That letter is in these words:

'Daily Union, Washington City, May 25th, 1849.

'The State of Mississippi has no other question with bondholders than that of debt or no debt. When the United States Bank of Pennsylvania purchased what are known as the Union Bank bonds, it was within the power of any stock dealer to learn that they had been issued in disregard of the Constitution of the State whose faith they assumed to pledge. By the Constitution and laws of Mississippi, any creditor of the State may bring suit against the State, and test his claim, as against an individual. To this the bondholders have been invited; but conscious that they have no valid claim, have not sought their remedy. Relying upon empty (because false) denunciation, they have made it a point of honor to show what can be shown by judicial investigation; i. e., that there being no debt, there has been no default. The crocodile tears which have been shed over ruined creditors, are on a par with the baseless denunciations which have been heaped upon the State. Those bonds were purchased by a bank then tottering to its fall—purchased in violation of the charter of the bank, or fraudulently, by concealing the transaction under the name of an individual, as may best suit those concerned—purchased in violation of the terms of the law under which the bonds were issued, and in disregard of the Constitution of Mississippi, of which the law was an infraction. To sustain the credit of that rickety bank, the bonds were hypothecated abroad for interest on loans which could not be met as they became due.

'A smaller amount is due for what are termed Planters' Bank bonds of Mississippi. These evidences of debt, as well as the coupons issued to cover accruing interest, are receivable for State lands; and no one has a right to assume they will not be provided for otherwise, by or before the date at which the whole debt becomes due.

To this letter the London Times, in its money article, of the 13th July, 1849, replied as follows:

'The case of Mississippi stands thus: In 1838 the State issued bonds for five millions of dollars, to establish the Union Bank. These bonds were dated June, 1838, bearing five per cent. interest from date, and it was stipulated with the bank that they should not be sold under their par value. On the 18th August following, the bank sold all these bonds to the United States Bank for five millions of dollars, payable in five equal instalments in November, January, March, May, and July, but without interest. The money was punctually paid to the Mississippi Bank, and the Legislature of Mississippi, on the terms of the sale being communicated to them, resolved, 'That the sale of the bonds was highly advantageous to the State, and in accordance with the injunctions of the charter, reflecting the highest credit on the Commissioners, and bringing timely aid to an embarrassed community.' In little more than two years, however, the Mississippi Bank became totally insolvent, having lost the entire five millions invested in it by the State. Immediately on this having transpired, the Governor of the State sent a message to the Legislature recommending them to repudiate (this was the first time the word was used) their obligations, being founded on the plea, that as the bonds were issued with interest payable from the date, and they had been sold to the United States Bank for their nominal amount only, the stipulation that they should not be disposed of below their par value had been departed from. He further urged that although the bonds had been sold ostensibly to Mr. Biddle, the president of the United States Bank, the sale was actually to the bank itself, which, by its charter, could not legally purchase them. Hence, although Mississippi had received the money for the bonds, it was thus proposed to refuse to repay it, on the ground that the purchaser had no right to buy them. The Legislature, however, was not quite prepared for this, and accordingly, in responding to the Governor's message, they resolved: '1st. That the State of Mississippi is bound to the holders of the bonds of the State sold on account of the bank for the amount of principal and interest. 2d. That the State of Mississippi will pay her bonds, and preserve her faith inviolate. 3d. That the insinuation that the State of Mississippi would repudiate her bonds and violate her plighted faith, is a calumny upon the justice, honor, and dignity of the State.' But after this, the pecuniary condition of the State became rapidly worse, and the disposition to pay diminished in proportion. Accordingly a joint committee of the Legislature appointed in 1842, reported that the State was not bound to pay the bonds, advancing the reasons before mentioned, and also another, namely, that the bonds had not been sanctioned in the manner required by the Constitution, since, although the provision that no loan should be raised, unless sanctioned by a law passed through two successive Legislatures, had been complied with, and the bonds had been legally authorized, the act also prescribed certain conditions regarding the Bank of Mississippi, which conditions had been altered by a subsequent act, that had only passed through one Legislature.

'In addition to the five millions thus repudiated, Mississippi owes two millions which she recognizes. It has always, however, been a difference without distinction, since she pays no dividends on either. From the period of repudiation up to the present moment, all representations of the bondholders have been treated with disregard. About a year and a half back, however, one of the citizens of Mississippi, a Mr. Robbins, admitted the moral liability of the State, and proposed that the people should discharge it by voluntary contributions.

'The next step is the appearance of the letter from Mr. Jefferson Davis, with whom we are now called upon to deal. This statement, which was transmitted by him to the Washington Union, in reply to our remarks of the 23d February last, runs as follows.'

Here the Times inserts Mr. Jefferson Davis's repudiation letter before quoted.

'The assurance in this statement that the Planters' Bank, or non-repudiated bonds, are receivable for State lands, requires this addition, which Mr. Jefferson Davis has omitted, that they are only so receivable upon lands being taken at three times its current value. The affirmation afterward, that no one has a right to assume that these bonds will not be fully provided for before the date at which the principal falls due, is simply to be met by the fact that portions of them fell due in 1841 and 1846, and that on these, as well as on all the rest, both principal and interest remain wholly unpaid.

'Regarding the first part of the statement no comment could be made which would not weaken its effect. Taking its principle and its tone together, it is a doctrine which has never been paralleled. Let it circulate throughout Europe, that a member of the United States Senate in 1849, has openly proclaimed that at a recent period the Governor and Legislative Assemblies of his own State deliberately issued fraudulent bonds for five millions of dollars to 'sustain the credit of a rickety bank;' that the bonds in question, having been hypothecated abroad to innocent holders, such holders had not only no claim against the community by whose executive and representatives this act was omitted, but that they are to be taunted for appealing to the verdict of the civilized world, rather than to the judgment of the legal officers of the State by whose functionaries they have been already robbed; and that the ruin of toilworn men, of women, of widows, and of children, and the 'crocodile tears' which that ruin has occasioned, is a subject of jest on the part of those by whom it has been accomplished; and then let it be asked if any foreigner ever penned a libel on the American character equal to that against the people of Mississippi by their own Senator.'

To this reply of the London Times, which (except in portions of Mississippi) was generally approved throughout the Union, Mr. Jefferson Davis responded in a very long letter, dated from his residence, Brierfield, Mississippi, August 29, 1849, addressed to the editors of the Mississippian. He begins as follows:

'The London Times of July 13, 1849, contains an article which most unjustly and unfairly attacks the State of Mississippi and myself, because of a statement I made in refutation of a former calumny against her, which was published in the same paper.'

This article of the London Times Mr. Davis denounces as 'a foreigner's slander against the government, the judiciary, and people of Mississippi;' 'very well for the high Tory paper as an attack upon our republican government;' as 'untrue;' 'the hypocritical cant of stockjobbers and pensioned presses' 'reckless of reputation;' 'hired advocates of the innocent stock dealers of London 'Change;' 'a calumnious imputation.' These are pleasant epithets which Mr. Jefferson Davis applied to the London Times and the London 'Change. But Mr. Jefferson Davis was very indignant, not only with London, but with all England; for he says,

'With far more propriety might repudiation be charged on the English Government, for the reduction of interest on her loans when she consolidated her debts; for the income tax, which compels fundholders to return part of the interest they receive on their evidences of public debt, for the support of the Government which is their debtor.'

According, then, to Mr. Jefferson Davis, the London Times and the London 'Change are great reprobates, and it is not Mississippi, but 'the English Government' which has repudiated their own public debt.

From such angry epithets and fierce denunciation, the reader will be prepared to find very little argument in Mr. Jefferson Davis' second letter. He denies that Mississippi received the money. But a bank, of which she was the sole stockholder, and whose directory was all appointed by her, received it. They received it also for her exclusive benefit, for she, as a State, was to derive large profits on the stock of the bank, which was hers exclusively, and was paid for entirely by the proceeds of these bonds. Mississippi then, as a State, through her agents appointed by her, received this money. All governments must act through human agency, and the agency in this case, which received the money, was appointed entirely by the State. But this is not all. The Bank, which was exclusively a State bank, and based entirely on the proceeds of these State bonds, with no other stockholders, was directed by the charter to loan this money, the proceeds of these bonds, only to 'the citizens of the State,' sec. 46, and so the loans were made. The State, then, through an agency appointed exclusively by itself, received this money, the proceeds of the State bonds, and the State, through this same agency, loaned this money to 'the citizens of the State,' who never repaid the loans. The State then received the money and loaned it out to its own citizens, who still hold it; and yet this money, obtained on the solemn pledge of the faith of the State, her citizens still hold, and the State repudiates her bonds on which the money was received, and Mr. Jefferson Davis sustains, indorses, and eulogizes this proceeding. Never was there a stronger case.

Mr. Jefferson Davis reiterates in this letter his arguments contained in his previous communication of the 25th May, 1849, so fully answered by the editors of the London Times in their money article before quoted of the 13th July, 1849. He elaborates, particularly, the legal position, that the bonds were invalid, because he says not sanctioned by two successive Legislatures as required by the Constitution of Mississippi. This statement is erroneous, because the loan, in the precise form in which the bonds were issued, was sanctioned by two successive Legislatures in perfect conformity with the Constitution. This is shown, as will be proved hereafter, by reference to the laws passed by the State, and such was the decision on this very point by the highest judicial tribunal of Mississippi, in 1842 and 1853. But let us suppose that there was some technical legal informality as to the law, would that justify the repudiation of these bonds? The Legislature had passed laws in 1837 and 1838 authorizing the issue and sale of these bonds, those acts had been all signed and approved by the Governor of the State, the bonds had been signed by the Governor and Treasurer of the State, the broad seal of the State had been affixed to them by the Governor, they were placed in the hands of the authorities of the State for sale, they were sold by them, and the full amount paid over to the agency appointed by the State, and by that agency the money was loaned to the 'citizens of the State' and still retained by them. When the sale of these State bonds in August, 1838, together with all the facts and documents, were placed by the Governor before the Legislature in 1839, they ratified and highly approved the sale, as before quoted by the Times, and again still more decidedly in 1841. And yet the State, on the technical grounds stated by Mr. Davis, repudiated their bonds. It was unconstitutional to return the money which they had borrowed and used! Could anything be more absurd or dishonorable than this? The law says, if a man borrows money without certain legal authentications, he shall not be forced to repay; but if he receives and uses the money, and then interposes such technical pleas, he is justly deemed infamous. He has violated his honor. And is the honor of an individual more sacred than that of a state or nation? State and national debts rest upon faith, they repose upon honor, the obligation is sacred, and must be fulfilled. It can never he illegal or unconstitutional to pay a debt, where the money has been received by a state or a nation. And, where a State, acting through its supreme Executive and Legislature, has issued its bonds and affixed its seal, and they have passed into the hands of bona fide holders, the obligation must be fulfilled. For a state or nation, having issued its bonds under its highest legislative and executive sanction, to say, that their own functionaries mistook some of the formalities of the law, and refuse payments, is a fraud upon the bona fide holders, and can never be sustained before the tribunal of the world. But when, besides the Legislature and Executive of the State, its highest judicial tribunals have declared the bonds perfectly constitutional and valid, and to have been sold in accordance with the terms of the law, for such repudiation of such bonds it is difficult to find any language sufficiently strong to mark the infamy of such a transaction.

If indeed the formalities of the Constitution had not been complied with, and this were not a mere pretext, how easy would it have been to have passed a new act in conformity with the constitutional formalities, assuming the debt, or providing for the issue of new bonds to be delivered to the holders on the return of those alleged to be informal. But the truth is, this alleged unconstitutionality was a mere pretext for repudiating a just debt: it never occurred to the Legislatures which passed these laws in 1837 and 1838, or to the Governor, who signed them, and was rejected by the Legislature in 1839, and again, in the most solemn form, in 1841.

And now let me trace the history of this transaction chronologically. The original act chartering the bank, with the 5th section authorizing the loan, was passed by the Legislature January 21st, 1837, and again, in strict compliance with the provisions of the Constitution, reënacted in the same words on the 5th of February, 1838. Now the bonds issued are in strict conformity with this law, and an exact copy of the form of the bonds prescribed by the law. If then, the supplemental act of the 15th February, 1838, was unconstitutional, null, and void, as contended by the repudiators, then the whole original act remained in full force, and the bonds were valid under that law, and such was the unanimous decision of the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, as will be shown hereafter. It was contended before the court (and by Mr. Davis in his last letter) that, under the original law, certain acts were to be performed before the bonds could issue. But here again, it is plain on the face of the law, and so the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi unanimously decided, that these acts were not required to be performed as conditions precedent to the issue of the bonds, and that the issue and sale of the bonds were perfectly valid before these acts had been performed. The bonds then are in exact conformity with a law, which was passed by two successive Legislatures, precisely as provided by the Constitution.

In 1836 there was a great pecuniary embarrassment in Mississippi, attributed by many to what was called the specie circular, and soon followed a suspension of the banks. Under these circumstances there was an almost universal demand in Mississippi for relief measures. As a consequence, the attention of the Legislature was absorbed almost exclusively in the consideration of remedies for the existing embarrassments. The result was the enactment, on the 21st January, 1837, of the law, creating the Union Bank of Mississippi. This bank was based upon loans to be obtained upon bonds of the State, the proceeds of which, when sold, were to constitute the capital of the bank, which money, by the terms of the charter, was to be loaned to the 'citizens of the State,' to relieve the existing embarrassments.

The fifth section of the act was the only one in which any authority was given for a loan by the State, and any power to pledge its faith. That section, entire, was as follows:

'That, in order to facilitate the said Union Bank for the said loan of fifteen millions five hundred thousand dollars, the faith of this State be, and is hereby pledged, both for the security of the capital and interest, and that 7,500 bonds of $1,000 each, to wit: 1,875 payable in twelve years; 1,875 in fifteen years; 1,875 in eighteen years; and 1,875 in twenty years, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, shall be signed by the Governor of the State to the order of the Mississippi Bank, countersigned by the State Treasurer, and under the seal of the State; said bonds to be in the following words, viz.:

'$2,000. Know all men by these presents, that the State of Mississippi acknowledges to be indebted to the Mississippi Union Bank in the sum of two thousand dollars, which sum the said State of Mississippi promises to pay in current money of the United States to the order of the President, Directors, and Company in the —— year ——with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, payable half yearly, at the place named in the indorsement hereto, viz.: —— on the —— of every year until the payment of the said principal sum: in testimony whereof the Governor of the State of Mississippi has signed, and the Treasurer of the State has countersigned these presents, and caused the seal of the State to be affixed thereto, at Jackson, this —— in the —— year of our Lord.

'Governor.

'Treasurer.'

The whole act, of which this section was a part, was passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor in 1837, and the entire section as to the loan as required by the provision of the Constitution of the State, was referred to the action of the next succeeding Legislature. That succeeding Legislature was chosen in November, 1837, and assembled, at its regular session, in January, 1838. After full discussion in both houses, this act of 1837 was passed by large majorities in both branches of the Legislature, and approved by the new Governor, A. G. McNutt, on the 5th of February, 1838. The act of 1837, including the 5th section, before quoted, was thus reënacted by the succeeding Legislature, without any change whatever. There was then a full, complete, and undisputed compliance with the requirements of the Constitution, and, under this act, thus sanctioned by two successive Legislatures, it is conceded that the faith of the State was pledged, and that the bonds might be issued and sold. But it is contended by Mr. Jefferson Davis in his first, as well as his second letter, before quoted, that the bonds are invalid, because of the supplemental act of the 15th of February, 1838. Now, it will be observed, that no change whatever was made by this supplemental act, in this 5th section of the original act, before quoted, by which alone the faith of the State was pledged for the payment of these bonds, and which section alone, as required by the Constitution, had been referred to the action of the succeeding Legislature. No change whatever was made by the supplemental act in that section of the original act, the bonds were issued and sold in precise conformity with its provisions, and, indeed, these bonds, thus actually issued and sold, are a precise and literal copy of the form of the bonds as given in the original act, as before quoted. The supplemental act changed only some of the 'details' of the charter of the Bank, but made no alteration whatever in the 5th section. This supplemental act, which is now denounced by Jefferson Davis as unconstitutional, was passed, after the fullest investigation of this question, as to the power of the Legislature, with favorable reports as to the constitutional power by the joint Committee of both Houses. The Committee reported to the Senate, that, by a 'supplemental bill' 'it is competent for this Legislature to alter and amend the details of the bill, incorporating the subscribers to the Mississippi Union Bank, passed at the last session of the Legislature of this State.' (Senate Journal, 103.)

The report of the Committee to the House was as follows: 'The said Committee are of the opinion, that it is within the province of the Legislature to amend or change the details of the said Mississippi Union Bank Charter,' &c. (House Journal, p. 117.) Such was the opinion of the joint Committee of both Houses of the Legislature, which reported this supplemental act, which act was passed by the vote of 22 to 3 in the Senate (Journal, 320), and 55 to 22 in the House. (Journal, 329-30.) It would appear, then, that in the opinion of an overwhelming majority of both branches of the Legislature of Mississippi, the supplemental act was constitutional; and the act was approved by A. G. McNutt, the Governor of the State, and thus became a law on the 15th of February, 1838. Indeed, the idea that a subsequent Legislature could change none of the details of a bank charter, because there was embodied in the act a separate and distinct section authorizing a loan of money by the State, seemed to me never to rise to the dignity of a question. Such, we have seen, was the view of the Legislatures of 1838, 1839, and 1841, and such was the unanimous decision, hereafter quoted, of the Chancellor and Circuit Judge of Mississippi, and of the supreme judicial tribunal, the High Court of Errors and Appeals of the State, in two decisions, on this very point, and in favor of the constitutionality of this law. One of these decisions was made in January, 1842, and the other in April, 1853. These decisions were conclusive against the State, and binding upon the Legislature, the Governor, and the people, for the following reasons. The Constitution of the State of Mississippi contains the following clause:

'Article II. Distribution of Powers.

'Sec. 1. The powers of the Government of the State of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate body of magistracy; to wit, those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another.

'Sec. 2. No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.'

It is not pretended that any exception was made for this case. The contrary has always been held by the courts of Mississippi. Indeed, as late as October term, 1858, this very question was decided by the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, when it was ruled by the court that 'the Legislature may not, therefore, exercise powers which in their nature are judicial.' (Isom. v. Missis. R. R. Co., 7 George 314.)

In the 9th section of the 7th article of the Constitution of Mississippi is found the provision on which Mr. Jefferson Davis relies requiring the assent of two successive Legislatures to pledge the faith of the State. Immediately succeeding this provision is the following: 'The Legislature shall direct by law in what courts suits may be brought against the State.'

These two consecutive sections of the same article of the Constitution, being in pari materia, are to be construed together. Indeed, it is a well known historical fact, that this 9th section, as regards the pledge of the faith of the State, which is now perverted to a wholly different purpose, was intended to give greater solemnity and a higher credit to the bonds of the State, as was likewise the provision in the same Constitution of 1832, sanctioning by name the Planters' Bank bonds of the State (now unpaid), in consequence of which, they were sold at a premium of thirteen and a half per cent. In pursuance of the provision of the Constitution before quoted, the Legislature of Mississippi, in 1833, passed an act, designating the Court of Chancery as the one in which suits might be brought against the State, with the right of appeal by either party to the High Court of Errors and Appeals. That act was passed in 1833, in pursuance of this mandatory provision of the Constitution before quoted. That act provided, that, if the decree of the court should be against the State, the Governor shall issue his mandate to the Auditor to draw on the Treasurer to pay the decree, but 'no execution whatever shall ever issue on any decree in chancery against the State of Mississippi, whereby the State may be dispossessed of lands, tenements, goods and chattels.' (Howard's Dig. 523, 524.)

Here, then, are the two consecutive provisions of the Constitution in pari materia, the one designating the mode by which the bonds of the State might be issued, and the other the judicial tribunals in which all disputes as to such bonds might be definitively settled, and payment made, if the decree were against the State. That Constitution vested the whole judicial power of the State in the courts, it vested nothing but 'legislative power' in the Legislature, and it prohibited the Legislature and Executive from exercising judicial power; it adopted the great fundamental principle of constitutional government, separating the executive, legislative, and judicial power. Indeed, it is the great doctrine of American law, that the concentration of any of these two powers, in any one body or functionary, is dangerous to liberty, and that the consolidation of all of these powers creates a despotism. The interpretation of a law, and particularly of a constitution, which is made the 'supreme law,' the lex legum, has uniformly been regarded as exclusively a judicial, and not an executive or legislative function. In this case, however, it has been made clear by an express provision of the Constitution separating these functions, and designating, under its mandate, the courts in which suits shall be brought against the State, and the form of the decree to be rendered, and requiring payment to be at once made. A suit is a judicial act, and so is the decree of a court. Well, then, the highest judicial tribunals of Mississippi have twice decided this question; they have declared this supplemental act constitutional, these bonds valid, and the sale of them to be in conformity with the law; and, in a suit on one of these very bonds, after the fullest argument, the court entered a decree of payment, overruling every point made by Jefferson Davis; and yet the State still repudiates, as well after the first decision in 1842, as the second in 1853. It is difficult to imagine a more palpable infraction of the Constitution, or a clearer violation of every principle of justice than this.

The State prescribes certain forms under which her bonds may issue; she adds to this, in the very next section, a provision commanding the Legislature to designate the judicial tribunals in which suit may be brought on such bonds against the State; those tribunals are designated by the Legislature, namely, the Court of Chancery, with appeal to the High Court of Errors and Appeals of the State; both those tribunals (including the Chancellor) have unanimously decided against the State, and a decree is entered for payment of the bonds. And yet the State persists in repudiation, and Jefferson Davis defends her course. When the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi first decided this question, it was composed of Chief Justice Sharkey, and Justices Turner and Trotter (one of the framers of the Constitution). When, again, in 1851, suit was brought against the State on one of these repudiated Union Bank bonds, and a decree for its payment rendered by the Chancellor, that decree, on full argument on appeal, was unanimously confirmed by the highest judicial tribunal of the State, composed entirely of different judges, namely, Chief Justice Smith, and Justices Yerger and Fisher. Here, then, are eight judges, all chosen by the people of Mississippi, concurring in 1842, as well as in 1853, as to the validity of these bonds; and yet Jefferson Davis justifies their repudiation. The judges of Mississippi all take an oath to support the Constitution, and it is made their duty to interpret it, and especially this very clause: the Legislature is confined to law making, and forbidden to exercise any judicial power; the expounding this supplemental law, and the provisions under which it was enacted, is exclusively a judicial power, and yet the Legislature usurps this power, repudiates the bonds of the State, and the acts of three preceding Legislatures, and the decision of the highest tribunals of the State: Jefferson Davis sustains this repudiation, and the British public are asked to take new Confederate bonds, issued by the same Jefferson Davis, and thus to sanction, and encourage, and offer a premium for repudiation. These so-called Confederate bonds are issued in open violation of the Constitution of the United States; they are absolute nullities, they are tainted with treason, they never can or will be paid, and yet they are to be thrust on the British public under the sanction of the same great repudiator, Jefferson Davis, who applauds the non-payment of the Mississippi bonds, and thus condemns hundreds of innocent holders, including widows and orphans, to want and misery. Talk about faith, about honor, about justice, and the sanctity of contracts. Why, if such flagrant outrages, such atrocious crimes, can be sustained by the great public of any nation, small indeed must be the value of their bonds, which rests exclusively on good faith.

Suppose some astute lawyer could find some informality in the law authorizing the issue and sale of the bonds representing the British consols; would any member of either House propose in Parliament to repudiate such bonds, and would not such a motion cause his immediate expulsion? Yet, this is what the Legislature of Mississippi has done, what Jefferson Davis approves and applauds, and what, he says, the 'English Government' has done.

The London Times has heretofore quoted the proceedings of the Legislature of Mississippi in 1839, approving the sale of these bonds and eulogizing the transaction. It has also referred to the Message of Governor McNutt, of 1841, nearly three years after the sale of the bonds, first recommending their repudiation, and to the resolutions of the Legislature of Mississippi of that date, affirming the legality of these bonds and the duty of the State to pay them. As these resolutions are of great importance, and ought to have closed the whole controversy, I will state, what is shown by the Journals of the Senate and the House, that they passed both Houses, in great part unanimously, and for the remainder, by large majorities. (Sen. Jour. p. 312; House Jour. pp. 416-417, 249, 324-329.)

The objections made by Governor McNutt in 1841, were as follows:

'1st. The Bank of the United States is prohibited by its charter from purchasing such stock, either directly or indirectly.

'2d. It was fraudulent on the part of the bank, inasmuch as the contract was made in the name of an individual, when, in fact, it was for the benefit of the bank, and payment was made with its funds.

'3d. The sale was illegal, inasmuch as the bonds were sold on a credit.

'4th. Interest to the amount of about $170,000 having accrued on those bonds before the purchase money was stipulated to be all paid, the bonds were, in fact, sold at less than their par value, in direct violation of the charter of the bank.' (House Journal, p. 25).

It will here be remarked, that the great objection now urged by Jefferson Davis against these bonds, namely, that the act under which they were alleged to have been issued was unconstitutional, is not enumerated by Governor McNutt. Surely if such an objection existed to the payment of the bonds, it must have found a place in this celebrated message. Is not this conclusive proof that this constitutional objection was a mere afterthought and pretext of Jefferson Davis and his associate repudiators?

Let us examine the Governor's objections. As to the 1st and 2d—the bank did not make the purchase; the contract was made by an individual, although the performance was guaranteed by the bank. As this is a mere technical objection, surely the Bank guarantee, even if void, could not affect the contract itself. 2d. The purchase, even if made by the bank, was not of stock, but a loan made upon bonds. 3d. The right of the bank to make the purchase is immaterial, if the money was paid, as in this case, the bonds received, payable to bearer, and passed for value, into the hands of bona fide holders. What an objection to the refunding the money—that, although it was received, the purchaser of the bonds had no right to buy them, and therefore the bona fide holders should lose the money. It might have been in violation of its charter for the bank to purchase the bonds, but it was 'fraudulent,' when the money was received by the State, to retain it, on the allegation, that the bank could not legally make the purchase, especially when the bonds, in the mean time, had passed into the hands of bona fide holders. As to the 3d objection—as the money was paid before the objection was made, and the Union Bank authorized to draw at once for the amount, at a point beyond the limits of the State, which it did do, and realized a large premium on the exchange, and profit on the transaction, the objection is as unfounded in law as it is in morals or good faith; especially as the bonds were payable to bearer, upon their face, in exact conformity to the law, and had passed, for value, into the hands of bona fide holders. Besides, there was no such restriction in the charter. The only restriction in the supplement was, that they should not be sold below par. Suppose the bonds for five millions of dollars had been sold for five millions and a half, payable in sixty days, and the money paid at the time, it is equally absurd and fraudulent to contend, that for such a reason, the whole money could be retained, and bonds repudiated. As to the 4th objection, the original 5th section which passed two successive Legislatures, did not require that the bonds should not be sold for 'less than their par value.' If, then, as contended by Jefferson Davis, the supplemental act containing this provision, was unconstitutional, null and void, then no such restriction existed, and the sale was valid under the original act. But the truth is, the bonds were not sold below par, but above par, as shown by the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, in the decision hereafter quoted by me. Indeed, all these four objections of the Governor, as well as those of Jefferson Davis, are shown in that decision to be as unfounded in fact, as they were in law or morals.

But suppose the bonds were sold below par, that is, that the State had lost $170,000, or less than four per cent., on bonds for five millions of dollars. Was that a just or valid ground for repudiating the whole, principal and interest? The plea of usury is always disgraceful, even if true, especially where the security was negotiable to bearer and had passed, for full value, into the hands of bona fide holders. But if such a plea is disgraceful to individuals, what shall be said when it is made on behalf of a State? And what shall be thought of those who make such an objection? What of a Governor, or of a United States Senator, who urges such objections on behalf of a State? Do we not feel as if the State were some miserable culprit on trial, and some pettifogging lawyer was endeavoring to screen him from punishment, by picking a flaw in the indictment. Yet such are the pleas on behalf of a State, urged by Governor McNutt and Senator Jefferson Davis. On reference to the letter before referred to, of Jefferson Davis, it will be found that he does not confine himself to the constitutional objections. In his first letter, before quoted, of 25th May, 1849, Mr. Jefferson Davis says, 'Those bonds were purchased by a bank then tottering to its fall—purchased in violation of the charter of the bank, or fraudulently, by concealing the transaction under the name of an individual, as may best suit those concerned, purchased in violation of the terms of the law under which the bonds were issued, and in disregard of the Constitution of Mississippi, of which the law was an infraction.' These positions are deliberately repeated by Jefferson Davis, in his second letter, before referred to, of the 29th August, 1849. That is, the State should pay none of the money received, because the purchaser, as alleged, had no right to buy the bonds—and because the sale was, as erroneously stated, an infraction of the law, that is usurious, or a sale below par. He insists the money was not received by the State, because, he says, 'Mississippi had no bank, and could not have a bank of issue, because forbidden by the tenth section of the first article of the United States Constitution—'no State shall emit bills of credit.'' Surely Mr. Davis must have known, that in the case of the Bank of Kentucky, a State bank of issue owned exclusively by the State, it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, that such a bank was constitutional, and no politician of the secession school can object to that decision. (2 Peters 257.) But however this might be, what kind of a plea is this? Why, if, as alleged by Mr. Davis, Mississippi had violated the Federal Constitution, by establishing a bank of circulation, that therefore the bonds of the State should be repudiated. Is it not incredible that a Senator should assume such a position on behalf of his State? But, if this be sound, it clearly follows, that, inasmuch as the Confederate bonds are issued in plain violation of the Constitution of the United States, those bonds should be repudiated; so also if they were sold below par, or if there be any other technical objection. Nor will it avail that the bonds may have passed into the hands of bona fide holders, for, Mr. Jefferson Davis says, in his letter of the 29th August, 1849, 'If the bonds have passed into the hands of innocent holders, the fact does not vary the legal question, as the purchaser could not acquire more than the seller had to dispose of.' And again, he says, referring to the alleged inability of the first purchaser to buy the bonds, 'The claim of foreign holders is as good, but no better, than that of the first purchaser.' It is difficult to say which is most astounding, the law or the morals of this position. At all events, 'the foreign holders' of Confederate bonds are informed by Jefferson Davis, that this is the law. Indeed it is a singular coincidence, that one of the objections made to the payment of the Union Bank bonds by the Governor, was, as he alleged, 'the monstrous assumption of power on the part of the bank, in seeking to monopolize the cotton crop of the State, and becoming a factor and shipper of our great staple.' (Senate Journals, 29.) Why, this is what is being attempted by these Confederate cotton bonds, although the State-rights strict constructionists of slavedom would in vain look for any clause in their so-called constitution, authorizing any such transactions in cotton. And here, let me say, that the objection of a Senator from Mississippi to the payment of her bonds, that, in issuing them, her Governor and Legislature had violated their own Constitution, proposes to cure one fraud, by committing another far more stupendous. The bonds were issued by the highest legislative and executive functionaries of the State, the broad seal of the State attached, the bonds sold, and the money received. In such a case, there is a legal, as well as a moral estoppel, forbidding such a plea, for, by the English, as well as by the American doctrine, an estoppel excludes the truth, whenever such proof would enable the party, who obtained money on false pretences, to commit a fraud on third persons, by disproving his own averment. This is not a mere technical rule, but one which is based upon experience, and sustained by the most exalted morality.

I have given the several objections made by Governor McNutt and Senator Davis to the payment of these bonds, with one exception. This will be found in the following extract from the executive message of Governor McNutt, (p. 502): 'The bank, I have been informed, has hypothecated these bonds, and borrowed money upon them of the Baron Rothschild; the blood of Judas and Shylock flows in his veins, and he unites the qualities of both his countrymen. He has mortgages on the silver mines of Mexico and the quicksilver mines of Spain. He has advanced money to the Sublime Porte, and taken as security a mortgage upon the holy city of Jerusalem, and the sepulchre of our Saviour. It is for the people to say, whether he shall have a mortgage upon our cotton fields and make serfs of our children.' I trust the baron will have the good sense to smile at such folly, and realize how universally, at least throughout the North, the malice and dishonesty of these suggestions was condemned and repudiated. We have no such prejudices, worthy only of the dark ages, against 'God's chosen people,' 'the descendants of the patriarchs and prophets,' and the 'countrywomen of the mother of our Lord.'

But this whole question has been twice unanimously decided by the highest judicial tribunal of Mississippi against the State, and every point made by Governor McNutt and Jefferson Davis overruled by the court. One of these decisions was in January term, 1842, more than seven years before the date of Jefferson Davis's letters, and the other was at April term, 1853, nearly four years subsequently.

The first decision, at January term, 1842, is in the case of Campbell et al. v. Mississippi Union Bank (6 Howard 625 to 683). In this case it was pleaded 'that the charter of the Mississippi Union Bank was not enacted and passed by the Legislature in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of the State, in this, that the supplemental act of 15th February, 1838, the same being a law to raise a loan of money on the credit of the State, was not published and submitted to the succeeding Legislature, according to the provisions of the Constitution in 9th section, 7th article.' Here the direct constitutional question was presented, requiring the decision of the Court. The case was most elaborately argued on both sides. The able and upright circuit judge, Hon. B. Harris, had decided that the supplemental act was constitutional, and the bonds valid, and the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi, after full argument on both sides, unanimously affirmed that decision. In delivering the opinion of this highest judicial tribunal of the State, and the one designated by the Legislature in 1833, under the mandatory clause of the Constitution, Chief Justice Sharkey said:

'The second plea is, in substance, that the act supplemental to the charter of the Union Bank, was not agreed to by a majority of each House of the Legislature, and entered on the journals with the yeas and nays, and referred to the next succeeding Legislature, after publication in the newspapers, according to the provisions of the 9th section of the 7th article of the Constitution; but the said supplemental act made material alterations in the original act, and was only passed by one Legislature, and that no loan of money can be made on the faith of the State without the assent of two Legislatures, given in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.'—'I shall then proceed to notice the constitutional provision, and to inquire, by an application of it to the bank charter, whether the position can be sustained. The 9th section of the 7th article (of the Constitution) is in these words: 'No law shall ever be passed to raise a loan of money on the credit of the State, for the payment or redemption of any loan or debt, unless such law be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives, and be agreed to by a majority of the members of each House, and entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and be referred to the next succeeding Legislature, and published for three months previous to the next regular election, in three newspapers of the State, and unless a majority of each branch of the Legislature, so elected after such publication, shall agree to pass such law, and in such case, the yeas and nays shall be taken, and entered on the journals of each House.'

'The 5th section of the original act provides—'That in order to facilitate the said Union Bank for the said loan of fifteen million five hundred thousand dollars, the faith of this State be and is hereby pledged, both for the security of the capital and interest,' &c. It appears that the original charter in which this provision is contained, was passed in accordance with the provision in the Constitution. The supplemental act makes no alteration whatever in regard to this section. It changes in some respects the mere details of the original charter, in the mode of carrying the corporation into successful operation, and authorizes the Governor to subscribe for the stock on the part of the State. The object of the pledge is not changed; on the contrary, the supplemental act was passed in aid of the original design. In applying the constitutional test to the 5th section, I am not able to perceive any reason which to me seems sufficient to justify the conclusion that it is unconstitutional.'

'The plea presents no bar to the action.'

Justices Turner and Trotter concurred.

Mr. Howard, the distinguished State reporter, gives, in the heading of the case, the following as the decision of the court. 'The act supplemental to the charter of the Union Bank, being in aid of the charter, and changing the same only in some of the mere details, is a constitutional act.'

Surely this decision should have settled the question. But it did not. The Governor, A. G. McNutt, who had signed the laws authorizing these bonds, and the bonds themselves, anticipating the decision of the court (as he indicates in his message) in favor of 'the holders of certain bonds heretofore issued to the Planters' and Union Bank,' recommends the Legislature, in his message of January, 1842, to create a 'revenue court,' the judge of which shall be appointed 'by the Executive or Legislature,' to which such cases should be transferred. (Sen. Jour. p. 22.) Thus the case, on the bonds, was to be taken from the high tribunal (where it was then pending) created by the Constitution, and chosen by the people, and transferred to a revenue judge to be appointed by the repudiating Governor and Legislature of 1842, of course a mere executive parasite, or legislative minion, placed on the bench to repudiate the bonds. Fortunately, such an appointment was forbidden expressly by the Constitution, and would have been disregarded by the court; so this attempted usurpation failed.

The Governor says in that message:

'It never was intended by the framers of the Constitution, that every public creditor should be permitted to harass the State at pleasure by vexatious suits. Neither the judgment of a court nor the decree of the Chancellor can be obligatory on the Legislature,' &c. (P. 17.)

In conformity with this recommendation of the Governor, the Legislature passed a series of resolutions declaring that 'the Legislature is the exclusive judge of the objects for which money shall be raised and appropriated by its authority,' &c.; that the Legislature has no right to 'levy or appropriate money for the purpose of executing the object of a law, by them deemed repugnant to, or unauthorized by the Constitution;' that the 'Supplemental (Union Bank) Bill is unconstitutional;' that 'the bonds delivered by said bank, and by it sold to Nicholas Biddle on the 18th August, 1838, are not binding upon the State,' &c. (Acts of 1842, ch. 127.) But, unfortunately for these positions, the Constitution of the State had deprived the Legislature of all 'judicial power;' it had vested this power exclusively in 'the courts;' it had, in the very case of all bonds of the State, required and commanded the Legislature to designate the courts in which such cases should be decided; it had, by the act of 1833, passed in obedience to the imperative mandate of the Constitution, referred all such cases to the decision of the Court of Chancery, with appeal to the High Court of Errors and Appeals; it had made their decision conclusive; it had already appropriated the money, to pay all such decrees, and made it the duty of the Governor to command the Auditor to draw his warrant on the Treasurer for payment: this was the constitution of the law when these bonds were issued and sold in 1838—such was the contract of the State, in regard to which the Federal Constitution declares, 'no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts'—which clause has been uniformly held by all the Federal as well as State Courts, to apply to contracts of a State—and yet, in flagrant defiance of the highest duties and the most sacred obligations, the Legislature passed these resolutions, to nullify the anticipated decisions of the court. We have seen, however, that this executive and legislative usurpation was ineffectual. The court stood firm, not a single judge wavered, and, by a unanimous decree, reversed the legislative and executive repudiation—vindicated the majesty of the law and the Constitution—upheld the sacred cause of truth and justice—resisted the popular frenzy, and defied the unprincipled demagogues by whom the people of the State had been deceived and deluded. It was a noble spectacle, when those three upright and fearless Judges, Sharkey, Turner, and Trotter, entered the temple of justice, and declared to the people, by whose ballots they were chosen, that the State was bound to pay these bonds, and decreed accordingly. The same sublime scene was reënacted by a similar decree, in a suit against the State, on one of these bonds, by the same court, in 1853, then composed of different judges—Smith, Yerger, and Fisher. And not one judge or chancellor of the State ever wavered. Amid all this heaven-daring iniquity, thank God! the judicial ermine was unstained. Whilst constrained to denounce the repudiating Legislature, Governor, and Senator of Mississippi, let me point to another green spot amid the moral waste and desolation of that dreadful period.

With scarcely an exception, the Bar of Mississippi was true to the cause of honor, law, and justice. They knew the objections of McNutt and Davis were wretched pretexts, and they vindicated the reputation of that noble profession, which, in all ages, has been the champion of constitutional liberty. They were men of the same stamp as their illustrious English ancestry, Hampden, Sidney, and Russell, whose names cover the map of my country, and whose deeds have exalted the character of man; and although the blood of our anti-repudiating heroes did not flow like that of the British martyrs, as a sacrificial offering on the altar of freedom, they sacrificed ease, and affluence, and ambition, and political preferment, and endured obloquy and reproach. I rejoice in the recollection, that, during this contest they should have selected a sentence from my address against repudiation, and placed it on their banners, and at the head of their presses, in these words: 'The honor of the nation and of every State is the birthright of every American—it is the stainless and priceless jewel of popular sovereignty—it has been preserved unsullied, in all times that are past, through every sacrifice of blood and treasure, and it must be maintained.' Ay! and it will yet be maintained. The time will come, when repudiation will be repudiated by Mississippi—when her wretched secession leaders, the true authors of her disgrace and ruin, will be discarded—when her insolent slaveholding oligarchy will be overthrown, when the people will break the chains of their imperious masters, and labor, without regard to color, will be emancipated. Secession, repudiation, and slavery are the same in principle and had the same leaders. Jefferson Davis carried the repudiation banner in 1849, as he now does that of secession and slavery. Secession is a repudiation of law, of constitution, of country, of the flag of our forefathers, and of the Union purchased by their blood. Driven at home within a circle of fire, which narrows every day, it is crouching before foreign rulers, and imploring their aid to accomplish the ruin of our country. It appeals to their ambition, their avarice, their fears, their hatred of free institutions and of constitutional government. It summons them to these English shores, it unsheathes the imperial sceptre in the House of Commons, denounces the Ministry of England, and dictates the vote of Parliament on the most momentous question in the history of the world. Why, when these sentiments were uttered, I almost expected to see the shades of Burke and Fox, and Pitt and Chatham, and Peel and Wellington, rise in the midst and denounce the degenerate bearer of such a message. What! the British Commons become the supple tools, the obsequious minions, the obedient parasites, to do the bidding of a foreign master, and tremble when his envoy should stamp his foot and wave the imperial banner in the halls of Parliament. From whom was this message, and to whom? Was it to the England of Trafalgar and the Nile? Was it to the descendants of the men who conquered at Agincourt and Cressy, and changed for ages at Waterloo the destiny of the world? Why, Nelson would speak from his monument, and the Iron Duke from his equestrian statue, and forbid the degradation of their country. But there stood the Confederate messenger, delivering the mandate of a foreign power to the House of Commons, describing England as a crawling reptile, exalting the Government he professed to represent, as controlling the Continent, and fearing lest the Imperial Eagle alone should swoop down upon his prey. And such language, such sentiments! Was I in Billingsgate, that ancient and illustrious institution, so near the House of Parliament? Why, the whole code of morals and of international law was repudiated in a sentence, and our demagogues distanced in the race. Did the envoy echo the voice of his master, when he announced that the American Union must be dissolved by foreign intervention, because, if reunited, it would be too strong, and bully the world—therefore France and England combined must strike us when we were supposed to be weak and divided. It is not the author of such atrocious and dastard sentiments that would lead the banner of France or of England anywhere except to humiliation and disgrace. 'Non talis auxilii, nec defensoribus ipsis.' No, when England seeks leaders, it will not be the sycophants of power, those who worship alternately democracy and autocracy, who slaver over despotism one day with their venom, and the next with their still more loathsome adulation.

But there was a change. The Ministry, and one of an order supposed to be our most deadly foes, spoke. There were some opinions as to the results in which no American could concur—there was deep devotion to England—but there was also the voice of reason, of justice, of international law: it was not so cosmopolitan as I expected, but the argument of felon force and robber violence was discarded. The scholar, the statesman, the gentleman, the philanthropist addressed the English Commons. Yes, and the nobility of nature also spoke, one who could rise above the reputed prejudices of his order, and do justice to a kindred race of simple republicans, though they may know neither diadems nor coronets. Such examples exalt and dignify the character of man. They teach us republicans a useful lesson—that those who differ from us as to some of the forms of government, may most sincerely support that system which in their judgment will best promote the welfare and happiness of the people. That indeed is the only question. Let England and America work out the problem in peaceful and friendly rivalry. Time and experience will decide the question. If, when slavery is extinguished in our Union, and the only aggressive element of our system is extirpated, we should run a grand and peaceful career of honor and glory and prosperity, we will want no other argument than the results. The blasphemous doctrine of the divine rights of kings was discarded by England in the revolution of 1688. The British throne reposes now on the alleged basis of the welfare and happiness of the people. What form of government will best promote that end—this is the only question. I believe it is ours—but only with slavery extinguished, and universal education—schools—schools—schools—common schools—high schools for all. Education the criterion of the right of suffrage, not property. I do not believe in a government of ignorance, whether by the many or the few. With the constant and terrible opposing element of slavery, we have certainly achieved stupendous results in three fourths of a century, and to say that our system has failed, because slavery now makes war upon it, is amazing folly. Why predict, that, when reunited, and with slavery extinguished, we would bully the world. Who were our bullies? Who struck down Charles Sumner, the Senator of Massachusetts, the eminent scholar and orator, on the floor of the Senate, for denouncing the horrors of slavery? A South Carolinian, whilst all slavedom approved the deed. Who endeavored to force slavery on Kansas by murder and rapine, and the forgery of a constitution? Who repealed the Missouri Compromise, in order to force slavery upon all the Territories of the United States? Who are endeavoring now to dissolve the Union, and spread slavery over all this wide domain? There is a plain answer to all these questions. It is the lords of the whip and the chain and the branding iron, who are our bullies—who insist upon forced labor, and repudiate all compensation to the toiling millions of slaves—who repudiate, among slaves, the marital and parental relation, and class them by law as chattels—who forbid emancipation—who make it a crime to teach slaves to read or write—ay, even the Bible—who keep open the interstate slave-trade (more horrible than the African, making Virginia a human stock farm), tearing husband from wife, and parents from children—founding a government boldly announcing the doctrine of property in man, based avowedly on the divinity, extension, and perpetuity of slavery—these are our bullies; and when they are overthrown, we shall commence a new career of peaceful progress and advanced civilization. And why sow the seeds of international hatred between England and America? Is war really desired between the two countries, or is it supposed that we will yield to foreign intervention without a struggle? No, the North will rise up as one man, and thousands even from the South will join them. The country will become a camp, and the ocean will swarm with our privateers. Rather than submit to dismemberment or secession, which is anarchy and ruin, we will, we must fight, until the last man has fallen. The Almighty can never prosper such a war upon us. If the views of a foreign power have been truly represented in Parliament, and such an aggression upon us is contemplated, let him beware, for in such a contest, the political pyramid resting upon its apex, the power of one man, is much more likely to fall, than that which reposes on the broad basis of the will of the people.

Returning from this episode, I resume the narrative.

We have seen the repudiating Executive message and repudiating legislative resolutions of January, 1842, and their failure to influence the decision of the court. And now, we approach another act in the drama. The court having affirmed the constitutionality of the Union Bank bonds, and as the act of 1833 directed their payment, the Legislature of 1844 enacted a new law, in these words: 'That hereafter, no judgment or decree of any court of law or equity having jurisdiction of suits against the State, shall be paid by warrants on the Treasurer, or otherwise, without an appropriation by law, any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.' The 'law and usage' were plain, to pay such decrees, as required by the law and Constitution; but both were disregarded, and the act of 1833, for all practical purposes, repealed. It remained in part, on the statute book, only to invite to the gambler's game of 'odd I win, even you lose'—that is, if, under the act of 1833, there should be a decision in any case in favor of the State, it should be conclusive, but if against the State, the money should not be paid, where (as in the case of these bonds) the Legislature differed from the court, and had already repudiated its decision. Such was the action of the Legislature in 1842 and 1844. In 1842, it repudiated, in advance, the decision of the court on these bonds, and, after that decision, repealed so much of the law as required the payment of the decrees of the court. Now, with a full knowledge of these facts, is it not amazing, incredible, that, several years subsequently, Mr. Jefferson Davis should have declared, in his first letter of 1849, 'By the Constitution and laws of Mississippi, any creditor of the State may bring suit against the State, and test his claim as against an individual; but, conscious that they have no valid claim, they have not sought the remedy;' and he repeats this averment, substantially, in his second letter. Now, who would have supposed, that more than five years before the date of Mr. Davis's letters, the highest judicial tribunal of the State, the one designated by the law and the Constitution, had already unanimously decided that these bonds were valid, and that the State Legislature, instead of paying the money, had repealed the appropriation. But there came a new court, all chosen by the people, under the wretched system, in many of the States, of an elective judiciary, but unknown to the independent Federal judicial system. A suit was brought in 1851, under the act of 1833, on one of the Union Bank State bonds and coupons before the Chancellor. After elaborate argument, the Chancellor decided against the State, and entered a decree for the payment of the money. The State, as authorized by the law, appealed from this decision to its own High Court of Errors and Appeals, elected by the people.

Surely, it was supposed, that this new court, so recently chosen by the people, after the legislative repudiation, would be governed by 'a proper regard for the public interest and public opinion.' Before the Chancellor, as well as the High Court, all the objections made by Governor McNutt and Senator Davis were earnestly pressed by the Attorney-General of the State and associate counsel, but in vain; the decision of the Chancellor was against the State, and it was unanimously affirmed by the High Court. This case will be found reported by the State reporter, Johnson v. The State, April term, 1853. (3 Cushman, 625 to 882,—257 pages.)

In this case, the bond sued on is given in the record, and will be found an exact copy of that (heretofore quoted) under the original act, which had passed two successive Legislatures, the principal as well as coupons being payable in Federal currency.

On the reverse side of the bond is the following:

'£450 sterling. The President, Directors, and Co. of the Mississippi Union Bank, do hereby designate the agency of the Bank of the United States in London, as the place of payment of the within bond and interest, and hereby assign and transfer the same for value received to the bearer, principal equal to £450 sterling, and guarantee the payment of the same at the place designated.

'S. Gwin, Cashier. 'H. G. Runnells, President.

'Mississippi State Bond, No. 91. 'Redeemable February 25th, 1850.'

As to the place where the bond was made payable, there could be no objection, for the original, as well as the supplemental act, gave full authority to make the bonds payable abroad. But as to the objection that they were said to be payable in sterling, at the rate of four shillings and sixpence to the pound, the answer was, as shown: 1st. That this was the true rate of exchange. 2d. That the bond was payable in Federal currency, and this was all the bondholder ever asked from the State. As to the allegation that the bonds were sold below par, the court showed most conclusively from the facts and agreed case, that they were sold above par, and their constitutionality was fully affirmed.

The argument of the Attorney-General (Glenn) for the State, embraced 32 printed pages; in addition to which was an elaborate argument by his associate, Mr. Stearns. The opinion of Chief Justice Smith embraced 45 pages, the concurring opinion of Justice Yerger, 27 pages, and Justice Fisher concurred. The State was not satisfied, but moved for a reargument, that of Wharton for the State, embracing 54 pages, and that of Mays, on the same side, 32 pages; but the court adhered to their decision, and unanimously affirmed the decree of the Chancellor against the State. The decision of the court, in the heading of the case, is thus given by the reporter.

'The bonds might have been legally issued to the bank, by the Governor, on the 5th June, 1838, pursuant to the provision of the original charter of the bank, and the faith of the State pledged for the purpose of raising the capital.' 'The supplement was not void in consequence of not having been passed in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution contained in the 7th article, 9th section of that instrument.' 'The object of the original pledge of the faith of the State, was not changed by the supplemental charter, but it was passed in aid of the original charter.' 'Campbell v. Union Bank (6 Howard 625) cited and confirmed.' 'The liability of the State, under the operation of the charter of the bank, attached so soon or whenever the bonds were legally executed to the bank, and the execution of the mortgages was neither a condition precedent to the pledge of the faith of the State, nor the condition on which the State bonds were to be executed and delivered.' 'It does not appear from the facts that the bonds were sold for less than their par value. Held that the sale was neither illegal nor void.' 'If the commissioners in the sale of the bonds received 'sterling money of Great Britain' at the rate of four shillings and sixpence to the pound, that is not such an act on their part as would avoid the bonds.'

Here, then, the whole case was again fully decided in 1853, by the very tribunal to which Jefferson Davis, in 1849, invited the bondholders. And did he or the State then yield or pay the obligations. Not at all, but they adhered to the repudiation of these bonds, disregarded and defied the decision of the court, and have never paid one dollar of principal or interest, and never will, so long as slavery exists in Mississippi.

And now, after the almost unanimous passage of the supplemental act in 1838, the sanction of the Legislature in 1839 and 1841, the decision of the Circuit Court and Chancellor, and of the High Court of Errors and Appeals, how strange is the assertion of Mr. Slidell, that 'The Union Bank bonds were issued in direct violation of an express constitutional provision.' It is a well settled principle of American law, so adjudicated by the State Courts, as well as by the Supreme Court of the United States, that, 1st, To authorize the court to decide that a law is unconstitutional, the repugnance to the Constitution must be 'plain and palpable.' 2d., That the interpretation given by the highest court of a State, to a State law, or constitution, 'is conclusive.' But the truth is, as is proved by Mr. Slidell's own letter (having never resided in the State), he knew nothing of the subject, or he never would have spoken of Jefferson Davis as 'Governor,' or alluded to 'his administration,' when he never held that office. But it is of some moment, at least to the unfortunate bondholders, that the minister of Jefferson Davis at Paris, avers now that these bonds are unconstitutional.

But, Mr. Slidell says, 'There is a wide difference between these bonds and those of the Planters' Bank, for the repudiation of which, neither excuse nor palliation can be offered.'

Now, in a subsequent letter, I will prove conclusively, from authentic documents, that the State of Mississippi has, most effectually, repudiated those bonds also, and that Jefferson Davis has sustained that repudiation.

In the case, also, of another slaveholding State, I will prove, from the public documents, that Jefferson Davis volunteered to sustain her in the repudiation of her State bonds, in a case more atrocious, if possible, than that of Mississippi. As Jefferson Davis is now at the head of a slaveholding conspiracy, endeavoring to destroy the Government of my country, and is now also engaged in selling worthless Confederate bonds in this market, I have deemed it my duty to make this publication.

R. J. Walker.

Note.—Since this was written, the supposed menacing message from the Continent has been officially contradicted. Surely, however, I had a right to conclude, after such solemn assurances from a member to the House, that, although acting in the character of a Confederate messenger, and avowing such atrocious sentiments, he at least spoke the truth on that point.

R. J. W.