THE COMMAND IN THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL.

The preparation of a History of Charlestown—the occupation of leisure hours—led to large collections relative to the military events which occurred in the neighborhood of Boston at the commencement of the war of the revolution; but as a full account of them did not appropriately belong to so local a publication, and as no work had been issued containing a narrative, in much detail, of these interesting events, it was thought best to prepare the volume now before the public entitled History of the Siege of Boston. The old subject of the battle of Bunker Hill was so directly in my way that it could not be avoided; and as an apology for adding another to the narratives of this event, I determined to construct it, as much as possible, from contemporary materials.

In a faithful history of the battle, the question of command cannot properly be avoided. If it is not of the importance which many attach to it, still it is a curious question, about which there is much interest. It may be well, in the outset, to state clearly the matter at issue. The point is, was there a general officer detached to exercise a general command in the battle? There is great incongruity in the statements relative to this. It is stated (by Dr Whitney) that the detachment that fortified Breed's Hill was first put under the command of Gen. Putnam, that with it he took possession of this hill, and "ordered the battle from beginning to end;" or as another (Hon. John Lowell) states it, "General Putnam was detached for the purpose of fortifying it (Bunker Hill,) and Colonel Prescott was placed under his orders." On the other hand it is stated, that the orders to fortify Bunker Hill were given to Colonel Prescott, that the redoubt was raised by troops under his command, and that at no time during the whole affair did he act under, or receive an order from, a general officer. These statements are conflicting and cannot both be true. It is these rival claims as to Putnam and Prescott that constitute the delicacy and difficulty of the question.

Whoever investigates this subject must determine the kind of evidence that will be allowed to influence, mainly, the decision. There are numerous statements of soldiers who were in the battle, which were made forty years or more after it took place; after antipathy or gratitude had biassed them against or for their old commanders; after what they had heard and had come to believe, had unconsciously become interwoven with impressions of what they saw; and at a time of life, too, when exactness as to details of what took place so long before in such a scene, could not reasonably have been expected. These relations bear, in some points, the characteristics of tradition. They mostly harmonize as to the movements of companies or regiments, but differ, irreconcilably, on points bearing on the question of command. An argument, or an array of evidence, of equal authority and of equal positiveness, may be drawn out of this large reservoir in favor of Putnam, or of Prescott, or that there was no general commander, or that there was no command at all in the action. A somewhat laborious study, and critical collation of these statements forced upon me the conviction, that they ought not to be relied upon as leading authorities, and that it was idle to expect to arrive at a satisfactory result by depending on such sources of information. Hence diligent search was made for contemporary matter. Much caution and discrimination, however, are necessary in using such material. The first rumors of events are as apt to be as inaccurate as reminiscences of those events prepared after years have elapsed. But these rumors are followed by relations more reliable, and it is material of this sort that is the most valuable for historical purposes. It was such material that was selected. There are, however, but few facts bearing on the question of command in the many contemporary documents I have examined. Yet what is gleaned from them is important. Among the documents are letters from Generals Ward and Putnam, and Col. Prescott. The facts they supply are on some points conclusive.

Still, in a volume designed to be a simple record of authentic facts, and in a narrative of the battle prepared without conscious bias for or against either Putnam or Prescott as the commander, a labored argument on the question of command seemed neither desirable nor proper; and in disposing of it, it was thought best to state concisely, yet fairly, all the evidence of a contemporary nature relative to both that was known, state the conclusion it seemed to warrant, and leave the subject with the reader. This course, right or wrong, it is proper to say, after a remark of Mr Swett in the pamphlet which has occasioned this publication, was suggested solely by reflection on the authorities; and the gentlemen to whom he alludes are hereby exonerated from all responsibility, even for a suggestion, on this subject. And the "invincible prepossession," which seems to puzzle Mr Swett, it will be indeed "useless to inquire" into because it did not exist. One great reason for treating the subject in this way was, that the reader, with facts thus before him, might make up a theory to suit himself. This plan was, accordingly, carried out. And though Mr Swett is pleased to say that I labored "throughout a large portion" of the Siege of Boston to prove a certain "insignificant abstraction," yet, if so, it was unconscious labor, and to say so is ascribing to the effort far too much design. The evidence is merely stated and left to speak for itself. The reader will find it to occupy seven pages.

The conclusion reached is that there was no general commander, other than Gen. Ward, of the Bunker Hill battle. After quoting the evidence that bears in favor of Colonel Prescott, the following statement is made:—"The conclusion warranted by this evidence is, that the original detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott, and that no general officer was authorised to command over him during the battle." In other words, there is not only no evidence that a general officer was detached to exercise a general command, but contemporary authorities bear decidedly against such a conclusion.

Mr Samuel Swett has published a pamphlet entitled—"Who was the Commander at Bunker Hill. With Remarks on Frothingham's History of the Battle, with an Appendix," in which he labors to overthrow this conclusion, and to establish the position that General Putnam was the authorized and general commander. Mr Swett is one of the old partizan writers on this subject. He began to write at a time (1818) when there was much excitement relative to the battle. The Analectic Magazine for February of that year had an account of it; the Port Folio for March had General Dearborn's extraordinary article, which opened up the long, bitter, and not yet closed controversy about General Putnam; Daniel Putnam's able and interesting letter soon (May) followed, marked by curious anecdote as well as by the indignant rebuke which filial duty dictated; General Dearborn (June) issued his "Vindication" with its imposing array of documents; in July, Hon. John Lowell made his thorough defence of Putnam's character, in the columns of the Centinel, and Hon. Daniel Webster, in the North American Review, contributed an invaluable article, drawing with indelible lines the characteristics of the battle, and defining, with remarkable accuracy, the positions of Putnam and Prescott; the subject had got mixed with party politics, and for six months the press had teemed with articles on one side or the other. It was, then, at an unfavorable period for healthy investigation, and after such a surfeit of the subject, that Mr Swett "from his attention to military subjects," "consented to describe the battle." He commenced his researches in July, finished them in August, and early in September was ready to favor the public with his "Historical and Topographical Sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill." This account made up, in great part, from oral or written communications of actors in the battle, and framed with the theory that General Putnam was the commander, was regarded as of a partizan character. It was immediately criticised unfavorably in the Boston Patriot, in a series of essays which subsequently appeared in pamphlet form, in which the main object is to show that Putnam was not even in the battle. Mr Swett has continued his researches, printed two editions of his history, and several times appeared in defence of it. His statements relative to the formation of the army and the battle have found their way into most of the books. It is no injustice to the authors of subsequent excellent accounts of the battle to remark—for it is acknowledged—that as to the details they do not go behind Mr Swett's account. The narrative in the Siege of Boston does. It is based, as much as possible, on contemporary documents, and, in its details, will be found to differ in many respects from those of the same period in Mr Swett's History. A study of the conflicting evidence relating to this subject, however, ought to excite charity rather than dogmatism; and it was no purpose in preparing the Siege of Boston to make of its pages a pillory of error for a respected pioneer enquirer. Let the language relative to him to be found there, say whether much was done at the poor business of disparagement, or whether just credit was withheld. Mr Swett, however, has had possession of this field so long, that, perhaps, it is not strange he should regard facts which fearfully disturb old opinions as errors; or that a conclusion as to the commander which conflicts with a prepossession which for thirty years has proved invincible, should be contested. But the spirit, tendency and object of the "Remarks" are too obvious to be misapprehended.

A publication thus by one who has made the Bunker Hill battle his special study, who has written more on it than any one, and whose opinions, hence, carry with them a certain authority, seems to demand a reply. Silence, under such circumstances, might either be construed into an insult to an older inquirer, or as doing myself the injustice of admitting the correctness of his strictures. Besides, those to whom I feel so deeply indebted for criticism as gratifying as it was unlooked for, on a volume, which gradually and unexpectedly grew to the form in which it appeared, and who have thus kindly commended it to the public, have a right to expect, that, when its integrity is seriously impeached, its author should show his vindication. Still, I undertake a reply with the greatest repugnance to controversy.[A] In doing it, and doing it after all, mainly for the sake of history, what is merely personal will be set aside as of little account. It is not of so much consequence to the public how a writer carries his head, whether sometimes under his arm or always above his shoulders, as it is how he does his work. Besides, discourteous personal allusions do not strengthen a weak cause, and are sure to mar a strong one.

It is difficult to observe method in dealing with this medley of accusation. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero is so ardent, and his imagination is so brisk, that he seems to have misapprehended the simplest language; and hence, quite unintentionally it may be, he ascribes to me views I do not express, facts I do not state, and opinions I do not hold. He is merry over mistakes that have not been committed, and is indignant at charges that have not been made. Where, for instance, in the Siege of Boston, is it written that the "great battle of Bunker Hill was fought on our side by a headless mob?" Where do I say that it is difficult to assign a "motive" for this conflict? Where is adduced "the most incontrovertible argument in the world," or is it even stated, that the army at Cambridge was "itself a mob?" What "mistake of law" is made where it is said that Warren had not received his commission? What charge is made against Col. Sargent? Where is it stated or intimated that General Putnam was "a mere volunteer" in the army at Cambridge? Where is it said that "he could not possibly" command at Bunker Hill, because it was an army of allies? Where is the sentence which reads that, had he been the commander, he would have "boasted of it," or have "publicly claimed" it? Where is that "large portion" which contains the attempt to prove that "General Putnam had no right to command Col. Prescott?" These allusions, and they might be increased, are to instances where the meaning has been misstated. Mr Swett does not quote the language he comments on, and I prefer to be judged by what is written rather than by what he says is written. Besides all this, and considerable attempts at ridicule, Mr Swett makes the serious allegations that I have been "grossly regardless of known facts," and have even "manufactured" history! Though age, among its privileges, cannot claim exemption from rebuke for such injustice, yet I deeply regret the occasion which requires controversy with one, relative to whom I had felt only respect, exchanged only courtesies, and written only commendation.

Before going to the question of command, it may be well to examine some of the errors which Mr Swett alleges the History of the Siege of Boston contains.

1. On page 166 it is related that "when General Warren entered the redoubt Colonel Prescott tendered him the command; but Warren replied that he had not received his commission, and should serve as a volunteer." Mr Swett remarks on this as "Frothingham's mistake in supposing that Warren told Prescott, as a reason for not assuming the command, that he had not received his commission. This is a mistake of fact and law; Warren, according to General Heath, said not one word about his commission, and his want of one did not diminish his rights of office—a point that has been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States," p. 7. Mr Swett does not quote my language, and the reader cannot find any such "mistake of law" as he comments on in the Siege of Boston. This "point," therefore, need not be discussed. Now for the mistake of fact. Mr Swett had before him, when preparing his pamphlet, President Sparks's MS. copy of Judge Prescott's memoir of the battle, and knew this was my authority for the anecdote. But what does he mean? Who would expect, after such a charge, to find on page 32 of Mr Swett's own history, the following account of what took place when Warren entered the redoubt:—"Prescott offered him the command; but he had not yet received his commission, and tendered his services to the colonel as a volunteer!" And Mr Swett says that he got this conversation from Colonel Putnam and Dr Jeffries. After three editions of his history has he concluded that he mistook those gentlemen? Does he mean to ignore his own authorities? If so, the fact must not be given up, for Judge Prescott states it as from his father, and it harmonizes with the records relative to Dr Warren's appointment, as will be seen in another place. Is this the way my narrative is to be pronounced incorrect and then ridiculed? As Mr Swett makes himself merry at what he calls my mistakes, he remarks—"He sometimes, like St. Patrick, carries his head under his arm instead of wearing it on his shoulders," p. 13. We know it is said that St. Denis carried his head in his hands, and that the Anthropophagi had heads,

"——grow beneath their shoulders,"

but it would seem that St. Patrick's head must have been right when he did his great work for Ireland. Letting this pass—how was Mr Swett's head located when it worked out this double "mistake of fact and law?"

2. Mr Swett accuses me of charging Colonel Sargent "with disobeying Gen. Putnam's order for him to go on to Bunker Hill. This injustice to the reputations of Putnam and Sargent arises from the most inconceivable misconstruction of Col. Sargent's letter to us," &c. &c, p. 11. And after considerable indignant comment—nearly two pages of it!—Mr Swett returns to the charge, and says: "These are all the facts the author has for the assertion, that Sargent disobeyed Putnam's order to go on to Bunker Hill," p. 12. Now where is such an "assertion" made in the Siege of Boston? The reader cannot find it! Mr Swett refers to a note at page 168, but without quoting it. This note occurs where, in the text, an attempt is made to give a definite idea of Gen. Putnam's service throughout the whole affair, from the laying out of the works on Breed's Hill, to his retreat to Prospect Hill. One sentence reads—"Some of the officers not under his immediate command respected his authority, while others refused to obey him." It is to sustain this remark that reference is made to the following note:—"Captain Trevett, (Mass.) for instance, applied to Gen. Putnam for orders; while Colonel Sargent, (N. Hampshire) in a letter, MS., dated Dec. 20, 1825, writes that Putnam 'sent an officer to order me on to the hill, but finding I did not attend to his order he sent a second, who I took no notice of. A third came open-mouthed, saying,'" &c. This is the note referred to, and this is all that is stated about Colonel Sargent. Now who but Mr Swett names Bunker Hill? And what charge is made here? Let the reader look at p. 92 of the Siege of Boston, and say whether there was any disposition to do injustice to this brave officer. No such charge was ever thought of, much less made. It is one of Mr Swett's inferences. His indignation is gratuitous.

But the "injustice" I have been guilty of, Mr Swett says "arises from the most inconceivable misconstruction" on my part of Colonel Sargent's Letter. Now to show fully the height of this "injustice" and the depth of this stupidity, it may be well to let Colonel Sargent speak for himself. He was applied to by Mr Swett for information about the battle; and, in a letter dated Dec. 20, 1825, gives his story. Mr Swett, in this pamphlet, (Appendix,) quotes from the conclusion of this letter, but does not quote from the commencement of it,—doubtless relishing its details about fighting among the islands in Boston harbor far better than its details about Putnam and Prescott, and the Bunker Hill battle. It is proper now that the latter should be printed. I put a few words in italics. Colonel Sargent writes—

"Had General Ward marched the whole of his troops then in Cambridge to Charlestown not one of the enemy would have escaped, but instead of that he only walked Hastings's front yard the whole day. He ordered Stark and Reed from Medford, and those two regiments did all that was done that day, of any consequence, although the fatigue party stood their ground better than could be expected after a hard night's labor. In my opinion, Col. Prescott is entitled to the honor of having the command in his calico gown. I doubt much if General Putnam was on the ground of battle for the whole day, and that he had no regiment that I ever heard of. I made application three times that day to be permitted to march my regiment to Charlestown, but General Ward feared my post would be attacked, and for once judged right, for a large schooner, with from five to six hundred men, attempted to gain the landing, but the wind against her and the tide turning, she returned. About 4, P. M., General Ward permitted me to march my regiment with one called his own to Charlestown, but too late to do any good. Gen. Putnam, then on Prospect Hill, sent an officer to order me on to the hill, but finding I did not attend to his order, he sent a second, who I took no notice of. A third came open-mouth, saying Gen. Putnam says the devil of hell is in you all, you will be all cut to pieces. The words were scarcely uttered when I was left with Lieut. Col. Ward and my waiter. I had before this received a scratch from a four pound shot—the same shot took off Lt. Col. Ward's cartouche box, and knocked down a subaltern behind him. I returned to headquarters."

This, Mr Swett confesses, is the only document relating to Colonel Sargent. Now with this as authority, what right has Mr Swett, as he does in his history, to put Col. Sargent under the immediate command of Gen. Putnam? What right has he to say, as he does in his pamphlet, that "Sargent found Putnam" on the top of Prospect Hill? As I read this authority, Putnam sent successively three officers to Sargent with an order which Sargent "refused to obey," but instead of joining Putnam, on Prospect Hill, he went to headquarters. It was a case where a New Hampshire officer declined to acknowledge the superior authority of a Connecticut officer; Sargent applied directly to General Ward for orders, but would not respect the orders of Putnam. The last point is the fact stated in the Siege of Boston. So much for the "injustice done to the reputations" of these two officers! So much for my "most inconceivable misconstruction of Col. Sargent's letter!!"

But there is more to be said about Prospect Hill, and here it is necessary to carry a bit of war into Africa. Mr Swett in his history (Notes p. 4) quotes from a letter by Rev. Joseph Thaxter, in which this hill is mentioned, though in the quotation it appears as "one of the neighboring hills"!! This letter was dated "Edgarton, June 15, 1818," and was addressed to Messrs Monroe & Francis. It will do no harm to print, for the first time, the whole extract. It reads—

"The writer yesterday saw Thos. Cooke, Esq. In 1775 he was a member of the Provincial Congress, and one of the signers of the sword in hand money. He was on the day of the Bunker Hill fight at Cambridge. He went down to Prospect Hill and saw the whole transaction of the day. He says that all was confusion, there was no command. That he saw Gen. Putnam, who did all that man could do to get on the men to Breed's Hill; that he appeared firm and resolute, thoughtless of personal danger, and that his praise was in the mouth of every one; that at that time nor ever after did he ever hear any one speak a disreputable word against him."

Mr Swett, in his history, besides suppressing the name of the hill, suppressed also the significant remark, "all was confusion, there was no command." And he suppresses also Mr Thaxter's own opinion in the same letter, viz:—"As to military discipline and command there was none." Neither suited his purpose! To fit his theory exactly this letter of Thaxter's must be garbled!

On these two letters of Sargent and Thaxter, I remark, 1. They serve to show the character of this sort of authority, and how cautiously it must be used. 2. Here two manuscripts, so long unpublished, harmonize on one point. Sargent (1825) says that about 4 P. M. Putnam was on Prospect Hill: Thaxter's letter (1818) says that Thomas Cooke went on to Prospect Hill and saw Putnam, who did all man could do to induce men to go to Breed's Hill. Now Stiles (June 23, 1775) states that towards night Putnam went away from the action "to fetch across reinforcements, and before he could return our men began to retreat." 3. Sargent says Prescott was the commander, while Thaxter and Cooke say there was no command.

3. Here as well as any where, another charge of Mr Swett may be noticed, because it serves to show how far partizan feeling has carried him. He has nearly a page of disparaging remark on the history, because the name of this same Rev. Joseph Thaxter is not mentioned in it, and especially in connection with the celebration of the fiftieth Jubilee (1825) of the battle, when he made the prayer. Mr Swett, after remarking that he "looked in vain to find his name," says (p. 27) that, "The author has devoted twenty-two pages to this jubilee and monument, without one syllable to spare for the patriotism, eloquence, and unction of this most interesting relic of olden time, or for the mention of any religious service whatsoever on the occasion;" and again he remarks that, though I "dwell on Webster's eloquent address," yet there is "not the slightest notice" of any prayer; and finally, his pious indignation culminates in asserting that, "The neglect of all religious services on the occasion will be considered by all those who give credit to the author's history as a serious imputation on our national character"!! Well, our national character certainly ought to be looked after. But 1. As to the twenty-two pages of matter. The reader will find in them accounts of the early celebrations of the battle; of the first monument on Breed's Hill; of the origin and progress of the Bunker Hill Monument Association, and the only account of much length there is existing; a history of the building of the monument; a general view of the two great celebrations of 1825 and 1843, and of the Ladies' Fair; the cost of the monument, and a minute description of it! So much for this twenty-two pages about "this jubilee and monument!" Cannot Mr Swett state a thing right? 2. "A faint outline" only is presented of the great celebration of 1825; and of this, the whole notice in the text of the ceremony of laying the corner stone, and of the oration, including where I "dwell on Webster's eloquent address to the sovereign people," and even quote his splendid words, makes ten lines! But it is not true that, in them, there "is not the slightest notice of religious services;" for the account concludes, (p. 345)—"When the exercises here were concluded," &c. One definition of "exercise" is "act of divine worship," and Mr Swett may look into either Webster's or Worcester's dictionary as authority! Now the "Address" had been mentioned, and "exercises" after it, manifestly, do not refer to wheeling regiments, but imply, in addition to the address, the acts of divine worship that, in this Christian land, are common on such occasions. Even the language itself must be perverted to sustain such libel as Mr Swett has written! And those who wring out of this account "a serious imputation of our national character," must hate this character intensely, be most inveterate word-catchers, and twist language from its obvious import. 3. It might have been better to have stated that Rev. Joseph Thaxter made the prayer, but no want of respect for the memory of this venerable veteran occasioned the "neglect." Better this omission, however, than to have been guilty of garbling and falsifying the account of the battle the patriot left behind him.

4. The next alleged error relates to the case of Captain Callender. Mr Swett lets his pen run as follows: "If any thing could be more wonderful than the author's mistaking one hill for another, when both have been before his eyes from his birth, it would be his adducing this case as one of disobedience, or a case of any kind to disprove that Putnam was the commander," p. 12. This indeed would be wonder upon wonder—if it were only true. But that I mistook Prospect Hill for Bunker Hill is one fancy; that this case of Callender is cited to disprove that Putnam was the commander, is another fancy. Where is it so "adduced?" Really Mr Swett's devotion to his hero leads him into strange misapprehensions. The reader will look in vain for such mistakes and citations in the pages of the Siege of Boston. Once more I ask, what in the name of common sense does Mr Swett mean? On page 164 of the Siege this very case is "adduced" among the things that bear in favor of Putnam, and no where is it cited against his "claims!" The very report made to the provincial congress, which Mr Swett accuses me of neglecting, was thoroughly studied, (and Mr Swett knew it) and is fairly quoted, and in favor of Putnam! Indeed this report, and the evidence given on the trial of Colonel Scammans were the main authorities for stating that General Putnam gave orders to the reinforcements.

But the strictures on pages 12, 13, relative to Callender, were not enough, and so Mr Swett (p. 22) adverts to this case again, and says:—"But allow the gentleman, as in regard to Callender, to manufacture his own case, grossly regardless of all known facts." What case have I manufactured? What "known facts" have I been regardless of? The chief thing that appears to be specified in this case is this:—"The author's declaration that Callender was tried for disobedience 27th June, seems to be a poetic license. Ward orders the court martial at that time, without the slightest intention of such a charge," p. 13. Why does not Mr Swett quote my language? But 1. He alludes here, I presume, to a remark (p. 185) of the Siege, when the question of command is not alluded to, but where an account is given of Callender, and it reads—"Capt. Callender, for disobedience of orders and alleged cowardice was tried June 27th." And again I say—"Captain Callender despised the charge of cowardice, and determining to wipe out the unjust stigma," &c. Now what sort of "license" has Mr Swett taken with my "declaration"? Something more than a poet's license, I fancy! 2. Any one would suppose, from Mr Swett's words, that Ward's order for a court martial specified what the charge was. Here it is—June 27, "The general orders that a general court martial be held this day at the lines, to try Captain Callender of the train of artillery. Witnesses on both sides to be duly summoned to attend a court which is to sit at 8 o'clock A. M., Col. Little president, Capt. Mosely judge advocate." What light does this throw on the matter? And what must be said of the character of Mr Swett's appeal to it?

5. Mr Swett, in denying that a portion of the troops refused to obey General Putnam, writes as follows:—"Now, we say with the utmost confidence, that, any few cases of cowardice out of the question, no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection than Putnam was throughout the battle, by every one, officers and men,"—p. 10. This, coming from so thorough an investigator, from a thirty years' student of the battle, is worth examination; though, had it come from another, it might be passed over with the simple remark, that it indicated more dogmatism than knowledge. Mr Swett, however, confesses that he is leading "a forlorn hope."

Now General Putnam had little or nothing to do with the original detachment, if the two hundred Connecticut men, after they got to the rail fence, be excepted. There is no proof that he gave an order to it throughout the whole affair, but on the contrary, this is denied in the strongest terms. But his principal service was rendered in connection with the reinforcements, which arrived at the scene of action in the afternoon. After the first attack, he rode to Bunker Hill, and to the rear of it, to urge them forward. But they hesitated. He used every effort, especially, it is stated, at Charlestown Neck and on Bunker Hill, to overcome this reluctance. He ordered, entreated, encouraged and threatened, but all in vain. "The plea was"—I quote a report made in 1775—"the artillery was gone, and they stood no chance for their lives in such circumstances, declaring they had no officers to lead them." They could not be prevailed upon to go where fighting was, and so large bodies of the troops remained out of the action. This fact is one of the most reliable, as well as most discreditable, relative to the battle. In truth, the state of things on Bunker Hill and in the rear of it, during the afternoon, was more like positive disobedience, than like "implicit subjection." However it may have been at Prescott's post there was no such efficient command in other parts of the field as is expressed in Mr Swett's language, anything he has written, or may write, to the contrary notwithstanding. There was confusion when he leaves the inference that there was order. The evidence on this point is conclusive—overwhelming.

Thus Captain Chester (1775) states:—"Those that came up as recruits were most terribly frightened, many of them, and did not march up with that true courage that their leader ought to have inspired them with." William Tudor (1775) says—"They were discouraged from advancing." Rev. John Martin (1775) says—"During the whole or most of the action Colonel Gerrish, with one thousand men was at the bottom of Bunker Hill and ought to have come up but did not." Contemporary authority as decisively connects General Putnam with the reinforcements. This is not denied. Thus Daniel Putnam, his son, states that he rode to the rear "to urge on reinforcements;" and Stiles states that he left the field to urge them on. Mr Swett, in his history, has no such "implicit subjection." He relates (p. 35) the efforts Putnam made at Charlestown Neck to induce the reinforcements that reached there to pass across; and although he "entreated, encouraged, and threatened," he could only get "some of the troops" "to venture over." Again, when Gerrish was on Bunker Hill with part of his regiment, the men disorganized and dispersed, "Putnam"—it is Mr Swett who writes this—"ordered them on to the lines; he entreated and threatened them, and some of the most cowardly he knocked down with his sword, but all in vain!" Once more, p. 41, he says—"Putnam rode to the rear and exhausted every art and effort to bring them on. Capt. Bailey only reached the lines." The evidence as to the confusion is equally clear. John Pitts (1775) says—"There never was more confusion and less command." In Major Gridley's sentence (1775) emphatic allusion is made to "the great confusion that attended" the transactions. Captain Chester (1775) says of things on Bunker Hill near the close of the battle—"When we arrived there was not a company in any kind of order." But why multiply testimony on this point? Mr Swett himself says, in his history, p. 50—"Great allowance must be made for those unable, and those unwilling to go on; the men went on or off as they pleased and when they pleased!"

Now with such evidence—and this is but a tithe of what may be adduced—is it not surprising that such a claim of efficient command should be set up at this late day, with nothing but bare assertion to support it? If it were so, if there were this implicit subjection, this ready obedience, the enemies of General Putnam might ask with force, what they have asked in weakness—'Why, if he was so obeyed, were not the troops at the lines? Could he not have led them up?' To affirm that he was obeyed implicitly, by officers and men, and then to be obliged to admit that those he commanded were not in battle raging a stone's throw off, is to place the brave old general in an awkward position, a position he never filled in his life time. Mr Swett's zeal here lacks discretion.

6. Another mistake seems to astonish Mr Swett "by its magnitude, nay its sublimity." He says—"According to him, the great battle of Bunker Hill was fought, on our side, by a headless mob; and, to prove this, he adduces the most incontrovertible argument in the world, were it true, that the army at Cambridge, which had been for two months collecting and organizing under the able and experienced Gen. Ward, assisted by a host of accomplished veteran officers, was itself a mob,"—p. 3. No quotation is made to sustain these remarks, and none can be made. Nothing to warrant it can be found in the book, and it is enough to stamp it as glaring misrepresentation. I hold no such opinion. I adduce no such argument. It may be cruel to annihilate so much "magnitude" and "sublimity," but I must state that they have no better basis than Mr Swett's imagination.

In opposition to this "mob" theory, Mr Swett goes to the other extreme, and affirms, p. 18—"That the army at Cambridge was regularly organized and consolidated under Ward, Warren, Putnam, and other officers in regular gradation, without any distinction in regard to the colonies whence the troops came." And this is repeated on p. 21, and again on p. 29. In fact this constitutes the foundation of one of Mr Swett's "incontrovertible" proofs that Putnam was the commander. It is strange that Mr Swett should venture upon such assertions flatly in the face of the most positive evidence. He makes no attempt to disprove the facts, first brought together in the Siege of Boston, (pp. 98 to 104) relative to the action of the colonies, and which were drawn entirely from contemporary MSS. and authorities. It is not necessary to repeat them here. They show that each of the four colonies commissioned its troops, supplied them with provisions, directed their disposition, and that it was not until after the battle of Bunker Hill that the Committee of War of Connecticut ordered Generals Spencer and Putnam, while their troops were in Massachusetts, to obey General Ward as commander-in-chief, in order that there might be "a due subordination;" and also advised the colonies of Rhode Island and New Hampshire to do the same respecting their troops. That the army (June 17, 1775) was regularly organized and consolidated is not true.

The evidence in relation to the want of organization in the Massachusetts army is ample. This army certainly cannot be said to have been settled under officers in "regular gradation." I have a report made to the provincial congress of Massachusetts, dated June 15, 1775, by a committee appointed "to consider the claims and pretensions of the colonels," which goes with much particularity into many cases, and recommends several to be commissioned, which was not done, however, until after the battle. On the 21st of June an important committee was raised "to inquire into the reason of the present want of discipline in the Massachusetts army, and to report to this congress what is the proper way to put said army into a proper regulation;" and on the next day, the congress ordered the committee of safety to present lists of persons worthy to be commissioned, "that so our army may be organized as soon as possible." The army regularly organized and consolidated! I beg Mr Swett will make himself acquainted with the facts, from authentic sources, before he writes again.

The old soldiers gave Mr Swett, when he prepared his history, better information than he writes in his last pamphlet. On page 11 (edition of 1826) he says:—"They (the troops) were strangers to discipline and almost to subordination. Though nominally organized into regiments, these were deficient in numbers, many of them only skeletons, and their respective ranks not ascertained. Some of the troops were yet serving as minute men, and the officers in a number of regiments were not yet commissioned." Again, p. 14: The Americans "were unable to appreciate the necessity of discipline or to understand the unorganized state of the army in every department!!" But in 1850 the same writer has it that this same army was "regularly organized and consolidated," and in "regular gradation." It really seems only necessary to adduce Mr Swett's facts to correct Mr Swett's imagination.

The reminiscences of the veterans go so far in this direction as to border even on injustice to the army, if they do not make it a mob. Thus, Gen. Dearborn states that "nothing like discipline had entered into the army," and Mr Thaxter, whom Mr Swett likes as an authority, writes severely on this point. He says:—"As to military discipline and command (in the battle) there was none; both officers and men acted as volunteers, each one doing that which he thought right." * * "At that time our army was little better than a mob, without discipline, and with little command till General Washington came, and Gates, and gave it some regularity." It would be quite easy to increase quotations of this character. But this will answer. It conveys a very incorrect idea of the army to say that it was a mob, but it is as incorrect to say that it was regularly organized and consolidated.

7. Mr Swett, p. 16, writes—"We are delighted to discover, at last, something amusing in one of the author's mistakes. He says Putnam had the command of a regiment, because he was complimented with the empty title of colonel of a particular regiment," &c. &c. And then follows nearly a page of matter in which "signing humble servant" in letters, "the king of Prussia," "the virgin Mary," "wolves heads," figure, along with surmises about my "hallucination," and my ideas about "the odd notion" of "perdition," and of "the head of the wolf Putnam slew." Here, as usual all through the pamphlet, if I am quoted at all, it is with gross injustice. But what is all this for? What is the offence? I am really at a loss to know what it is. On page 100, the action of Connecticut is stated, and that the regiments of Spencer and Putnam, and part of Parson's, were ordered to Cambridge. Will this be contested? On p. 168, it is stated that Putnam "was in command of the Connecticut troops stationed at Cambridge," and in another place are specified, the regiments and parts of regiments that were here. Will this be disputed? Again, I state, p. 168—"No service was more brilliant than that of the Connecticut troops whom he (Putnam) was authorized to command." Again, p. 188—"The Connecticut forces at Cambridge were under the command of General Putnam." Is there any thing wrong here? What is there then so amusing? What has drawn forth nearly a page of such attempt at ridicule? Is it that I name the undoubted fact from the records of the Connecticut assembly, that General Putnam had a regiment? Has Mr Swett forgotten how he commences his own account of the battle? His first paragraph, p. 18, reads—"The same order issued for one hundred and twenty of Gen. Putnam's regiment, and Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces;" a statement, by the way, nearly all wrong: for "the same order" for Prescott's, Frye's, and Bridge's regiments to parade (see Fenno's MS. Orderly Book,) 1, did not embrace the Connecticut men; 2, nor Gridley's company; 3, there were two hundred men; and 4, they were not all taken from "Putnam's regiment"—four errors in less than three lines! But to return. Once more I ask, what is the mistake I have committed about Gen. Putnam's regiment? What is there so amusing? Where is the point of the ridicule?

Mr Swett throughout his pages has much matter rather personal, which may pass for what it is worth. He supposes how I would write on "chemistry" and "astronomy;" he compares me to a character Colman has in his "Broad Grins," and to a clergyman "fulminating" against the "flaunting top-knots our foremothers wore;" and he accuses me of mooting questions "on a par with that of free agency or the origin of evil." It is not, however, necessary even to specify other such matter. He makes President Adams, Sen., and Judge Tudor, after failing "so egregiously" on a certain question, jump into a "quickset hedge," and ascribes to me a power of following them with my "eyes shut." I feel honored in being put in such society, and as yet suffer no inconvenience from the place we occupy. But one remark I protest against. On p. 10 he says we are writing on a subject technical, and "concerning which both of us confess we know little or nothing." Here I claim at least the privilege of the dying. Positively, Mr Swett has no authority to act as my confessor. And how a person, who, in 1818, stated that "from his attention to military subjects," he consented to describe the battle, and who since, has had a thirty years' study of it, can in 1850 "confess" that professionally, he knows "little or nothing" about it, seems "most inconceivable."

The errors that have been examined appear to be the most material which Mr Swett has specified, though he names others, and even grows desponding over their number. He remarks, p. 10—"We have made the supposition of the author's fundamental error being solitary; but errors, like misfortunes, never come alone. The lost traveller who wanders from the right road enters a boundless field of aberration, and at every step plunges deeper into a chaos of mistakes." The right road in this case is probably the beaten path of Mr Swett's history, and every step from it is aberration and a plunge deeper into "chaos." The reader can judge of the nature of some of these mistakes. Others are of like character. It is however, entirely inadmissible that facts resting on contemporary documents are to be proved errors by the recollection of aged people. Is it not a waste of words to refute charges based on this sort of proof? I have aimed to give a faithful relation of facts, and on this score fear no investigation and ask no quarter. But more of this in another place.

But in spite of this endeavor to state things exactly, it would be strange indeed if the "Siege of Boston" did not contain errors, for what book is without them? As yet none of much importance have been pointed out, though I should thank any one who will inform me of such as there are and should be glad to correct them. Two may be here acknowledged: one on page 135 where "to a slough," should read "towards a slough." I regret to have met with no particular contemporary description of the entrenchments, and hence quoted Mr Swett's words, and this error was copied from his History! (This quotation is acknowledged on p. 135 of Siege of Boston as from p. 20 of his History.) Another error is on page 164, where "riding down the hill" should read "going down the hill," an error inadvertantly made in copying for the press. Long before Mr Swett printed his pamphlet he knew how these errors occurred, and also knew they were acknowledged and corrected for a subsequent edition of the Siege of Boston. What more could be done?

When this is considered let the reader judge the spirit or purpose or honor that could have dictated Mr Swett's comments on these two errors. 1. Of the breastwork error, he says—"By describing it as reaching down to the slough he has represented it as longer than it was, and has marred and obscured by this mistake one of the principal features of the battle," &c., &c., p. 5. Indeed! Is this so? Let both descriptions be examined and it will be seen who, in this, has "marred and obscured" this battle the most. The Siege says, page 135—"A breastwork beginning a short distance from the redoubt, and on a line with its eastern side, extended about one hundred yards north to a slough." The distance specified was taken by measure from Page's Plan—"to a slough" was taken from Mr Swett's History! The error is mostly corrected by the limitation. Now Mr Swett's description (History, p. 20, 1823 edition) reads—"A breastwork ran in a line with it north down to the slough." The error here has no corrective! My breastwork runs only "about one hundred yards north." Mr Swett's breastwork runs north down splash to the slough,—marring and obscuring (he says,) the principal features of the memorable Bunker Hill battle! But really he is altogether too severe on his mistake! 2. On the other error Mr Swett writes—"As if purposely to declare he did not think anything relative to Putnam deserving of ordinary care or attention, he says—'This report states Callender was riding down the hill, when there is not a syllable of the kind,'" p. 13. Now, 1st, the words put upon me between quotation marks are not mine. This is not what I say. The statement in the Siege, p. 164, is—"In the report (1775) made to the Massachusetts provincial congress it is stated that on Bunker Hill he (Putnam) ordered Capt. Callender, who was riding down the hill, 'to stop and go back.'" This statement, substituting going for riding, is correct. The exact statement of the report is that "an officer of the train was drawing his cannon down" Bunker Hill, when General Putnam met him and ordered him "to stop and go back." "He refused, until the General threatened him with immediate death, upon which he returned up the hill again, but soon deserted his post. Another officer, who had the direction of another cannon, conducted much in the same manner." And in another place Captains Gridley and Callender are named as being the officers. Now, by comparing this report with an article on Callender in the Centinel (1818), it will be seen that it was Callender "who was going down the hill." The sentence in the Siege is quoted simply to show that Gen. Putnam gave orders in the battle, and is concise, but it was written with "care and attention." I fearlessly appeal to the report to sustain this remark. Let Mr Swett look at it closely, calmly, and surely he cannot again write that "there is not a syllable of the kind there!" As though I had manufactured the whole statement! Here, then, an inexact quotation from the Siege, and a false statement as to fact, are prefaced by an illiberal, unjust and even wanton remark. Let the Siege of Boston, I had almost written everywhere, answer whether its author "did not think anything" "deserving of ordinary care and attention" relative to General Putnam. While Mr Swett is dealing out such rank injustice, accusing me of "sacrificing" Putnam's character, of "racking my fancy" to discover objections against "his claims," and I know not what else, it is peculiarly gratifying to me to be able to show the impression which the pages of this volume, as far as they relate to Putnam, made on a candid critic. An article on the Siege of Boston, in the Philadelphia Bulletin—understood to be from the pen of William B. Reed, Esq., the accomplished author of the Life of President Reed—after, I fear, too favorable a notice of my labors, reads:—

"For one thing we especially thank Mr Frothingham—his defence of Putnam from the miserable imputations which anonymous or irresponsible writers of a late day have sought to cast on his memory. He does it thoroughly, and shows that at Bunker Hill, as on all occasions where he had a chance, the old man valiant did his duty well."

What but partizan feeling could have dictated such gross and groundless attacks on the integrity of the Siege of Boston as abound on nearly every page of Mr Swett's pamphlet?

Having thus shown what some of the accusations made against the History of the Siege of Boston amount to, I might here stop. If remarks on the Battle of Bunker Hill, to which I apprehended no intelligent inquirer would object, and a fair citation of the evidence on both sides, which it would have been grave neglect to have omitted, be excepted, the whole statement relative to the question of command is given in a few lines, and seemed to be such as the authorities quoted necessarily demanded. They will do it injustice who discover in it, or fancy they discover, any disposition to make out an exclusive hero, or to fortify an "invincible prepossession." The question really seems of little practical account. General Putnam acted throughout with that bravery that marked his nature,—at the rail fence and on the brow of Bunker Hill in the heat of the action, and in the rear of these urging on the reinforcements. Gen. Warren, armed with a musket, fought in the redoubt, where he remained throughout the action; General Pomeroy, in the same way, kept at the rail fence; Colonel Prescott commanded at the original entrenchments. How much would it add to the fame of either of these patriots, were it made out clear that either exercised, or was authorized to exercise, a general command? How much would it increase the gratitude posterity owes to their memory for their gallant conduct? With such views, even the zeal and positiveness, and injustice, of Mr Swett shall not make me a partizan. I have only gone where the evidence carried me.

But the question of the command—a really curious historical question—had to be met, and I endeavored to account for the incongruity of the statements relative to it, and to dispose of it, in a way, which, if free from non-committalism, should also be free from dogmatism. The candid must judge whether the attempt has been successful. Mr Swett is not satisfied with the disposition, and announces his intention as follows:—"It will be our duty to enter into a thorough investigation of this subject of the command." It may be well, therefore, to follow him, and see how thorough has been his investigation, how sound is his reasoning, and how satisfactory is his conclusion. There is matter bearing on this subject in the Siege of Boston, never before printed, never before alluded to, consisting of extracts from original letters from General Ward and General Putnam; an entire and most important letter from Colonel Prescott; copious extracts from Judge William Prescott's memoir; an important document from Rev. Peter Thatcher; Rev. John Martin's statement; a fine letter from Captain John Chester, a brave and accomplished officer, who was in the battle; to say nothing of various other contemporary MS. letters and documents referred to and quoted. It is rather a question of fact than of argument. The positive language of contemporaries has, at least, as much to do with it, as considerations relative to military rank. Now, whoever professes to thoroughly investigate this subject, and does not cite these authorities fully and fairly, and consider them candidly, makes an unfortunate mistake. How does Mr Swett deal with them?

Mr Swett first notices, for he cannot be said to quote them, the authorities that bear in favor of Colonel Prescott. He does not allege that they are inaccurately presented in the Siege of Boston, but complains that they are "left unexplained," and hence that they may "mislead" readers. Now the intention was to cite these authorities, relating both to Putnam and Prescott,—leaving out the soldiers' statements—as concisely as possible, and let them make their own impression. It was no part of my plan to stretch them, or shorten them, or twist them, or explain them, so as to sustain a favorite theory. Such work was left for others. Mr Swett has explained some of this testimony and what is the explanation? Passing by sundry inferences that are unwarranted, and sundry statements relative to Prescott, put upon me that I never made, it will be sufficient to notice his manner of dealing with the two Thatchers', Ward's and Scammans's testimony. The admirable letter of Colonel William Prescott is not in this connection, noticed or named by him! Mr Swett will find it, copied I think correctly from the original, on pp. 395 and 396 of the Siege of Boston! Neither does he appear to have seen Rev. Peter Thatcher's important statement. This, also, he will find, in the same volume, pp. 385 and 386! I commend them to his attention.

1. Mr Swett comments on the statement of Rev. Peter Thatcher as follows:—"The report of the committee of safety says—'The commander of the party gave orders to retreat from the redoubt'; and one of the writers of the report is supposed to have called Prescott 'the commander of the provincials.' That is, Prescott commanded the party, the provincials, who raised the redoubt, and those of them who fought there under him, till he gave them orders to retreat." But, 1, as to the character of this evidence. What supposition is there about this authority? Supposed to have called Prescott the commander! I print from the original a statement made by Rev. Peter Thatcher in his own handwriting, under his own signature, relative to his own account of the battle, which is the basis of all the accounts; and I state that the sheet on which this statement is written encloses a manuscript copy of this account, with the interlineations preserved, and that I found this at Worcester. Now this document—page 385 of the Siege of Boston—is either false, or it is true. If false, let Mr Swett say so; if true, there can be no supposition. It is as much a fact that Rev. Peter Thatcher says that Colonel Prescott was the commander, as it is that the battle was fought. 2. Let the authority bear as it will, even though it cut a theory at right angles, there is no such limitation about it as Mr Swett puts to it. Here it is—that part of it relating to the command:—"The following account was written by a person who was an eye witness of the Battle of Bunker Hill. Some of the circumstances the intervention of the hill prevented him from seeing, for he stood on the north side of Mystic river. What facts he did not see himself were communicated from Col. Prescott (who commanded the provincials), and by other persons, who were personally conversant in the scenes which this narrative describes." Such is the authority. Where is the limitation that Mr Swett applies to it? Mr Thatcher is talking about the whole battle. What right has Mr Swett to restrict his language to the party who raised the redoubt and fought there under him? If Prescott's position during the battle is confined to his post, the original entrenchments, it must be deduced from other circumstances and authorities, and not from Thatcher's words. If Prescott did not go to the rail fence, his sagacity saw the necessity of this new position, and his order occasioned it to be taken. But more of this is in the sequel.

2. Mr Swett next comments on the letter of General Ward. So important an authority required an exact quotation, but he introduces it as follows:—"Gen. Ward, in his letter to President Adams, 30th Oct., '75, says that Bunker Hill battle was conducted by a Massachusetts officer," p. 6. These words are put in quotation marks. But whose language is it? Not Ward's, for he says, October 30, 1775,—"I think there has been no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer of this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by Gen. Putnam:" not mine, for this is an opinion on these words expressed as follows:—"General Ward's remark is decisive that a Massachusetts officer conducted the battle." Who, then, is quoted? There were no such words to quote. They were manufactured by Mr Swett.

And the comment is of a piece with the coinage. Mr Swett sees the difficulty—with these words of Ward to take into the account—a writer who desires to be accurate has to meet, if he ascribes to a Connecticut officer the command of the battle, but he removes it in the following curious way:—"Ward was endeavoring to make out a strong case for the Massachusetts against the southern officers. As he knew it was physically impossible for Prescott to have conducted the battle—because he was on foot, and militarily so; because there were generals and other officers older than Prescott on the field—he must have intended to designate himself or Warren as the conductor of the battle. Possibly he intended to claim the honor himself. The first syllable of the word "conducted" has been altered by the pen: he began, perhaps, to write the word "commanded," but, recollecting that he could not claim the command, altered it into "conducted," p. 7. This twisting and syllable business will not answer. General Ward must be dealt with in a straighter way and with more breadth of view.

It adds force to this remark of General Ward, that it was written at a time when the circumstances of the battle of Bunker Hill were much talked of in the American camp. Nobody at this time (October, 1775,) thought of ascribing much credit to the plan of the enterprise to Charlestown. At this time it was no glory to have had the general command, or conduct, or responsibility of the Bunker Hill battle. But those who really fought this battle stood out then, as they do now, in envied prominence. An article in the Connecticut Courant, which does not say that Putnam commanded, had much to say in praise of the Connecticut officers, but not a word about such officers as Prescott, Brewer, Gardner, Parker, &c. "This account," General Heath writes October 23, 1775, "was detested by the brave Putnam." The trials, also, had for months been going on for the ill behavior of officers. The battle, then, was no obsolete affair. The camp was alive with talk about it. It is at such a time, that General Ward writes to John Adams, October 30, 1775—"I think there has been no one action with the enemy which has not been conducted by an officer of this colony, except that at Chelsea, which was conducted by General Putnam." The action at Chelsea took place in the previous May, in which General Putnam commanded, and led the men with great bravery. Now, General Ward was thinking over the actions there had been with the enemy, and thinking also of General Putnam's agency in them. Had there been, as to the Bunker Hill enterprise, an express agreement between Ward and Putnam—had Putnam been detached as the general officer to exercise the command—had he conducted so important a battle—is it probable, is it possible, that a person of the strict integrity of General Ward would have written in this way only four months afterwards? Is not the inference from his words a necessary one, that General Putnam did not conduct, or command, in the battle of Bunker Hill, as he conducted or commanded in the battle at Chelsea, but that it was a Massachusetts officer who performed this duty? It would not be inconsistent with these words to ascribe the conduct or command of the battle to Ward, or to Warren, or to Prescott—all Massachusetts officers—but it is utterly inconsistent with them to ascribe it to General Putnam, a Connecticut officer. This remark has this significance or it has none.

The way Mr Swett treats this authority deserves notice. He first garbles it, and then endeavors to evade its force. He tells, with due gravity, what General Ward began to write, but did not write and to crown all, tells who he probably intended to name as the commander, but somehow did not name. Mr Swett says that he meant to say "That Warren was the conductor or commander of Bunker Hill battle"!! Now really all this looks like "manufacturing a case." Is not this modest in one who professes to be so indignantly averse to such discreditable business? But Mr Swett, on this fifth page of twisting, surely did not so faithfully reflect as he did on the ninth page, that, "We were dealing with hard characters. Ward, Warren, Putnam and Prescott," he there rousingly writes, "are not rag babies, that an historian may bend and distort according to his fancy. The whole kingdom of Great Britain could not bend one of them," &c. Why then does he try to bend Ward's words to suit his theory, or distort them according to his fancy? This is no way to deal with authorities. This is trifling with history. Mr Swett must take the language of Ward as it is, even though unaltered it consigns a theory, nursed with parental care for more than a generation, to the tomb of the Capulets.

3. The remark of Colonel Scammans—that "there was no general officer who commanded at Bunker Hill"—made too as though it were a perfectly well known fact, is first denied, and then characteristically explained so as to mean nothing. "The author," Mr Swett says, "attributes to Colonel Scammans an anonymous note in a newspaper, written perhaps by the editor." Now if the note were written by the editor, it was not anonymous! But let this absurdity pass. Let any one turn to the New England Chronicle of February 29, 1776, read there a letter requesting the editor "to print the proceedings of the court martial, with some remarks upon the depositions then taken," and signed "James Scammans," Colonel Scammans, and then say how cool it is in Mr Swett to write that "the note was anonymous" or that it was "written by the editor." The remark, I repeat, was undoubtedly made by Colonel Scammans, and it is so plain that it speaks for itself. Besides this, Mr Swett charges me with omitting to mention here, that "Scammans, during the battle, sent to General Putnam, at Bunker Hill, to see if he was wanted," and that afterward "General Putnam came up and ordered the regiment to advance." Now truly this is not omitted, but it all appears on page 164 of the Siege of Boston among the things bearing in favor of General Putnam! Mr Swett however plies his ridicule here: but really I do not see the cause of it, without he designed it to rebuke me for the presumption of putting corn into his hopper. Up stream or down stream it seems to be all the same. Mr Swett's zeal for his hero has even a lover's jealousy. He frankly admits (p. 4,) that I treat General Putnam's character "with the utmost candor and kindness," but still to his mind, there is a heathenish heart in it,—for he says, it is done, "as animals destined for the altar are pampered, to be sacrificed at last." The renowned Mr Burchell would say fudge.

4. Mr Swett's remark on Dr J. Thatcher's statement,—a surgeon in the army—the first, I think, to make such a statement, is still worse. He says Thatcher is unequivocal in favor of Putnam's command, by placing him at the head of all the officers in the following words: "Generals Putnam, Warren, Pomeroy, and Colonel Prescott were emphatically the heroes of the day." And Mr Swett writes this, too, when Dr Thatcher goes on to say that "though several general officers were present, Colonel Prescott retained the command during the action"!! Comment on this is unnecessary.

It is not very surprising that Mr Swett, after such a sham review of the authorities bearing in favor of Colonel Prescott, should venture to write that "in the whole of them there is not a shadow of an excuse" for my conclusion, one half of which he actually quotes, but the other half he characteristically suppresses! Is it then possible that such authorities, the whole of them, do not supply even "a shadow of an excuse" for stating that "the original detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott, and that no general officer was authorized to command over him during the battle?" What! When, according to General Ward, a Massachusetts officer must have conducted the battle; when, according to Judge Tudor, there was no authorised general officer on the field; when Col. Scammans says no general officer commanded; when Martin, Gordon, Thatcher, and Prescott himself state explicitly that the original detachment was put under Col. Prescott's orders; when James Thatcher states that, though several general officers were present, Prescott retained the command during the action; when Peter Thatcher states that he commanded; when John Pitts states that no one but Prescott appeared to have any command; and when Judge Prescott states that he had orders in writing, and that no officer exercised or claimed any authority over him during the battle! When a writer confesses that evidences of this sort "come like shadows, so depart," all that need be said is, that the difficulty is not with them, it is not that they lack character, directness, or substance, but it is in the writer's mind, it is what metaphysicians term subjective—perhaps it is a "prepossession" that is "invincible"—and it therefore cannot be reached and removed.

In direct conflict with this conclusion, however, is the statement made first by Rev. Mr Whitney in 1790, as from conversations with General Putnam—"That the detachment was put under the command of General Putnam; with it he took possession of the hill, and ordered the battle from beginning to end;" or as Hon. John Lowell (1818) states it:—"If General Putnam is to be believed, he first proposed the taking possession of Bunker Hill, and was detached for the purpose of fortifying it, and Col. Prescott was placed under his orders;" or as Mr Swett (1818) states it—"General Putnam having the general superintendence of the expedition," accompanied the detachment; or (in 1850) he went to Breed's Hill, p. 23, "under the express agreement with General Ward that he was to do so, and to have the direction and superintendence of the whole expedition." The proof to sustain this consists, 1. Notices in diaries, letters, or newspapers, giving the earliest rumors of the action, as Stiles' Boyle's, S. Ward's, Jackson's, Clarke. None of these are dated later than June 1775. Or, 2. Matter commencing with Whitney's declaration, May, 1790, and supported in 1818, and afterwards, by the statements of the soldiers and others; as, Putnam, Grosvenor, Dexter, Bancroft, Cleaveland, Allen, Trevett, Dearborn, Thaxter, Keyes, Smith, and Low. The character of this sort of evidence has been sufficiently dwelt upon. It is granted that a specious argument may be framed out of it, either in favor of Prescott or of Putnam, and still a more specious one, I am sure, in favor of the position that there was no command in the action. A re-reading of this matter has only served to strengthen a conviction of its unsatisfactory nature, and that contemporary testimony, of a proper character, ought to determine the question. As to proof of this sort, it will only be remarked, that I have not met with a single statement, in manuscript or in print, to the effect that General Putnam commanded in the battle of Bunker Hill, between the dates of June, 1775 and May, 1790. Mr Swett does not produce any such statement. On the contrary, every contemporary allusion to his conduct in the battle, I could find, has been faithfully quoted. But the same allusions to Colonel Prescott, which also might be supported by soldiers' statements, are of the most positive character, and they state that the orders to occupy Bunker Hill were given to him, and that no general officer interfered with his command. In accounting for this conflict of testimony, in page 166 of the Siege of Boston, I remark—"Without intending to question the honor or the veracity of any one, it is more reasonable to conclude that the facts communicated by the general (Putnam) have not been stated exactly, and with the proper discriminations, than it is to conclude that so many independent contemporary authorities are incorrect in stating that the first detachment was placed under the orders of Colonel Prescott."

Mr Swett has over a page of comment, as unjust to me as usual, on the extracts I make from Stiles' MS. Diary. President Stiles resided in Newport, and was in the habit of writing in his journal, very minutely, of the occurrences of the day; and in long entries, under the dates of June 18, 19, 20, 23, and 30, he writes of the all engrossing subject of this battle, as he could gather facts from letters, or from persons from the camp. The extracts before me are of much length, and they furnish an excellent and curious specimen of the rumors that went abroad relative to this battle, and show how cautiously this material must be used. From all this I selected two extracts, one to the effect that Gen. Putnam with 300 men took possession of Bunker Hill; another, that detailed from his own lips, his course in the action. Mr Swett does not quote these extracts, nor others fully. Why does he not do it? I here give a specimen. Stiles, June 18, journalizes: "A gentleman" from camp "this morning" "informs" among other things "that Col. Putnam is encamped in Charlestown, on Bunker Hill, and has lost one of his best captains, but is determined to stand his ground, having men enough," &c., &c. June 19. "Every one filled with the greatest solicitude." * * * "Charlestown is in ashes." * * "We have various accounts—some that Gen. Putnam is surrounded by the king's troops—some that he repulsed them," &c. June 20. William Ellery comes in and shows copies of several letters from camp, one from General Greene, "dated Lord's day evening, (June 18) giving an account of the battle." "General Greene says General Putnam with 300 men took possession and entrenched on Bunker Hill on Friday night the 16th inst." I said (p. 164) this was a rumor from camp, and say so again. Why does not Mr Swett quote the whole of it? Why leave out the 300 men? Various other rumors, and also opinions of Greene's, are given. To return to Stiles. He writes: "Upon news of the action or landing the congress instantly broke up and those who had arms repaired to the field of action. Hence Dr Warren's being in the action," &c. Why does not Mr Swett quote? "Sterling gold," he says, "stamped at the highest mint in America!" But to go on with Stiles. The next entry I have is dated June 23, and here we first come to authentic history. It is General Putnam's own account, and it is so curious, that it ought to be in print. I quote here, therefore, all I have of this entry, which is from Bancroft's copy:—

"June 23, 1775. Messrs Ellery, Chang, &c., returned here from a visit to the camp which they left on Saturday last. They spent an hour with General Putnam in his tent on Prospect Hill, about half way between Cambridge and Charlestown. The general gave them an account of the battle last Saturday, said the number on one side was not ascertained, but the nearest account was, that we had about fifty (not sixty) killed, and about twenty wounded. We lost few till the retreat. We repulsed the regulars three times, fought four hours. The small arms and six field pieces made great havoc among the regulars till our powder failed. General Putnam said by accounts from within Boston, the regulars confessed their loss of killed, wounded, and missing, was about one thousand. Our body on Bunker Hill, where was the action, was about 1500 first and 700 afterwards. Putnam says he judged the regulars were 3000. There was a reinforcement within perhaps half a mile and ought to have come up to their assistance, but they must pass an open causeway, where the regulars kept up a heavy fire from floating batteries. Putnam was not at Bunker Hill at the beginning, but soon repaired thither, and was in the heat of the action till towards night, when he went away to fetch across this reinforcement which ought to have come before. Soon after, and before he could return, our men began to retreat; for some imprudently calling out the powder is gone, the regulars heard it, and rallied again, and came on with fury, and forced the trenches, and then our people retreated leaving the heroic General Warren mortally wounded in the trenches. * * * The army are in high spirits. They consider this scarcely a repulse, considering the damage they did to the enemy; and indeed, if, with the loss of 50 or 60 killed, our people killed and damaged the regulars more than a thousand, it is a wonderful Providence. The troops landed under fire of the shipping, then set fire to Charlestown in which were 300 houses, all which, but 2 or 3, were reduced to ashes and ruins. Then about 1 or 2 o'clock P. M. they marched for the attack, and continued it four hours till near night."

Now it seems almost incredible that Mr Swett should have made the hard remarks upon me he has, pp. 14, 15, for selecting, of this entry, the paragraph in italics relative to General Putnam's personal service in the battle; and even ascribe to me a motive for quoting it that I did not dream of! One more extract from Stiles must suffice. "In June 30, Rev. Mr Martin visited me and gave me an account of the battle of Charlestown." "Mr Martin was in the whole affair from first to last." "He says that about 1500 went on Friday night and took possession of Bunker Hill, under the command of Colonel Prescott." And this is the first mention of Prescott's name there is in such extracts of this journal as I have. Then follows several pages of details, some of which are interwoven in the narrative in the Siege of Boston. All I have to add is, that those who rely on such rumors from the camp as Stiles' first chronicles,—which however have their value as the life-like talk of the day—will be liable to frame just such an account of this battle as Humphries in his life of Putnam has, where (in the beginning) the original detachment is put under Warren, and in the end, the British pursues to Winter Hill, Putnam there makes a stand, and drives them back under cover of their ships!

In connection with this testimony in favor of General Putnam, Mr Swett finds what he calls "the most astonishing inadvertence of the author, though (bless the charitable admission) mere inadvertence we believe," p. 25. It consists in "never hinting" that in Rivington's New York Gazette, June 29, 1775, it is stated that 'Putnam on the evening of June 16, took possession of Bunker Hill, and began an entrenchment,' and this extract from Rivington was mentioned in a publication of ours, which he had among our documents," p. 25. I am not indebted to Mr Swett for a single contemporary document; and as for Rivington's paper, I examined the fine file of it in the rooms of the New York Historical Society, and made the extract, but found the same sentence in other newspapers, for they copied from each other. What an "astonishing inadvertence" it was in "never hinting" this, the reader may easily see by looking at page 124 of the Siege of Boston, for there the fact of such a statement being in the papers is given to show that Putnam was on the hill at night; and once more at page 164, where it is a second time named among the facts bearing in his favor, in the evidence on the question of command! Is Mr Swett's remark, however, "mere inadvertence?"

The only new piece of evidence adduced is an extract from John Boyle's manuscript annals. Mr Swett says, He "writes in his diary, 16th of June, 1775, General Putnam, with a detachment of about a thousand American forces, went from Cambridge and began an entrenchment on an eminence below Bunker Hill." This MS., which I did not hear of until after the publication of the Siege of Boston, is not a diary written at the time. Certainly, Mr Swett must, at least, have known that the record about Bunker Hill battle could not possibly have been put there on the day it was dated, for it contains Gage's official account of the killed and wounded, and the American account from the Providence Gazette, which did not appear till months afterwards, and could not have been then known! And it requires but a moderate acquaintance with the newspapers of this period to see, at a glance, that this interesting MS. is a compilation mostly from them, and often, as in this case, in their language. Yet Mr Swett quotes this in a diary written at the time! The fact stated by Boyle is taken from the newspapers, and is given on p. 164 of the Siege!

To supply the place of this diary, thus struck away, I cheerfully quote a real diary, which I did not see until the Siege was in type, and which will answer Mr Swett's purpose as well as Boyle's, if not better. It is the account of Samuel Bixby, at the time of the battle a soldier at Roxbury. It begins:—"June 17, Saturday, Colonel Putnam, with a large party, went on to a hill in Charlestown, called Bunker Hill, last night to entrench"—and all through the relation, no officer is even named but "Colonel Putnam." The simple explanation of the whole of these early rumors, or reports, is, that from General Putnam's being so active during the day of the battle, the report went abroad, that the entrenching party went on under him; when the fact was that it went on under the orders of Colonel Prescott.

Mr Swett's statements about Putnam, Warren, Prescott, and the question of command, when brought together, make a singular medley.

1. He represents (p. 22,) that Putnam at last persuaded "the prudent Ward" "to grant him a detachment" "to meet the enemy;" and went to Breed's Hill under "an express agreement" that he was "to have the direction and superintendence of the whole expedition" (p. 23,): and he proves that Putnam was the commander by the nature of the army, by his rank, and a third and fourth time, by his conduct in the battle, during which "there was scarcely a regiment, corps, or individual of the army that Putnam did not personally command, direct, or encourage" (p. 28,): for "he was galloping from end to end of the line, encouraging, directing, commanding every body." In fact "no military despot was ever obeyed with more implicit subjection." He was "the bright particular star, to which, during all the storm and tempest of the battle every eye was turned for guidance and for victory," p. 29. This is exclusive enough, dogmatic enough, and general enough, to satisfy any body. Here General Putnam, if words mean anything, is from first to last, and by special agreement, the authorized, sole general commander.

2. Mr Swett, however, states (p. 7,) that Gen. Warren "was on the field, vested with all the rights and authority of a major general;" and (p. 29,) "notwithstanding he declined to issue any orders, was authorized to do so whenever he pleased," and "thus was the authorized, and for many years the supposed commander." Knowing this, Ward, (p. 7,) "probably intended to say that he was the conductor or commander" in his letter. But (p. 29,) General Putnam was the actual, and on Warren's declining, the "authorized commander." Ward was (p. 7,) "doubtless ignorant of the fact that Warren refused to exercise any command on the occasion"!! But what becomes of the "express agreement" between Ward and Putnam? Was this contingency of Warren's declination in it? Was Putnam to have the whole direction only in case Warren did not choose to assume it? Is it for a moment admissible that General Ward did not know when he wrote his letter, who was detached to the command, who exercised it, or who conducted the battle? Is it not a direct attack on Ward's reputation to impute to him such disgraceful ignorance?

3. Mr Swett states (p. 30,) "Colonel Prescott was commander at Bunker (Breed's) Hill the night before the battle, and the next day till Gen. Putnam came on with the reinforcements; and during the battle, the commander at the redoubt." What is the authority for such a statement? If Dr Whitney, Mr Lowell, and Mr Daniel Putnam are exact in giving General Putnam's conversation, he stated that the original detachment was placed under his command, and that Colonel Prescott acted under his orders. This indeed must have been so, if General Putnam, according to Mr Swett, by express agreement, had the superintendence of the whole expedition. How then could Prescott have been the commander the night before the battle and up to noon the next day? If Putnam and Prescott had differed any time previous to noon on the 17th, then, according to this last theory, the responsibility of decision rested on Prescott. Was this in the agreement? Did a general agree to be commanded by a colonel? There could have been no such incongruity.

4. Mr Swett viewing General Ward as, in one sense, the commander, comes to the conclusion, (p. 30,) that, "There were then four who in some sense participated in the command of Bunker Hill battle"—not the exact truth, but nearer to it than any theory of the pamphlet. And he says, "It may be impossible to demonstrate who was exclusively the commander as to discover the author of Junius or the birth place of Homer." Et tu Brute! And alter so much "incontrovertible," "perfectly decisive proof," "express agreement," despotic command, and "implicit subjection" relative to Putnam? After charging me with treating his character with candor only to sacrifice it at last—with robbing him of the command and not enriching any one? Who is doing sacrifice here? Who is committing robbery here? Who is enriching any one here? However, Mr Swett is correct if he means that it is impossible, from the known evidence, to demonstrate who was exclusively the commander, for it all tends to show that there was on the field no general officer who exercised a general command. Such at least is the view that will be found to be taken in the Siege of Boston!

5. Mr Swett (p. 10,) says: "All the world knows that he (Putnam) did come forward and exercise the command most effectually from the beginning to the end of the engagement:" on p. 29, Mr Swett says: "Seventy-five years ago the battle of Bunker Hill was fought. Who the commander was has ever since remained a mystery." Now these two things cannot be. What "all the world knows" certainly cannot be a "mystery," i. e. a profound secret, (see Webster) on something wholly unknown. If Mr Swett clings to the mystery he must give up the knowledge.

Such are the conclusions on the subject of command in the Bunker Hill battle, of "an author in spite of himself," who "thirty-two years ago consented to write an account" of it, and who this year considered it his "duty to enter into a thorough investigation" of this question. History cannot be worth much that resolves itself into such a mass of absurdity and contradiction.

But there is something more serious than inconsistency to allege against Mr Swett's conclusions. What is the authority for the following, I think, new statement?—"Maj. Gen. Ward was the commander in chief of the army at Cambridge; Maj. Gen. Warren, the next; Brig. Gen. Putnam the third in command; and Col. Prescott, another officer of the army," p. 29. This is neither correct, first, as to the general army, even if it were "consolidated;" for General Thomas was the second in command; General Whitcomb ranked above General Warren; General Pomeroy probably (for he was an older officer) ranked above General Spencer, and Spencer certainly ranked Putnam. It is difficult to say who would have ranked as between Brigadier General Putnam and Brigadier General Greene. Nor second, as to that portion of the army stationed immediately at Cambridge, for Major General Whitcomb ranked above Major General Warren, and General Pomeroy ranked above General Putnam. Nor was General Ward, in either case, at the date of the battle, the regular commander-in-chief, excepting of the Massachusetts forces. But more about these officers in another place. The only strictly accurate thing in the statement is, that Col. Prescott was another officer of the army! Mr Swett's facts being taken from him his theory falls.

I have done with Mr Swett's pamphlet. A remark relative to his History needs justification.

It has been stated that the narrative of the organization of the army and of the battle of Bunker Hill in the Siege of Boston, differs materially in details from the account of the same events in Mr Swett's History. As an instance of this, as to the former, take the two statements of the action of Rhode Island,—selected because they are the shortest:—

From the Siege of Boston.

"The Rhode Island assembly, April 25, voted to raise fifteen hundred men, to constitute 'an army of observation,' and ordered it to 'join and coöperate with the forces of the neighboring colonies.' This force was organized into three regiments, of eight companies each, under Colonels Varnum, Hitchcock, and Church, and placed under the command of Nathaniel Greene, with the rank of brigadier-general. One of the companies was a train of artillery, and had the colony's field pieces. General Greene, on arriving at the camp, Jamaica Plains, found his command in great disorder: and it was only by his judicious labors, and great personal influence, that it was kept together. In the rules and regulations for the government of this force, it is called 'The Rhode Island army.' They provide that 'all public stores, taken in the enemy's camp or magazines,' should be 'secured for the use of the colony of Rhode Island.' It was not until June 28 that this colony passed an act putting its troops under the orders of the general of the combined army."

From Mr Swett's History.

"Rhode Island had sent a regiment to Massachusetts imbued with the determined spirit of civil and religious liberty, which the founder of their state maintained through every peril. Colonel Greene was their commander, one of the most prominent heroes of the revolution. The elements of a soldier were so mixed in him, that his elevated rank among distinguished warriors was already anticipated. Under him were Lieut. Col. Olney, and Maj. Box, an experienced English soldier. An artillery company with four field pieces was attached to the corps."

And the variations, as to the details of the action of the other three colonies, are still greater.

The same thing will be found to prevail as to the battle. Take, as an illustration, the two first paragraphs of the two accounts.

From the Siege of Boston.

"On Friday, the sixteenth of June, the commanders of the army, in accordance with the recommendation of the committee of safety, took measures to fortify Bunker Hill. Orders were issued for Prescott's, Frye's, and Bridge's regiments, and a fatigue party of two hundred Connecticut troops, to parade at six o'clock in the evening, with all the entrenching tools in the Cambridge camp. They were also ordered to furnish themselves with packs and blankets, and with provisions for twenty-four hours. Also, Captain Samuel Gridley's company of artillery, of forty-nine men and two field-pieces, was ordered to parade. The Connecticut men, draughted from several companies, were put under the command of the gallant Captain Knowlton, a captain in General Putnam's regiment." p. 122.

From Mr Swett's History.

"On the 16th of June, 75, the sun fell with its full force on the American camp, the earth was parched up, but the vigorous frames and patriotic spirit of the soldiers were proof against its influence. With the advice of the council of war General Ward issued orders to Col. William Prescott, Col. Bridge, and the commandant of Frye's regiment, to be prepared for an expedition, with all their men fit for service, and one day's provisions. The same order issued for one hundred and twenty of Gen. Putnam's regiment, and Capt. Gridley's company of artillery with two field pieces." p. 18.

These extracts will serve to show the character of such variations between the two narratives of the battle, as will be found to run through them. Other paragraphs might be quoted containing things of far more consequence. The variations as to the parts individuals bore, are also important. To do justice to the actors, they should be named in connection with the service they rendered. With this in view, let the critical reader, as an illustration, compare the notices in the two accounts, of what the brave Knowlton did. Mr Swett's first and last mention of him, in describing the battle, is on p. 26, as follows: "While the enemy were landing, Putnam ordered Knowlton with the Connecticut troops, to take post behind a rail fence." Passing the correctness of this, it is every syllable there is about Knowlton, until p. 56 of the supplementary chapter, where there is, so far as this battle is concerned, only a general, but deserved, compliment to him. In the whole, the reader is not told that he had the command of the Connecticut fatigue party of two hundred, one fifth of the whole, or even went on at night. In the "Notes" of Mr Swett, his name will be found to occur twice in depositions. Now is not Knowlton's well won reputation as dear as Putnam's or Prescott's? With this, compare the notices of him on pp. 122, 134, 136, 151, 189, 190, of the Siege of Boston, which rest on authorities that are named. Before these details, or others that may differ in toto from Mr Swett's History, be unceremoniously shovelled aside as a "chaos of mistakes," I have a right to demand that the authorities on which they rest, shall go through the process first.

It is then frankly admitted that the two histories, as far as they go on together, will not harmonize in their details. All that need be said on my part is, that an endeavor was made to frame the account in the Siege of Boston with care and with a partiality only for well directed effort, and lofty patriotism, and noble self-sacrifice, by whomsoever manifested, going directly to original authorities in all cases where it was practicable; and at a risk of being charged with pedantry, references are made in notes to authorities, especially where this battle is described, that will justify every line of the text. It is these that are to decide who is most in error. The appeal is cheerfully and confidently made to the candid and unprejudiced. But whatever the judgment may be as to my selection of authorities, I feel incapable of manufacturing facts, or of intentionally disparaging the services, or of doing injustice to the reputation, of any of the patriots who took a part in the great work of the Revolution.

Having thus done with Mr Swett, who really deserves much credit for his patriotic and indefatigable pioneer labors, and done, it is hoped, finally with controversy on this subject, this opportunity is embraced of making a few remarks on the character of the army and the commanding officers of the battle of Bunker Hill. This is done the more readily, as it will serve as an occasion to-weave in additional contemporary matter, not in print, that may afford aid to a future enquirer in settling this question.