Note 11 — THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

‘Lastly, that there is some one principle or substance, absolutely simple in its nature, and distinct from every composition of matter, which is the seat of thought, the soul of man, and the bond of our existence, will appear evident to any one who considers the nature of judgment and comparison: where both terms of the one, and both branches of the other must be apprehended together, in order to determine between them. Let one man be ever so well acquainted with St. Peter’s at Rome, and another with St. Paul’s in London, they can never tell which is the larger, the handsomer, or make any other comparison between the two buildings by virtue of this knowledge. But you will say, the one may communicate his knowledge to the other: but then that other has the idea of both before him in his imagination, and it is from this that he forms his judgment. Nor is the case different with respect to the parts of a percipient being: let the idea of an elephant be impressed upon particle a, and that of a mouse upon particle b, they can never know either jointly or separately which is the larger creature: nor can a judgement be formed till the ideas of both coincide in one and the same individual. This is the common sense of mankind. For when we make use of the pronouns, I, He, You, &c. and say, I heard such a sound; I saw such a sight; or felt such a sensation; are not these different impressions all referred by implication to the same simple individual? Or were I to say, that in looking at a chess-board for instance, one part of me saw the yellow king, another the black, another the queen, another the bishop, and so on, should I not be laughed at by every body as not knowing what I was talking about?’—Tucker’s Light of Nature pursued, chapter on the Independent Existence of Mind. See also Rousseau’s reasoning in Answer to Helvetius, Emile, tom. 3. And Bentley’s Sermons at the Boyle Lecture.