CONTENTS.

Page

PREFACE

CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 1

The general military situation 2

Reasons for taking the offensive 2, 3

Napoleon decides to move against Wellington and Blücher 3

Positions of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies 3, 4

Napoleon’s plan 4

As stated in Gourgaud’s Narrative 4

And in the “Memoirs” 5

The other plans which were open to him 6

His expectation that Blücher would accept battle single-handed 7, 8

NOTE TO CHAPTER I 9

Napoleon’s plan distinguished from certain other plans attributed to him 9

Alison’s view that he threw himself between the two allied armies 10

Condemned by Wellington and Clausewitz 10

But adopted by Hooper and Quinet 11

Rogniat’s theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimed at seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day 12

Jomini’s belief, that he did have this intention 12

Adopted by La Tour d’Auvergne 13

And by Charras 13

Their view opposed to that of Napoleon, Wellington and Clausewitz 13

Napoleon desired and expected a battle with the Prussians 14, 15

CHAPTER II: THE FRENCH ARMY 16

The army as affected by Napoleon’s return from Elba 16

Confidence of the soldiers in Napoleon 17

Lack of confidence in the high officers 17

Napoleon’s choice of Soult to take Berthier’s place 17

Soult’s unfitness for the position of chief-of-staff 18

The five corps-commanders 18

Estimate of the defects of the French general officers by Napoleon and by Charras 19

Probability of the truth of their views 19

What Napoleon expected from his lieutenants 20

Marshal Ney sent for at the last moment 20

Sudden appointment of Marshal Grouchy to the command of the right wing 21

Napoleon’s error in not taking Marshal Davout with him 22

Estimate of Napoleon’s own bodily and mental vigor at this period 23-24

Portrait of Napoleon by General Foy 23

Estimate of the French Army 24

It was not the best army which Napoleon had ever led 24

But it was a better army than either that of Wellington or of Blücher 25

Its strength and composition 25-28

NOTE TO CHAPTER II 29

Napoleon’s health—Gardner—Ségur 29

The Gudin story 30

Napoleon more or less a sufferer; but on the whole possessed of good health and strength 30, 31

CHAPTER III: THE ALLIED ARMIES 32

Strength and composition of the Prussian army 32, 33

Location of the different corps 33

Temper and spirit of the army 34

Marshal Blücher 34

The Duke of Wellington’s army 34

Its strength and composition 35-38

Location of the various divisions 38

Merits and defects of the several parts of the army 39

The generals: the Prince of Orange 40

Lord Hill,—Sir T. Picton 40

The Duke of Wellington 40

The internal economy of the three armies 41, 42

That of the French army 41

That of the English army 42

That of the Prussian army 42

NOTE TO CHAPTER III 43

Defects peculiar to the inexperienced English regiments 43

CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 44

Napoleon assembles his army near Charleroi 44, 45

He addresses it at Avesnes on the 14th 45

His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davout confirm the view above given of his plan of campaign 45

The general order of movement issued on the evening of the 14th of June 45, 46

Accident in the transmission of his orders to General Vandamme on the 15th 46

Desertion of General Bourmont 47

The operations in the centre under Napoleon’s immediate supervision 47

Positions of the centre and right on the night of the 15th and 16th 48

Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney 48, 49

He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and Piré to Frasnes 49

And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies 49

Backwardness of the 1st Corps 50-52

At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrived at the Sambre 51

D’Erlon to blame for this tardiness 52

Napoleon’s own summary of the situation on the evening of the 15th 53

He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe 53

He expected Blücher to fight the next day for the preservation of his communications with Wellington 53

He gets a few hours’ sleep during the evening of the 15th 54

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 55

1. Marshal Ney’s lack of a proper staff 56

2. Discussion of the results of the operations on the 15th 56 et seq.

Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete and unsatisfactory 56

A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th 57-61

Rogniat’s criticism 57

Napoleon’s answer 57

Charras and Jomini 58, 59

Re-statement of Napoleon’s plan and expectations 59

The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras no improvement on that of Napoleon 60

B. The question as regards the non-occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th 61-63

(1.) Reasons why the effect on Blücher of the occupation of Quatre Bras might be different from that of the occupation of Sombreffe 61

(2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme 62

3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th 63

4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? 64

The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs 64

The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off in the evening of the 15th 65

The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in 1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th 65, n. 122

The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value 66-67

The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have 67-69

That no mention is made in the written orders of the 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material 69

CHAPTER V: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON 70

Blücher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrate at Sombreffe 70

And without consulting Wellington 70

The nature of the understanding between them 70 et seq.

Müffling’s statement generally misunderstood 71

There was every intention to act in concert, but no definite agreement as to details 72

Bülow’s disobedience of orders 73

Gneisenau’s remissness in not giving him full information of the situation 73

Wellington’s desire to protect Ghent and Brussels 74

He retained his headquarters at Brussels 74

He thought it probable that the French would advance by way of Mons 74

Hence he would not hastily move in force in the direction of Quatre Bras 75

The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance 76

And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at 3 P.M. of the 15th 77

Wellington’s first orders were issued between 5 and 7 P.M. 77

They were simply for the concentration of the various divisions of his army 78

But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras was likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army 78

Information that Blücher is concentrating at Sombreffe arrives in the evening at Brussels 78

And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “After Orders” which direct a general movement towards the east 79

Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the subsequent orders of the Duke 79

The Duke’s official report states that he ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 80

Müffling’s statement 80

The Duke’s conversation with the Duke of Richmond 81, n. 170

The instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey have been lost 81

The orders to Hill in the early morning of the 16th 82

They indicate that no decision for a concentration at Quatre Bras had then been reached 83

This inference may be also drawn from the halt of Picton’s division at Waterloo 83

It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M. of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras 84, n. 182

But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Blücher and the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict this supposition 85

Character and meaning of the “Disposition” 86

The “Disposition” evidently the foundation of the Letter to Blücher 87-88

Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th 88

But not until after he had given the orders above mentioned to Hill and Picton 88

His decision was probably arrived at while he was at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball 89

NOTES TO CHAPTER V 90

1. The Duke’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo” 90

Its surprising statements 90

2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellington and Blücher in the event of a French invasion 91

3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptness in deciding to concentrate at Quatre Bras 92

4. Wellington’s original intention of concentrating at Nivelles considered 93

It is approved by Colonel Maurice 93

A. But when Wellington knew that the French main army was in front of Blücher at Sombreffe he could run no great risk in concentrating at Quatre Bras 94

B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to do so 94

If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney would have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon at Ligny 95

C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to make sure of its acquisition 95, 96

5. The extent of the cantonments of the allied armies criticized 96

Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy 96

Opinions of Charras and Napoleon 97, 98

6. Napoleon’s criticism on Blücher for fixing Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army, well supported 98

But his censure of Wellington for concentrating at Quatre Bras undeserved 99

Because this decision of Wellington’s was based on Napoleon’s having already concentrated in front of Sombreffe 99, 100

CHAPTER VI: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS 101

Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar occupies Quatre Bras in the afternoon of the 15th 101

And is attacked by Reille’s advance between 5 and 6 P.M. 101

The other brigade of Perponcher’s division, Bylandt’s, ordered there also 102

The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6 A.M. of the 16th 102

NOTE TO CHAPTER VI 103

Maurice’s criticism on the occupation of Quatre Bras by the Dutch-Belgian generals 103

But the fact that they knew of the concentration of the French and Prussian armies near Sombreffe fully justifies their course 103, 104

CHAPTER VII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON 105

The Duke leaves Brussels about 7.30 A.M. of the 16th 105

And rides at once to Quatre Bras 106

His letter to Blücher 106

Comparison of the statements in the Letter with those in the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey 107-108

He evidently accepted the “Disposition” as conclusive 108

He rides over to Brye to confer with Blücher 108

And returns to Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 P.M. 109

No doubt expecting to find a large part of his army there 109

Delbrück’s theory, that the Duke deliberately misrepresented the situation of his army, entirely unsupported 109, 110

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 111

1. Actual positions of Wellington’s divisions at 7 A.M. of the 16th 111-113

2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, he would have stayed at Quatre Bras,—quære 114

3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates in the matter of the transmission of intelligence from the front 114-115

CHAPTER VIII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NEY 116

Ney returns from Charleroi to Gosselies at 2 A.M. 116

And at first orders Reille to set out at once for Frasnes 116

But afterwards changes his mind, and allows Reille, with the divisions of Jerome and Foy, to remain in Gosselies 117

He ought to have sent them to Frasnes at once 117

And to have filled their places at Gosselies with the divisions of the 1st Corps 118

He does nothing to bring up the 1st Corps till late in the forenoon 119

Soult’s first order to him on the 16th 120

Received about 6 A.M., and answered before 7 A.M. 120

Ney then returns to Frasnes, leaving Reille at Gosselies, with instructions to march to the front at once on receipt of orders from army headquarters 120

About 9 A.M. Reille receives word from Girard that the Prussians are massing at Fleurus 121

And at 10 A.M. he reads the Emperor’s letter to Ney, brought by Flahaut 121

But defers his march to Frasnes till he gets further orders from Ney 122

He gets further orders, and leaves Gosselies at 11.45 A.M. 122

Soult’s second order directs Ney to march on Quatre Bras 122

The Emperor’s letter to Ney 123

The 1st and 2d Corps and Kellermann’s cavalry are all put at Ney’s disposal 123

The third order to Ney from Soult that morning 123, 124

Its peremptory character 124

Ney refuses fully to obey his orders 124

His unwillingness to take the risks which they involve 124

He proposes to keep half his force in reserve 125

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 126

1. Summary of Ney’s conduct on the morning of the 16th 126

2. He evidently did not intend to obey his orders strictly 127

3. The light his conduct on the 16th throws on his failure to seize Quatre Bras the day before 127

4. No criticism can be made on Napoleon and Soult 128

5. Why Napoleon did not send Ney an earlier order to seize Quatre Bras, answered in Chapter IX 128

CHAPTER IX: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 129

Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night of the 15th and 16th 129

Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of d’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready 130

The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not given until Ney’s report of the state of his command had arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M. 131

The advance of the centre and right also delayed to conform to the movements of the left 131, 132

Napoleon’s expectations as to the forwardness of Ney’s command 132, 133

Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal of Marshal Blücher 134, 135

He seems to have thought this probable 136

But he made every preparation for encountering the enemy in force both at Sombreffe and at Quatre Bras 137

The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the whole army 138

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 139

1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for his delays on the morning of the 16th not deserved 139

Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz 139, n. 310

2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of the 1st Corps during the night 140

3. Ney’s inactivity on returning to Gosselies 140

4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolution on the part of Napoleon 140

5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of pressing on to Brussels between the two allied armies—Chesney and Clinton 141

His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive as to this 141, 142

His object was to destroy the allied armies in succession—Jomini 142

CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY: BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT 143

Blücher concentrated his army without receiving any assurance of support from Wellington 143

He got Wellington’s letter about noon of the 16th 144

Wellington arrived at Brye at 1 P.M. 144

Their conversation 144

Wellington gave no unconditional promise 145

Blücher’s decision to fight was arrived at before he heard from or saw Wellington 146

And on entirely independent grounds 147

NOTE TO CHAPTER X 148

Blücher’s reasons for deciding to accept battle at Ligny as given by Damitz 148

He was unwilling to retreat 148

Suggestions of Ollech and Delbrück not of any value here 149

Blücher expected to concentrate his whole army of 120,000 men 149

And was unwilling to change his decision when he found he could not count upon Bülow’s arrival 150

CHAPTER XI: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 151

Position of the Prussian army at Ligny 151

Napoleon examines the position 152

The most obvious plan of battle was to turn the Prussian right 152

But Napoleon decides to attack the centre 153

Positions taken by the French 153, 154

The 2 P.M. order sent to Ney to coöperate with the main army 154

The battle begins at 2.30 by attacking Ligny and St. Amand 154

The 3.15 P.M. order to Ney 155

Napoleon determines about half-past five o’clock to put in the Guard 156

The unexpected appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps causes a delay of nearly two hours 157

The attack by the Guard breaks the Prussian centre 158

The Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe 159

Losses of the Prussians and French 159

The non-employment of the 6th Corps 159, 160

Extent of the victory 160, 161

It was not equal to Napoleon’s hopes, but it had disposed of the Prussians for a time 161, 162

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 163

1. Napoleon’s delay in beginning the battle 163

His reasons considered 164

2. His plan of battle criticised by Rogniat and others 164

Napoleon’s reply to Rogniat 165

His reasons for taking the course he did 165

The criticism of Davout and Clausewitz considered 166

3. Clausewitz’s doubts as to the decisive result of Ney’s movement 167

The question fully stated and Napoleon’s expectations justified 167

4. What Napoleon had a right to expect from Ney 168

5. Whether Napoleon’s plan was the best, considering that he could not absolutely rely on Ney’s coöperation 169

6. Why Napoleon did not order d’Erlon to remain and take part in the battle 170

He must have assumed that d’Erlon had come upon the field for this purpose 170

And there was not time to send him orders 170

7. Napoleon’s skill well displayed at Ligny 171

Clausewitz’s review of the battle 171-173

He points out that Napoleon was more economical in the use of his troops than Blücher 171

Severe and unwarranted criticism of Marshal Davout on Napoleon’s tactics 173

Napoleon not responsible for the error which brought d’Erlon on the field 174

8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting the progress of the battle on the appearance of the strange corps (d’Erlon’s),—Quære 174-175

9. Napoleon to be censured for not having made use of the 6th Corps 175

CHAPTER XII: THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS 176

Résumé of Marshal Ney’s doings in the forenoon of the 16th 176

He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosselies in the early morning 177

He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as he was ordered to do 177

He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisions of Bachelu, Foy and Piré 178

Jerome’s division arrives at 3 P.M. 178

Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P.M. 178

Picton’s division arrives at 3.30 P.M. 178

Alten’s division arrives at 5 P.M. 179

At this hour Ney has only the 2d Corps on the field 179

Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps 179

Its delay in starting 180

Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by an aide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St. Amand 180

The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about 5 P.M. 180

It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road at Frasnes about 4.30 P.M. 181

This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s division had passed through Frasnes 181

Responsibility of Ney and d’Erlon for this extraordinary state of things 181

Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D’Erlon to Quatre Bras 181

It was probably the staff-officer who carried the 2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off from the turnpike 182

For the non-arrival of Kellermann’s cavalry Ney alone was responsible 182

He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes and Liberchies 182, 183

In this he deliberately disobeyed orders 183

He finally, at 6 P.M., puts in one brigade of Kellermann’s Corps 183

Which is at first successful, but is afterwards driven back with loss 184

The French retire to Frasnes 184

The casualties on both sides 184

If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it is probable that Wellington would have been badly beaten 184, 185

If Ney had concentrated his whole command between 12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras would probably have been evacuated 185, 186

In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000 men to assist Napoleon 186

Criticism on Marshal Ney’s management 186

Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops 187, 188

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 189

1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s orders in regard to the employment of Kellermann’s cavalry 189

2. Napoleon’s mistakes in his account of the matter in his Memoirs 190

But his principal censure on Ney for not having got his command together and used it as a whole, is fully borne out 191

3. Curious error of Siborne’s 191

4. Jomini’s defence of Reille’s delay to march to Frasnes 192

It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in any event, and therefore cannot be accepted 193

5. Baudus’ account of his carrying an order from Soult to d’Erlon 193

Reasons for thinking that this order must have been directed to Ney 194

Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15 P.M. order to Ney 195

The evidence on certain minor points conflicting 196

CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 197

Résumé of the campaign up to date 197

Napoleon had no reason for delay 197

He had a disposable army composed almost entirely of fresh troops 197

Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soon recover from the defeat of Ligny 198

Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelming that part of Wellington’s army which was at Quatre Bras 199

Napoleon’s inactivity on this morning 200

Probably the result of fatigue 200

Ney sends no report to the Emperor 200

Soult’s first order to him to move on Quatre Bras 201

Napoleon presumes that Wellington has long since fallen back 201

Napoleon’s lack of energy and activity this morning 202

Before noon, however, the 6th Corps and the Guard are ordered to Marbais 203

Second order to Ney at noon 203

Girard’s division of the 2d Corps left at Ligny 203

Napoleon’s reasons for supposing that Blücher had retired on Namur 203, 204

Of which the principal was that he had on the day before employed so large a part of his army in holding the Namur road 204

Pajol captures some prisoners and a battery on the road to Namur 205

Napoleon’s neglect to send out cavalry to explore the country to the north 205

Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians 206

His verbal orders to Grouchy, and Grouchy’s remonstrances 207

Grouchy’s points not well taken 207

Grouchy’s denial that he ever received on that day a written order 208

Berton reports a whole Prussian corps at Gembloux 209

The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dictates to Bertrand an order to Grouchy 209

Full text of this order 209, 210

This order changes entirely the task assigned to Grouchy 210

He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend to separate from the English or to unite with them to cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate of another battle 211

And is left full discretion as to his course in either event 211

Strength and composition of his command 212

He reaches Gembloux that evening 212

And writes to the Emperor a report in which he says he shall try to separate the Prussians from Wellington 212, 213

Strength of Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras 214

At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads the pursuit of the English 214

His remark to d’Erlon 215

Interesting picture of the march by the author of “Napoléon à Waterloo” 215

Skirmish at Genappe 216

The English take up positions south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean 216

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 217

1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursued the Prussians in the early morning of the 17th. Clausewitz’s opinion 217

2. Napoleon probably would not have detached Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had retired on Wavre 218

3. Effect on the contemporary historians of Grouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—e. g., on Clausewitz 218

4. Curious survival of this effect on historians who wrote after the order had come to light 219

On Chesney 219

On Maurice 219

On Hamley 221

On Hooper 222

5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficiently explicit. Charras’ opinion 222

6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gembloux considered 223

7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasons which induced Napoleon to suppose that the Prussians had retreated to Namur 223

8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the probabilities, when so much was at stake 224, 225

CHAPTER XIV: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON 226

Zieten and Pirch I. fall back towards Wavre 226

Renunciation of the line of Namur 226

But a general concentration at Wavre not necessarily implied 226

Although it was rendered possible by Gneisenau’s action 227

Gneisenau unwilling to renounce all hope of union with the English 228

Although he recognized the difficulties attending it 228

And doubted whether he could rely on Wellington 229

Blücher carried off the field to Mellery 229

Hardinge’s story of the discussion between Blücher and Gneisenau 230

The Prussian generals decide to march to join Wellington 230

Movements of Thielemann and Bülow 231

Admirable conduct of the Prussian corps-commanders 231

The Prussians fall back on Wavre 232

Leaving a detachment at Mont St. Guibert 232

The artillery trains arrive at Wavre at 5 P.M. 232

Wellington at Quatre Bras on the morning of the 17th 233

His message to Blücher sent through Lieut. Massow 233

Blücher replies about midnight, promising support 234

Wellington’s uncertainty during the day and evening of the 17th 234

The risk which he ran 235, 236

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV 237

1. Maurice’s correction of Siborne 237

2. The story of the Duke’s ride to Wavre on the evening of the 17th 238-242

Lockhart’s brief statement 239

Lord Ellesmere’s denial of Lockhart’s statement 239

The story as told by the Rev. Julian Charles Young 239-241

Mr. Coltman’s recollection of his father’s statement about it 241

Reasons for rejecting the story 242

3. Napoleon’s criticism on the course of Wellington and Blücher after the battle of Ligny 243

Clausewitz denies that Wellington ran any risk 243

His view not tenable 244

The question of the advisability of running the risk stated 244

CHAPTER XV: THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE: GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER 245

Grouchy’s letter from Gembloux of 10 P.M. not really satisfactory 245

But Napoleon and Soult do not give him further instructions or any information 246

Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridge of Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him 247

Grouchy was acting under the Bertrand order 248

Which laid upon him the task of ascertaining the intentions of the Prussians 249

And then left him entire liberty of action 249

Errors of Gardner and Maurice as to this latter point 249, 250

Grouchy at 10 P.M. of the 17th issues his orders for the next day to move on Sart-à-Walhain at 6 and 8 A.M. 250

But at daybreak he has learned that the Prussians had retired on Brussels 251

Yet he does not change his orders 252

He should have marched for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak 253

Opinion of Jomini 253

Opinion of Clausewitz 253

Opinion of Charras 253

Grouchy neglects to reconnoitre to his left 254

He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house of M. Hollert, a notary 255

He writes a despatch to the Emperor 255

Analysis of this despatch 255, 256

The sound of the cannon of Waterloo is heard 256

Grouchy’s plain duty 256

Gérard’s advice 256

Grouchy refuses to follow it 257

And resumes his march on Wavre 257

Condition of the roads and bridges 258

Grouchy might have crossed the Dyle after having arrived at La Baraque 259

Three general misconceptions 259

1. As to the place where the sound of the cannon was heard 259

2. As to the necessity of marching by way of Mont St. Guibert 259

3. As to the resistance to be expected at the bridges 260

Grouchy might have been across by 4 P.M. 260

Positions of the IVth and IId Prussian Corps at that moment 261

And of the Ist Corps 261

Probability that Grouchy would have arrested the march of Bülow and Pirch I. 261

Zieten’s march, however, would not have been interfered with 261

Bülow reaches St. Lambert at noon 262

Pirch I. and Zieten do not leave Wavre till nearly noon 262

Tardiness of these movements 263

Accounted for by Gneisenau’s distrust of Wellington 263

His postscript to the letter to Müffling 263

His doubts as to Wellington’s accepting battle dispelled by the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 264

The combat at Wavre 264, 265

The bridge of Limale carried by the French between 6 and 7 P.M. 265

Soult’s 10 A.M. order to Grouchy 265

Analysis of this order 266

Its main object 266

It furnishes no justification for Grouchy’s course 267

Inconsistency between this despatch and the instructions given to Marbot 268-270

The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon 270

The 1 P.M. order to Grouchy 270, 271

Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying on Grouchy 272

The postscript to the second shows that the Emperor had become alarmed 272

NOTES TO CHAPTER XV 273

1. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000 men considered 273

This course was decided on when it was believed that the Prussians had retreated on Namur 273

For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with the Anglo-Dutch army 274

But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared that Blücher might have undertaken to join Wellington 274

In which case he would have had a long start by the time when Grouchy could move 275

Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to send Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinct warning 276

Risks incurred by this course 276

It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy and his two corps with the main army 277

2. Kennedy’s reason against the detachment of Grouchy 277

But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was needed, but to keep off Blücher 278

3. Importance of treating independently of the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy 279

4. Hamley’s opinion as to Grouchy’s proper course given and commented on 280

5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marched for Moustier at daybreak 281

It would seem that he might easily have concealed the object of his march 281

Charras, however, is of a different opinion 282

Examination of his views 282

Probability that Grouchy could have effected a crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M. 283

And that Bülow would have stopped to concentrate his corps and fight 283

And that Pirch I. and Thielemann would have reinforced Bülow 284

Zieten, however, if he chose to do so, might have continued his march 284

6. Charras’ view as to the difficulty of Grouchy’s effecting a crossing after he had arrived at La Baraque 284

His statements as to the Prussian force in the vicinity of the lower bridges unsupported 285

7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at Sart-à-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 286

Statements of the different narratives 286, 287

He was, however, at Walhain, at the Chateau Marette, then the residence of M. Hollert, the Notary of Nil St. Vincent 287, 288

CHAPTER XVI: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 289

Napoleon examines the allied position at 1 A.M. 289

Early in the morning he again goes to the front to see if the English are there 290

His expectation of victory 290

The rôle which he expected Grouchy to play 290

He does not seem to have drawn the very natural inference that Wellington was expecting Blücher; or, if he did, he certainly did not act upon it 291

The rain ceased about 8 A.M. 291

The original intention was to begin the battle at 9 o’clock 292

But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced 292

Napoleon forms the army in three lines 292

His delay in beginning the action criticised 293

And his neglect to send word to Grouchy 294

Every hour’s delay a gain to Wellington 294

Whose army was unequal to the shock without the assistance of the Prussians 294

Kennedy’s explanation of Wellington’s course 295

Risks that Wellington took 295

Wellington had had the field surveyed 296

Description of the English position 297

Composition and strength of Wellington’s army 298

Positions of the various troops 299

Hougomont and La Haye Sainte 300

Strength and composition of the French army 301

Positions of the corps 301

Napoleon’s plan of battle 302

Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroi turnpike 302

It has been universally commended 303

The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminary to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very rashly and carelessly conducted 303, 304

The assault by d’Erlon’s Corps 304-307

Formation of the troops 305

No assignable reason for such a peculiar and unwieldy formation 305

The attack is made and repulsed 307

Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St. Lambert 307

Capture of La Haye Sainte 307

The great cavalry attacks on the English centre 308

They were made against troops in good condition to stand them 308

Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take charge of the resistance to the Prussians 308

Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road and Planchenoit against their assaults 309

Napoleon’s personal supervision needed 309

The great cavalry charges 309

They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined 310

French batteries placed to the south of La Haye Sainte enfilade the English line west of the turnpike 310

But this was only done to a limited extent 310

The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard 311

Napoleon succeeds in repulsing Bülow 311

The battle against the English not actively carried on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks 312

But the English line at this period becomes from various causes very weak. Kennedy’s description of it 312

What Napoleon might have accomplished against the English had he not been fighting the Prussians at this time 313

The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleon returns to the front 314

Wellington has made every effort to restore his line; its condition to the west of the pike 314

Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack to be made by the Imperial Guard 315

Disposition at this time of the various battalions of the Guard 315, 316

Strength and composition of the attacking force 316

The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments of grenadiers and two of chasseurs 317

They are formed in columns of battalions and march in échelon, the right in advance 317

Premature attack of a body of French horse on the left of the Guard 317

No support furnished by Reille 318

Admirable conduct of d’Erlon 318

The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’s brigade of guards 319

Captain Powell’s account 319

The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten 320

General Maitland’s account 321

Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett 322

The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue to advance 323

But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment 324

And are completely overthrown 324

The failure of the attack largely due to the absence of supports 324

Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field 324

The French right wing retires in confusion 325

Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur 325

Exertions of Napoleon to restore order 325

He is finally forced to retire 326

The French retreat blocked at Genappe 326

The result of the battle due to the intervention of the Prussians 327

Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained Bülow and Pirch I. 328

Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat 328

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 329

1. The French tactics generally censured 329

Napoleon and Ney both to blame 329

Injurious effect on the French chances of success of Napoleon’s absence at Planchenoit 330

The attack on Hougomont criticised 330

The defence of Planchenoit praised 331

2. The English tactics exceedingly good 331

3. The attack of the Imperial Guard 331

A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns 332

B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered 333

The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s brigade refuted by the testimony of eye witnesses 334

The great credit due to Colborne 335

4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered 336

Zieten’s intervention not anticipated 336

The English reported as growing weaker 337

Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left 337

Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in both respects 337

The charge of the Guard might have been properly supported 338

Contrast between Ney and Wellington 338

Note on Ney’s state of mind 338, n. 777

5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at Hal and Tubize, not to be defended 339

6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance of Grouchy’s force marching from the Dyle 339

7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption of Zieten’s Corps 340

The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch army at the close of the action 341

8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy for the intervention of the Prussians 341

Both are responsible for it 342

CHAPTER XVII: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 343

The principal points treated of in this book 343-350

Appendix A.

On some characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs 351

Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others 351

Peculiarity of Napoleon’s memory 352

He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the orders which he gave 352

Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the 16th 352

The same thing probably true as to the order sent to Grouchy 353

The orders given in the “Memoirs” were probably never sent 354

And the Bertrand order, which was sent, was forgotten 354

Appendix B.

On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order 355

Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets published in Philadelphia that he received on the 17th any written order 355

He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand order was among the major-general’s papers 356

Publication of the order in 1842 357

It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs 357

Original text of the Bertrand Order 358

Grouchy’s report to the Emperor dated Gembloux, 10 P.M., June 17, given in full 359

It is in reality a reply to the Bertrand order 360

Mutilation by Marshal Grouchy of the text of this report 360

Object of the change 360

No doubt as to the correct reading 361

Appendix C.

I. Napoleon’s Address to his army, June 14, 1815 362

II. Order of movement, June 14, 1815 363

III. Order to the Count Reille, 8.30 A.M., June 15, 1815 366

IV. Order to the Count d’Erlon, 10 A.M., June 1815 367

V. Order to the Count d’Erlon, 3 P.M., June 15, 1815 367

VI. Subsequent Order to the Count d’Erlon, June 15, 1815 367

VII. Order to Gen. Noguès, 3 A.M., June 16, 1815 368

VIII. Bulletin of the army, June 15, 1815, evening 369

IX. Wellington’s first Memorandum of Orders, June 15, 1815 370

X. Wellington’s letter to the Duc de Feltre, 10 P.M., June 15, 1815 371

XI. Wellington’s “After Orders,” 10 P.M., June 15, 1815 371

XII. Extract from Wellington’s Report of the Operations, June 19, 1815 372

XIII. Wellington’s Conversation with the Duke of Richmond, June 16, 1815 373

XIV. Wellington’s Orders to Lord Hill, June 16, 1815 374

XV. Extract from Wellington’s “Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo” 374

XVI. Wellington’s Letter to Blücher, 10.30 A.M., June 16, 1815 376

XVII. Soult’s first order to Ney, June 16, 1815 377

XVIII. The Emperor’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815 377

XIX. Count Reille’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815 379

XX. Ney’s Orders to Reille and d’Erlon, June 16, 1815 379

XXI. Soult’s formal Order to Ney to carry Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815 380

XXII. Soult’s second Order to Ney to carry Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815 381

XXIII. Flahaut’s Letter to the Duke of Elchingen 382

XXIV. Napoleon’s Letter to Grouchy, June 16, 1815 382

XXV. The 2 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney 383

XXVI. The 3.15 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney 384

XXVII. Soult’s Letter to Ney, June 17, 1815 384

XXVIII. Soult’s Order to Ney, 12 M., June 17, 1815 385

XXIX. Capt Bowles’ story of Wellington at Quatre Bras, June 17, 1815 386

XXX. Grouchy’s report to Napoleon from Sart-à-Walhain, 11 A.M., June 18, 1815 386

XXXI. General Order of preparation for the Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 387

XXXII. Order for the attack to begin at 1 P.M., June 18, 1815 388

XXXIII. The 10 A.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy 388

XXXIV. The 1 P.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy 389

MAPS

(At end of this volume.)

The Theatre of War.

The Field of Waterloo at 11 A.M., June 18, 1815.

A PARTIAL LIST OF WORKS RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN.1

ALISON:

History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. By Archibald Alison, LL. D. New Edition with Portraits. Vols. XIII and XIV. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London, MDCCCL.

BATTY:

An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of Quatre-Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. By Captain Batty, of the First or Grenadier Guards. 2d Edition, Considerably Enlarged. London, 1820.

BAUDUS:

Études sur Napoléon. Par le lieutenant-colonel de Baudus, ancien aide-de-camp des Maréchaux Bessières et Soult. 2 Vols. Paris: Debécourt: 1841.

BERTON:

Précis, historique, militaire et critique, des batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo. Avec une Carte. Par le Maréchal-de-Camp Berton. Paris: Delaunay. 1818.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CAMPAIGN:

Prepared, with critical estimates, in October, 1875, by Justin Winsor, now Librarian of Harvard College, in Bulletin No. 35 of the Public Library of the City of Boston, of which Mr. Winsor was then Librarian. It includes a notice of Maps and Plans.

Colonel Chesney gives a list of works cited by himself just after the Table of Contents in his Waterloo Lectures.

Colonel Maurice in his book entitled “War,”—London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1891,—gives in the Appendix, pp. 128 et seq., a list of books relating to the campaign of Waterloo,—with comments and estimates.

BROWNE:

Wellington: or Public and Private Life of Arthur, first Duke of Wellington. By G. Lathom Browne. London, W. H. Allen & Co. 1888.

BULLOCK’S DIARY:

Journal of R. H. Bullock, 11th Light Dragoons. English Historical Magazine. July, 1888.

CAMPAGNE DE LA BELGIQUE:

Contenant

1. L’Ode sur la Bataille de Waterloo ou de Mont St. Jean:

2. Relation Belge sur la Bataille de Waterloo, et de la part qu’y a prise la troisième division militaire du Royaume des Pays Bas:

3. Relation Française, par un témoin oculaire:

4. Campagne de Walcheren et d’Anvers; 1809:

5. Relation Anglaise, traduite sur le texte, publiée à Londres en Septembre dernier.

Bruxelles, 1816. (With a portrait of the Prince of Orange, and maps.)

CHARRAS:

Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Waterloo: Par le Lt-Colonel Charras. 5me Édition, revue et augmentée. Avec un Atlas nouveau. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. (No date.)

CHESNEY:

Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815. By Colonel Charles C. Chesney, R. E., late Professor of Military Art and History in the Staff College. Third Edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

CHURCHILL’S LETTER:

Letter to his father written by Major Chatham Horace Churchill, of the 1st Foot Guards, Aide to General Lord Hill. (Waterloo Roll Call, pp. 2, 14, 92, and Appendix.) The letter was first printed in the Life of Sir William Napier, pp. 175 et seq. It was reprinted, with some omissions and some additions, in an English magazine called Atalanta, in November, 1887, where it erroneously said to have been “hitherto unpublished.” The writer’s name is not given. Mr. Dalton, the compiler of the Waterloo Roll Call, states in the Appendix (p. 235) that a copy of the letter is in his possession. It would be well worth while to republish it textually with notes.

CLAUSEWITZ:

Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz.

Zweite Auflage. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmler’s Verlagsbuchhandlung: 1862.

CLINTON:

The War in the Peninsula, and Wellington’s Campaigns in France and Belgium. With original maps and plans. By H. R. Clinton. London: Frederick Warne & Co. 1878.

CORRESPONDANCE de Napoléon 1er, publiée par ordre de l’Empereur Napoléon III.

Tome XXVIII.

Tome XXXL Œuvres de Napoléon 1er à St. Hélène. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale. 1869.

COTTON:

A Voice from Waterloo: a history of the battle, &c. By Sergeant-major Edward Cotton, late 7th Hussars.

Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged. Printed for the author. London. R. Green. 1854.

CRAAN, W. B.:

Plan du Champ de Bataille de Waterloo. Bruxelles: 1816.

DAMITZ:

Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Par le major de Damitz, officier prussien, d’après les documents du Général Grolman, Quartier-Maître-Général de l’armée prussienne en 1815.

Traduite de l’Allemand par Léon Griffon. Avec Plans. 2 Volumes. Paris. Correard. 1840.

D’AUVERGNE:

See La Tour d’Auvergne.

DAVOUT:

Histoire de la Vie Militaire, Politique, et Administrative du Maréchal Davout, Duc de Auerstaedt, Prince d’Eckmühl. D’après les documents officiels. Par L. J. Gabriel de Chenier. Paris: Gosse, Marchal & Cie: 1866.

DOCUMENTS INÉDITS:

Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815, publiés par le Duc d’Elchingen. Paris. 1840.

DRAME DE WATERLOO:

Le Drame de Waterloo: Grande Restitution Historique. Avec un plan. 3me edition. Paris: Au Bureau de la Revue Spiritualiste. 1868.

DROUET:

Le Maréchal Drouet, Comte d’Erlon. Notice sur la vie militaire, écrite par lui-même et dediée à ses amis. Publiée par sa famille. Avec portrait. Paris: Gustave Barba: Libraire Éditeur. 34 Rue Mazarine. 1844.

ELLESMERE:

Essays on History, Biography, Geography, Engineering, &c. Contributed to the Quarterly Review: By the late Earl of Ellesmere. London: John Murray. 1858.

FRAGMENTS HISTORIQUES:

See Grouchy.

FRASER: Letters written during the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns. By Sir A. S. Fraser. London: 1859.

FRASER:

Words on Wellington—the Duke-Waterloo—the Ball. By Sir Wm. Fraser, Baronet. London. John C. Nimmo: 1889.

GARDNER:

Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. A narrative of the campaign in Belgium in 1815. By Dorsey Gardner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1882.

GAWLER:

The Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo. By an Eyewitness. Dublin. Richard Milliken & Son: 104 Grafton Street. 1833.

GÉRARD:

1. Quelques Documents sur la Bataille de Waterloo, propres à éclairer la question portée devant le public par M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le Général Gérard. Paris: Denain: Novembre, 1829. (With a Map.)

2. Dernières Observations sur les Opérations de l’aile droite de l’Armée Française à la Bataille de Waterloo, en réponse à M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le Général Gérard. Paris: Denain: 1830. (With a Map.)

3. Lettre à MM. Germain Sarrut et B. Saint Edme, Rédacteurs de la Biographie des Hommes du Jour. Paris: 12 Mars, 1840.

GIRAUD:

The Campaigns of Paris in 1814 and 1815, etc. Translated from the French of P. F. F. J. Giraud by Edmund Boyce. 2d Edition, enlarged. London. 1816.

GNEISENAU:

Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Reithardt von Gneisenau. Vierter Band. 1814, 1815. Von Hans Delbrück. Fortfetzung des Gleichnamigen Werkes von G. H. Pertz. Berlin. 1880.

GOMM:

Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm, G. C. B. From 1799 to Waterloo, 1815. Edited by Francis Culling Carr-Gomm. London: John Murray. 1881.

GORE:

An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo; intended to elucidate the topographical plan executed by W. B. Craän, J. U. D. Translated from the French, with explanatory notes, by Captain Arthur Gore, 30th Regiment of Foot. With Plates. London. Printed for Samuel Leigh. 1817.

GOURGAUD (original):2

Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze: ou Relation des Opérations Miliaires qui ont eu lieu en France et en Belgique, pendant les Cent Jours. Écrite à Sainte Hélène. Par le Général Gourgaud. Paris: 1818.

GOURGAUD (translation):

The Campaign of 1815. Written at St. Helena by General Gourgaud. London: 1818.

GRENADIER GUARDS:

The Origin and History of the First or Grenadier Guards. By Lieut. Gen. Sir F. W. Hamilton, K. C. B. In three volumes. London: John Murray. 1874.

GROUCHY:

1. Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publiée par le Général Gourgaud, et Réfutation de quelques unes des Assertions d’autres écrits relatifs à la bataille de Waterloo. Par le Maréchal de Grouchy. Philadelphie. 1818.

2. The same, with omissions and changes. Philadelphia, 1819.

3. The same title except that the author’s name is given as “le Comte de Grouchy.” Reprinted, with many omissions and changes, from the Philadelphia edition of 1819. Paris: Chez Chaumerot Jeune, Libraire, Palais Royal. 1819.3

4. Doutes sur l’Authenticité des Mémoires historiques attribués à Napoléon et première réfutation de quelques unes des assertions qu’ils renferment. Par le Comte de Grouchy: Philadelphie: Avril, 1820.

5. Fragments Historiques relatifs à la Campagne de 1815 et à la Bataille de Waterloo. Par le Général Grouchy.

Lettre à Messieurs Méry et Barthélemy.

Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 20 Novembre, 1829.

6. Fragments Historiques, &c.

De l’influence que peuvent avoir sur l’opinion les documents publiés par M. le Comte Gérard.

Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 20 Decembre, 1829.

7. Le Maréchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin 1815. Par le Général de Division Sénateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris. E. Dentu. 1864.

8. Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy. Par le Marquis de Grouchy, officier de l’état-major. vol. 4. Paris: E. Dentu. 1874.

GURWOOD:

The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. Compiled from official and authentic documents, by Lieut.-Colonel Gurwood. Vol. XII. London: John Murray: 1838.

HAMLEY:

The Operations of War explained and illustrated. By Edward Bruce Hamley, Colonel in the Army, etc. Second Edition. William Blackwood & Sons. Edinburgh and London. 1869.

HILL:

The Life of Lord Hill, G. C. B. By the Rev. Edwin Sidney, A.M. Second edition. London: John Murray: 1845.

HISTOIRE DE L’EX-GARDE:

Depuis sa formation jusqu’à son licenciement. Paris: Delaunay: 1821.

HOOPER:

Waterloo: the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign of 1815. By George Hooper: author of “The Italian Campaigns of General Bonaparte.” With Map and Plans. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1862.

IMPERIAL GUARD:

See Histoire de l’Ex-Garde.

See St. Hilaire.

JOMINI (original):

Précis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815, pour servir de supplement et de rectification à la Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon racontée par lui-même. Par le Général J. Paris: 1839.

JOMINI (translation):4

The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo. Translated from the French of General Baron de Jomini, by Capt. S. V. Benét, Ordnance Dept. U. S. Army. Second Edition. New York: D. Van Nostrand: 1862.

JONES:

The Battle of Waterloo, with those of Ligny and Quatre Bras, described by eye-witnesses, and by the series of official accounts published by authority. To which are added Memoirs of F. M. the Duke of Wellington, F. M. Prince Blücher, the Emperor Napoleon, etc., etc. Illustrated by Maps, Plans, and Views of the Field, and Thirty-four Etchings from Drawings. By George Jones, Esq., R. A. Eleventh Edition, enlarged and corrected. London: L. Booth: Duke Street. 1852.

KENNEDY:

Notes on the Battle of Waterloo. By the late General Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, K. C. B., acting at the time of the battle on the Quarter-Master-General’s Staff of the Third Division of the Army. London: John Murray: 1865.

LA TOUR D’AUVERGNE:

Waterloo: Étude de la Campagne de 1815. Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Édouard de La Tour d’Auvergne. Avec Cartes et Plans. Paris: Henri Plon: 1870.

LEEKE:

The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (the 52d Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. By the Reverend William Leeke, M. A. 2 vols. London: Hatchard & Co. 1866.

LOBEN SELS:

See Van Loben Sels.

LOCKHART:

The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. By J. G. Lockhart. Third edition. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1835.

The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. Reprinted from the Family Library. London: William Tegg. 1867.

MARÉCHAL DE GROUCHY EN 1815:

See Grouchy.

MAURICE: ARTICLES ON WATERLOO:

By Col. J. F. Maurice, R. A. From the United Service Magazine. Vol. 123. In the years 1890 and 1891.

MÉMOIRES (original):

Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de la bataille de Mont St. Jean. Paris: 1820.

MEMOIRS (translation):

Historical Memoirs of Napoleon. Book IX. 1815. Translated from the original Manuscript by B. E. O’Meara. London: Printed for Sir Richard Phillips & Co. 1820.

MERCER:

Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. Kept throughout the Campaign of 1815. By the late General Cavalié Mercer, commanding the 9th Brigade Royal Artillery. In 2 vols. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London. 1870.

MORRIS, O’CONNOR:

See O’Connor Morris.

MUDFORD:

An Historical Account of the Campaign in the Netherlands in 1815 under his Grace the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Prince Blücher. By William Mudford. Illustrated. London. 1817.

MÜFFLING: PASSAGES:

Passages from my Life; together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813 and 1814. By Baron von Müffling. Edited with notes by Col. Philip Yorke, F. R. S. Second Edition, revised. London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street. 1853.

Part II., beginning with page 197, contains an account of the Waterloo Campaign.

MÜFFLING: SKETCH:

A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo, to which are added the Official Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Field Marshal Prince Blücher, and Reflections on the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo. By General Müffling. With Craän’s Map of the Field. Sixth Edition. Waterloo. H. Gérard, Publisher. 1870.

MUQUARDT:

Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Bruxelles. Libraire Militaire C. Muquardt: Merzbach and Falk, Éditeurs. 1887.

NAPIER:

Life of General Sir William Napier, K. C. B., Author of the “History of the Peninsular War.” Edited by H. O. Bruce, M. P. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1864.

NAPOLEON:

See Correspondance.

„ Mémoires.

„ Memoirs.

NAPOLÉON À WATERLOO:

Souvenirs Militaires. Napoléon à Waterloo, ou Précis rectifié de la Campagne de 1815. Avec des Documents nouveaux et des Piéces inédites. Par un ancien officier de la Garde Impériale, qui est resté près de Napoléon pendant toute la campagne. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1866.

NIEMAN’S DIARY:

The Journal of Henri Nieman of the 6th Prussian Black Hussars. From the English Historical Magazine for July, 1888.

O’CONNOR MORRIS:

Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815. By William O’Connor Morris. London: W. H. Allen & Co.: 1891.

OLDFIELD:

Letters on the Battle of Waterloo. MSS. By John Oldfield, Captain and Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers.

OLLECH:

Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 nach archivalischen Quellen. Von Ollech, General der Infanterie. Berlin: 1876.

O’MEARA:

See Memoirs.

PAJOL:

Pajol, Général en Chef. Par le général de division Comte Pajol—son fils ainé. 3 vols. Paris. Firmin Didot Frères. 1874.

PASCALLET:

Notice Biographique sur M. le Maréchal Marquis de Grouchy, Pair de France, avec des Éclaircissements et des Détails historiques sur la Campagne de 1815 dans le midi de France, et sur la Bataille de Waterloo. Par M. E. Pascallet, Fondateur and Rédacteur en chef de la Revue Générale, Biographique, Politique and Littéraire. 2e Edition. Paris. 1842.

QUINET:

Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Par Edgar Quinet. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1862.

RELATION BELGE:

See Campagne de la Belgique.

ROGNIAT:

Réponse aux notes critiques de Napoléon sur l’ouvrage intitulé “Considérations sur l’Art de la Guerre.” Paris. 1823.

SIBORNE:

History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815. Containing minute Details of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, Wavre and Waterloo. By Capt. W. Siborne; Secretary and Adjutant of the Royal Military Asylum Constructor of the “Waterloo Model.” 2d Edition. 2 vols. London T. & W. Boone: 1844. With an Atlas of Maps and Plans.

STANHOPE:

Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 1831-1851. By Philip Henry, 5th Earl Stanhope. New York, Longmans, Greene & Co. 1886.

ST. HILAIRE:

Histoire, anecdotique, politique et militaire, de la Garde Impériale. Par Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire. Paris: Eugène Penaud. 1847.

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES:

The Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G. Edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K. G. Volume X. London: John Murray. 1863.

THIERS:

History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon. By M. A. Thiers. Vol. XX. London: Willis and Sotheran. 1861.

TREUENFELD:

Die Tage von Ligny und Belle-Alliance. Von v. Treuenfeld, Premier-Lieutenant im 2 Hessischen Infanterie-Regiment No. 82. Mit 11 Karten. Hanover, 1880. Helwing’sche Verlags-Buchhandlung: Schlägerstrasse 20.

VANDAMME:

Le Général Vandamme et sa Correspondance. Par A. Du Casse. 2 Vols. Paris: Didier et Cie. 1870.

VAN LOBEN SELS:

Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Par le major d’artillerie E. Van Löben Sels, aide-de-camp de S. A. R. le Prince Frédéric des Pays-Bas. Avec Plans. Traduit du Hollandais. La Haye: Chez les Heritiers Doorman: 1849.

VAUDONCOURT:

Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France. Par le Général Guillaume de Vaudoncourt. Tome Quatrième. Paris. 1826.

VAULABELLE:

Campagne et Bataille de Waterloo. Par Achille de Vaulabelle. Bruxelles. 1853.

WATERLOO LETTERS:

Waterloo Letters. A selection from original and hitherto unpublished letters bearing on the operations of the 16th, 17th and 18th June, 1815, by officers who served in the campaign. Edited, with explanatory notes, by Major General H. T. Siborne, late Colonel R. E. Illustrated with numerous Maps and Plans. London: Cassell & Co. Limited. 1891.

WATERLOO ROLL CALL:

The Waterloo Roll Call. By Charles Dalton, F. R. G. S. London. Wm. Clowes & Sons, Limited. 13 Charing Cross, S. W. 1890.

WELLINGTON:

See Gurwood, and, also, Supplementary Despatches.