Front matter

THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO

THE

Campaign of Marengo

With Comments

BY

HERBERT H. SARGENT

FIRST LIEUTENANT AND QUARTERMASTER, SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY; MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS; AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN"

LONDON

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER, & CO. L^TD

PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD

1897

Copyrighted in Great Britain.

University Press:

John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A.

DEDICATION

BY A SOLDIER

TO

THE SOLDIERS OF HIS COUNTRY

It is written in a certain book, with which most of us are familiar, that a day will come when there shall be no more wars. But that time is far distant. When the laws of human society change, wars may cease, but not till then. All around us is strife; the weak are ever falling before the strong. The grass takes its strength from the soil and air, and each blade struggles for food and light with its neighbor. The beast consumes the grass, and man destroys the beast. We struggle on, contending with one another and with the world, and encountering defeat and death when we meet a stronger power than ourselves. Such is Nature's stern law. It regulates the life of the worm that crawls at our feet, governs the actions of men, and determines the destinies of peoples. The conclusion is therefore reached that until man can rise above this law, the time will not come when there shall be no further need of armies, and when war shall be no more.

No country has ever become great without soldiers. They lay the foundations of nations. In the history of every great people there is a record of battles fought and battles won. At Lexington, at Bunker Hill, at Gettysburg, men died that a nation might live. Is it any wonder that we should be proud of our profession? "Whoever has a heart," says Von der Goltz, "feels it beat higher and becomes enthusiastic for the profession of the soldier." Napier says: "War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife; and the glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honor, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening corrective for the rich man's pride."

We cannot know whether we shall be called upon to fight for our country; we may be called, or not; but we shall deserve no less the gratitude of our countrymen, if we remain always ready. Wars have been necessary in the past; they will be necessary in the future.

"Man needs must fight To make true peace his own; He needs must combat might with might, Or might would rule alone."

"The decisive events of the world take place in the intellect. It is the mission of books that they help one to remember it."

PREFACE

I have written this book for the civilian and the soldier. I cherish the hope that it will be interesting to both.

H.H.S.

Fort Wingate, New Mexico, December 7, 1896.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.

Page

Introduction 15

Comments 30

CHAPTER II.

Genoa 54

Comments 72

CHAPTER III.

Moreau in Germany 92

Comments 109

CHAPTER IV.

Marengo 136

Comments 173

CHAPTER V.

General Comments 216

Index 233

LIST OF MAPS

AT END OF VOLUME.

Map 1 to illustrate Chapter I. Map 2 to illustrate Chapters II. and IV. Map 3 to illustrate Chapter III. Map 4 to illustrate Battle of Marengo.

THE

CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.[1]

After a war one ought not only to write the history of what has taken place, but also the history of what was intended.—Von der Goltz.

Upon Bonaparte's return from Egypt in October, 1799, he found England, Austria, and the small states dependent upon them waging war against France. The allies were united in an effort to crush the French Republic. They were sanguine of success. Against this formidable coalition France stood alone.

Before Bonaparte's return, a Russian army, commanded by Suwaroff, had also been fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland; but, having been defeated by Masséna, Suwaroff had retreated with the remnants of his army into the valley of the Danube, and thence had proceeded into Russia. The defeat of Suwaroff had caused the Russian Emperor, Paul the First, to believe that his army had not been properly supported by the Austrian armies. He therefore felt angry and bitter towards Austria. As soon as Bonaparte became aware of the state of the Emperor's mind he collected the Russian prisoners then in France, gave them new uniforms and new arms, and sent them back to their own country. These acts and others of a conciliatory nature pleased and flattered the Emperor Paul, and enabled Bonaparte, soon after his return, to detach Russia from the alliance.

Of the two great powers at war with France, England had been more active and more successful upon the sea; Austria, upon the land. In the battle of the Nile, Nelson had dealt the French navy a terrible blow, from the effects of which it never recovered. England was now mistress of the sea. Having her fleets in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Genoa, she was prepared to assist Austria in her efforts to overthrow the French Republic.

During Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, Austria, aided by Russia, had pushed forward her armies to the boundaries of France. One large Austrian army[2] in western Germany was watching the crossings of the Rhine; another in northwestern Italy was fighting the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. From the theatre of operations made memorable by Bonaparte's victories in 1796-97, Austria had almost driven the French eagles. Bonaparte's battles of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli seemed to have been won in vain. Austria had all but reconquered Italy. Except along the narrow seaboard between the Apennines and the sea, no French soldiers were to be found upon Italian soil.

Such was the situation when, in November, 1799, Bonaparte became First Consul of France. At this time his acts certainly indicated a desire for peace. He wrote to the governments of England and Austria, deploring the futility of a continuation of the conflict, and suggesting that the war should cease. His overtures, however, were coldly rejected. He was forced to fight. Against this powerful coalition peace could be obtained only by victorious battle.

Industriously Bonaparte prepared for war. France was in a deplorable state. The treasury was empty; the soldiers were ill fed and ill clad; recruits and supplies were obtained with difficulty; civil war existed in certain parts of western France; and the armies of the Republic had met with defeat again and again. Over the French people this condition of affairs had cast a gloom which the magic of Bonaparte's name alone could dispel.

During the winter of 1799-1800 his energy and activity were apparent everywhere. His proclamations aroused the spirit and patriotism of the French people, and gave them confidence in their government, and hope of success under his leadership. He placed the finances upon a firm basis, crushed out the civil war, caused arms to be manufactured, and supplies to be collected; and from the levies that he ordered he organized sufficient forces to strengthen materially the French military power. Of the two French armies in the field, he sent re-enforcements to the Army of the Rhine, gave the command of it to General Moreau, and ordered General Masséna to take command of the Army of Italy, which, half-starved upon the rocks of Genoa, was struggling heroically against overwhelming odds. At this time, too, he began to collect, drill, and organize, in different parts of France, bodies of men who were destined to unite near Lake Geneva, and together with other troops in France already organized, were to form a third army, to be known as the Army of Reserve.

Before entering into the details of the campaign, it is necessary to describe the topography of the theatre of operations, to point out the situations of the opposing forces, and to explain the plans of the contending powers.

Bordering France on the east are Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The Alps, covering Switzerland like a huge network, give to this country the appearance of an immense bastion, which, extending east, separates Germany from Italy. From Switzerland these mountains extend through and beyond the Tyrol. They separate the valley of the Danube from the valley of the Po. In Switzerland they are known as the Swiss Alps; in the Tyrol, as the Tyrolese Alps. On the north side of them are the States of Swabia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria; on the south side, Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice.

Extending south from western Switzerland to within about thirty miles of the sea, the French Alps form part of the boundary line between France and Italy; thence, turning east, they approach the Italian shore, and are here known as the Maritime Alps; still farther east, along the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, they are called the Apennines.

With the exception of a few passes, this great mountain chain, almost enclosing northern Italy, forms an insurmountable barrier to the soldier. Even over the passes, especially across the higher ranges, communication was, at the time of which we write, extremely dangerous. The snow and ice, the glaciers, avalanches, frequent storms, and steep declivities, made these mountain roads hazardous and difficult for the passage of armies. The principal passes in the Swiss Alps are the St. Gothard, the Simplon, and the Great St. Bernard; in the French Alps, the Little St. Bernard, and the Mont Cenis; in the Maritime Alps, the Col di Tenda and the Col di Ormea; and in the Apennines, the Col di Cadibona and the Bochetta.

Lying partly or entirely within this territory are three large rivers and their tributaries. They have their sources in or near the great chain of the Alps, and drain the tributary country. The Po rises in the French Alps, and flows east through northern Italy. The Danube rises in western Germany, and flows east through Bavaria and Austria. The Rhine rises in Switzerland, flows north into Lake Constance, thence, forming the outlet of the lake, flows west to Bâle, where it turns abruptly and flows north for the rest of its course.

Early in April, 1800, an Austrian army of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, commanded by Marshal Kray, guarded the right bank of the upper Rhine. The right wing extended beyond Strasburg; the left, well up into the Alps east of Switzerland; and the centre, forming the greater part of Kray's army, occupied the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine made by its change of direction at Bâle. Kray's line of communication was along several roads down the Danube to the Austrian capital.

Facing the Austrian army, on the opposite side of the river, was the Army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau. Including the French forces in Switzerland, it numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, and extended from the St. Gothard on the right to Strasburg on the left. It had for a base of operations the frontier fortresses of France, and Switzerland, which was occupied by the French.

The Austrian army in northwestern Italy consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, and was commanded by General Melas. The greater part of it was in the vicinity of Genoa and along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. The remainder, occupying the fortresses and guarding the entrances to the passes of the Alps, was scattered throughout northwestern Italy. This army had its base of operations on the Mincio; and its line of communication was by several roads down the valley of the Po to its base, thence by two roads: one north through the Tyrol across the Brenner Pass into the valley of the Danube; the other northeast through Friuli across the Pontebba Pass to Vienna.

Opposed to the army of Melas was the Army of Italy. It consisted of forty thousand soldiers, of whom thirty-six thousand, commanded by Masséna, were holding the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. The remainder, four thousand strong, commanded by General Thurreau, was guarding the Mont Cenis Pass in the French Alps. The line of communication of the Army of Italy to its base of operations on the Rhone was by the Genoa-Nice road.

A British fleet, commanded by Admiral Keith was in the Gulf of Genoa; and a British corps twelve thousand strong, commanded by General Abercromby, was at Port Mahon in Minorca.

Such were the main features of the theatre of operations, and such were the positions and numbers of the opposing armies that were facing each other in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, at the beginning of hostilities early in April, 1800. Against the Austrian armies, supported by the British navy, and a British corps which might at any time be thrown upon the coast of France, Bonaparte could not, with his two armies, expect to make much headway. His chances of success were small; the odds against him were too great. Unless he could increase his own forces, a French victory was doubtful. Thus it was that early in the winter he had seen the necessity of creating an army of reserve, which could be sent to re-enforce Moreau in Germany or Masséna in Italy as circumstances might require. But the Army of Reserve had not yet been assembled. The divisions composing it were still scattered throughout France. Their organization, however, was being rapidly pushed forward, with the intention that early in May they should unite near Lake Geneva and form an army of forty thousand soldiers.

On the French side, Bonaparte, at the head of the French Republic, had for the first time full control of all military operations. Hitherto, great as had been his achievements in Italy and in Egypt, he had acted as a subordinate, merely directing the operations of his own army; but now his military genius was to have full play.

On the Austrian side, the Aulic Council, consisting of twenty-one members, directed all military operations. This council, which held its sessions at Vienna, not only made the plans of campaign, but also issued detailed orders to the Austrian commanders, and furnished them information regarding Bonaparte's plans and manœuvres.

At this time the ablest soldier in Austria was the Archduke Charles. Already he had greatly distinguished himself in several campaigns. He reasoned that, inasmuch as Austria, England, and Russia had failed to crush the French Republic in 1799, before Bonaparte's return to France, the allies stood little hope of success after Russia had withdrawn from one side, and Bonaparte had been added to the other. He therefore advised his government to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace. To the Aulic Council he also gave valuable advice upon the military situation. But no attention was paid to his suggestions. In fact, before the campaign opened, the Archduke was relieved of his command in the army, and sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile.

The plan of campaign adopted by the allies was that the Austrian army under Kray in Germany should remain on the defensive, holding Moreau in check if possible, while the Austrian army under Melas in Italy attacked the Army of Italy along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. By this means, the allies expected that the Austrian forces in Italy, so superior in numbers to the French, would be able with the help of the British fleet to blockade Genoa, and to drive the Army of Italy across the Var into southern France. This movement being accomplished, the purpose was that Melas, supported by the British navy and Abercromby's corps, should invade France, and attack and capture Toulon. Furthermore, the allies hoped, by adopting this plan, to receive some support from the Royalists in the south of France. If this operation succeeded, it was expected that Moreau would detach a sufficient force from the Army of the Rhine to march on Toulon for the purpose of driving back the allies: whereupon Kray could attack the Army of the Rhine, thus weakened, with much hope of success; that, in fact, he could take the offensive, force the crossings of the Rhine, and invade France.

In this calculation no plans were made to attack the French forces in the great stronghold of Switzerland. If, however, the allies succeeded in their designs, Kray and Melas could unite their armies in France, thus cut the communications of the French forces in Switzerland, and smother them, as it were, between the two great Austrian armies.

In view of the facts that the allies were flushed with their recent victories, were superior to their adversary in numbers, and also held the mastery of the sea, they expected great results in the coming campaign. With so many advantages on their side, their plans seemed both reasonable and accomplishable; but they reckoned without the genius of Bonaparte.

On the other side, Bonaparte had two plans, both of which it will be well to examine, that the reader may grasp the breadth of Bonaparte's intellect in originating strategic conceptions. Both plans were based upon the fact that the great stronghold of Switzerland, extending like a huge wedge between the Austrian army in Germany and that in Italy, was occupied by the French. This natural fortress, almost impregnable, could be used as a base of operations from which to attack either Kray in Germany or Melas in Italy.

The first plan conceived by Bonaparte was to leave Masséna in Italy on the defensive to hold Melas in check, then to unite the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, cross the Rhine in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, and attack that part of Kray's army occupying the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg. By an attack in this direction, Bonaparte calculated that he could defeat Kray, drive him north, sever his communications with Vienna, and either destroy or capture his army. If successful in this operation, he could descend the Danube and seize the Emperor's capital; then by taking possession of the Tyrol and the Carnic Alps, he could occupy the Brenner and Pontebba passes, which operation would sever the communications of Melas in Italy and cut him off from Vienna. With Kray's army captured or destroyed, with the French holding the only passes by which the Austrians in Italy could retreat, and with Bonaparte in possession of the Austrian capital, the campaign must end; the Austrian Emperor would be compelled to make peace. This plan had many advantages. It would, if successful, be far-reaching in its results; it would not only destroy Kray, but would paralyze the operations of Melas; it would, to use Bonaparte's expressive words, "reconquer Italy at Vienna."

Though this plan promised great results it was not carried out. A rivalry between Moreau and Bonaparte was the principal cause. The former, being jealous of the latter, refused to serve under him. Though the First Consul had shown his confidence in Moreau, and, by appointing him to command the Army of the Rhine, had recognized his great military abilities, nevertheless Moreau objected to having Bonaparte direct the operations of the combined armies in person. In fact, he stated that he would send in his resignation if the First Consul took command of the Army of the Rhine. At a later day this would undoubtedly have resulted in Moreau's losing his command; but at this time Bonaparte was not in a position to force a quarrel with him. He had need of Moreau's great military talents. Furthermore, the commander of the Army of the Rhine had the unbounded confidence of the soldiers under him, and was at that time the only general in France, except Masséna and Bonaparte himself, who was able to direct successfully the operations of a large army. Victory was Bonaparte's object. To be victorious, it was necessary to utilize the services of every great soldier of France.

Doubtless, too, in adopting another plan, Bonaparte was influenced somewhat by the hope of gaining a great victory with the army that he himself had created. If he could cross the Alps with the Army of Reserve and strike a blow which would decide the fate of Italy, he alone would reap the glory. Moreover, by following in the footsteps of Hannibal, he would be more likely to dazzle the French people, and to fix deeply in their minds the splendor of his achievements.

Bonaparte's second plan was that Moreau should cross the Rhine and attack Kray in such a direction as to push him back from Lake Constance towards the north; that he should then detach a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand soldiers from his army and send them across Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass into Italy, where they were to unite with the Army of Reserve to be led by Bonaparte in person over the Great St. Bernard Pass. With these forces Bonaparte purposed to march south, cross the Po, seize the line of retreat of the Austrians, and force them to fight a battle to recover their communications.

Should he succeed in this manœuvre, a single victorious battle would decide the fate of the Austrians in Italy; for it would sever their communications and cut them from their base of operations. To Melas, therefore, a defeat would mean the ruin, capture, or annihilation of his army; to Austria it would mean the loss of Italy.

The success of this plan depended upon the skill with which Bonaparte could deceive the Austrians in Italy as to his intentions; for should they learn of the existence of the Army of Reserve, and of Bonaparte's intention to cross the Great St. Bernard, they could concentrate near the Italian entrance to the pass, and overwhelm the French divisions in detail as they issued into Italy. It was necessary, therefore, that the strength, destination, even the existence of the Army of Reserve, should be kept as secret as possible. To accomplish this, Bonaparte published in the newspapers, and announced in various ways, that the Army of Reserve was assembling at Dijon in France, and that it would soon be sent to re-enforce the Army of Italy. At the same time he took care to collect there only a few thousand men, consisting mostly of conscripts and old soldiers.

The wide publicity given the matter caused the spies of England and Austria to gather at Dijon, but finding there only unorganized conscripts and veterans too old for active service, they sent word to their governments that no such army existed. Consequently the Army of Reserve was believed to be imaginary, and was ridiculed and caricatured throughout Europe.

Both Melas and Kray were completely deceived. Feeling certain that there were but two French armies with which to contend, they had great hope of success. Moreover, the information received from the Aulic Council confirmed them in this opinion. Melas, in particular, regarded the matter as a ruse of Bonaparte, intended to divert the Austrians in Italy from invading France. He therefore felt secure in his positions, and pushed forward his forces with renewed energy. Feeling certain that he had fathomed Bonaparte's stratagem, he rested in a security which doomed him to defeat.

Meanwhile the divisions of the Army of Reserve were concentrating. They were marching through France; and were rapidly assembling near Geneva, from which place they were to be led across the Alps into Italy. This army, so secretly organized, and so derided throughout Europe; this army, whose very existence was doubted by the allies, was destined to amaze the world by the brilliancy of its exploits. Bonaparte will lead it over the Great St. Bernard Pass across the Alps, descend like an avalanche into the valley of the Po, cut the communications of the Austrians, and defeat them in the hard-fought battle of Marengo. He will emulate the deeds of Hannibal. He will lead forty thousand soldiers across the highest mountains of Europe, surmount every obstacle in his pathway, overthrow every force sent to oppose his progress, and by a single march and a single battle reconquer northern Italy.

COMMENTS.

In making war upon France the Austrian forces were obliged to advance along both the Danube and the Po; for if they confined their operations exclusively to the valley of the Danube, they must yield northern Italy to the French; or if they restricted their operations wholly to the valley of the Po, they must lose western Germany, and leave unguarded the direct route between France and Austria. The Austrian forces were, therefore, divided into two armies: one of which confined its operations to the valley of the Danube; the other, to the valley of the Po. In advancing towards France, these armies became farther and farther separated from each other. Kray's army in western Germany and the army of Melas in northwestern Italy were separated by Switzerland and the great chain of the Alps. As Switzerland and the passes of the Swiss Alps were held by the French, there could be no direct communication between Kray and Melas. Though the great highway of the Tyrol, which crossed the Alps over the Brenner Pass, was in possession of the Austrians, it was so far in rear of the Austrian armies that re-enforcements could not be sent over it from one army to the other without making a march of several hundred miles. In fact, the nature of the country was such that during active operations neither army could expect to receive any support from the other. They were independent armies of equal strength. Each had a separate commander, and each had its own line of operations and its own line of retreat.

On the other hand, the three French armies were so situated that they could support one another. With Moreau's army on the Rhine, Masséna's along the Apennines, and the Army of Reserve between them near Lake Geneva, Bonaparte could move the last along the roads of eastern France to re-enforce either of the others as circumstances might require. In this way Bonaparte could re-enforce Masséna with the Army of Reserve, which would increase the Army of Italy to eighty thousand combatants. Or, should Masséna be driven back across the Var into France, Bonaparte could leave Moreau on the defensive along the Rhine with a part of his army, withdraw the remainder, unite it with the Army of Reserve, and with these combined forces added to the remnants of Masséna's army, destroy Melas in the south of France.

Had the Austrian armies succeeded in invading France simultaneously, Bonaparte would have detached a containing force[3] against one army, and then have massed his remaining forces against the other. By repeating this manœuvre, first against one army and then against the other, he would have attempted to defeat both. In this case, the Austrian armies would enter France from different directions; one from the east, the other from the southeast, separated by Switzerland and the French Alps; and since the French armies, even while falling back, would still be between the Austrian armies, Bonaparte would, from his central position, have the advantage of interior lines, and could rapidly combine his forces against his adversaries in succession.

How well he would have succeeded in this manœuvre can best be judged by what he accomplished by similar manœuvres.

In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, when the Austrians advanced against Bonaparte on both sides of Lake Garda, he united his forces at the foot of the lake; and, by throwing a strong force against one and then against the other of the advancing armies, defeated both in succession before they could unite. In these manœuvres, with a total force of forty-five thousand soldiers, he defeated seventy-two thousand Austrians.

In the campaigns of Arcole and Rivoli, the Austrians likewise advanced with divided forces. In the former, forty thousand Frenchmen opposed seventy thousand Austrians; in the latter, forty-four thousand Frenchmen opposed sixty-five thousand Austrians. By skilful combinations, similar to those just described, Bonaparte defeated the Austrian armies in both campaigns.

In 1814, when the Prussians, under Blucher, and the Austrians, under Schwarzenberg, were advancing from different points of the French frontier upon Paris, the results obtained by Napoleon's leaving a retarding force before one army, and by massing his remaining forces against the other, were still more remarkable. With a force numerically inferior to either army opposed to him, he succeeded in winning battle after battle. Though in the campaign of 1814 we find strategical problems with which we are not now concerned, yet Napoleon's victories there in the face of such odds show what he might have accomplished had Kray and Melas crossed the French frontiers and advanced on Paris.

But the combination that offered Bonaparte the greatest chance of success yet remains to be considered. Should Masséna be able single-handed to hold in check the Austrians in Italy, Bonaparte could unite the Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong, to Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand. This junction would give Bonaparte one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers with whom to attack the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians under Kray. With such a superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would probably have annihilated the Austrian forces in the valley of the Danube.

But the mere superiority in numbers, which, by this combination, might have been obtained in Germany, is not the only advantage which Bonaparte could have derived from the positions of the opposing armies. In order to understand the subject better and see, perhaps, in a measure, the whole strategical situation as it appeared to Bonaparte himself, it will be necessary to examine somewhat carefully the positions of the opposing forces, and point out the advantages which the possession of Switzerland gave to the French.

Since Moreau's army was in position in France along the west bank of the Rhine from Strasburg to Bâle, and extended into Switzerland along the south bank of the Rhine from Bâle to Lake Constance, Bonaparte could use either France or Switzerland as a base of operations from which to attack the Austrians in the Black Forest. This angular base gave to Bonaparte a great advantage. His adversary could not know on which side to expect him. By making demonstrations on one side, Bonaparte might deceive Kray as to the real point of attack; then, by massing his forces on the other, he might surprise and overwhelm him. Moreover, by crossing the Rhine in force between Lake Constance and Schaffhausen, he could strike the left flank of the Austrian divisions in the Black Forest, and might be able to defeat them in detail before they could unite. Even should Kray succeed in concentrating his divisions, he would be compelled to face south in order to give battle. In this position, his line of battle being parallel to his line of retreat, he must, if defeated, lose his communications. In this position, defeat meant ruin to his army; for with the loss of his communications he could not escape capture or annihilation.

On the other hand, Bonaparte's line of battle would face the north, and be perpendicular to his line of retreat. If defeated, he could fall back and cross the Rhine with little danger of losing his communications.

By uniting the Army of Reserve to Moreau's army, and by crossing the Rhine in force near Schaffhausen, Bonaparte could not only greatly outnumber Kray upon the battle-field, but could force him to fight in a position where an Austrian defeat would be fatal to the Austrian cause. By this manœuvre Bonaparte would threaten the communications of the enemy without exposing his own, and would, if victorious, decide in a single battle the fate of the Austrians in the valley of the Danube. He could then march rapidly upon the Austrian capital, and could seize the Brenner and Pontebba passes, the possession of which would sever the communications of the Austrians in the valley of the Po. Such a manœuvre would paralyze the operations of Melas in Italy, and compel the Austrian Emperor to sue for peace.

Though this plan offered Bonaparte great results, yet in several respects it was somewhat difficult to execute. In order to gain a favorable position for attacking Kray in the Black Forest, Bonaparte would have to make a flank march from Bâle to Lake Constance; and consequently would have to expose his own flank to the attacks of the enemy. But in this case the French flank would be protected by the Rhine; and as Bonaparte would march rapidly, he would in all probability succeed in crossing the river in force near Lake Constance before his adversary should discover his plan. Nevertheless, this flank march would be attended with considerable danger. In fact, every flank march in the vicinity of an active enemy is dangerous; for a commander who gains a position on the enemy's flank must necessarily expose his own flank to the attacks of the enemy. Even when his flank is protected by a river, he cannot cross it without taking some risks. Had Kray's army been assembled in force near Schaffhausen, where it could have attacked the French divisions in detail as they crossed the Rhine, Bonaparte would have had much difficulty in carrying out successfully this plan of campaign. "Of all the operations of war," says Jomini, "there is none more hazardous and difficult than the passage of a large river in the presence of an enemy."

Had Bonaparte adopted this plan, he would undoubtedly have attempted to deceive Kray as to the real point of attack. If we form a judgment of what he would have done by what he afterwards did in the Ulm campaign, we can safely assume that he would have ordered at least one division to cross the Rhine from France, and to advance directly eastward upon Kray's army in the Black Forest. The march of this division would have deceived Kray, and would probably have led him to expect the entire French army from that direction. Bonaparte could then have made his flank march in safety, and could have crossed the river with little danger of having his divisions defeated in detail.

As a matter of fact, however, Kray had his army so widely dispersed that he could not in any case have concentrated a sufficient force in time to oppose successfully the progress of Bonaparte. Even had he been able to assemble his entire army near Schaffhausen, it is doubtful whether, in the face of such odds, he could have prevented Bonaparte from crossing the river. Perhaps it will be well to substantiate this statement by an example. In the two passages of the Danube by Napoleon at Lobau near Vienna in 1809, the difficulties were greater and the odds less than in the hypothetical case now before us. Furthermore, in these operations Napoleon was opposed by that illustrious soldier, the Archduke Charles. Surely, these facts warrant the conclusion that an army of one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers, led by the greatest captain of modern times, could have successfully crossed the Rhine in spite of one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, commanded by Marshal Kray.

That Bonaparte could have executed this plan of campaign admits of little doubt. We have already shown why the plan was not adopted. But it is worthy of notice that afterwards, in the Ulm campaign, along almost identical lines, he carried out this great strategic conception with remarkable results. It is worthy of notice that, in 1805 at Ulm in the valley of the Danube, he captured an Austrian army, under General Mack, by manœuvres similar to those by which in 1800 he purposed to overwhelm Marshal Kray in the Black Forest. It is worthy of notice that he then descended the Danube, and seized the Austrian capital, and that this march paralyzed to a certain extent the operations of the Archduke Charles in Italy. It is worthy of notice that this march was the principal cause which led the Archduke Charles to retreat before Masséna; and that the Archduke's army would have been captured or destroyed, had not Napoleon been compelled to march north from Vienna in order to meet the Austrian and Russian armies on the field of Austerlitz.

Consider now the situation in northwestern Italy. Since the French were holding the Apennines and Maritime Alps on the south, the French Alps on the west, and Switzerland on the north, they were in possession of the three sides of a rectangle, which almost enclosed Melas in Italy. Should Bonaparte decide to take the offensive there, he could attack the Austrians from the south, from the west, or from the north. This situation gave him several advantages; for Melas could not know on which side to expect the French. Bonaparte might surprise his adversary; he might deceive him as to the real point of attack, and then mass his forces at some unexpected point where he would have the advantage of position.

On the other hand, Melas within the rectangle had the advantage of interior lines. He could therefore, other things being equal, concentrate his forces more quickly upon any side than could Bonaparte. Should he learn in time where Bonaparte would enter Italy, he could defeat the French divisions in detail as they issued from the passes of the Alps. But in order to take advantage of his central position, he must be accurately informed of Bonaparte's movements. He must fathom his adversary's designs; otherwise the advantage of position could avail him nothing. Thus it is seen how the element of surprise became such an essential factor in these operations, and how important it was that Bonaparte should deceive the Austrians as to his real intentions. The success of the entire plan, the fate of Italy itself, hinged on this fact. It was the first great step towards success; it was the entering wedge to victory. Long before the campaign opened, Bonaparte saw clearly this fact. In the midst of untiring activity at Paris, while momentous questions were engaging his attention, he contrived the stratagem that deceived his adversary, and worked out the details that led ultimately to his triumph at Marengo.

Already some of the advantages which the possession of Switzerland gave to Bonaparte have been pointed out. It will now be noticed that he could safely assemble a large force in this almost impregnable stronghold, and could debouch therefrom upon the rear of the Austrians in Italy. In this way he could descend upon the Austrian communications with little danger of losing his own with Switzerland. Even should the army of Italy be driven back to the line of the Var, as long as the French held this river and the French Alps on one side of the Austrians, and Switzerland on the other, Bonaparte had the advantage of an angular base, from either side of which he could march to attack the Austrians in Italy. In fact, the possession of Switzerland, extending east from the French frontier, gave to Bonaparte the advantage of an angular base in his operations against either Kray in Germany or Melas in Italy. Moreover, Switzerland offered him a secure place where he could assemble his forces and strike either Austrian army a vital blow. Upon these facts was based not only the plan of campaign that decided the fate of Italy, but that grander conception which offered still greater results.

As previously stated, the Austrian plan of campaign was that Kray should remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the offensive in Italy. There were several reasons for adopting this plan.

First: Austria had in the preceding year been remarkably successful in northern Italy. Step by step she had driven the French from the Adige to the Apennines. Being anxious to hold what she had conquered, and hoping to continue her success in Italy, she gave Melas one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, and directed him to take the offensive against Masséna.

Second: By making her principal efforts there, she could receive the support of the British fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, and possibly that of the British corps in Minorca.

Third: The English favored this plan; for they saw in it a chance to gain possession of Toulon, which was a desirable acquisition on account of the naval establishments there.

Fourth: The Royalists of southeastern France were in sympathy with England and Austria, and might possibly aid them at the first opportunity.

Fifth: Since Austria knew that Moreau's army was large, and that the Army of Italy was small, she believed that, by taking the defensive in Germany and the offensive in Italy, she could hold in check the larger army, while she overwhelmed the smaller with greatly superior numbers.

Consider for a moment the situation as it must have appeared at this time to Austria. Not aware of the existence of the Army of Reserve, she saw only Moreau's army along the Rhine, and Masséna's along the Apennines. Was it not reasonable to suppose that the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Germany might hold in check Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand, while the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Italy destroyed the forty thousand French under Masséna?

On the other hand, there were several reasons why this plan should not have been adopted by the Aulic Council.

With the Army of Italy in possession of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, flanked on the right by the fortified city of Genoa, Masséna had the advantage of a strong defensive position. Without an enormous superiority in numbers, it was a difficult matter for Melas to drive back the French. And even should he succeed in this undertaking, there still remained the line of the Var, a strongly fortified position, flanked on the north by the Alps and on the south by the sea; a position which could neither be turned nor be forced, except with greatly superior numbers and desperate fighting.

To succeed offensively in Italy, the Austrians had therefore to outnumber greatly the French. The French superiority in position counterbalanced the Austrian superiority in numbers. The Austrian plan allowed Bonaparte with inferior forces to hold in check for a time a large Austrian army in Italy, and left him free to direct his remaining forces upon the important points of the theatre of operations. By uniting the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, he could outnumber his adversary in Germany; or by uniting the Army of Reserve with a corps of Moreau's army, he could descend upon the rear of Melas, and decide in a single battle the fate of Italy.

By remaining on the defensive in Germany, Kray gave Bonaparte the opportunity of taking the offensive there. This allowed him to make use of the angular base of operations formed by eastern France and northern Switzerland. Bonaparte, however, could derive no advantage from the angular base except by taking the offensive; for should he simply defend the line of the Rhine, he would be obliged to occupy both the Swiss and French sides of the river. In other words, he would be obliged to divide his forces, to lengthen and weaken his line, thus giving his adversary the opportunity either to defeat the French forces in detail, or to force a passage across the river at some weak point. Furthermore, it was important that Bonaparte should take the offensive for other reasons than those already given; for should he once force the position of the Rhine and Black Forest, he would find no other great natural obstacles in his front as he descended the Danube towards the Austrian capital.

Because the strong position of the Rhine and Black Forest is a long distance from Austria; because the more direct route between France and Austria is through the valley of the Danube; because no great natural obstacles, forming strong defensive positions, lie across this route near the Austrian capital; and because a French victory in the valley of the Danube would probably give the French commander an opportunity to make such dispositions as should paralyze the operations of an Austrian army in Italy,—it follows that the main effort for supremacy between France and Austria should take place in the valley of the Danube. There Austria should take the offensive; there she should show her full strength; there she should make one mighty effort to decide her own or her adversary's fate. "It is in the valley of the Danube," says the Archduke Charles, "that the blows are to be struck which are decisive of the fate of France or Austria."

Austria did exactly the reverse of what she should have done. By taking the offensive in Italy, and by remaining on the defensive in Germany, she gave Bonaparte the opportunity to remain on the defensive in Italy and to take the offensive in Germany. She gave him the opportunity to carry out a plan of campaign which offered him the greatest results,—a plan which was perhaps, on the whole, one of the grandest strategic projects ever conceived by the mind of man.

"To invade a country," says Napoleon, "upon a double line of operations is a faulty combination." Though the Austrian plan was that Kray should remain on the defensive in Germany, while Melas took the offensive in Italy, yet both armies were, under certain circumstances, expected to invade France. Separated as they were by impassable obstacles, Bonaparte could leave a containing force to hold one in check, while he massed overwhelming numbers to crush the other. Thus by adopting a double line of operations, Austria gave Bonaparte the opportunity of bringing superior numbers against either Austrian army. As the first principle of war is to be stronger than the enemy at the vital point, it is always of the greatest importance that no plan of campaign be adopted which shall, at the very start, allow the enemy to bring superior numbers upon the battle-field. For the battle-field is the vital point.

The error of adopting a double line of operations might easily have been avoided by Austria. Had she left fifty thousand soldiers in Italy to hold Masséna in check, and concentrated one hundred and ninety thousand in Germany to act on the offensive, she would have confined her main efforts to the more important route between France and Austria, and would have had greater chances of success.

Had this plan been followed, Bonaparte could not, by any strategical combination, have outnumbered the Austrians in Germany. Since it was necessary that the Army of Italy should remain along the Apennines and Maritime Alps to prevent the invasion of France on that side, the maximum strength which Bonaparte could direct against the Austrians in Germany was Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand and the Army of Reserve, forty thousand strong. In other words, Bonaparte could bring only one hundred and seventy thousand Frenchmen to oppose one hundred and ninety thousand Austrians.

Furthermore, northern Italy offered Melas many advantages for a defensive campaign. If hard pressed by Masséna, he could fall back to the Mincio, a strong position, flanked on the right by Lake Garda and on the left by the fortress of Mantua. If defeated in this position, he could retire into the Tyrol, where he would directly cover his communications with the valley of the Danube. In the mountains and defiles of the Tyrol, he could, if hard pressed, fall back to another strong position, fight again, and thus prolong the conflict. Moreover, Masséna could not advance eastward through Friuli towards Austria so long as fifty thousand Austrians remained in the Tyrol; for they could then descend upon the flank and rear of the Army of Italy, and could sever the French communications without exposing their own to Masséna's attacks. Of still greater importance, however, is the fact that, had Masséna driven Melas through the Tyrol, or across the Carnic Alps, his success would have had little or no effect upon the operations of the one hundred and ninety thousand Austrians in the valley of the Danube. And why? Because the route between France and Austria through northern Italy was longer than that through the valley of the Danube. Because the mountains of Austria on the side towards Italy offered strong defensive positions near the Austrian capital. Because the vital point of the theatre of operations was in western Germany, and not in northern Italy.

The proof of this will be apparent when we examine the Italian campaign of 1796-97. Though Bonaparte fought his way through northern Italy, and crossed the Alps into Austria, this movement had scarcely any effect upon the operations of the Austrian army that was facing the two French armies, under Moreau and Hoche, on the Rhine in the vicinity of the Black Forest.

In this discussion it has been assumed, in order to point out some of the advantages of a defensive campaign in northern Italy, that forty thousand Frenchmen, commanded by Masséna, might have driven fifty thousand Austrians, under Melas, from the Apennines to and even beyond the Mincio. But this assumption is altogether improbable. Undoubtedly Melas could have held in check the Army of Italy along the Apennines. To prove this statement, consider for a moment what Bonaparte did in the same theatre of operations in 1796. Though he defeated fifty thousand allies with forty thousand Frenchmen, his success was due in great measure to the faulty position of the allies. They were greatly subdivided and separated. Their front was widely extended. At Montenotte he broke through their long line, then defeated them in detail at Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi. Their faulty position was due to the fact that the Sardinian army, based upon Turin, and the Austrian army, based upon the Mincio, were attempting to cover their divergent lines of communication back to their bases of operations. Moreover, as they fell back along these divergent lines, they became farther and farther separated from each other. The error of separating their armies and of scattering their forces, caused by the attempt to cover directly their communications, made it easier for Bonaparte to defeat them than if they had been united into a single army, and had adopted a single base of operations. For Masséna to defeat fifty thousand Austrians, based upon the Mincio, would therefore be a more difficult undertaking than was that of Bonaparte in 1796. But to do even what Bonaparte did in the early days of the first Italian campaign required a greater soldier than Masséna,—a Frederick himself might have failed.

To the plan of campaign that we have suggested, there was one objection: Marshal Kray did not have sufficient military ability to handle an army of one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers. To direct successfully the operations of so large an army is a great undertaking. Even to command and care for a much smaller one is no small task. Hundreds of matters must be carefully considered. Not only the strategical and tactical manœuvres by which the commander concentrates his forces and wins his victories, but his communications, his means of transportation, the supplies for his army, the equipment and discipline of his troops, the abilities of his subordinate commanders, the topography and resources of the country, give him the greatest anxiety. He must give close attention to all these matters; for the neglect of a single one may lead to disaster. He must be brave, clear-headed, cool, cautious, and fearless; and be able to make a quick decision in critical times. He must have an eye for facts. He must weigh correctly all reports and rumors, and out of the doubtful information at hand sift the true from the false. He must see everything that is going on around him. His glance must penetrate the enemy's line, his vision sweep the whole theatre of operations.

As an army increases in size, so, likewise, the difficulties of commanding it increase. To manœuvre one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers, so as to obtain from them a fighting power proportionate to their numbers, requires the genius of a great captain. Neither Marshal Kray nor General Melas was equal to the task. Though both were brave soldiers, who had distinguished themselves in previous campaigns, neither had great military ability. In fact, the Archduke Charles was the only soldier in Austria capable of handling so large an army. He had already shown himself to be a great general. His views upon war were largely the outgrowth of his own successes. He was not wedded to the past. He saw the errors in the system of war so persistently advocated by the Aulic Council. He perceived the reasons for many of Bonaparte's previous successes. He had fought Bonaparte in Italy; and he comprehended, though somewhat dimly, Bonaparte's system of war. Moreover, his views upon the military situation were sound. Though he was far inferior to Bonaparte in military ability, yet, being the ablest soldier of Austria, he should have been made commander in chief of the Austrian armies, and should have been allowed to conduct the campaign in his own way. Probably he would not have succeeded against Bonaparte; and yet, who can say what the result would have been had he commanded one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers in the valley of the Danube? Austria was perishing for want of a leader, yet among her distinguished sons she saw not her ablest soldier.

Why was the Archduke Charles not made commander in chief? Why did Austria deprive herself of his services at the beginning of a great war? It was because the Aulic Council, which decided all military questions and directed the operations of the Austrian armies, did not approve of the Archduke's views upon the military situation. He had advised Austria to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace, and had pointed out that, in case of war, the principal effort against France should be made in the valley of the Danube. But the members of the Aulic Council knew little about military matters; they could see no merit in these suggestions. With a narrowness which they had many times exhibited before, they continued to blunder on, neither willing to take the advice of their only great soldier, nor able to comprehend the strategical combinations which their errors allowed Bonaparte to make. They originated faulty plans, sent unreliable information to the Austrian armies, and exercised over Melas and Kray a fatherly control which hampered them throughout the campaign. In short, they failed completely to appreciate the situation. "To the Aulic Council," said Jomini in 1804, "Austria owes all her reverses since the time of Prince Eugene of Savoy."

That the Aulic Council should fail was inevitable. In war the opinion of a trained soldier on military matters is worth more than that of a congress of a hundred men. Whenever the members of a senate, a council, or a congress, attempt to decide military questions, they are sure to err; for, being absent from the theatre of operations, they can neither see clearly the military situation, nor render decisions with promptness in critical times. Besides, their decisions are often halfway measures, neither one thing nor the other; like the laws passed by a bicameral legislature, they are nearly all compromises. In war there must be resolution, boldness, decision; to compromise is to court defeat.

In this chapter we have attempted to point out the strategical situation as it appeared to Bonaparte at the beginning of the campaign. In subsequent chapters we shall try to show how Bonaparte carried out some of his strategical conceptions; and how the operations of Masséna at Genoa, and of Moreau in the Black Forest, affected those of Bonaparte in Italy. Before closing the discussion, it will be well to remark that the most perfect strategy is of little value, unless it is executed with energy and culminates in victory. The difficulty lies not so much in the conception of great strategical projects, as in the execution of them. Strategy is only a means to an end. It does not win victories; but it clears the way for the winning of them, and adds to their value. It aims to bring a stronger force upon the battle-field, or to place an army in a position where victory will bring great results. But the battle must decide the struggle. "Even the weakest combatant does not lay down his arms to strategical manœuvres." It is victory upon the battle-field which settles the disputes of contending powers. There, amidst the clash of arms and the roar of cannon, amidst the shouts of triumph and the cries of despair, amidst the wounded, the dying, and the dead, victory decides the fate of armies and of empires.

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER II.

GENOA.[4]

In the fertile valley of the Po, the Austrian army, commanded by Melas, found supplies in abundance for both men and animals. The equipment, discipline, and morale of the Austrians were good. The successes of the preceding year had encouraged them. They had that confidence in their commander so necessary to secure success. Filled with the enthusiasm of victory and looking hopefully forward to new triumphs, they were ready and anxious to be led against the French.

On the other hand, the Army of Italy, extending along the Apennines and Maritime Alps, found difficulty in obtaining supplies. Cut off from the productive basin of the Po by the Austrians on the north, and from the commerce of the sea by the British fleet on the south, this army had to depend almost entirely upon such supplies as could be sent from France over the Nice-Genoa road. The French soldiers were in a deplorable condition. Neglected by the French government, they were ragged, half-starved, discouraged. They had been defeated again and again. They lacked the discipline and morale so essential to success. A few soldiers had already deserted; many were so emaciated that they could hardly bear arms, and a number were sick with fever.

On assuming command of the Army of Italy, Masséna took steps to improve the condition of his men. With money furnished by Bonaparte he supplied his troops with wheat, and by his energetic measures soon brought about better discipline. In Bonaparte's name, he published a spirited proclamation, which did much to renew the courage of his soldiers and to inspire in them the hope of victory.

Notwithstanding the efforts of Masséna, his soldiers were in a destitute condition. Only the bare necessaries of life were furnished them. Ammunition alone was sent them in abundance. Though the Army of Italy numbered but forty thousand men and was opposed to one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, Bonaparte would not re-enforce it by a single soldier. In fact, all the men and matériel collected in France were used to strengthen Moreau's army and the Army of Reserve. The Army of Italy was left to fight, as best it could, a force overwhelmingly superior in numbers, matériel, and equipment.

At the opening of the campaign, the condition of the Army of Italy was such that but thirty-six thousand men were fit for active service. Of this force, four thousand under Thurreau were in the Mont Cenis Pass, so that there remained but thirty-two thousand with which to hold the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. Masséna's right wing, numbering eight thousand under Miollis, held the fortified city of Genoa, which, owing to the outlying works and natural obstacles surrounding it, was an exceedingly strong place; his centre, twelve thousand strong, commanded by Soult, defended the Bochetta Pass, which opens upon Genoa, and the Cadibona Pass, which opens upon Savona; his left, consisting of twelve thousand under Suchet, occupied the Col di Tenda, Nice, and the line of the Var.

Inasmuch as the active French army directly in front of Melas numbered only thirty-two thousand soldiers, and was spread out from Genoa to Nice, he calculated that by directing twenty-five thousand men upon Genoa and a column of forty thousand upon the centre of the French line, he could hold in check the French right, while he broke through their centre and cut the Army of Italy in two. This feat accomplished, he expected that his left wing of twenty-five thousand, with the aid of the British fleet, would be able to enclose, blockade, and capture Genoa, while his right wing of forty thousand was forcing the remainder of the Army of Italy across the Var.

On the French side, the plan of campaign that offered the best results was one that Bonaparte himself had originated. He ordered Masséna to leave only small detachments at the passes of Tenda, Ormea, and Cadibona, and to concentrate twenty-five or thirty thousand men at Genoa. In written instructions to Masséna, the First Consul set forth his views as follows:—

"Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Put but few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tenda, where the snow will protect you. Leave some detachments around Nice and in the forts in its vicinity; keep four fifths of your force in Genoa and its neighborhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself with all your forces united upon one of the enemy's columns. The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favored by the nature of the place, it may make up for the deficiency in number. In that broken country, if you manœuvre well, with 30,000 men you may give battle to 60,000. In order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops into Liguria, Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of 120,000 at least. Melas possesses neither your talents nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from your position; he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in Piedmont."

Though this plan was excellent for holding in check the Austrians for a time, unfortunately it was beyond the execution of Masséna. Provisions were so scarce in Genoa that it would have been foolish to concentrate nearly the whole of the Army of Italy there. To feed his army was the difficulty that confronted Masséna. For this reason he scattered his troops along the Apennines, and occupied the seaboard from Genoa to Nice. In this position, his soldiers could seize the meagre supplies that the barren country afforded, and could more easily obtain provisions direct from France. Though it is doubtful whether Masséna fully appreciated the advantages of Bonaparte's plan, nevertheless, he would probably have carried it out, had he not been prevented from doing so by a lack of provisions, and by the beginning of hostilities much earlier than either he or Bonaparte expected.

On the 5th of April, Melas, leaving thirty-five thousand Austrians under General Kaim to occupy the fortresses of northwestern Italy and to watch the passes of the Alps, advanced with sixty-five thousand[5] to attack Masséna. His forces were divided into three columns: General Ott with fifteen thousand men ascended the Trebbia and presented himself before the defiles of the mountains which shoot off from the main chain of the Apennines and extend along the east side of Genoa; General Hohenzollern with ten thousand marched upon the Bochetta Pass on the north side of the city; and Melas himself with forty thousand ascended the Bormida, and attacked the forces of Soult and Suchet along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. Confining his principal attack to the centre of the French line, Melas succeeded, after hard fighting, in forcing his way through the Cadibona Pass, which movement cut in two the Army of Italy and separated Soult from Suchet. The former fell back towards Genoa; the latter, towards Nice. In these engagements both sides fought fiercely. Though the French had the advantage of position, they were compelled to give way before the onslaughts of superior numbers.

At the Bochetta Pass, the attack made by General Hohenzollern was repulsed; but on the east side of Genoa the French, numbering less than four thousand, could not hold the defiles and crest of the Apennines against General Ott's force of fifteen thousand. The Austrians drove the French across the mountains, then surrounded and invested the French forts that protected the city on that side. By this successful attack, General Ott gained a foothold within cannon-shot of the walls of Genoa.

Thus far Melas had been successful. The first great step in his undertaking had been accomplished. Now he could close in upon Masséna with his left wing, force him back into Genoa, and hold him there as in a vise; while with his right, strongly re-enforced, he could advance against Suchet, perhaps crush him or drive him across the Var into France.

Meanwhile Masséna was in a precarious situation. His army was cut in two; his communications with France were severed. In the face of superior numbers, Suchet was being driven back towards Nice, and Soult was withdrawing the shattered remains of his forces towards Genoa. In front of the city and along the Italian shore, the British fleet was actively supporting the operations of Melas. On the east side of the city, the Austrians had gained the crests of the mountains; and at the Bochetta Pass they were ready to make another attack, which would prove successful. In fact, Masséna was surrounded. The allies were closing in upon him. Already their guns could be heard at Genoa; soon they might force him inside the walls of the city.

But it was the want of provisions that gave Masséna the greatest anxiety. Food was already scarce, and there was but little hope of receiving any more. Though defeat and famine were staring him in the face, yet he did not allow himself to be discouraged. He realized that it was his duty to maintain a stubborn resistance, and to engage actively as many of the Austrians as possible, in order that Bonaparte could cross the Alps and strike the Austrian rear. By prolonging the conflict he would gain time; and time was of the greatest importance to the success of Bonaparte.

In order to understand how Masséna attempted to carry out his purposes, it is necessary to describe briefly the situation of Genoa and its fortifications. The city lies at the foot of a spur of the Apennines, on the shore of the gulf that bears its name. This spur, running south from the main chain towards the sea, divides into two ridges which extend to the water's edge, one along the east side, the other along the west side of the city. Upon the crests of the ridges, which form two sides of a triangle, having its base on the sea, a number of forts had been constructed and were occupied by the French. Within the triangle was the walled city of Genoa, containing about one hundred thousand inhabitants. Thus the city had two lines of fortifications surrounding it: one along the ridges and crests of the Apennines, the other along the walls of the city.

Masséna had but eighteen thousand soldiers to defend Genoa. But with this force in so strongly fortified a place, he knew that he could hold out as long as his provisions lasted. Perhaps, by vigorous fighting, he might be able to unite with Suchet, and in this way re-establish his communications with France.

For the purpose of carrying out these views, Masséna resolved to drive the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines on the east side of the city; then, if possible, to effect a junction with Suchet by a movement along the Genoa-Nice road. Accordingly, on the 7th of April, at the head of a strong force, he issued from the city and vigorously attacked General Ott. The French drove the Austrians from the crest of the Apennines, and, after desperate fighting, seized and reoccupied the Austrian positions.

Having been successful in this attack, Masséna then made preparations for a movement towards Nice. For this purpose, he divided his command into two parts: he left Miollis with eight thousand men to defend Genoa; and with the remaining ten thousand, divided into two columns, one of which was commanded by Soult, the other by himself, he began his westward march. At the same time, Suchet, who had been informed of Masséna's plan, marched eastward from Nice to attack the Austrians from that side. Both Masséna and Suchet met with fierce opposition. Neither could make much headway against the overwhelming forces of Melas. For several days the fighting was furious, desperate, and bloody. Though Masséna captured several thousand Austrians, he was finally repulsed and driven back. On the 18th of April he re-entered Genoa; and Suchet again fell back towards the Var.

Masséna was now enclosed in the city. From this time dates the beginning of the siege of Genoa,—one of the most memorable and stubbornly contested struggles mentioned in history. In this brief account of these operations, we shall not attempt to describe the sufferings of the French soldiers who fought and starved and died here; nor to dwell upon the heroic deeds of their commander,—as stubborn a soldier and fierce a fighter as ever trod a battle-field; but rather to point out the important facts that had a bearing upon the operations of Bonaparte, and to show why Masséna, in the midst of a starving army and a starving city, still continued to fight on.

The Army of Italy having been cut in two, Melas gave orders that General Ott should take command of the thirty thousand Austrians then surrounding Genoa, and, if possible, force Masséna to capitulate; and that General Elsnitz, with twenty-five thousand, should proceed vigorously against Suchet, whose active force at this time numbered but ten thousand men. Masséna himself had but fifteen thousand; but nevertheless he had resolved to hold out to the last extremity. He sent an aid-de-camp to the First Consul to apprise him of the situation of the Army of Italy, and to urge him to hasten the movement of the Army of Reserve. Realizing that the scarcity of provisions would prevent a long resistance, Masséna took possession of all the wheat he could find in the city. Even the grain of inferior quality, such as rye and oats, was seized and made into bread. Though the quantity of bread thus obtained was small, and the quality poor, it sufficed to keep alive the soldiers and the poor of Genoa during the first two weeks of the siege. But ten days passed, and the supply of bread was almost exhausted. Moreover, its bad quality was already causing sickness. A number of soldiers were in the hospitals; and many were so weak and emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their arms.

Though the outlook was gloomy to Masséna's soldiers, some hope yet remained in his rugged soul. Perhaps a storm or adverse winds might drive the English fleet off the Italian shore, and thus allow the French ships to bring in provisions; perhaps Bonaparte, now that he understood the situation, would hurry across the Alps into Italy, and strike a blow that would cause Melas to raise the siege of Genoa and set free Masséna's perishing army.

Masséna's force, exclusive of the sick, now numbered but twelve thousand men; part of whom were occupying the outlying works, and the remainder, within the city, were acting as a reserve. His purpose was to attack the Austrians, whenever they advanced towards the city, and to exhaust them as much as possible by partial engagements. By this means he expected to prevent Melas from sending away a force, either to aid the Austrians in front of Suchet, or to oppose the projected march of Bonaparte across the Alps.

On the 30th of April General Ott, supported by English gun-boats in the Gulf of Genoa, made simultaneous attacks on the east, north, and west sides of the city. In these attacks, he met with considerable success. On all three sides the Austrian columns advanced and occupied more favorable positions. In fact, they gained the crests of several mountain ridges within cannon-shot of the city, and succeeded in capturing several French forts.

Masséna fought fiercely. Throwing his reserve first on one side of the city and then on the other, in order to re-enforce his troops occupying the outlying works, he finally forced back the Austrians from their commanding positions and recovered the lost forts. The success of Masséna at this time was discouraging to General Ott; for he knew that he could not lay close siege to the place until his troops gained the crests of the Apennines and invested, or captured, the outlying works.

Meanwhile the twenty-five thousand Austrians under Elsnitz had, by vigorous fighting, driven Suchet from position to position. They had even forced him to abandon Nice, and to fall back on the Var. On this river, which had been strongly fortified, Suchet rallied his scattered forces. Having received from the departments of southern France a considerable re-enforcement, which increased his total strength to fourteen thousand men, he was able, in this position, to make a successful stand, and to stop the onward rush of the victorious Austrians.

As soon as Bonaparte learned of the hopeless condition of affairs at Genoa, he saw the necessity of hurrying across the Alps with the Army of Reserve. But since the successful execution of his plan depended upon his receiving a large re-enforcement from the Army of the Rhine, and since Moreau could not safely detach this force till he had defeated Kray and pushed him back from Lake Constance, Bonaparte was compelled to delay his own movement. Moreau was slow to begin; and his lingering inactivity gave Bonaparte intense anxiety, for it not only paralyzed the operations of the Army of Reserve, but prolonged the sufferings of the Army of Italy. Repeatedly Bonaparte urged Moreau to cross the Rhine and attack Kray. "Hasten," said the First Consul, "hasten by your success to accelerate the arrival of the moment at which Masséna can be disengaged. That general wants provisions. For fifteen days he has been enduring with his debilitated soldiers a struggle of despair. Your patriotism is addressed, your self-interest; for if Masséna shall be compelled to capitulate, it will be necessary to take from you a part of your forces, for the purpose of hurrying down the Rhone, in order to assist the departments of the south."

Finally, on the 25th of April, Moreau began his advance against Kray. It is not the intention at this time to describe in detail these operations. At present it is sufficient to say that Moreau executed vigorously his part in Bonaparte's great plan. Having defeated Kray in two battles, he detached, on the 11th of May, a corps of fifteen thousand men from his army, gave the command of it to General Moncey, and ordered him to march by way of the St. Gothard into Italy.

The time had come for Bonaparte to move forward the Army of Reserve. Accordingly, on the 15th of May, he began his advance by way of the Great St. Bernard into Italy. While this army of forty thousand and this corps of fifteen thousand are marching hopefully forward across the Alps, from France and Germany respectively, let us again turn our attention to Masséna, who, amidst famine and death, is desperately fighting on.

On the 5th of May a small vessel, containing grain sufficient to last the besieged garrison for five days, ran the blockade and entered Genoa. Masséna felt encouraged, and shortly afterwards made a sortie on the east side of the city. Though he drove the Austrians from their positions, this assault was the last of his successes. On the 13th of May he attempted another assault, but was badly defeated. Henceforth his soldiers were so weak that they lacked the strength to undertake any movement beyond the walls of Genoa. In fact, many, not being able to bear the weight of their arms, were compelled to sit down while doing guard duty. Consequently, Masséna was obliged to limit his efforts to the defence of the city, and to the task of providing food for his men.

By the 20th of May the bread and meat were exhausted; even the horses had all been consumed. All the linseed, starch, and cacao found in the city were then collected and made into a kind of bread, which was all but indigestible. This wretched and repulsive food, and a soup made of herbs were all that remained to sustain life. Nevertheless, Masséna would not capitulate. Stubborn and courageous to the last, he seemed bent on defying even starvation and death. Possibly Bonaparte might yet come; for word had been brought that he had crossed the Alps. It was reported that, on the 20th of May, his army had been seen descending the Great St. Bernard into Italy. If so, why did he not come? It was now the 30th of May, and not another word had been heard of him. Could he have met with defeat? Could he, whose movements were usually so rapid, whose blows were so terrible and unexpected—could he have been ten days in Italy, and not yet have struck the blow that was to shatter the Austrian rear and bring relief to Masséna's perishing soldiers?

With intense anxiety these despairing men looked for the coming of Bonaparte. But he came not. Already discouraged, they now lost all hope. A few went so far as to destroy their arms. Some plotted; others talked wildly of the sufferings and horrors that they were called upon to endure. All urged Masséna to surrender; but he would not yield. He begged his soldiers to hold out a little longer. He told them that the First Consul was advancing to their relief; that if they capitulated now, they would lose the results of all their heroism, all their sufferings. "Yet a few days," said he, "nay, a few hours, and you will be delivered."

Thus, for a brief time, Masséna succeeded in raising the hopes of his soldiers. Again they looked expectantly towards the Apennines. Never was anxiety more intense. In every sound, in every echo, in every flash of light along the northern horizon, they thought that they saw signs of the coming of Bonaparte. But they were mistaken. Despair seized them; no hope remained. Even Masséna saw that the end had come; for the last ounce of that wretched food composed of linseed, starch, and cacao, had been consumed. It was now absolutely necessary to surrender. Yet Masséna's inflexible nature would not wholly yield. He declared that he would never capitulate, unless his soldiers should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, and with the liberty to fight again when beyond the enemy's line. And he kept his resolution. The Austrians were compelled to accept these terms.

That the reader may understand why General Ott did not continue the struggle a few days longer, and thus force Masséna to surrender unconditionally, let us consider for a moment the situation at this time in the valley of the Po.

On the 2d of June, two days before Masséna capitulated, Bonaparte entered Milan, and there awaited Moncey's corps, which did not arrive till the 6th of June.

On the 29th of May Melas learned that Bonaparte was advancing on Milan. On the 31st he learned that Moreau had defeated Kray, and that Moncey's corps was marching by way of the St. Gothard into Italy. At once he comprehended the vast plan of the First Consul. Melas was in consternation; he had been surprised. To him the Army of Reserve was no longer imaginary; it was a reality. Moreover, it was rapidly approaching a favorable position from which it could strike a formidable blow at the Austrian communications. Melas saw the necessity of concentrating immediately his scattered forces. He must, if possible, break through the French Army before it closed in upon him. Accordingly, on the 31st of May, he sent orders to General Elsnitz to quit the Var and march on Alessandria; and instructed General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa and hasten north in order to defend the line of the Po.

General Ott received this order on the 2d of June, during the negotiations for the capitulation of Genoa. He realized that he must either raise at once the siege of the city or else accept Masséna's terms.

On the 4th of June Masséna surrendered. On the 5th his active force, numbering eight thousand men, set out over the Genoa-Nice road to join Suchet, who at this time was following closely upon the rear of the Austrians in his front, as they withdrew towards Alessandria. In addition to his active force, Masséna surrendered four thousand sick soldiers at Genoa; but it was stipulated that they should be cared for, and upon their recovery should be sent back to join the French army. Having made these arrangements, Masséna himself proceeded by sea to join Suchet.

During these operations the English fleet in the Gulf of Genoa actively supported the Austrians; but the English corps in Minorca remained inactive. No effort was made to land it either at Genoa or at any other point along the Italian or French coast.

During these engagements the fighting on both sides was desperate, the loss heavy. In prisoners, killed, and wounded, the Austrians lost about twenty thousand; the French, about fourteen thousand. But the loss of the latter was in reality much greater; for out of Masséna's active force of eight thousand that had marched out of Genoa to join Suchet, probably six thousand were unfit for arduous service. The total number, therefore, on the French side put hors de combat, for the time being, may be reckoned at about twenty thousand men.

The active operations of the Army of Italy were ended. They had begun on the 5th of April, and had terminated on the 4th of June. For two months Masséna had shown himself firm as a rock,—had gloriously performed his part in Bonaparte's great plan.

COMMENTS.

At the outset the Austrian forces were greatly scattered. A few thousand were in Tuscany and in the Papal States; an Austrian garrison was occupying the fortress of Mantua, which is situated on the Mincio about twenty miles south of Lake Garda; twenty-five thousand were moving forward in two columns to attack Genoa; forty thousand were being directed on the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and thirty-five thousand were occupying the fortresses of northwestern Italy, and guarding the Italian entrances to the passes of the Alps.

The purpose of Melas was to push forward across the Apennines and Maritime Alps, force the line of the Var, and invade France. How best to accomplish this project was the problem before him. Having an army of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers and being opposed to but forty thousand, he believed that his force was sufficiently large to undertake the invasion of France. Since the French line directly in his front extended along the mountains from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, Melas could easily overwhelm the French centre and cut the Army of Italy in two; then, by leaving a sufficient force to surround Genoa, he could push forward vigorously to the Var with the bulk of his forces, and perhaps carry the position there before the French had time to make the necessary dispositions for defending it. Had he adopted this plan, and made arrangements with Admiral Keith and General Abercromby to have the English corps in Minorca landed at the same time on the coast of Italy or France, he would doubtless have been successful.

He was not successful because he did not thoroughly appreciate the situation. He did not know how to handle his army. He scattered his forces, and thus dissipated his strength. He spent too much energy at Genoa, and not enough along the Var. His rear guard, which consisted of the thirty-five thousand soldiers under General Kaim in Piedmont, and of twenty thousand scattered throughout Italy, was unnecessarily large, and yet was so divided, subdivided, and dispersed that it was weak at all points. In short, Melas committed many errors.

First: In advancing against Genoa with twenty-five thousand men, divided into two columns, and against the centre of the French line with a third column of forty thousand, Melas gave to Masséna the opportunity of holding in check with small forces two of the columns, while he concentrated his remaining forces against the third. In fact, this was exactly what Masséna did. He left eight thousand soldiers in and around Genoa to hold the place, then united the rest of his troops near Savona to attack Melas. When it is remembered that these three Austrian columns of attack were separated by impassable obstacles, and could not support one another, the errors of Melas become apparent to every soldier. That, in spite of such errors, he was successful in cutting the Army of Italy in two and in gaining the crest of the mountains on the east side of Genoa was due to his great superiority in numbers. His attacking force numbered sixty-five thousand men, while Masséna had but thirty-two thousand.

In this connection it is worthy of notice that numbers alone can neutralize and finally overcome any advantage of position or of generalship. Thus mediocrity may triumph over genius. Even a Napoleon cannot conquer in the face of odds sufficiently great. At Leipsic one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, commanded by him, were defeated by two hundred and ninety thousand allies. In the Waterloo campaign, which, from a strategical point of view, is a masterpiece in generalship, his army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men was crushed and overwhelmed by the armies of England and Prussia, numbering two hundred and eighteen thousand soldiers. Hence follows the first principle of war: Be as strong as possible at the vital point.

Second: A victory on the Var was of much greater importance to Melas than was the capitulation of Genoa; for should this river be once forced, there would be no further obstacle to the invasion of France; and, besides, a successful attack on Suchet would hopelessly deprive Masséna of all support, and would in time force him to surrender. In truth, the great effort for success should have been made on the Var. But Melas failed to appreciate this fact. After he had separated Masséna from Suchet by forcing the centre of the French line, he directed his greatest efforts to the capture of Genoa. For this purpose the troops surrounding the place were increased to thirty thousand men, and were kept at or about this strength till Masséna surrendered; while on the Var the Austrian forces actively engaged during these operations numbered but twenty-five thousand. Since, at the outset, Masséna had only eighteen thousand combatants at Genoa, and since this number was rapidly reduced from day to day by casualties and sickness, it is evident that Melas could have surrounded the place and have maintained the siege there with less than thirty thousand soldiers. The increase of his troops beyond the number necessary to hold securely the place was injudicious; for the surplus could have been used with greater effect on the Var. Moreover, the surplus did not hasten the surrender of Masséna; for he was able to hold out against thirty thousand till his provisions were exhausted. Against ten thousand less he could have held out no longer. Again and again Melas assaulted the works surrounding the city, but his efforts were, to a great extent, a waste of energy; for they resulted in a greater loss to the Austrians than to the French, and had little or no effect in hastening the surrender of Masséna.

In the treatment of fortresses, it is worth while to compare the methods of Bonaparte with those of Melas. In the Italian campaign of 1796-97, the strong fortresses which were held by the allies, and which were on the direct line of Bonaparte's operations, did not stop his progress for a moment. Though from a lack of siege artillery, he could not completely invest them, he pushed forward past them to decide, if possible, their fate upon the open battle-field. In that campaign he invested the fortress of Mantua, containing twelve thousand combatants, with ten thousand men; and though the besieged were finally increased to twenty thousand soldiers, he continued with ten thousand or less to hold them in check for seven months, while he won the battles of Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, San Georgio, Arcole, and Rivoli. "It is upon the open field of battle," said Napoleon, "that the fate of fortresses and empires is decided."

Third: The Austrian rear guard was unnecessarily large. It consisted of fifty-five thousand soldiers. At present it is not the purpose to point out in detail the errors that Melas committed by leaving so large a force inactive in Italy, but rather to show that this force was larger than necessary, and that the surplus troops composing it could have been used to much greater advantage along the Var. The necessity for a strong rear guard in northwestern Italy becomes apparent when it is remembered that Thurreau was occupying the Mont Cenis Pass with four thousand men, and might at any time attempt to issue therefrom upon the flank and rear of Melas as he advanced towards the Var. Inasmuch as Thurreau's detachment occupied a favorable position from which to attack the Austrians, it was necessary, perhaps, that Melas should leave ten or twelve thousand men to hold this force in check. There was, too, some likelihood that French troops might issue into Italy from Switzerland by the St. Gothard Pass or the Simplon; a few thousand troops were therefore needed in that vicinity to give warning in case the French attempted to enter Italy from that direction. At this time Melas doubted the existence of the Army of Reserve; but, had he believed it to be a reality, doubtless he would not have expected Bonaparte to cross the Great St. Bernard. And even had he expected him from that direction, perhaps no better arrangement of his rear guard could have been made than to leave five thousand men before the St. Gothard, five thousand before the Great St. Bernard, and twenty thousand near Turin with their left flank well extended towards the Mont Cenis Pass. In this central position the rear guard could march rapidly to attack the French, should they enter Italy by any one of these passes, and could hold them in check till a larger Austrian force could be concentrated. Had Melas known that Bonaparte expected to cross the Alps with the Army of Reserve, no better method could have been devised to prevent the projected march of Bonaparte than to force the Var and invade France. This undertaking being accomplished, there would be no further danger of Bonaparte's crossing the Alps; for he must then fight on the west side of the mountains to save France from invasion. The surest way to protect the Austrian rear was to force the Var. Every spare man should have been directed there. Twenty thousand could have held Genoa; thirty thousand would have sufficed for a rear guard; and of the remaining seventy thousand, probably fifty or sixty thousand could have united in an attack upon Suchet.

Fourth: Had the English corps of twelve thousand men been thrown upon the coast of France just in rear of Suchet, while sixty thousand Austrians were attacking him in front, who can doubt what the result would have been? Suchet had but fourteen thousand men; and against such overwhelming odds he would have been compelled to yield.

With a large and brave army, capable of doing great things, if it had been properly led, Melas so scattered it and dissipated his strength that he virtually accomplished nothing. Though he commanded one hundred and twenty thousand men, he brought but twenty-five thousand upon the vital point. In short, he committed blunder upon blunder, and finally failed in his undertaking.

The problem before Masséna was to hold in check the Austrians in Italy until Bonaparte could perfect his arrangements, cross the Alps, and strike the Austrian rear. Masséna could not expect to do more than this; for he could not take the offensive single-handed against an Austrian army three times the size of his own. Moreover, he was in possession of the strong defensive positions of Genoa, of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, and of the line of the Var, where inferior numbers could make a vigorous resistance against greatly superior forces. Masséna could not know how soon Bonaparte would cross the Alps. His object, therefore, was so to arrange his troops as to enable them to hold out as long as possible.

At the outset of the campaign the Army of Italy was stationed as follows: eight thousand were at Genoa; twelve thousand, in the vicinity of Savona; twelve thousand, at the Tenda Pass, at Nice, and along the Var; and four thousand, in the Mont Cenis Pass. By examining the several positions on the map, it will be seen that the French forces were greatly scattered. Thirty-two thousand, under the direct command of Masséna, were defending the line of the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda, a distance of about seventy-five miles; and four thousand, under Thurreau, were holding the Mont Cenis Pass, which lies in the French Alps about one hundred and twenty miles north of Nice.

Inasmuch as the direct road from Italy into France crossed the Alps over this pass, it was necessary to leave Thurreau's detachment there. Otherwise an Austrian corps of several thousand could have crossed the Alps at this point, thence have marched south along the west side of the mountains, and have attacked the French on the Var in rear, while Melas with his main forces was advancing across the Apennines to attack them in front. Moreover, in this favorable position, Thurreau, unless strongly opposed, could descend the Alps and fall upon the flank and rear of the Austrians as they advanced towards Nice. It was necessary, therefore, for Melas to leave ten or twelve thousand soldiers of the Austrian rear guard near the Italian entrance to the Mont Cenis Pass in order to hold Thurreau in check. Thus, though this French detachment could take no active part in the engagements along the Apennines and Maritime Alps, its four thousand men did good service in the struggle by rendering nugatory the fighting power of a much larger Austrian force.

Since the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps occupied a front of about seventy-five miles in extent, they could not concentrate rapidly. Consequently, Melas could throw a strong force against some point of their long line with great hope of success. In fact, by attacking the centre of their line with superior numbers, he could cut the Army of Italy in two. Having in this way separated Masséna from Suchet, Melas could concentrate an overwhelming force against each in succession, and thus defeat them separately. Moreover, this movement would cut the communications of Masséna with France, and compel him to seek safety in Genoa, where the opposition of superior numbers and the scarcity of provisions must eventually force him to surrender.