Part 2 — CHAPTER XI
Reading edition
SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE
This book would be incomplete if I omitted to append some general remarks on the operation and on the factors which led to success.
First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in comparisons. The enterprise described in this book attracted attention owing to its somewhat unusual type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless, there are many points of similarity between the attack on Zeebrugge and the military trench raids which took place night after night on the Allied fronts. The preliminary bombardment, the advance under cover of darkness and smoke, the wild firing of star shell, the rush across No Man's Land, the encounter with barbed wire and other defence material, the leap down into the enemy's trench, the hand-to-hand fighting, the holding of the position whilst demolition work was in progress, and the final withdrawal when the object had been attained; such was a trench raid as carried out again and again by our brothers in the Army. In their case the following day brought a two-line communiqué, e.g., "Last night in the Ypres salient our troops carried out a trench raid; they captured seven prisoners." In our case the communiqué and unofficial reports filled many pages. I would warn the reader not to be misled into thinking that the military raids were any less hazardous than our own.
The story provides just one more illustration of the fact that, however large may loom the difficulties with which one is confronted, the means to overcome them can usually be found if one possesses the "will to win through."
The fundamental principles of war demand the Offensive and Concentration. The all-important element of strategy to be utilised against a strongly entrenched enemy is that of Surprise. From the latter spring Diversion and Mystification.
An attempt has been made to describe the manner in which the seemingly impossible was accomplished without very great difficulty.
The plan was built up on the foundation of surprise—not surprise in the sense that something would suddenly occur where all had been quiet up to that moment, but surprise in that the real object of the enterprise would be concealed up to the latest possible moment, the concealment to be brought about by mystifying the enemy and diverting his attention.
Whilst concentrating all available powers of offence against the enemy, and allowing nothing to divert us from our main object, we took every step to bewilder the defence and to shift the weight of the difficulties upon the shoulders of our opponents. But that was only the foundation. The material brought into use was the best available at the moment; it is not suggested that, given further time, it would have been incapable of improvement.
Earlier in this book a few remarks were offered on the importance of the personnel. Many further remarks could now be added after the story has been told. I only propose, however, to deal with certain aspects which, by their nature, are less likely to be realised by the man-in-the-street.
It has already been mentioned that a considerable percentage of the vessels and craft engaged in the attack were commanded and manned by officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The majority of the smoke-screening craft and rescue craft came under that heading. Without the smoke the operation must have failed. Without the rescue work the price paid for success would have been excessive. These representatives of the auxiliary naval services earned a full measure of admiration. Their daring in the face of danger, their coolness in situations which lacked nothing in excitement, their initiative when confronted with the unexpected, and their perfect co-operation with the remaining forces engaged in the enterprise, were worthy of the best traditions of the Navy. The more that one considers the dependence upon seamanship, the practical use of technical knowledge, the mental and physical strain, the value of perfect discipline, and the initiative called for on such an occasion, the greater is one's admiration for these fine fellows of whom the majority had seen comparatively little of sea life and had lacked that severity of training which is inseparable from the naval profession.
The reports of all Commanding Officers contained one particular similarity—I refer to the behaviour of the men. The cynic who might be inclined to discount such unqualified praise, on the plea that the men were specially chosen, could easily be silenced. The specially selected personnel were certainly picked with difficulty, not because the desired qualities were rare, but for exactly the opposite reason. The Grand Fleet and naval bases contained many thousands of such men; the embarrassment lay in deciding who of these thousands should be taken to make up the seventeen hundred and eighty personnel required. But the latter were only required for some ten vessels out of one hundred and sixty-two; required because those ten vessels were out of commission and therefore had no crews. The remaining one hundred and fifty-two vessels and craft took part in the operation with their ordinary crews, and I repeat that the behaviour of the crews of all units was exemplary.
But co-operation between units, and efficiency of individuals, are not alone sufficient to ensure success. Absolute confidence and perfect co-operation between officers and men, founded on true discipline, is of vital importance. Without these, little or nothing can be achieved in war. The seeds of these vital requirements were sown by our forefathers. Those of our predecessors who, although too old to serve in the Great War, were still in the land of the living had reason to feel proud at the success attained by their pupils.
There is one other human aspect which cannot be omitted without leaving a serious blank in these pages. That aspect is the one of Leadership.
Leadership has been defined as that power in a man which causes others to follow him irrespective of the direction in which he leads.
It would be a presumption, almost amounting to an impertinence, for me to endeavour to measure out the praise which is due to the Vice-Admiral in command of the enterprise, now Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. The reader will understand my difficulty. In past history, again and again, it was manifest that some of the outstanding factors which led to success were the personality of the leader, the supreme confidence in him held by all ranks, his realisation of the powers and limits of his subordinates, his personal courage, and his intensity of purpose. The outstanding factors which brought success on the particular occasion described in this book have served to repeat and illustrate these old historical lessons.
A few more words and I shall have finished.
I venture to suggest that this particular exploit provides just one more example, such as are recorded again and again in the histories of most civilised countries, of what can be accomplished in the face of difficulty. Unfortunately, when hostilities cease, we are prone to forget, not only the sacrifices by which successes were achieved, but also the principles which guided us in the achievement. We are all ready enough to admit that confidence and co-operation are of prime necessity for the preservation of our lives and our interests when danger threatens us in war, but, somehow, when the welfare of communities is threatened in days of so-called peace, by international suspicions, by revolutionary doctrines, by economic difficulties, by unemployment, and by political schisms, we weaken ourselves as a result of deconcentrating into numberless camps, one against the other, in direct opposition to those fundamental principles which are the root cause of our existence.
It is all very strange, and, I suppose, very human, for nothing is stranger than humanity. How many of us realise that our superiority over the rest of the animal world is directly attributable to the fact that human beings, alone, have sufficient understanding to combine when danger threatens? Having successfully combined for the greatest of all causes, are we now to revert to the instincts of the inferior animals? Are we to persuade ourselves that co-operation merely results from paper treaties rather than from a common spirit, forgetting that officers and men, armies and navies, needed no signed agreements between them for the overthrow of the greatest menace to civilisation that the world has ever seen?
The Great War is over; is a Great Peace to follow?
What is our object? Surely it is the welfare of civilised communities and the progress of those who are less enlightened.
There will always be secondary objects calculated to divert us from our purpose. There will always be individuals who, for their own ends, will endeavour to sow discord and confuse the issue. It is of paramount importance that we keep our object in view, and that we cultivate intensity of purpose and wholeheartedness, without which our object is unattainable.
We know that the right spirit exists, but it is of little value if we keep it locked away within us until disaster is imminent; the mere fact of its existence cannot keep us free from danger any more than the existence of medicine stored at the apothecary's can protect us from infection and illness.
Let each one of us, each class, each sect, each nation, each group of nations, do all that is humanly possible to foster that spirit, to further mutual understanding, to breed confidence in one another, and to co-operate for the weal of all.
Without such confidence and co-operation success is impossible; with them, our well-being is assured.
THE END
APPENDIX
The following vessels and craft took part in the simultaneous blocking operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende.
THE ZEEBRUGGE ENTERPRISE
(a) Special services during the oversea voyage
Aerial Escort— 61st Wing of Royal Air Force. Other services— Special service vessel Lingfield. Motor Launches Nos. 555, 557.
(b) Off shore forces
Outer Patrol— Scout—Attentive. Destroyers—Scott, Ulleswater, Teazer, Stork. Long-range Bombardment— Monitors—Erebus, Terror. Destroyers—Termagant, Truculent, Manly.
(c) Inshore forces
Flagship— Destroyer—Warwick (Flag of Vice-Admiral R. J. B. Keyes). Blockships— Light Cruisers—Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia. Storming Vessels— Light Cruiser—Vindictive. Special vessels—Iris, Daffodil. Attack on Viaduct— Submarines—C1, C3, and one picket boat. Aerial Attack— Aircraft—65th Wing, Royal Air Force. Other Operations— Destroyers—Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield, Whirlwind, Myngs, Felox, Morris, Moorsom, Melpomene.
Motor Launches—Nos. 79, 110, 121, 128, 223, 239, 241, 252, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308, 314, 345, 397, 416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533, 549, 552, 558, 560, 561, 562. Coastal Motor Boats—Nos. 5, 7, 15, 16A, 17A, 21B, 226, 236, 24A, 25BD, 266, 27A, 28A, 306, 32A, 35A.
THE OSTENDE ENTERPRISE
(a) Bombarding forces
Monitors— Marshall Soult, Lord Clive, Prince Eugene, General Craufurd, M. 24, M. 26, M. 21. Destroyers— Mentor, Lightfoot, Zubian. Motor Launches— Nos. 249, 448, 538, and three others. French Destroyers and Torpedo Boats— Lestin, Roux, Bouclier, and Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 34. French Motor Launches—Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34. British Siege Guns in Flanders.
(b) Inshore forces
Blockships— Light Cruisers—Sirius, Brilliant. Destroyers— Swift, Faulknor, Matchless, Mastiff, Afridi, Tempest, Tetrarch. Motor Launches— Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279, 283, 429, 512, 532, 551, 556. Coastal Motor Boats— Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 20A, 34A.
COVERING SQUADRON FOR BOTH ENTERPRISES
Forces from Harwich— Light Cruisers, seven. Leaders, two. Destroyers, fourteen.
INDEX
Acetylene gas, use of, for salvage, 47, 52 Adams, Lieut.-Comdr. B. F., R.N., 187, 188, 200, 201 Admiralty, Board of, responsibility of, 69 Aerial attack— at first attempt, 146, 147 at final attempt, 171 Afridi, H.M.S., App. Aircraft— German in Flanders, 6, 41 utility in defence, 40, 41 Allied lines of communication, 3, 12, 13 Anchoring of Vindictive, 184 Approach, the story of the, 173 ff. Astronomical conditions, 134 Attack, expected duration of, 132, 134 Attempt— the first, 141 ff., 155 the second, 153, 154 the final start, 165 Attentive, H.M.S., App. Babb, Sub-Lieut, R.N., 230 Bamford, Captain E., R.M.L.I., 203 Barrage firing from coast batteries, 37 Bases, use of advanced, 19 Beatty, Admiral Sir David, 63, 104, 105, 107, 108 Billyard-Leake, Lieut. Edward W., R.N., 226, 231, 234, 235 Blake, Able-Seaman F. E., R.N., 209 Blake, Sub-Lieut. L. R., R.N.R., 218 Blankenberghe, buoy, 174, 175, 242 description, 8, 9 German craft at, 11, 12, 190 Blocking— alternative methods of, 17, 42, 43 favourable position for, 44 influence of current, 57 previous attempts elsewhere, 54-56, 58 summary of difficulties, 41, 56 Blockships— capabilities of, 49, 52, 69, 70 credit due to, 73, 234, 235 difficulty of sinking, 56, 57, 58 preparatory work in, 52, 100 types of, 45-47, 69, 70 See Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia Blockship's crews, disembarkation of surplus, 124, 125, 170, 171 Boddie, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr., R.N., 228 Bombardment— by our monitors, 16, 84, 174, 175 previous attempts at, 35, 43, 44 Bonham-Carter, Lieut. Stuart S., R.N., 226, 228, 230, 234, 235 Botha, H.M.S., 91; App. Bouclier, French destroyer, App. Bowen, Lieut. G., 225 Bradford, Lieut. George N., R.N., 206, 207 Brilliant, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App. British morale, effect on, 258, 259 Brock, Wing-Commander Frank, R.N.A.S., 98, 115, 116, 153, 187, 200 Bruges, 9, 10, 11, 270 Brussels, merchant steamer, 29 Buckley, Yeoman of Signals John, R.N., 189, 190 Buoys, lack of dependence on, 8, 91, 92 Bury, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr. W. A., R.N., 184, 243 Calais, 13 Cameroon River, German attempt to block, 58 Campbell, Lieut. H. G., R.N., 185, 188, 189, 240, 245 Campbell, Commander V. L. A., R.N., 220 Canal system in Flanders, 9-11 Casualties, British, 253, 254 Cement, use of, in blockships, 52 Chappell, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 224 Chevallier, Sub-Lieut. F. E., R.N., 205 Clerical work, 140 Coast defences, German, 35-38 Coastal Motor Boats, 144, 145, 149-151 No. 5, 219; App. No. 7, 218, 233; App. No. 16, 217; App. Nos. 21, 25, 26, 219; App. No. 22B, 217; App. No. 23B, 217, 232; App. No. 32, 219, 220; App. Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 15, 17A, 19, 20, 24A, 27A, 28A, 29A, 30B, 34A, 35A; App. Collins, Captain Ralph, R.N., 224 Command of the sea, 3, 4 Compasses, damage to—in Vindictive, 239, 240 Concentration, 144, 145, 262 Cooke, Lieut. F. T. V., R.M.L.I., 203 Co-operation, value of, 264 Cordner, Major, R.M.L.I., 182 Cory-Wright, Lieut., R.N., 230 Crews, size of, in blockships, 86, 124. Daffodil, H.M.S.— choice of, 79, 80 duties of, 81, 86, 176 fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119 previous history, 80 proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 188, 189, 199, 205, 237, 240 retirement of, 245 Dallas-Brooks, Captain Reginald, R.M.A., 192, 193, 194 Darkness, use of, 37, 38, 132 Davidson, Captain A. P., R.N., 111 Deane, Lieut. Percy T., R.N.V.R., 232, 233 Defence measures, 61, 62 Defences, summary of German, 41 Demolition— object of, 76, 77, 195, 196 training for, 111, 112 the work of, 189, 205 Depths— at Blankenberghe, 9 in entrance channel at Zeebrugge, 48, 49, 131 Destroyers, 84, 220, 221 D'Eyncourt, Sir Tennyson, 100 Dickinson, Lieut.-Comdr. C. C., R.N., 111, 205 Diversions, 59, 60, 61, 196, 208, 279 practibility of using, 61 Douglas, Captain H. P., R.N., 90 n. Dover— the return to, 243, 244 the reception at, 244 Dover Patrol— memorials, 15 morale, 96, 97 work of, 13, 14, 15, 97, 98 Dover Straits, difficulty of closing, 13, 14 Dunkerque, 13 Eagles, Major C. E. E., R.M.L.I., 208 Eastlake, Lieut. A. L., attached R.E., 186, 187 Edwards, Commander, R.N.V.R., 182 Elliot, Lieut.-Col. Bertram N., R.M.L.I., 111, 112, 128, 182 Endurance of German submarines, 4, 5 Erebus, H.M.S., 174; App. Faulknor, H.M.S.; App. Finch, Sergeant, R.M.L.I., 192 Flame-throwers in Vindictive, 115, 186, 187 Flanders Coast— description of, 6, 7, 8, 22, 24, 25 value to Germany, 5-7, 10-12 Fog, effect on attackers, 60, 175 effect on defence, 59, 175 Fogs, artificial, 59, 60 Franks, Lieut. Ivor B., R.N., 110 French motor launches Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34; App. French Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, 34; App. Fuel, 4 Function of the Navy, 3 Gas, poison, 60 Geddes, Sir Eric, 157 General Craufurd, H.M.S.; App. Geographical situation, 6, 7 German bases in Flanders, 6, 10, 29 German craft based on Flanders, 6 German High Seas Fleet, 3, 4, 19, 21, 94, 95 German morale before the attack, 96, 97, 104 German morale after the attack, 255-257 German reports of the attack, 250, 251 German submarines, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 Gibbs, Commander Valentine F., R.N., 185, 207, 208 Godsal, Commander A. E., R.N., 42, 246, 247 Goeben battery, 204 Gore-Langton, Lieut-Commander Hubert E., R.N., 220, 223 Grand Fleet— duties of, 94, 95 work of, 102, 103 Groynes, 7, 24, 25 Guerre de Course tactics, 5 Halahan, Captain H. C., R.N., 111, 114, 116, 128, 182, 201 Hardy, Lieut.-Comdr. H. N. M., R.N., 246 Harrison, Lieut.-Comdr. A. L., R.N., 200, 201, 202 Harwich, forces from; App. Haselfoot, Lieut.-Comdr. F. E. B., R.N., 90 n. Hawkings, Lieut. Claude E. K., R.N., 206 Heligoland, 19 Helyar, Lieut.-Comdr. Kenneth C., R.N., 220, 222, 223 Henderson, Lieut. Oscar, R.N., 209, 245 Hermione, cutting out of—in 1799, 54, 55 Hewett, Lieutenant Graham S., R.N.V.R., 194 Hilton-Young, Lieut. E., R.N.V.R., 196 Hindustan, H.M.S., 111, 118, 119, 120, 125, 127; App. History— lack of encouragement from, 58 object of studying, 54 Historical analogies, 54-56, 58 Howitzers in Vindictive, 79, 98, 193, 194 Hydrographic Department, 91 Initiative, 89, 149, 150 Instructions, the art of writing, 66,67 Intrepid, H.M.S., 70, 143, 170, 228, 229-231, 232, 234; App. Iphigenia, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 241, 243-251; App. Iris, H.M.S.— choice of, 79, 80 duties of, 81, 86 fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119 proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 205-209 retirement of, 245, 246 Jakobynessen battery, 37 Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, R.N., 17, 157 Kaiser's visit to Zeebrugge, 252 Kaiser Wilhelm battery, 204 Keyes, Vice-Admiral Roger J. B., R.N., 14, 63, 109, 113, 114, 167, 168, 220, 243, 246, 263, 264, 265, 282 appreciation of, 63, 68, 69 connection with planning, 67, 68, 82 postponement decision, 147, 148 Lamplough, Lieut. C. R. W., R.M.L.I., 203 Leadership, 264, 265 Lestin, French destroyer; App. Lightfoot, H.M.S.; App. Lines of communication, 3, 12, 13, 96 Lingfield, H.M.S.; App. Littleton, Lieut. H. A., R.N.V.R., 232, 233 Lord Clive, H.M.S.; App. Lock gate, 10, 22, 28, 43, 44, 49 Losses, British material, 253, 254 MacVean, Lieut. D. E. J., R.N.V.R., 217 Mails, precautions, 120 Manly, H.M.S.; App. Mansfield, H.M.S., 224; App. Marine Artillery, 104, 112, 113, 126, 192-194 Infantry, 104, 111, 112, 126 Marines, embarkation of, 118, 119 Marshal Soult, H.M.S.; App. Martinique, attack on—in 1794, 54, 55 Mastiff, H.M.S.; App. Matchless, H.M.S.; App. Material results obtained, 249-253. Matériel, relation to personnel, 181 McCutcheon, Staff Surgeon, R.N., 197, 198 McKenzie, Able Seaman, 202 Medical, 197, 198 Meikle, Engineer Sub-Lieut., R.N., 230 Melpomene, H.M.S., 224; App. Mentor, H.M.S.; App. Mercantile Marine, appreciation, 143, 144 Merrimac, U.S. steamer, 54, 58, 88 Meteorological conditions, 131 Military training, 112, 113 Minefields, German, 38, 39 Mines— effect of, 93, 94, 173 precautions against, 94 Mine-sweepers, 6, 39, 94 Monitors, 36, 146, 174 Monitors: M. 21, M. 24, M. 26; App. Moon, state of, 134 Moorsom, H.M.S., 224, 242, 243; App. Moral results obtained, 255-260 Morale, 96, 97 Morris, H.M.S., 224; App. Motor launches, 144, 225, 240 Motor launches:— No. 110, 225; App. No. 128, 224; App. No. 282, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234; App. No. 308, 225; App. No. 424, 224; App. No. 526, 229, 232, 233; App. No. 558, 224, 226; App. Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 79, 105, 121, 223, 239, 241, 249, 252, 254, 258, 262, 272, 274, 276, 279, 280, 283, 314, 345, 397, 416, 420, 422, 429, 448, 512, 513, 525, 532, 533, 538, 549, 551, 552, 555, 556, 557, 560, 561, 562; App. Myngs, H.M.S., 224; App. Napoleon's maxim, 95 Navigation, coastal, 56, 57 difficulties and dangers, 7, 8, 40, 41 importance of accuracy, 90 ff., 178 open sea, 56 Nelson, Lord, 55, 147, 148 Newbold, Lieut. Aubrey C., R.N., 210, 214 Nieuport, 6, 7, 8 North Star, H.M.S., 220, 221, 222, 223; App. Objectives, difficulty of locating, 42, 56, 71 Objects, secondary, 77 Offensive measures, 16, 17, 43, 262 Officers, choice of, 106, 107 Orders— art of writing, 66, 67 the drafting of the, 66, 67, 140, 156, 166 Osborne, Commander E. O. B. S., R.N., 178 Ostende— attack on, in 1798, 54, 55, 56 description of, 9, 10, 11, 12 difficulty of locating entrance, 42, 71 reason for blocking, 42 reason for omitting story, 41, 42 Outhwaite, Sub-Lieut. C., R.N.V.R., 219 Patrol craft, German, 40, 96 Peace, 266 Period available for attack, 134 Personnel, remarks on behaviour, 263, 264 selection of, 102 ff. training of, 112, 125, 126 Phoebe, H.M.S., 220-224; App. Photography, 129, 130, 246 Plan— credit for, 17, 18, 19 how built up, 262 inception, 17, 18, 67 history of, 17, 18, 67, 68 modifications of, 65 previous suggestions, 17, 70 various stages of, 64 ff., 72, 76 Plans department, 17, 67 Poison gas, 60 Port Arthur, attempts to block, 54, 56, 58 Postponement, first, 148 second, 154 Power, Rear Admiral L. E., R.N., 100 Preparations— preliminary, 125 ff. final, 145, 167, 168 Preservation of life, 87 Prince Eugene, H.M.S.; App. Printing the orders, 140 Puerto Cabello, attack on, in 1799, 54 Pyrotechnic Brigade, 194 Rain, effect of, 171, 172, 173 Rescue of men from Mole, 218 Rescue work, 87, 88, 89, 132, 229 ff., 244-249 vessels, 84 Results— material, 249-253 moral, 255-260 Retirement, 132, 252-260 Rigby, Lieut. Charles N. B., R.M.A., 191, 192 Robinson, Lieut. J. W., R.N.V.R., 224 Robinson, Lieut. O., R.N.V.R., 224 Rocket apparatus, 194 Rodman, Rear Admiral Hugh, U.S.N., 107, 108 Rosoman, Lieut.-Comdr. R. R., R.N., 176, 184, 188, 238, 239, 242, 259 Roux, French destroyer; App. Royal Air Force— 61st Wing, 85, 130 65th Wing, 85, 146 Royal Naval Reserve, 130, 263 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 130, 263 Rufigi River, attempt to block, 54 St. George for England, 169 Salvage— effect of silt on, 23, 24, 25, 28, 51 German attempts, 251 importance of, 44, 45 previous experience, 25 remarks on, 25, 26, 44 ff., 251, 252 Sandford, Lieut-Comdr. F. H., R.N., 213, 214 Sandford, Lieut. R. D., R.N., 210, 211, 213 Santiago, attempt to block in 1898, 54, 56, 58 Scott, H.M.S.; App. Seamanship, importance of, 41, 57, 58 Seaplane base, German, 12 Secrecy, 100, 111, 120, 121, 155 Secret, divulging the, 108, 119, 120 Shoals, 7, 41 Siege guns, 84 Signalling difficulties, 137, 138 Silt, description, 23, 24 effect of, 24, 28, 51 Sirius, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App. Smith, Petty Officer, R.N., 209 Smoke, artificial— limitations of, 59, 60, 99 use of, 59, 60, 83, 99, 100, 175, 176, 208, 216, 217, 218, 246 Smoke-screen vessels, 83, 175 Sneyd, Commander R. S., R.N., 226, 228, 229, 235 Souvenir hunters, 248 Staff, operational duties, 66, 67, 139 Star shell, 38, 175 Stonewall Jackson's maxim, 60, 61 Stork, H.M.S.; App. Storming the Mole, 186, 187, 188, 200-204, 213 Submarines— attack on viaduct, 82, 100 defensive use, 40 German, 4, 40 shelters, 10, 11 Submarines— C1, 210, 211, 214; App. C3, 210-211, 213, 215, 224; App. Success, chances of, 54, 62 Supporting squadrons, 146 Surprise, 59, 60, 61, 262 Surveys, 7, 91 Swift, H.M.S.; App. Swin Deep, 118, 153 Synchronisation of events, 137, 138, 170 Teazer, H.M.S.; App. Tempest, H.M.S.; App. Teneriffe, Nelson's attack on—in 1797, 54, 55 Termagant, H.M.S.; App. Terror, H.M.S., 174; App. Tetrarch, H.M.S.; App. Thetis, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 226 ff., 233; App. Tidal stream— description, 7, 24, 30, 74 effect, 24, 92, 174, 183 Tide, rise and fall, 8, 48, 49 Tigris River, blocking of, 58 Time factor, 137-139 Time table, 138, 156 Tomkinson, Captain Wilfred, R.N., 220 Towing— necessity for, 142 of Iris and Daffodil, 142, 143, 173 Trench raid, analogy, 112, 113, 265 Trident, H.M.S., 224, 245; App. Truculent, H.M.S.; App. Ulleswater, H.M.S.; App. United States— battle squadron, 107 personnel, 107, 108 Velox, H.M.S., 224; App. Viaduct— attack on, 194, 195, 210-215 description, 23, 25, 82, 83 Vindictive, H.M.S.— anchoring, 184 attack on Ostende, 247 choice of, 76, 126 command of, 114 damage, 181, 182, 198, 238, 239, 241, 255, 256 fitting out of, 77-79, 100, 110 position at Mole, 128, 129, 202, 203 proceedings of, 143, 148, 150, 170, 173, 176, 179 ff., 200 ff. retirement of, 230 ff. Visibility, 136, 165 Volunteering— for danger, 89, 122-125, 189, 202 how arranged, 104, 105, 122, 123 Von Capelle, Admiral, 158 Walcheren expedition, 156 Walker, Lieut. H. T. C., R.N., 190 Warwick, H.M.S., 144, 168, 173, 220, 221, 222, 233, 243; App. Weather, vagaries of, 41, 93, 246 Weller, Major B. G., R.M.L.I., 202 Welman, Lieut. A. P., R.N., 217 Wemyss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, R.N., 157 Whirlwind, H.M.S., 224, 230; App. Wind, importance of direction, 60, 131, 176 Wounded, behaviour of, 196, 197 Youlton, Petty Officer, E. G., R.N., 238, 242 Young, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 225 Yser Canal, 7 Zeebrugge, 7, 8, 9, 11 batteries, 28, 29, 31, 33 craft based at, 11, 32 German belief in security at, 33, 34 German constructions at, 26, 28, 29 canal, 10, 22 canal lock, 22, 29, 43, 44, 49 navigable channel, 28, 49 obstruction and boom, 32, 33, 41, 227 tidal harbour, 22 village, 22 Zeebrugge Mole, description, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 approach to, 27-30 attack on: see Storming the Mole buildings on, 26, 28, 29, 32, 183 currents alongside, 30 garrison, 32, 81, 82 lighthouse extension, 27 outer wall, 26-28, 73, 74, 76 peace use, 22 seaplane base, 29, 32 souvenir, 244, 245 viaduct, 23, 25 Vindictive's position, 128, 129, 202, 203 war use, 29, 30 Zero time, meaning and object, 170, 173 Zone of fire, German batteries, 30 Zubian, H.M.S.; App.