Chapter XII · CONCLUSION.

The treaty of peace was greatly objected to by such of the Canadians as had favored a continuation of British rule, and the more bitter of these attempted to organize an "Independence party."

Their numbers, however, were comparatively insignificant, and although they made a show of organizing an army for the purpose of opposing the United States troops, and achieving the independence of Canada, they took good care not to risk a conflict with the vastly superior forces of the Americans, and in less than a month, such of them as had not deserted, surrendered; and all further traces of opposition to American occupation disappeared. On the 4th of July, 1890, which was the one hundred and fourteenth anniversary of American Independence, the United States took formal possession of Canada; and the prosperity of that vast section of the North American Continent may be said to date from that eventful day.

The war now being concluded, and the questions which had for more than a century proved so vexatious, being permanently settled, the people of the United States had plenty of leisure time to count up the cost of the "economy" which their rulers had been treating them to, ever since the end of the Civil War.

As has already been shown, these demagogues, while prating about the surplus, and the tariff, and the down-trodden laboring man, and the crime of spending the people's money for anything but river and harbor and public building jobs, and exorbitant premiums on immature bonds; had permitted the United States Navy to go to decay, from motives of "economy;" had utterly refused to offer even decent rates of compensation for the carrying of foreign mails in American ships, for the sake of "economy;" had declined to encourage the establishment of an auxiliary naval force, by the payment of an annual rental for the privilege of employing swift American built steamships as cruisers in time of war, because by not doing so, the treasury would save $5,000,000 or $10,000,000 a year, and these statesmen could continue to pose before the country as champions and apostles of "economy;" and had neglected year after year to fortify the seaboard cities, notwithstanding the constant and oft repeated warnings uttered by military and naval experts, intelligent and thoughtful writers, and farsighted statesmen of both political parties; because, forsooth, when year after year the River and Harbor Bill and the Public Buildings Bill had been inflated to the largest possible figures that would be likely to escape a presidential veto, they found that they could not spend any money on fortifications without exceeding the appropriations made by their predecessors, and would thus render themselves liable to be considered by their constituents as lacking in the great essential element of "economy."

Well, these economical statesmen had had their way—and their day—and their constituents and masters—the People of the United States—said to them, "Gentlemen, render an account of your stewardship. Let us see what your loud professions of 'economy' for the past twenty-five or thirty years amount to. Let us have an itemized account, debit and credit, and see how far your acts have been justified by results."

You are clearly entitled to credit for the following amounts:

CREDIT.

Mail Subsidies saved annually $5,000,000

Rental of Steamships (assuming 100 swift ships at $100,000 each) as an auxiliary naval force 10,000,000

Adequate naval and fortification appropriations annually 20,000,000 ———————

Total annual saving $35,000,000 ———————

Total for ten years $350,000,000

A very handsome exhibit, gentlemen; now let us see the other side of the account.

DEBIT.

Amount paid annually to foreign ships, carrying American products $150,000,000

Amount of wages lost to American ship-builders and their workmen, annually (figures previous to 1860) 12,000,000

Amount of domestic shipbuilding materials not used annually (figures previous to 1860) 30,000,000

Passage money paid by Americans to foreign shipowners annually (estimated) 5,000,000 ———————

Total annual cost $197,000,000 ———————

Total for ten years $1,970,000,000

To this must be added the following amounts:

War indemnity, paid to Great Britain by reason of our not having a navy $1,500,000,000

Canadian debt assumed 300,000,000 ———————

Carried forward $3,770,000,000

Brought forward $3,770,000,000

Amount expended by U. S. in War with Great Britain 100,000,000

Amount of damage done to New York and Brooklyn by British fleet 300,000,000 ———————

Total $4,170,000,000

Less credits as above 350,000,000 ———————

Total cost of ten years of Congressional "economy." $3,820,000,000

"There are other items, gentlemen, which could easily be made to swell the above debit balance; but these are sufficient. You may step down and out. The people of the United States are the most wealthy and liberal people in the world, but ten years more of such "economy" as yours has been, would bankrupt us. We wish you no harm, gentlemen, but we have no further need of your services."

Of course this monologue is not to be taken literally, but it is what the people of the United States practically said, by their action, at the elections which succeeded the Battle of the Swash.

It is, perhaps, needless to remark, that for many years subsequent to 1890, American statesmen were not called upon to wrestle with the difficult problem of "how to dispose of the surplus revenue."

Their "economical" predecessors had effectually obviated all necessity for any such discussion; but the lesson which the people had learned, was a most valuable one, and instead of considering themselves the suffering victims of an excessive and burdensome system of taxation, they fully realized that they were the most favored people in the world in that respect, and cheerfully supported the new generation of Congressmen in authorizing the liberal expenditures, which in a few years made our coasts and harbors invulnerable; gave us a navy superior to that of any other nation, and placed us once more in the van among the maritime powers of the world.

At the first glance, the Battle of the Swash seemed to have been a most disastrous event for the United States.

England got all the glory and all the money, and the United States got Canada and—the experience. But the latter proved to be worth infinitely more than it cost, in that it exploded the absurd system of miscalled "economy," which only "saved at the spigot to waste at the bung."

Let us rejoice that in this year of grace 1930, we have so profited by the errors of our ancestors, that we now occupy unchallenged, the foremost position among the Nations of the earth; and that with our 200,000,000 of intelligent, prosperous and contented citizens—each one a sovereign in his own right—we can afford to look with indifference upon the wars and struggles of our less fortunate contemporaries on the other side of the Atlantic.

Too late, alas! had the truth and wisdom of these words—written by that great founder of the Government, Thomas Jefferson—become manifest.

"Our navigation involves still higher consideration; as a branch of industry it is valuable; but as a resource of defense, it is essential.

"The position and circumstances of the United States leaves them nothing to fear from their land board, and nothing to desire beyond their present rights.

"But on the seaboard they are open to injury, and they have then, too, a commerce which must be protected.

"This can only be done by possessing a respectable body of artists and citizen seamen, and establishments in readiness for shipbuilding.

"If particular Nations grasp at undue shares of our commerce, and more especially, if they seize on the means of the United States, to convert them into aliment for their own strength, and withdraw them entirely from the support of those to whom they belong, defensive and protective measures become necessary on the part of the Nation whose marine sources are thus invaded, or it will be disarmed of its defense, its productions will be at the mercy of the Nation which has possessed itself exclusively of the means of carrying them, and its politics may be influenced by those who command its commerce.

"The carriage of our own commodities, if once established in another channel, cannot be resumed at the moment we desire.

"If we lose the seamen and artists whom it now employs, we lose the present means of Marine defense, and time will be requisite to raise up others, when disgrace or losses shall bring home to our feelings the evils of having abandoned them."

The "disgrace and losses" incurred by our ancestors in this brief but disastrous campaign, had indeed brought "home to their feelings the evils of having abandoned" the great interest thus earnestly pleaded for by the greatest statesman of his day; and the absurd folly of the so-called "economy," which prompted its abandonment, was at length reluctantly conceded by the noisiest and bitterest advocates of free trade throughout the land.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUXILIARY NAVAL FORCE.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted that from and after the passage of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy is authorized and directed to execute contracts with the owners or agents of steam vessels, built and owned in the United States of America, and sailing under the American flag, upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth; and the faith of the United States is hereby pledged to carry said contracts into effect, and to make all payments arising thereunder, in strict and prompt accordance with the terms thereof.

SECTION 2. All vessels now built or owned, or hereafter to be built or owned in the United States of America, and carrying the American flag, which possess the following qualifications and requirements, shall be deemed subject to the provisions of this Act, and eligible to the benefits conferred thereby.

1st. The said vessels must be of at least four thousand tons burden.

2nd. The said vessels must have a maximum speed of at least nineteen statute miles per hour, the same to be established by actual test.

3rd. The said vessels must be built, both as to their hulls and engines, on plans to be approved by a Bureau of Naval Construction and Engineering, consisting of five members, to be appointed for that purpose by the President and the Secretary of the Navy; and every such vessel shall have carriages or platforms for two or more guns of at least eight inches calibre, and also suitable accommodations for an auxilliary battery of rapid firing guns.

4th. Estimates of the cost of such vessels and engines—exclusive of furniture and equipment for passengers—shall also be submitted to, and approved by, the said Bureau of Naval Construction and Engineering, and the amount of cost, thus approved by such Bureau, shall be taken as the value upon which the contracts provided for in the first section of this Act, shall be based.

SECTION 3. Upon the completion of any such vessel, and the filing in the office of the Secretary of the Navy of certified copies of the report of the Bureau of Naval Construction and Engineering, approving the plans of the hull and engines of such vessel, and also certifying that the estimate of the cost of such vessel is not excessive; and after actual tests of the speed of such vessel, under regulations imposed by the Secretary of the Navy; the said Secretary shall, if requested to do so by the owner or owners of such vessel, enter into a contract with such owner or owners, for a period of not less than ten, nor more than fifteen years, by which, in consideration of the privilege of taking such vessel by charter or purchase, at any time during the pendency of the said contract, on ten day's notice, the United States shall pay as an annual rental, to the owners or agents of such vessel, interest on her cost, as certified by the Bureau of Construction and Engineering, as follows:

1st. For vessels having a speed of nineteen statute miles or over, and less than twenty statute miles per hour, four per cent.

2nd. For vessels having a speed of twenty statute miles or over, and less than twenty-one statute miles, per hour, four and one-half per cent.

3rd. For vessels having a speed of twenty-one statute miles or over, per hour, five per cent.

Provided. That such annual rental shall in no case exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars for any single vessel.

SECTION 4. The maximum price at which the United States will purchase such vessel, shall be fixed at the price approved as heretofore provided, by the Bureau of Naval Construction and Engineering, plus a bonus of not to exceed twenty-five per cent. of such price, to cover the outlay for passenger equipment, and as a compensation to the owners of such vessel for her withdrawal from her regular employment.

Such valuation shall govern until such vessel shall have attained the age of five years; and thereafter a deduction of six per cent. shall be made therefrom annually, to cover depreciation and wear and tear.

SECTION 5. In case the Secretary of the Navy shall elect to charter such vessel or vessels, instead of purchasing them, the rate to be paid therefor shall be five dollars per month per registered ton; such vessel to be at the risk of the United States during the pendency of such charter.

SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect immediately.