Chapter VII

THE SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED BY A TREATY

I. The Dominion of Canada voluntarily to divide itself into different states, geographically arranged as its citizens desire, in proportion to population, and each state to be admitted as a full member of the American Union.

I approach this subject with the greatest diffidence, for, plainly as I perceive its necessity, I mistrust my ability to make clear to others the motives and causes which induce me to believe that the consolidation of Canada into our Republic is an indispensable condition to the establishment of a complete and permanent brotherhood between the Anglo-Saxon people. Canada a part of the United States by her free and voluntary act, generously and freely seconded by England, and graciously accepted by the United States, the Anglo-Saxon race eo instanti becomes a unit in sympathy, purpose, and progress.

With Canada a separate nation, as she is now, a real, lasting entente between the British Empire and the United States, is impossible.

"'T is true 't is pity; and pity 't is 't is true."

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At the first blush I am sure to encounter reluctance and opposition on all sides—from the Canadians as well as the English and Americans. I meet at the outset sentiment and pride, two of the strongest and most invincible sentinels that guard the approach to human reason and judgment. As Mr. Lecky says: "The sentiment of nationality is one of the strongest and most respectable by which human beings are actuated. No other has produced a greater amount of heroism and self-sacrifice, and no other, when it has been seriously outraged, leaves behind it such enduring and such dangerous discontent."[1]

While the bond existing between England and Canada is sentimental and as "light as air," it creates a union between the two people "as strong as iron." Canada would never renounce England's formal sovereignty without her fullest and freest consent; and I believe England would exhaust the last drop of her blood to prevent a forcible annexation. Canadian sentiment and English pride stand ready to oppose the proposition. The United States, on the other hand, does not seek or want Canada to join the Union, and deep and strong opposition to such a course may also be encountered here. On the mere face of the question, therefore, annexation seems difficult and hard to accomplish. It should not be forced. It cannot be bought. Neither arms, money, nor commercial advantages can be of themselves sufficient potent factors to accomplish this end. It {161} must come voluntarily: it must spring from the hearts of the people. It is well not to underestimate the difficulties of the proposition, and with that view I have gone beneath the surface in search of higher and nobler motives than those which ordinarily impel individual or national action. In this way only can sentiment be satisfied and pride placated. But it will be argued by some, ice must be broken to reach annexation; if all three parties interested must be converted to this view, why not, if it is to come at all, leave it to the "fulness of time," or, in other words, to processes entirely natural. As it now stands, say they, there is no impelling necessity, no heavy past experience of evils to force us together, as in the case of Scotland, and of our thirteen original States—no circumstances, on the other hand, that directly favour it.

But I ask the Canadians, the English, and the Americans, in all seriousness, When will the "fulness of time" occur? I assert that the fulness of time has been reached, and that the natural processes have matured. They have ripened over night as the result of years being crowded into two events—the Spanish-American and the Boer Wars. These wars show us our weaknesses and our strength.

The Anglo-Saxons, to be impregnable, must be united. I shudder to draw the reverse picture. Shall we wait until a dispute occurs between us? Shall we fold our arms until a war breaks out, and reveals through its lurid light our real relation to {162} each other? Thucydides says: "In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities."[2] If we wait until our necessities tell us that we belong to one family and should be confederated together, who can divine the conditions and inequalities which will result? Can we not now, therefore, look the situation fully and candidly in the face, and decide calmly and dispassionately in what our best interests consist?

I admit that the mere aggrandisement of the United States by the extension of her territory; the benefit to Canada by opening the door to material development and improved commercial privileges; the release of England from the heavy and unprofitable responsibility of defending Canada against attacks by the United States,—these are influences which, though none are more weighty and important, would not of themselves operate to produce annexation. They must be combined with others, connected with the future welfare and progress of all the three powers involved. We must all see and realise that our future onward march can only be successfully made together. Interest, in other words, must be combined with sentiment. In the great march towards civilisation we cannot take separate paths. The Anglo-Saxons must go together.

I take it for granted, therefore, that we truly believe the solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon races is the {163} great desideratum of this century; and that although it may be more important to England than to the United States or Canada to hasten this result, yet all three are so bound up together that in the end they are vitally interested in bringing about a common understanding as quickly as circumstances will admit it.

The present relation which Canada and the United States and England bear to each other confirms this last view. England is the third party standing between Canada and the United States in the negotiation. What is her position? What are her interests? What position has she in the ultimate annexation of Canada? What should she do—aid or oppose annexation? I shall endeavour to answer these questions satisfactorily.

The present Dominion of Canada, consisting of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, and the other unorganised territories, was created by virtue of the Act of the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain, entitled "The British North American Act, 1867." This Statute practically constituted the Dominion of Canada an independent nation, subject only to the Imperial power of Great Britain as to its foreign relations. Since its passage the English Government exercises no more actual rule in the Dominion of Canada than it does in Chicago or New York; in fact, Canada can even maintain formidable tariffs to keep Great Britain out of her markets. I do not overlook the fact that Canadian co-operation, {164} in men and money, may always be relied upon by the mother country in the time of her need, nor do I belittle the moral support which the Canadians will extend to her when required. Canada is a pure and shining jewel in her imperial crown.

Therefore she would undoubtedly make sacrifices in parting with Canada. But she could not retain Canada by force against the will of the latter; and she would not do so even if she could. While it is also true that a formal English representation is still kept up, the Dominion of Canada as a matter of fact, through a Governor-General, is now bound to Great Britain, notwithstanding the forms created by the Act of 1867, only by a mere sentimental tie—a bond of sympathy recently, by the Boer War, renewed and strengthened and now so strong that both Canada and Great Britain would probably exhaust themselves in endeavouring to maintain it if sought to be forcibly rent asunder. Such is the ligament which binds these two powers. Conquest in such a case, even in the event of war, is out of the question. If the Canadians were subdued by the Americans, God forbid that they should sink so low in the scale of generosity and national manhood as to forcibly annex them to their Government! And, if conquest will not avail, it requires something more than logic and selfish argument to dissolve such a tie. The particular sympathy which exists between Canada and the British Empire must be balanced by the future vital interests of the whole Anglo-Saxon people; and while mere selfish interests might not {165} alone appeal to these three nations to agree voluntarily to annexation, the ultimate safety, welfare, progress, and unity of the whole Anglo-Saxon race should affect them when everything else might fail. Would the Canadians stand in the way of the accomplishment of such a mighty result? Would not England under such circumstances generously yield to a request of Canada for consent to annexation?

I shall endeavour to traverse the whole field of the discussion, and lay bare every view that can influence fair and honest judgment. As a matter of fact, the position of England, as she stands between Canada and the United States, is not an enviable one. She is liable any minute to be involved in a war with the latter power on account of the former, in whom she has not a great material interest, and from whom her people receive very little appreciable benefit. As a question of mere selfish policy, therefore, England has everything to gain by the annexation of Canada to the United States, and everything to lose by continuing to be her formal sovereign and her actual champion. It is true, that under the present relations, if unhappily a war should ever occur between England and the United States, England might worry the United States through Canada, but it is not too much to say that this worriment would be of short duration. Any misunderstanding between Canada and the United States, involving war, precipitates England in a bloody and ruinous contest with the United States, without having the slightest {166} material interest in the issue. She would gain by being relieved of this immense burden of responsibility, which exists without any adequate quid pro quo, or corresponding advantage. What more trying position for England than the necessity of championing quarrels not of her own making, where both of the contending parties have claims upon her forbearance, and in a sphere where her powers and resources would have to be employed to the full, and then only wasted? There arises out of these conditions a question of grave import, whether any nation is justified, before its own people, in assuming such a burdensome relation. I do not argue the point, I merely ask the question—"Has England the right to spill the blood of her people and spend their money; should she involve the happiness and future of her citizens to maintain this purely sentimental tie?" Quite apart from all this, it is reasonably certain, judging from her conduct towards her other colonies, that if Canada should desire to disrupt the formal relations existing between herself and England, the latter power would acquiesce upon a simple request.

I pass, then, to the relations between Canada and the United States accruing out of England's position. In the event of a dispute between England and the United States, Canada, although perfectly disinterested in the quarrel, is liable to be drawn into a war, because she happens to have a formal relation with England, and acknowledges that power as sovereign. The first shock of a war {167} between England and the United States would be felt by Canada. Her condition is paradoxical; it creates a dilemma; it evolves a situation most remarkable and striking. England can be forced into a war because of her empty and hollow sovereignty over Canada; Canada is subject to destruction because she officially acknowledges England's sovereignty. Either nation is liable to invasion and devastation, if not ruin, because of formal ties. If the power of England were to decline and wane,—which Heaven forbid!—what would be the future of Canada? Isolated from England, where could she turn, except to the one contiguous power of the United States, and perhaps under circumstances far less pleasant than those which would accompany a voluntary union. These are serious aspects of the question. Standing alone, notwithstanding their importance, these considerations might not be overpowering, but if the situation described above can be dissipated by a free, voluntary, honourable, and wholesome alliance, is it not for the advantage of all that it be accomplished, thereby removing for all time the serious consequences which may at any moment arise from these formal and anomalous conditions? Remove the cause and avoid the result.

But there are other views which must not be overlooked or disregarded. Canada is a friendly neighbour of the United States, but a fast-growing commercial rival. Separated as adjoining owners are from each other, by a mere partition, a division line, and capable of walking upon the other's {168} territory at will, the results of this physical contiguity are easily foretold. Jealousies, rivalries, encroachments upon each other, and grievances fast piling up between them, are liable to set the feelings and passions of their people afire by the most insignificant discord or incident. But why cannot we live together as Christian neighbours and friends, striving to reach a common goal, and attending to our own affairs? So far as mere physical area is concerned, there is undoubtedly room for two Anglo-Saxon nations to exist separately and independently upon this continent, working out their own destinies in their own way, and not only undisturbed, but aided and encouraged by each other. Moreover, as Canada is the weaker nation, the Americans should treat her not only fairly, but generously. I think that this spirit predominates among the greater portion of the people of the United States to-day. I do not believe there are any considerable number of Americans anxious to have Canada become a member of their political household, except by her free and unqualified consent. I know there are only a few who would think of force or purchase to consummate that result. But, on the other hand, there are many Canadians and Americans who would welcome annexation if it could be brought about graciously and naturally. If Canada and the United States could exist as independent nations; if their political orbits (in other words their laws of movement) were fixed externally apart; if by commercial treaties they would open to each other free and unrestricted {169} trade; if their citizens would intermingle not as jealous rivals and strangers, but as fair competitors and friends, their international existence would be ideal. As long as we are separated, I insist that decency and good manners should teach us to treat Canada as a friend and neighbour. We should study the rights and duties of meum et tuum. And no matter what eventually becomes of the proposition here suggested, we should be generous and broad in our treatment of her. But is it safe to expect all this? Is it human nature? Will not self-interest and temporary advantage dominate our behaviour when the critical moment comes? I appeal to the good sense and judgment of the Anglo-Saxon people; I point to all history to answer these questions. I interject no opinion of my own, except so far as it is founded upon the actions of states and nations situated similarly to the United States and Canada. What has been the result? If mutual consent has not brought them together, has not union been accomplished by force? It would have been ideal for the original thirteen States to have existed as independent nations, developing and extending themselves into the highest stages of civilisation; but aside from the immediate necessity which drove them into a federation, how long could they have existed apart as independent states? The cities of Greece remained separate and independent for ages, but they at length succumbed, vainly striving to combine when combination was too late. And what was their condition before this? Were they not constantly at war {170} with each other? Are not some of our most glowing illustrations of the efficiency and soundness of confederate governments drawn from the history of Grecian cities; and is not the language of Professor Freeman, in speaking of these Greek cities, most strikingly and forcibly applicable to Canada and the United States?

"But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate free cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. (And I might add commercial rivalry.) This is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes, which in a great monarchy or a federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neighbouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with tenfold force in the case of independent city commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to individual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay: but a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities.[2] . . . The greatest work that orator or diplomat ever achieved was when Demosthenes induced the two cities to lay aside their differences and join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader."[3]

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Another authority develops the same views:

"Neighbouring nations are natural enemies of each other, unless their common weakness forces them to league in a confederate republic, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all States to aggrandise themselves at the expense of their neighbours."

This sentence is quoted by Alexander Hamilton,[5]. in reference to which the latter adds this significant remark: "This passage at the same time points out the evil and suggests the remedy."

As long as we remain apart, are not tensions, discords, and differences imminent? And at some unexpected moment will not a fanatic, politician, or demagogue cast a brand into the fire of discussion, and then will we not have war? As Canada grows in her development, and increases in prosperity and population, will not these dangers become more likely and pressing?[6] I frankly and gladly admit that the chances of war between the United States and England are becoming less probable every day. The only existing bone of contention {172} which might create war is Canada. There is no other question which cannot, and, I hope, will not be settled by agreement, or arbitration. With Canada annexed, and a common citizenship established, all causes for differences would be removed, and we would practically become one great nation, with one great purpose and a single ambition—to civilise mankind.

The disadvantages and evils which result to the three nations concerned from the present anomalous government of Canada are apparent and susceptible of much more elaboration than I have indulged in. I leave much to the imagination. Real harm may ensue from opening up these matters with too much detail. On the other hand, in searching for the advantages of union, we find all the natural causes which tend to and justify the consolidation of separate states present.

Contiguity of territory, the same race of people; the same language, literature, and laws; the same political and religious tendencies; the dominating necessities of commerce; self-protection, mutual interest, motives of peace and good-will—in fine, all those elements necessary to insure a prosperous and permanent political marriage. Almost every reason which operated upon the minds of the citizens of the original thirteen States to create the present federation is to be found in the case of Canada. She is naturally related to the United States; she is only artificially connected with England. In a commercial and material sense, the advantages of her annexation to the United States {173} are potent. She would move forward with gigantic strides, opening, developing, and peopling her vast country. In separate States of the American Union, the Canadians would cultivate and guard their own destinies, just as the present States of the Union now do. The free and unrestricted admixture of the people of the different States of the American Union has been one of the causes of her vast progress. Break down the political paper barrier which now exists between Canadians and Americans, open the door between them so that each can pass in and out of the other's country, establish a free communion of persons and goods, and Canada would leap into a condition of progress and prosperity equal to that of our most envied and successful States. American capital, invention, and push would combine with Canadian ability, energy, and resources to reach the highest stage of individual and national development.

The road to great prosperity is now blocked by the mere form of a different citizenship, although we are really one people. We are standing idly looking at each other, relying upon forced, strained, and unnatural efforts to build up commercial relations, when we have it in our power, by the stroke of a pen, as it were, to reach the goal of business, fortune, and success.

Cannot the Canadians learn an important lesson from a study of the history of Scotland? I do not mean to assert that there is a perfect historical parallel, but there are significant events connected with that history which certainly bear upon this {174} discussion. Causes which led to the merger into one of the different Saxon kingdoms, gradually to the annexation of Wales, and finally to the absorption of the Palatinates, had long been working toward similar results in both England and Scotland. The wisest statesmen in these two countries deplored those miseries which, till they ceased to be divided, each inflicted on the other. The Scots, though uncertain, intractable, and passionately jealous of their national liberties, again and again allowed the question to approach the edge of solution.[1] In fact, the union of Scotland and England was agitated in different forms for many hundred years before it was accomplished, with the most lamentable consequences in the interim, to say nothing of the policy of Edward I., and the aspirations and efforts of Henry VIII. to achieve that result after the marriage of his sister, Margaret, with James IV. of Scotland. The supreme effort of King James I., in 1606, to effect a union between the two kingdoms, when the matter was brought before Parliament, and the extraordinary zeal shown by Sir Francis Bacon in support thereof, are well known. "Swayed merely by the vulgar motive of national antipathy," as Hume puts it,[2] the attempt was defeated, and one hundred years elapsed before the important event was consummated. Upon its final accomplishment, Scotland gave up many rights and accepted a representation inadequate and small in comparison to her population, {175} much to the nation's chagrin and loss; but everybody now admits that it was a wise and eminently necessary step for her future prosperity. If it had not been accomplished[9] there would have been a renewal of national wars and border feuds, the cost of which the two kingdoms could never have endured, and at a hazard of ultimate conquest, which, with all her pride and bravery, the experience of the last generation had shown to be no impossible result of the contest.

I wish, also, to recall the important fact, that Canada was originally embraced in the plan of the American Republic, as provided in the Articles of Confederation (XI.) as follows:

"Canada acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of, this Union, but no other colony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission be agreed to by nine States."

The door was left wide open for her admission, but she did not avail herself of the privilege to enter. Her actual reason for not accepting an offer which placed her on a par with the most prosperous colonies of England, I cannot satisfactorily discover. I can guess, but speculation upon this point answers no practical purpose. The anomalous fact is, however, recorded that while the French Canadians were combating American Independence, the French nation was aiding the Americans to attain it. It is important to keep in sight that it {176} was the opinion of the founders of our Government that geographically, commercially, and naturally, Canada belonged to the same sphere of political life in which they revolved. Indeed it requires no strained or artificial argument to show that Canada naturally belongs to the Union; just as naturally as the Union belongs to Canada.

Goldwin Smith's remarks are pertinent in this connection[10]:

"Yet there is no reason why the union of the two sections of the English-speaking people on this continent should not be as free, as equal, and as honourable as the union of England and Scotland. . . . When the Anglo-Saxons of England and those of Scotland were reunited they had been many centuries apart; those of the United States and Canada have been separated for one century only. The Anglo-Saxons of England and Scotland had the memory of many wars to estrange them. . . . That a union of Canada with the American Commonwealth, like that into which Scotland entered with England, would in itself be attended with great advantages, cannot be questioned, whatever may be the considerations on the other side, or the reasons for delay. It would give to the inhabitants of the whole continent as complete a security for peace and immunity from war taxation, as is likely to be attained by any community or group of communities on this side of the Millennium. Canadians, almost with one voice, say, that it would greatly raise the value of property in Canada; in other words, that it would bring with it a great increase of prosperity."

From time to time, sporadic attempts have been made by Canadians to force a sentiment in favour of annexation, but they have been abortive. In 1847, the American flag was hoisted on the Town Hall in Kingston, and in 1849 many prominent {177} men in Montreal signed an annexation manifesto.[11] No widespread, overwhelming feeling in its favour, however, has ever been developed in Canada, or encouraged or countenanced by any considerable number of citizens of the United States; in fact, the latter have displayed a cold and almost unnatural indifference to the movement, which, under the circumstances, is remarkable. This apathy is largely due to the fact that the subject has never been considered as a serious, vital issue. It is now fully opened to us. That this annexation will come I have no doubt. How, when, and under what circumstances, I will not prophesy. I pray it may not come by force. If Canada does not feel that she can enter into political communion with the Americans upon terms of perfect equality, we have nothing to do but fold our arms and accept the situation. The event ought to come as a true and loving marriage, with a full volition on each side, inspired by the double sentiment of mutual respect and interest. There should not be a particle of force, or a scintilla of commercial bribery about it. Until this moment arrives we should be patient with each other. If sometimes we must quarrel, remember that we pretend and proclaim ourselves to be the most civilised and Christian people on the face of the earth, and therefore ought to settle our disputes in a spirit of broadness and equity, and agree with our adversary quickly. Above and beyond this, let the Americans always {178} remember that Canada is the weaker nation, and that true Anglo-Saxon manhood requires that they should be generous to her, and give her the benefit of all doubt. The more magnanimous they are, the more tender in their treatment of Canada, the more quickly will come the desired event—a complete and happy union. Nothing will postpone its consummation so much as a narrow, bigoted policy towards her.

I will not assert that I have much faith in immediate annexation. I sincerely hope it may soon come. I fully believe in its eventuality. In the meantime I simply bring the question before Canadians, Americans, and Britons, but I cannot complete this sentence by adding, "Let nature take its course." This would mean that I thought events were not ripe; that the fruit was green and immature. Such is not my opinion. I believe every condition exists which makes the event feasible. I fear postponement, because I am warned by history that men and nations have never yet learned to control their passions at times when they should be calm, just, and generous.

When one says, "Let nature take its course," he may also mean that in the ordinary course of affairs arms and force may be used, while the weapons should be those of love and agreement. But a time may come when the Canadians and Americans, suddenly imbued with a feeling of interest and sympathy, will voluntarily move towards each other, and become unified through circumstances which will make an ideal political marriage.

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I recall that Lord Bacon advocated, in his own powerful and masterly way, the union of Scotland and England more than one hundred years before it was actually accomplished, and that history, reason, and argument were then disregarded and cast aside as so many straws.[12] But ideas survive. They cannot be destroyed. And Bacon's views eventually prevailed.

If I am called visionary; if my arguments are criticised as unsound; if my suggestions are stamped as inconclusive; if my results are laughed at, I shall find myself, or somebody else will find me, in most select and distinguished company; and certainly that will furnish some compensation for the time I am spending on this subject.

All I can do now is to sow a few seeds in this reluctant soil, and hope that at some time they may produce ripe and wholesome fruit. If my efforts are barren, other toilers will come in the same field of thought, and finally events, through one cause or another, will shape themselves into mature results, thus realising that which nature, destiny, self-interest, and national glory demand; the inhabitants of this North American continent will become one people, all Anglo-Saxon by birth or adoption—united in one free and prosperous government.

II.—COMMON CITIZENSHIP

I have now reached the crucial point of my subject: the common citizenship; the placing of all the {180} members of the Anglo-Saxon race on a political equality; conferring upon, them equal civic rights in the countries and colonies which they govern, making an Englishman a citizen of the United States and an American a citizen of England. By a single stroke of parliamentary and constitutional legislation the individuals composing the Anglo-Saxon race would enjoy common political rights, and, in fact and deed, become members of the same political family. This would resemble the important edict of Antoninus Caracalla, which communicated to all the free inhabitants of the Roman Empire, the name and privileges of Roman citizens. Professor Mommsen[13] says:

"When a stranger was by resolution of the community adopted into the circle of the burgesses, he might surrender his previous citizenship, in which case he passed wholly into the new community; but he might also combine his former citizenship with that which had just been granted to him. Such was the primitive custom, and such it always remained in Hellas, where in later ages the same person not infrequently held the freedom of several communities at the same time."

There would be no force or compunction in this common citizenship. The volition to embrace temporarily or permanently a citizenship in any other English-speaking country would rest with each individual. The barrier raised by the naturalisation laws would be removed, and the citizens of any English or American country could pass to and fro as freely as a person can move from one room to another, invested with full civic rights wherever {181} they should happen to be. An Englishman under the American flag would be an American; an American under the English flag would be an Englishman. A citizen of Great Britain visiting the United States would, upon landing, become eo instanti a citizen of the United States, pro hac vice, pending the duration of his visit. He would become a citizen of the United States with all the privileges and immunities of such citizenship, and also a citizen of the individual State in which he resides during his sojourn, subject, of course, to the municipal laws and regulations of each State applicable to all citizens in respect to length of residence and domicile; and, per contra, a citizen of the United States visiting Great Britain, Ireland, or Australia would, in like manner, and to the same extent, become a citizen of England, Ireland, or Australia, with all necessary sequences flowing from citizenship. Under this rule, therefore, an Englishman visiting New York would have the right to vote at a presidential or congressional election, subject, of course, to the restrictions as to residence applicable to all citizens of the United States, such as residing in the State or Congressional district for a fixed period of time anterior to the election.

In other words, without any actual or formal expatriation of his own country on the one side, or preliminary probation, quarantine, or naturalisation on the other, he would instantly, upon landing in the United States, by force of law become a citizen of the United States, subject to Federal and State restrictions, applicable to all citizens in {182} general. The proposition means, in effect, an abrogation of the naturalisation laws of each country in favor of the Anglo-Saxon people.

A citizen of Australia, visiting New York, would, upon landing, become a citizen of the United States as long as he chose to reside there; and a citizen of the United States visiting Melbourne, would, in like manner, become a citizen of Australia pending his sojourn in that country. This may be called common or reciprocal citizenship. The Greeks termed it "Isopolity," of which more hereafter.

I shall elaborate still further the effects of common citizenship. For example, if this rule were adopted, a New York lawyer would be entitled to practise law in England, as solicitor or barrister, subject to the regulations laid down in this respect for British subjects; it would entitle him to enter Parliament, and, in fine, to enjoy the emoluments, ranks, and honours of the highest English offices, except so far as he is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, which would necessarily be altered to conform to the principles of the treaty in question.

On the other hand, a citizen of Dublin, eo instanti: upon landing in New York, would be entitled to all the prerogatives of American citizenship, and to all the offices and honours which that relation may lead to, save that of President, which can only be enjoyed by a native-born citizen of the United States. But without an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a citizen of Great Britain, temporarily enjoying the rights of American {183} citizenship, as proposed, could not immediately become a member of Congress, for by Subdivision 2 of Section 2, Article I. of the Constitution of the United States, it is provided that:

"No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and have been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen";

and by Subdivision 3, of Section 3, of the same Article, it is also declared that:

"No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."

While the English Parliament, by a single act, could authorise a treaty which would carry into effect all the propositions above stated, to make the benefits of common citizenship reciprocal and equal it would be necessary on our side to amend the Constitution of the United States.

If the principle was acquiesced in, the lawyers would soon put these suggestions into practical shape.

There are two classes of rights which would follow the establishment of common citizenship, viz., civil and political.

The civil rights, inter alia, would be these:

1. An Isopolite would enjoy the same rights to real estate as a native-born citizen, such as buying, {184} selling, trading in, or disposing of the same by will; and the slender thread and fragment of the alien laws still remaining in the United States, so far as they apply to citizens whose respective Governments are parties to the treaty, would necessarily disappear.

2. He would possess the same commercial rights and privileges of business as a native-born citizen.

3. He would enjoy the same material rights and privileges and be subject to the same limitations and duties as pertain to native-born citizens.

His political rights, among others, would be:

1. He would be entitled to vote at all Federal elections.

2. The right to vote at all State, county, or municipal elections, precisely the same as citizens of one of the States of the United States.

But while enjoying the same rights, he would be under the same disabilities, and be subject to the performance of the same duties as a citizen of the United States, as, for instance, to pay taxes, and to perform military or jury duty. If war should unhappily arise between the two nations, it must be admitted that all these rights would be rent asunder. Inter armes silent leges. But would not common citizenship be a most effectual barrier against war? And with Canada in the American Union, would not war, or even ugly disputes, be remote possibilities?

The principle of common citizenship is not novel; on the contrary, it is very ancient. Something {185} like it existed in the Grecian states, which, in establishing a federal union among themselves, interchanged civic rights comprehended by the Greek word "Isopolity," There was also "Sympolity," which meant in effect the protection which a larger or stronger State gave to a smaller or weaker one,

In the "Byzantine Decree,"[14] it is inter alia provided:

"It is resolved by the people of the Byzantium and Perin thus to grant unto the Athenians the right of inter-marriage, citizenship, purchase of land and houses, the first seat at the games, first admission to the Council and People after the Sacrifices, and exemption from all public services to such as wish to reside in the City," and this because "they succoured us . . . and rescued us from grievous perils and preserved our hereditary constitution, our laws, and sepulchres,'"

"Isopolity," according to Niebuhr,[15] was a relation entered into by treaty between two perfectly equal and independent cities, mutually securing all those privileges to their citizens which a resident alien could not exercise at all, or only through the medium of a guardian; the rights of intermarriage, of purchasing landed property, of making contracts of every kind, of suing and being sued in person, of being exempted from taxes where citizens were so; and also partaking in sacrifices and festivals,

The Cosmos[16] is allowed to enter the senate {186} house of the allied city that he may be able to propound the business of his state there; and as a mark of honour he has a seat in the popular assembly by the side of the magistracy, but without a vote.

The persons who enjoyed "Isopolity" were called "Isopolites."

This idea of Isopolity existed in some essential features among the Romans, for "between the Romans and Latins, and between the Romans and Caerites there existed this arrangement: that any citizen of the one state who wished to settle in the other, might, forthwith, be able to exercise there the rights of a citizen."[17]

The other relation, known as "Sympolity," subsisted between Rome and its municipia: it was the connection of one place with another on a footing of inequality; the citizens of the subordinate state had not the same rights as those of the chief state, their advantage consisting in the close alliance with a powerful head, for protection, but they had no share in the election of magistrates (civitas sine suffragio), and the relation was altogether one-sided. Isopolite states, on the other hand, generally stood to each other in a relation of perfect equality, and were quite independent in their transactions with foreign countries.[18]

The Greeks learned the lesson too late in their national experience of the evils of political isolation {187} where nature intended there should be no isolation. The one idea in which that wonderful people were deficient was political unity. Each city was a separate entity and proud of being such. The dividing causes were many and strong. Isopolity and the like were indications of an underlying sense of a better principle.

The great Pericles caused a law to be passed restricting the citizenship to those only whose parents were both Athenian—a law which afterwards he sought to have repealed so far as to exempt a son of his own.[19]

When foreigners became frequent in Athens, a public vote of the people was necessary, in each instance, to bestow citizenship. If that could not be obtained, some form of evasion of the law was resorted to.[20]

The policy of the Greeks in the above respects was in direct contrast to that of the Romans. When their dominion became assured, the latter welcomed into their bosom all allies and conquered peoples. The Greeks, it is true, when it was too late, driven by necessity, formed the Achaian League, which would have been real and efficacious, had not the power of Macedonia, against which it was first directed, proved too strong for the liberties of their country.

These pages of classic history have not escaped the attention of modern scholars and publicists, and I am not alone in seeking to apply ancient examples to existing conditions.

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Professor Freeman[21] uttered a hope in 1885 that some day common citizenship would be established between the English-speaking nations.

"I have often dreamed that something like the Greek συμπολιτεία a power in the citizens in each country of taking up the citizenship of the other at pleasure, might not be beyond hope, but I have never ventured even to dream of more than that. It is our bad luck at present that there are only two independent English nations, two English nations which parted in anger, and neither of which has quite got over the unpleasant circumstances of parting."

And the same proposition of a common citizenship was advocated by Professor Dicey in 1897.[22] He stated that his

"aim is to establish the possibility and advocate the policy of instituting a common citizenship for all Englishmen and Americans. My proposal is summarily this: That England and the United States should, by concurrent and appropriate legislation, create such a common citizenship, or, to put the matter in a more concrete and therefore in a more intelligible form, that an act of the Imperial Parliament should make every citizen of the United States, during the continuance of peace between England and America, a British subject, and that simultaneously an Act of Congress should make every British subject, during the continuance of such peace, a citizen of the United States."[23]

Mr. Bryce also suggested the same course[24]: "There are things which may be done at once to cement {189} and perpetuate the good relations which happily prevail . . . such as the recognition of a common citizenship, securing to the citizens of each in the country of the other certain rights not enjoyed by other foreigners."

While common citizenship would not affect in the least the political form or substance of the government of either country, the result of its adoption would practically make the English-speaking people, so far as the outside world is concerned, one nation, inspired by one great, noble purpose. And the ebb and flow of citizens from one country to the other could not fail to be beneficial in its influence upon the internal and external policy of each.

It will have been observed that in what I have heretofore said I have carefully eschewed the use of the word "alliance," This word conveys the impression of a written or defined compact between separate nations for an offensive or defensive purpose, as, for example, the "Triple Alliance," the "Franco-Russian Alliance." I wish to exclude utterly such an idea and keep it altogether out of view. Nothing is more distasteful to my feelings or farther from my thoughts than an alliance of the Anglo-Saxon race to browbeat or bully the world. While the suggestions I make must necessarily be carried into effect by a preliminary treaty, and while incidentally the contracting parties will be benefited, its great object is to establish and maintain universal peace. It seeks to unite the people.

If Canada becomes a part of the United States, {190} the Canadians can possess all the rights of English citizenship when they chose to seek them by visiting any of the countries embraced in the British Empire—a privilege which they do not now enjoy. And vice versa, Englishmen can become citizens of any of the Canadian Provinces by simply landing on their soil. Englishmen and Canadians are now, inconsistently enough, political strangers to each other, but by an instantaneous operation of law they can, by their own volition, become fellow-citizens.

And will not the alleged grievances of the Irish roll away and disappear, like the burdens of Christian, in the Slough of Despond, before common citizenship? Will not the whole Anglo-Saxon race be practically united for the propagation of peace and civilisation? Will not the effect of common citizenship be to establish and enforce common rules of liberty and equality if, and where, they do not now already exist? Maintaining intact the peculiar governments which they now individually enjoy, will not the citizens of each feel that they are henceforth all interested in the welfare and glory of the whole race, and in the development of a common purpose? Will not a generous rivalry stimulate each to outdo the other in the breadth and liberality of their laws?

I shall say a word, in this connection, on the general subject of naturalisation laws, the abrogation of which I recommend in favour of our own kinsmen. A most superficial inspection of the history of the world will show that every nation has {191} guarded from motives of pride, jealousy, or fear, the privilege of citizenship. The general policy has been to confine it to those born and bred on the soil, and not to permit the outside world, or foreigners, to become members of the State. Exceptions were necessarily made to this universal rule, but they were rare. A nation, in respect to citizenship, was looked upon as a family, and strangers were not admitted to the fold. These observations are not simply applicable to ancient States, but the same rule existed, and exists, in modern governments.

It is a fact worthy to be chronicled to its credit, that the United States was the first nation to throw open its doors to foreigners, and invite all persons to become members of its political family. Our ancestors settled in North America to establish and perpetuate civil and religious liberty, and all who were in search of these blessings and new homes were welcomed to its hospitable shores. Instead of being jealous of our citizenship, we were delighted to welcome all classes to our country, and to confer upon them full and equal civic rights. We wanted company, and our newly arrived guests shared to the full in everything we could consistently give in property and citizenship.

Behold the results! They are seen to-day in our social life. Wherever we have a place, a foreigner can find a cheery and sincere welcome. This custom, coeval with our national birth, has grown and developed until the Americans are acclaimed the most hospitable people on the face of the earth. {192} None are equal to them as hosts. After our independence, there was an apprehension that foreigners might come here, and, with evil intent, propagate principles contrary to our political tenets. Accordingly, in the Constitution, Congress was given the power to make uniform naturalisation laws. Under this authority, the first Naturalisation Act was passed early in the nineteenth century. A quarantine was established to enable the foreigner to acquire our language and to become accustomed to our Government. Having passed the necessary probation, the naturalised foreigner is admitted to the fullest rank of citizenship, and there is no office or honour closed to him save one—the Presidency of the United States. Compare our policy, in this respect, with that of other nations, to see whether my eulogy is deserved.

We come, now, to solve the problem of a common citizenship for every member of the Anglo-Saxon race. Who but the American people can make such a proposition? Who but we are entitled to lead in such a movement? Where should such an invitation come from, but from the United States of America, and to whom should it be extended but to the members of our own family—to Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen, and Australians?

What are the objections to a curtailment, or an abolition, of the naturalisation laws, so far as the English-speaking people are concerned? This is practically all that is meant by common citizenship. Is it essential, or necessary, to the maintenance of any principle or policy of our Government, or of {193} national safety, that there should be a probation of five years, before an Irishman, or an Englishman, could become a citizen of the Republic of the United States of America? I propound the same question to the English in favour of the Americans.

What was the object sought to be accomplished by the naturalisation laws? To establish and compel a probation while the immigrating foreigner was learning to speak our language, and becoming familiarised with the form of our Government. In these enlightened days, when almost every member of the Anglo-Saxon race can speak, read, and write English, is this limit of five years any longer efficacious or necessary? In the early days of our Republic, as can be seen by a perusal of the debates in the Constitutional Convention, much anxiety was felt and expressed upon the subject of admitting foreigners to citizenship. It was thought they would bring into our midst and propagate political ideas quite foreign and antagonistic to the principles of a republic, and hence were adopted the restrictions of seven and nine years in the Constitution, relating to the election of foreigners to the House of Representatives and to the Senate. But these influences are now effectually guarded against by virtue of the overwhelming domination of American-born subjects; and it is very doubtful whether any of the reasons which led to the adoption of a five years' residence preliminary to citizenship now exist. Cessat ratione cessat lex. Open wide our doors to the Anglo-Saxon race, whether they come from England, {194} Ireland, Australia, or New Zealand. Welcome them not as aliens, but as political brothers and fellow-citizens.

I do not overlook the fact that there is an existing, not to say a strong, sentiment in the United States against foreign immigration. This feeling is based upon the necessity of protecting American labour. It is thought by some that the country, great and capacious as it is, is already overcrowded, and that, for a few years at least, until further development of its resources are made, and new fields of business, commerce, agriculture, and labour are opened, immigration should be curtailed, suspended, or even prohibited. If this objection had any relevancy to the present discussion, it is squarely answered by the fact that it has never been used to prevent the inflow of the English-speaking people. The sentiment against further immigration, or restricted immigration, is not, if I understand the subject correctly, aimed against those immigrants who come from English-speaking countries. No one, so far as I can learn, has raised his voice against this class of immigrants becoming citizens of the United States under proper conditions. The objection is especially directed against the Chinese, who might, if any encouragement were given them, no matter how slight, overrun the country and soon swamp the labouring classes—an eventuality which should be guarded against. In this respect it is unnecessary to advocate the removal of any of the barriers which now exist.

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I admit, also, that the same feeling, but in a milder form, exists against a class of foreigners who do not speak the English language. But as to the English-speaking races, if the citizens of the United States are admitted to a common citizenship in Great Britain and her colonies, I cannot conceive why we on this side should hesitate to grant a reciprocal privilege. Do we not all instinctively feel the difference? Mongolians and foreigners of other nationalities in the one case; English, Americans, Scotch, and Irish in the other—nature draws the line for us.

Again, if Canada becomes an integral part of our Republican system, her vast and comparatively unexplored soil will at once be opened to the energy and activity of American skill, genius, and labour, and superfluous immigrants to the United States would be welcomed there, and soon absorbed in her vast territory. On the whole, I do not think the United States or Canada, perhaps the two nations more particularly interested in the subject, could suffer any disadvantage by removing, at a single stroke, all barriers which now prevent the citizens of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and all the other English-speaking colonies, from becoming citizens, pro hac vice, of these countries, instantly upon the adoption of a common citizenship law. After all, as I have said, the whole question resolves itself into a conditional or limited curtailment of the naturalisation laws. These have never been uniform; but have been fluctuating and capricious—adapted to meet existing conditions.

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The laxity which has existed in the enforcement of these naturalisation laws is notorious, and has enabled all individuals so disposed to become members of our Republic by open evasion. The applications for citizenship now mainly come from the non-English-speaking people. The number of English-speaking immigrants is growing less every year, and Ireland and England will soon be drained. It is time this human current should be turned. There should be an ebb and flow between the English-speaking countries.

Another objection may be that the inauguration of common citizenship would open the door to fraudulent voting, by bringing hordes of people to this country on the eve of national, state, or municipal elections, to corrupt our ballot. There is, however, no force in this objection, because under the rules applicable to citizens of the United States, a voter must reside in the State where he casts his vote at least one year, and in the election district for a period ranging from thirty days to four months previous to the election. It is not probable that any political party or organisation could control a sufficient amount of money or exercise a strong enough influence upon immigrants by "colonisation," to control a question of national, state, or municipal importance. It is, moreover, a sword that cuts both ways, and affects all the countries involved, because what could be done in New York would be equally easy in London, Dublin, or in any of the colonies where an election might be held.

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But strenuous objection might be urged by foreigners to the doctrine of a common citizenship embracing only the citizens and subjects of the English-speaking countries. Is it just and right to discriminate against non-English-speaking nations—against Russians, Germans, French, Italians, Spanish, and Austrians, who have contributed so largely to our population and to the development of our national resources? The obvious answer is, that we cannot consult foreigners, or foreign nations, in shaping the policy of our Government. It does not become them to say what the British Empire or the United States shall do in the establishment of relations with each other. These foreigners are attracted to our shores by the allurements of our political institutions and the prospects of fortune and success. Welcome and receive them all under proper restrictions; but let them have nothing to do with our Government until they become citizens thereof.

In the next place, it does not lie in the mouth of any foreign nation to object to any treaty which the United States and Great Britain may choose to make. When nations enter into treaties, there is no principle of international or natural law, or justice, which requires the contracting parties to consult foreign nations as to the terms and conditions of the contract. Each nation is a free agent, possessing absolute liberty and power to enter into any alliance which is deemed to be for its best interests, security, or progress, subject only to an arraignment before the high bar of a general {198} public opinion where treaties and alliances are discussed upon the broad principles of truth and justice. It would no more lie in the mouth of Austria, Germany, or Italy, to find fault with a treaty made between Great Britain and the United States, adopting a common citizenship, as explained above, than it would be tolerated that Great Britain or the United States should object to the triple alliance which was made between Austria, Italy, and Germany, by Bismarck at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War for their mutual protection and support. When nations are entering into alliances they do not call into their councils foreign powers not directly concerned in the compact. But I do not rest the discussion upon any narrow or technical basis.

A treaty between Great Britain and the United States upon the lines heretofore indicated, is absolutely sustainable in the forum of conscience and justice, and it is an ample answer to any criticism which might be made of it, by a foreign power, to show that the basis of the treaty is self-preservation and interest, quite irrespective of that other unanswerable ground in international discussion, viz., that the aim and object of the treaty is the maintenance of universal peace.

Lastly, if there was any real and substantial objection to such a treaty on the ground that foreigners were excepted from the privileges of common citizenship, it might be provided that all such could immediately become English-American citizens, when they declared their intention to {199} establish a permanent home in either Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, or any of the colonies embraced in the treaty, and were able to speak, read, and write the English language. To this extent our naturalisation laws might be modified in favour of foreigners.

As one of the aims of this alliance would be to offer a home and citizenship to all persons who desired to embrace an English-American Nationality, there could be no objection to opening wide the doors to a class of immigrants such as those just referred to. This exception would be politic, and agreeable to one of the ultimate designs and motives of the treaty, viz., the propagation of the English language, as it would both operate as an incentive to induce foreigners to study and acquire the same, and fit themselves for eventual English-American citizenship. If the immigrants did not bring themselves within these conditions, there would seem to be no reason why the old laws of naturalisation should not be kept in full force.

The effect and result of a common citizenship in the English-speaking countries would be great and far reaching. To-day, the assertion, "I am an American," or, "I am an Englishman," is a passport securing safety and respect of person and property everywhere within the four quarters of the globe. How incomparably greater, more forcible, and striking the assertion would be, if a common citizenship were established such as I have above suggested! How talismanic such an utterance! In his oration against Verres, with what force and pride did {200} Cicero dwell upon the magical power and effect of the words, "I am a Roman citizen"[25]

Men of no means, he said, holding no office or station in public or private life, poor or friendless, at sea, or in places where they were neither known to men among whom they had arrived, or able to find people to vouch for them, by uttering the mere phrase "I am a Roman," received protection from the laws, and shared the rights of hospitality to an extent not common to the citizens of other nations.

Besides, common citizenship would tend to restore the office of a citizen to its high and elevated sphere. It would produce "fitness," which, after all, is the quality to be sought for in the true citizen. While in times of war or dispute, the pride of country is fully aroused and exercises a marked influence upon its citizens, yet in the intervals of peace the real duties of citizenship are overlooked or disregarded. Shall we recall what these duties are, and the nature of the office of a citizen? In most respects this office is the highest that exists in any civilised government. Why? Because the government is established for his benefit. All the officers of the government are the agents of the citizens. The government is made for man, not man for the government, as Mr. Webster said. Public officers are trustees for the citizens, who are the cestuis que trustent—the beneficiaries. An individual born in a country becomes, so to speak, a citizen thereof by operation of law. There is no ceremony of investiture-no {201} signing of a constitution—no oath—nothing to acquaint him with his duties, or to impress upon him the full measure of his responsibility. He becomes a citizen so naturally and imperceptibly that he often belittles the office, or fails to see its importance, or to understand the full measure and magnitude of his rights and duties. In a representative government the citizen surrenders his office to a representative and is removed far from the scenes of official action. He only participates in the government of the state, and in the making of laws, by proxy. In this respect the difference between a true democracy and a federated republic or constitutional monarchy is manifest. In the former, the citizens all actively participate in the making of laws; in the latter they are generally absent when legislation is enacted, and only appear by their representative. In a true democracy each citizen must take an active interest in every question that arises, because he is present and participating in all political discussions; in a federal republic, he knows very little of what is transpiring, for he has transferred his duties to a representative. In the former case the importance and responsibilities of citizenship are vividly impressed upon the democrat; in the latter these duties are unknown or neglected, and the burden thrown upon the proxy. The closer citizens are brought to legislation, the better government there will be. Do we not notice the distinction between our national and municipal politics? In the former sphere the citizens study, know, and act upon {202} political questions. In the cities they do neither; and public interests are placed in the hands of professional politicians who act often from base and sordid motives. Common citizenship will tend to elevate and enlighten all the citizens, and the healthful influences resulting therefrom will gradually permeate into the manners, morals, and legislation of all the countries involved.

III.—TO ESTABLISH FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED, TO THE SAME EXTENT AS THAT WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT STATES CONSTITUTING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

It would be quite useless to create common citizenship, it would be a vain endeavour to form a lasting union between the English-speaking people, unless free and unrestricted commercial relations were established between them. Every port which they own or control must always be wide open to the citizens of each nation. The same liberal commercial relations must be permitted between the United States and the British Empire as now exist under the Constitution between the citizens of different States of the Union.

Montesquieu says that commerce is a cure for the most destructive prejudices, and that peace is the natural result of trade.

We can behold its successful and beneficent effect upon the States of our American Union. We witness the disastrous influence of restricted {203} trade relations between Canada and the United States.

These two examples cover the whole field of discussion and render elaboration useless. Each American State has grown and thrived under the principle of free commerce. It regulates production and sale, and confines the inhabitants of each section to the cultivation or manufacture of those articles which surrounding conditions justify; it limits and attaches them to that industry which is most congenial and profitable. To the restless, discontented, unlucky, or unfortunate classes—of which there are always plenty—there is the chance to go elsewhere, a door always open through which they can pass into another State under the same citizenship, where different pursuits are followed more in keeping with their tastes and knowledge. A floating population, drifting from one place to another with perfect freedom and security, will finally settle in some locality where they can make use of whatever knowledge they possess, with a direct benefit to themselves and the place where they ultimately settle.

Lord Bacon saw the importance of commercial freedom in welding the bonds between England and Scotland, using the argument with skill and force in his advocacy for union between them:

"Thirdly, for so much as the principal degree to union is communion and participation of mutual commodities and benefits, it appeared to us to follow next in order that the commerce between both nations be set open and free, so as the commodities and provisions of either may pass and flow to {204} and fro without any stops or obstructions into the veins of the whole body, for the better sustentation and comfort of all the parts, with caution, nevertheless, that the vital nourishment be not so drawn into one part as it may endanger a consumption and withering of the other."[26]

And it was in the spirit of this advice that the union was, long afterwards, formed. It was the offer of free trade tendered by the Godolphin administration which finally overcame the national prejudices of the Scottish people. The results, after a brief period of adjustment to new conditions, amply justified the wisdom of the forecast: it is not necessary that I should again state them. To those who recall the former relations of the two countries as they had existed for centuries, they will appear among the most marvellous recorded in history.

It will not be necessary here to cite authorities. I am not dealing with an open question. The value of commerce, which, unless it is free, ceases to be commerce, in regulating the intercourse between nations, in promoting peace, in carrying forward the work of civilisation, has been recognised by every thinker and every philanthropist in every age since the world emerged from pure barbarism.

It was the full realisation of this truth and necessity that drove the thirteen original States into forming a federative union, quite as much as political reasons. The same causes operated upon the Canadians in their federative union, and they must be predominant features in the formation of the {205} political ligament which binds the English-speaking peoples in a perpetual league.

There are two unmistakable and substantial benefits which result from commercial reciprocity: first, joint business interests represented by men of both countries have a direct tendency to mutual understandings in the individuals; second, in the governments, as giving them objects of common protection and support.

How quickly these benefits will be realised in the union of the English-speaking peoples must be most obvious to all of us in the light of our present and past history.

IV.—GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (I) TO COIN GOLD, SILVER, NICKEL AND COPPER MONEY, NOT DISPLAYING THE SAME DEVICES OR MOTTOES, BUT POSSESSING AN EQUAL MONEY VALUE, AND INTERCHANGEABLE EVERYWHERE WITHIN THE LIMITS COVERED BY THE TREATY, AND (2) TO ESTABLISH A UNIFORM STANDARD OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

I. The same Gold, Silver, Nickel and Copper Money

The influence of a uniform standard of money upon a people in uniting them is most obvious. In fact, I know of no stronger element to educate a people in political and commercial sympathy than the use of interchangeable coins, possessing an equal money value, and circulating freely among them—money, bearing the same name for each denomination, with different national designs on the obverse side, but perhaps similar characters and figures could be used on the reverse side.

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The adoption of coins of the same value among all the Anglo-Saxon peoples would be perhaps next in importance to language and literature in binding them firmly together.

An element conspicuously noticed in the nationalisation or unification of different nations or tribes is a common money-system. Mommsen[27] in speaking of the unification of Italy by Rome, says:

"Lastly, Rome, as head of the Romano-Italian confederacy, not only entered into the Hellenistic state-system, but also conformed to the Hellenic system of moneys and coins. Up to this time the different communities of northern and central Italy, with few exceptions, had struck only a copper currency; the south Italian towns again universally had a currency of silver, and there were as many legal standards and systems of coinage as there were sovereign communities in Italy. In 485 all these local mints were restricted to the issuing of small coin; a general standard of currency applicable to all Italy was introduced and the coining of the currency was centralised in Rome; Capua alone continued to retain its own silver coinage struck in the name of Rome, but after a different standard."

I do not make any definite suggestion as to the size, design, or names of the different species of coins. This is not the place for such details.

Canada has already made an important step in this direction. She has freely followed the United States of America in her silver coins, which, with the exception of the inscriptions, are practically the same as those issued by our own Government—she has her half-dollars, twenty-five-, ten-, and five-cent pieces.[27]

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II.—To establish a uniform standard of Weights and Measures

Quite apart from the plan heretofore outlined, it is highly important as an element of mutual commercial benefit that the English-speaking people should establish among themselves a uniform standard of weights and measures. It would facilitate and make easy commercial freedom, and guarantee to our race that an entente, if established, would be built upon sound foundations. It would likewise impress upon foreign nations the strength of our compact. Once we have adopted a common monetary system, supplemented it with a uniform standard of weights and measures, and carried into effect the other suggestions heretofore advocated, the union of the English-speaking people is a fait accompli. Thus the two richest and most powerful nations of the world would be knit together by all the elements of sentiment and selfishness, and their moral force and influence would be predominating.

V.—IN CASE OF ANY DISPUTE HEREAFTER OCCURRING BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, OR ANY OF HER COLONIES, AND THE UNITED STATES, THE SAME TO BE REFERRED TO A SUPREME COURT OF ARBITRATION TO BE CREATED AND ORGANISED UPON SUBSTANTIALLY THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(a) All disputes between the signatories to be referred to, and settled by, this tribunal.

(b) The court to be composed of twelve arbitrators, as follows: Six to be selected by England and the same number by the United States.

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The King of England to appoint the Chancellor of England, a member of the House of Lords, a member of the House of Commons, a banker, a merchant, and the president or chairman of the leading industrial or labour organisation of the empire. The President of the United States to choose a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, a member of the United States Senate, a member of the House of Representatives, a banker, a merchant, and the president or chairman of the leading industrial or labour organisation of the United States.

(c) The first meeting of the arbitrators to be held, say, within ninety days after their appointment.

(d) At their first meeting, without regard to whether any quarrel or dispute has arisen to be submitted to them, to select an umpire, who shall cast the final vote in case of a tie.

By selecting an umpire in the beginning, the Arbitration Court is fully organised and always ready to act. After a dispute has arisen the choice of an umpire becomes most delicate and difficult and sometimes insuperable.

[1] History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. ii., p. 50.

[2] Thucydides (Jowett), 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 242.

[3] Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, 2d ed., p. 42 et seq.

[4] Ibid., p. 43.

[5] From "Principes des Negociacions," par l'Abbé de Mably, the Federalist, No. VI., Lodge's Ed., p. 32.

[6] As illustrating these views I quote from an interview published in the New York Herald of Sunday, June 15, 1902, with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, before leaving for London, to attend the coronation ceremonies and the conference of Colonial Premiers, as follows: "The most important question just now, as affecting the relations and friendly feeling existing between Canada and the United States, is the Alaska boundary question. This situation is full of danger, and all that is required to precipitate a disgraceful conflict is the discovery of gold in the disputed territory." This difficulty has happily been arranged by treaty and the question left to six arbitrators, but at the present writing Canada newspapers are urging strenuous objections against two of the American arbitrators.

[7] Froude's History of England, vol. vii.. p. 101.

[8] Hume's History of England, vol. iv., p. 251.

[9] See Hallam's Const. Hist. of England, vol. iii., p. 325.

[10] Canada and the Canadian Question, p. 267 et seq.

[11] "Commercial Relations between Canada and the United States," by Robert McConnell, Canadian Magazine, January, 1889.

[12] "Tracts Relating to Scotland," Lord Bacon's Works, vol. v., edited by Basil Montagu.

[13] History of Rome, vol. i., p. 88, Dickens's edition, 1894.

[14] Fully set forth in Demosthenes's Oration on the Crown, Bohn's Classical Library, p. 39.

[15] History of Rome, vol. ii., p. 51.

[16] Ibid., p. 52.

[17] Niebuhr's Lecture on the History of Rome, vol. i., p. 125.

[18] Niebuhr's Lectures on Ethnography and Geography, vol. i., p. 141.

[19] Vide Plutarch's, Pericles.

[20] Grote, vol. iv., p. 186.

[21] Freeman's Greater Greece and Greater Britain, Appendix, p. 142.

[22] Contemporary Review, April, 1897.

[23] This learned author subsequently lamented (Atlantic Monthly, October, 1898), that his proposal "fell flat. It was inopportune. It excited no attention in England, though it brought me a few friendly letters from the United States. But the tone of my correspondence was not encouraging."

[24] Atlantic Monthly, July, 1898.

[25] Cicero's Orations, vol. i., Bohn's Ed., p. 534 et seq.

[26] Certificate prepared by Lord Bacon upon the proposed union of England and Scotland.—Lord Bacon's Works, vol. v., p. 43.

[26] Vol. ii., p. 87.

[27] See also in this connection extracts from A History of Currency in the British Colonies, by Robert Chalmers, B.A., of Oriel College and of her Majesty's Treasury.

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CONCLUSION

THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION UPON THE QUESTION OF ANGLO-SAXON ALLIANCE

BEFORE the Spanish-American War a discussion of the subjects embraced in this book would have been premature. Professor Dicey, appealing through a magazine article, in April, 1897 (hereafter quoted), for a "common citizenship" for all Englishmen and Americans, was compelled to acknowledge a year later that his proposal "fell flat," and that for his disinterested efforts he received a few friendly but discouraging letters!

The times have changed, and the buds of great political and international questions, which have hung so long upon the trees of history, green and immature, have suddenly ripened.

The Spanish War peeped "through the blanket of the dark" and luminously lit up the American nation to the gaze of an astonished world. The problem which agitates the powers and the press of continental Europe is the future of the so-called "Anglo-Saxon" race, and the necessity and possibility of combining the nations of the world against it.

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The immature subject of an English-American alliance, which a few years ago could not awaken the interest of the people of the two nations, and was looked upon as an impracticable theory of visionary men, is now become momentous by reason of grim facts.

The courage and boldness which a writer must possess to open to public gaze new and untrodden fields of thought are no longer indispensable qualities to the present task. All that is now required is a substantial and satisfactory method of accomplishing the desired end.

It is interesting, if not essential, to explore the state of public opinion upon this subject. How far has public thought progressed in this direction? What view is entertained of it by the four great organs of public opinion of the two nations: the Press, the Pulpit, the Bar, the Stage?

Notwithstanding a somewhat diligent search for all literature bearing upon the subject, I have doubtless overlooked many, perhaps some of the best, contributions. From most of those I have seen, I will now give extracts. The newspaper articles it is impossible to quote from—they are too numerous. Besides, quotations from them in most cases would be unjust and unsatisfactory.

The Press of England and the United States has only treated this great question in a desultory and superficial way, because there has been no definite question before the two nations for discussion. So far as I can judge, however, a fair majority of the newspapers favour the general suggestion of a {211} "closer bond of sympathy," a "better understanding," and an utter renunciation of an appeal to arms to settle disputes between the United States and Great Britain. How these things will be accomplished they do not consider, except that a majority of the newspapers favour the adoption of an arbitration treaty.

The Bar, yet representing, shall I say, the serious, sober, best thought of the two nations, takes no combined action upon public questions. Its organisation, so far as matters are involved which do not directly affect its members or its esprit du corps, is merely formal. Its views can be gathered from individual sources only, and from articles which individual members contribute to the literature of the day. Those I have found and quote from, favour an alliance.

The Pulpit has been outspoken and enthusiastic from the commencement in its advocacy of an alliance.

The Stage, always ready to catch the sentiments of the hour, has, with its usual aptness and scenic skill, entwined England and the United States together in friendly embrace; and grotesque and exaggerated allusions to a coalition "to whip all the world," have been liberally and vociferously applauded.

I now give the quotations promiscuously. The italics are my own. They are made to show the very gist of the author's opinion.

The first article that came under my notice is, strangely enough, the most definite in its purpose {212} and conclusion, and was published in April, 1897, by Professor Dicey, under the title of "A Common Citizenship for the English Races."[1]

Professor Dicey states that his "aim is to establish the possibility and advocate the policy of instituting a common citizenship for all Englishmen and Americans." He says:

"My proposal is summarily this: That England and the United States should, by concurrent and appropriate legislation, create such a common citizenship, or, to put the matter in a more concrete and therefore in a more intelligible form, that an act of the Imperial Parliament should make every citizen of the United States, during the continuance of peace between England and America, a British subject, and that simultaneously an act of Congress should make every British subject, during the continuance of such peace, a citizen of the United States. . . .

"Common citizenship, or isopolity, has no necessary connection whatever with national or political unity. My proposal is not designed to limit the complete national independence either of England or of the United States. It would be not only an absurdity, but almost an act of lunacy, to devise or defend a scheme for turning England and America into one state. It is as impossible, as, were it possible, it would be undesirable, that Washington should be ruled by a government in London, or that London should be ruled by a government in Washington.

". . . What my proposal does aim at is, in short, not political unity, but, in strictness, common citizenship. Were it carried into effect, the net result would be that every American citizen would, on landing at Liverpool, possess the same civil and political rights as would, say, an inhabitant of Victoria who landed at the same moment from the same boat; and that an Englishman who stepped for the first time on American soil would possess there all the civil and political rights which would necessarily belong to an American citizen who, having been born abroad, had for the first time entered the United States."

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Mr. James Bryce, in an article favouring any proper means to establish an alliance between the two countries, says[2]:

"Meantime there are things which may be done at once to cement and perpetuate the good relations which happily prevail. One is the conclusion of a general arbitration treaty providing for the amicable settlement of all differences which may hereafter arise between the nations. Another is the agreement to render services to each other; such, for instance, as giving to a citizen of either nation the right to invoke the good offices of the diplomatic or consular representatives of the other in a place where his own government has no representative; or [following the proposition of Professor Dicey, heretofore referred to] such as the recognition of a common citizenship, securing to the citizens of each in the country of the other, certain rights not enjoyed by other foreigners."

Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, England's Secretary for the Colonies,[3] states his views upon the subject as follows:

"So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it may be taken as a fact that the British nation would welcome any approach to this conclusion, that there is hardly any length to which they would not go in response to American advances, and that they would not shrink even from an alliance contra mundum, if the need should ever arise, in defence of the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon race—of humanity, justice, freedom, and equality of opportunity.

"It must not be supposed, however, that in accepting an alliance as a possible and welcome contingency, anything in the nature of a permanent or general alliance is either desirable or practicable.

"Any attempt to pledge the two nations beforehand to combine defensive and offensive action in all circumstances must {214} inevitably break down and be a source of danger instead of strength. All therefore that the most sanguine advocate of an alliance can contemplate is that the United States and Great Britain should keep in close touch with each other, and that whenever their policy and their interests are identical they should be prepared to concert together the necessary measures for their defence.

"It is to such a course of action that Washington seems to point when he says: 'Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, in a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.'"

Walter Charles Copeland, favouring the proposed Anglo-American Alliance, says:

"Nor ought we to remain satisfied with the moral alliance which is, and always will be, and probably always would have been, formed at a Pinch between the branches of the Anglo-Saxon race. True, it may be considered by our statesmen in their wisdom that the common interest will be served best by a secret alliance, or a more subtle understanding. Anyway, there is ample scope for the work of a league or association, or for more than one, devoted to the great purpose of correcting misapprehensions and moulding public opinion on both sides."[4]

Sir Charles Dilke sympathises with the movement, but believes there is no chance of a permanent alliance with the United States as matters now stand:

"I have seen," he says, "no inclination expressed across the Atlantic by the responsible leaders of political opinion pointing towards the conclusion of any instrument consecrating so startling a departure from the American policy of the past."[5]

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The same author concludes an article[6] entitled "The Future Relations of Great Britain and the United States" as follows:

"The issue which lies behind this interesting, but perplexing, study of the future relations of our countries is no less than the decision whether in the second half of the next century the dominant interest in the world is to be Anglo-American or Russian. When I say Anglo-American, I in no way forget the position in the southern hemisphere of our own great colonies; but I include them under the first half of my compound name, Germans may be inclined to take offence at the above hint of prophecy. It is certain that for a long time to come the Prussian army must be an enormous factor in the Continental politics of the Old World. On the other hand, considered as a World-Power, Germany can hardly rank, even in the time of our remote descendants, on a level with the Russian Empire, or with the Anglo-Saxon combination, should the latter come into existence and survive.

"The matter which I have discussed in this article is no new one for me. Writing on Europe in 1886-87, I said, referring to what I had written in 1866-67:

"In 'Greater Britain' the doctrine which I attempted to lay down was that … the English-speaking … lands should attract a larger share of the attention of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom; that in all these, whether subject or not subject to the British rule, the English race was essentially the same in its most marked characteristics; that in the principal English-speaking country not subject to the Queen—the United States—England had imposed her tongue and laws upon the offshoots of Germany, Scandinavia, Spain, and I might now add, Russia; and that the dominance of our language throughout this powerful and enormous country . . . must produce in the future political phenomena to which our attention ought more persistently to be called.

"The prophecy has come true. It is for the Americans of the United States to decide how far toward firm alliance what I {216} called 'the tie of blood and tongue and history and letters' shall be carried."

Mr. A. W. Tourgee, in an article entitled "The Twentieth Century Peacemakers,"[7] discussed with great power the subject involved here. Inter alia he says:

"So well known and universally acknowledged is this characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon family, that one wonders how so much stress should have been laid on community of origin and identity of civilisation by the advocates of a better understanding between its two branches, and so little attention given to the one thing needful to efficient co-operation between political organisms—to wit, a common aim and purpose. Especially is this notable when we reflect that conditions not difficult to define clearly demonstrate that some closer relation between Great Britain and the United States is not only a desirable possibility, but an inevitable and quick-coming necessity. Instead of requiring advocacy at the hands of any party or individuals, the public sentiment of two great nations has outrun the sagacity of leaders, and with that curious instinct which often controls what seems to be a blind emotion, has truly forecast world-conditions, that must, in a very brief time, compel the two countries to strike hands for the preservation of the peace of the world, and the maintenance of those ideals which the Anglo-Saxon holds above any consideration of material or political advantage. For despite his enterprise and greed, the Anglo-Saxon, more willingly than any other stock, lends ear to Ruskin's 'strange people who have other loves than those of wealth, and other interests than those of commerce.' . . .

"The Anglo-Saxon alone offers to the semi-civilised peoples that come under his control the advantages of intellectual and material development. The schoolhouse, the free press, agricultural and commercial development, are inseparable incidents of Anglo-Saxon sway. Political and material betterment are {217} the prizes it offers to the laggards in civilisation who come beneath its rule. This is what England offers in India, Egypt, and the Soudan; what the United States offers in the West Indies and the Philippines."

In speaking of the possibility of a combination of other powers against the Anglo-Saxon race, the same author says:

"Eliminate the United States from the problem, guarantee her neutrality, and there is little doubt that before the dawn of the twentieth century the civilised world would be arrayed in arms against Great Britain."

"Whether they desire it or not, the necessities of the world's life, the preservation of their own political ideals, and the commercial and economic conditions which they confront must soon compel a closer entente between these two great peoples. They are the peacemakers of the twentieth century, the protectors of the world's liberty, of free economic development, and of the weak nationalities of the earth. With nations as with men, peace is usually the result of apprehension of consequences that might ensue from conflict. A free people, a government based on public opinion, a people whose interests demand commercial opportunity, is always in favour of peace. They may be stirred to war by injustice or oppression or in assertion of the rights and liberties of others, but are rarely moved to a war of aggression or for mere national aggrandisement. Commercial character is the surest guarantee of peaceful purpose, and the closer union of the two greatest commercial nations of the world is the strongest possible security for the world's peace."

Sir Richard Temple, in an article[8] entitled "An Anglo-American vs. a European Combination," makes an interesting analysis of the physical and {218} material elements which would enter into such a struggle. He concludes as follows:

"To us who believe in the superior power of the two English-speaking nations in comparison with other races taken together, the question may be put whether such a condition is morally and intellectually beneficial to us. I am not concerned, however, here to attempt any answer to such a question, which is wholly a matter of opinion. This article relates not at all to opinion, but only to facts.

"I will conclude the Anglo-American case with a metaphor. Britain is like a Grand Old Dame, well preserved and still maintaining the vigour and activity of her youth. Her eye is not dimmed by age; her strong hand is not weakened by the lapse of centuries. She has been the mother of many children, and has sometimes had troubles in her family. But in recent times she has been on good terms with all her offspring, all over the world. She would not suffer them to be beaten in the race of nations. If any of them were to fall into danger, she would bring out her stores, collected through many generations, in their support. If, on the other hand, she were to be hard pressed by any hostile combination, then her stalwart sons would gather round her."

Hon. David Mills, Canadian Minister of Justice,[9] under the title of "Which Shall Dominate—Saxon or Slav?", makes a very intelligent analysis of the question of the relative position of the Anglo-Saxon race against the continental powers of Europe. He says:

"In the highest sense the United States has not, and cannot have, an independent existence. Her fortune is inseparably associated with the race to which she belongs, in which her future is wrapt up, and in which she lives and moves and has her being. The unity between the United States and the {219} British Empire is a matter both of race and growth. They touch each other, and as peoples unite and great states rise, they must be, for all great international purposes, one people. They are parts of the same race, whose extension is being pushed more and more rapidly forward by the sleepless energy of individual men, under the protection of the United Kingdom, into barbarous regions where they are acquiring new standing-room for the formation of new states. In science, in literature, in government, in religion, in industrial pursuits, and in the conception of human rights and of human duties, they are one people, having common aims, a common origin, and from their necessary relations a common destiny. . . .

"The interests of the world call for Anglo-Saxon alliance. Let not the British Empire and the United States revive, after the lapse of centuries, the old contest of Judah and Ephraim; but, remembering that their interests are one, as the race is one, let them stand together, to maintain the ascendency which they will hold as long as Providence fits them to lead; which will be as long as, in their dealings with those beneath them, they are actuated by principles of justice and truth."

Rear-Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, in an article entitled "An Anglo-American Alliance,"[10] exclaims:

"Much has been said for an Anglo-American alliance. Perhaps 'alliance' is not the right word. We are already of the same blood, the same feeling, the same religion, and the same language. Now all that is necessary is to know each other better. England and America could form the most powerful alliance possible, because they are the two most patriotic countries in the world; because they alone, of all the nations, have an army and navy without conscription. . . . With the United States and England combined, we could well afford to smile at our enemies."

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An article which deserves to be carefully read is that by Prof. George Burton Adams[11] entitled "A Century of Anglo-Saxon Expansion."

"The simple truth is," says this writer, "that, great as have been the demands upon the race to create the history of the past in which we rejoice, the demands of the future will be even greater. It is the result of this history, the proper and fitting result, that we are now brought to the supreme test of racial ability. The nineteenth century, truly considered, is but an age of preliminary and introductory expansion. If the genius of the race fail not; if calm submission to the law, unwavering devotion to the task in hand, steady refusal to follow glittering allurements or hasty choices, may still be our leading traits; if we may trust our sons to equal our fathers' deeds of self-devotion without the hope of fame, then is the achievement of the nineteenth century but a preparing of the way for the vaster expansion of the twentieth,—for the founding, not of the empire of the race, but of the united commonwealth of all nations.