SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE LATE LIEUT.-GENERAL Sir GEORGE PREVOST, Bart. &c. &c. (continued 2)

The enemy, pursuing his advantages, pushed forwards a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 infantry and cavalry, with nine pieces of artillery, to attack the position which General Vincent occupied at Burlington. Previous, however, to their reaching that point, a well-concerted, daring, and spirited attack was made upon their camp in the night, by a party of General Vincent's force, and under his command, which proved completely successful as a surprise, and Generals Winder and Chandler, the two senior officers, together with 100 prisoners, and four field-pieces being taken, the enemy, after destroying their stores and provisions, &c. precipitately retreated, until they joined the main body of their army. While these operations were proceeding, the most active measures were taking at Kingston to fit out and equip a fleet which might be able to dispute with the enemy the temporary ascendancy which they had gained on the Lake; but whatever efforts might be made to construct vessels and prepare them for service, it must be obvious that no advantage could be derived from any number or description of vessels without officers and seamen. The only reinforcement which up to this period, the end of April, Sir George Prevost had been able to obtain from the Admiral commanding on the Halifax station, consisted of the three lieutenants, and four petty officers, whose arrival at Kingston has been already mentioned, and whose active services had very much accelerated the equipment of our squadron before Sir James Yeo took the command of it. Previous to the arrival of Sir George Prevost at that place in May, his extreme anxiety respecting the naval force preparing on both Lakes, had induced him, during the depth of winter, to proceed in the month of February, from the Lower Province to Kingston, York, and Fort George, where his presence must have essentially contributed to impart increased activity to the preparations then making for the opening of the next campaign. The zeal and energy thus displayed by him in his indefatigable endeavours to promote the public service, although justly appreciated by the inhabitants of both provinces, could not protect him from the unfounded accusations of the Reviewer,[46] who informs his readers that Sir George Prevost had excited the expectations of the Canadian public, "that he had designed an attack upon Sackett's Harbour, where the shipping was known to be very indifferently protected, by marching over the ice, which was stronger at that time than had been known for many years."—And that "the anxious inhabitants of the Provinces who had witnessed his previous inactivity, with gloomy foreboding, were again doomed to be disappointed." What the opinion of the inhabitants of the Provinces was, with regard to Sir George Prevost's "previous inactivity," has clearly been shewn from the different addresses presented to him at the period alluded to.

That Sackett's Harbour could at that time, or at any other period of the winter, have been attacked with the smallest prospect of success, may be confidently denied. So far from the shipping, which by the Reviewer's[47] own showing, was a formidable squadron, commanded by an experienced officer, and manned by more than 500 able seamen, being, as he has asserted, indifferently protected, the enemy had constructed batteries for their defence, and it was known that a very considerable force had been assembled at that post, and in its neighbourhood, in order to be ready for embarkation as soon as the season would permit the fleet to take the Lake. To have attempted with the small force which then garrisoned Kingston, and which was scarcely sufficient for its defence, an expedition against an enemy's position, capable of a determined resistance, when it is considered that the troops would have been obliged to march several miles over the ice before they could reach the American territory, from whence they would still have been 15 miles distant from the object of their attack, and exposed during the whole of their approach to the concealed fire of the enemy's troops in the woods, would have been, under the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was placed, with regard to his resources for defending Kingston, the Key, as it has been termed, to the Lower Province, little short of madness. Nothing but a determination to attach blame to the conduct of Sir George Prevost could have induced the Reviewer to hazard so groundless and unmilitary a stricture. That Sir George was alive to the importance of attacking this place, and of destroying the means there possessed by the enemy for increasing their marine, and for carrying on from thence their offensive operations, will appear evident from the measure which will be immediately adverted to, and which has drawn upon the Commander of the forces the acrimonious censure of the Reviewer.

In December, 1812, Sir George Prevost, aware of the importance of strengthening himself against the threatened attempts upon the Canadas, in the interval which would elapse before any reinforcements could by possibility arrive from Europe, had directed Lieutenant-General Sir John Sherbrooke, and Major-General Smyth, to make arrangements for forwarding to him, during the winter, by land, the 104th regiment, then in New Brunswick. This arduous march, which had not before been attempted, and which was thought extremely hazardous, if not altogether impracticable, was effected in the month of March without the loss of a single man, and by the end of April six companies of that regiment arrived at Kingston. This accession to the strength of that garrison enabled Sir George Prevost, who, as already stated, reached Kingston with Sir James Yeo about the middle of May, to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the sailing of the American fleet for the head of the Lake, to attempt a diversion in favour of the points threatened by the enemy on the Niagara frontier. The expedition against Sackett's Harbour was accordingly resolved upon, the moment the absence of the enemy's squadron was ascertained. The circumstances which attended this expedition, have been misrepresented in the most extraordinary manner by the Quarterly Reviewer,[48] who, instead of ascribing the failure of the enterprise to its real and natural causes, as given in the official report of Colonel Baynes,[49] and which will now be more particularly detailed, has not scrupled to attribute that failure to the indecision and misconduct of the Commander of the forces. As the whole force, which could be mustered for this service, hardly exceeded 700 men, consisting of the greater part of the garrison of Kingston, it must be obvious that means so inadequate could justify an attempt to carry Sackett's Harbour only by surprise. This, in fact, was the sole object in view; and the troops being embarked, together with two field-pieces, on board of our squadron, sailed in the evening of the 27th May, under the immediate command of Colonel, now Major-General Baynes. Sanguine hopes were entertained of teaching the enemy's post in the course of the night, when the surprise would have been complete, and our success infallible; but owing to light and baffling winds, it was not until between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning, the 28th, that our fleet was able to approach within 12 or 15 miles of Sackett's Harbour. Previously to this, and as soon as our squadron had been discovered from the port, alarm-guns had been fired, and boats were seen filled with armed men, continually passing down the shores of the Lake, from Oswego towards Sackett's Harbour, to assist in its defence. In the mean time, the troops on board the fleet were held in readiness for landing in the boats, as soon as the vessels should have approached sufficiently near to the shore for that purpose, as well as for insuring their co-operation in the attack. At this period, unfortunately, the wind, which had been rather fair, though light, altogether failed, and shortly afterwards the breeze came almost immediately from the point which the fleet was endeavouring to approach. To have attempted a landing in boats, at the distance of fifteen miles from the object of attack, would have been a most tedious and hazardous undertaking, exposed, as the men must have been, to the fire of musketry and field-pieces from the shore, and to the direct enfilade of all the heavy cannon in the enemy's forts and batteries. The day was too far advanced to leave any hope of completing the service before dark; and without the efficient co-operation of the fleet, which, from the state of the wind, could not be obtained, the most gallant exertions of the troops, as was afterwards proved, would have been ineffectual. From these circumstances, it was the unanimous opinion of the principal officers of the expedition under Colonel Baynes, who, together with Sir James Yeo, had been consulted by him as to the expediency of persevering in the enterprise, that the attempt should be abandoned, and orders were accordingly given for the return of the squadron to Kingston. The incident of the surrender of the cavalry officer and his party, which is stated by the Reviewer with his usual incorrectness, did certainly lead to the determination, which was subsequently taken, of persisting in the expedition; but it was the information obtained from those persons, with regard to the force of the enemy, and their means of defence, which principally influenced that determination. It appearing probable, from the state of the wind, which towards evening again became favourable for approaching Sackett's Harbour, that the men might be brought under cover of the night to the point of attack, in which they would be supported by the active co-operation of the fleet, it was resolved to make the attack at day-break the following morning. In order to favour the belief that we had abandoned the attempt, the ships' heads were kept towards Kingston until the evening commenced, when the squadron stood in for the shore. The troops were in the boats at ten o'clock, and confident hopes were indulged that, on the approach to the landing at day-break, they would be assisted by the artillery, and receive the effectual support and co-operation of the fleet, which was judged most essential to the success of the undertaking. The landing took place as was intended, nearly at day-break; and, considering the local impediments, was effected in a style highly creditable to the military skill of Colonel Baynes. Notwithstanding the want of our artillery, which being on board of a schooner, towed by the boats of the squadron, was still at a considerable distance, and the state of the wind, which prevented the squadron from approaching the shore, our troops, after landing and taking possession of one of their field-pieces and a tumbril, had, by a spirited advance, driven the enemy before them, at the point of the bayonet, through the woods, which were most obstinately maintained by them, and had forced them to retire towards their works and loop-holed barracks. But these works were found to be of such strength, as to render it next to impossible for our small force, unprovided with heavy cannon, to make any impression upon them. The men had been now engaged for several hours, and had sustained a considerable loss. It was at this period that Sir George Prevost, who had landed shortly after the troops, and who had followed their course and progress, came up with the main body engaged with the enemy; and it was then that he received from the officer commanding the expedition, the report of the manner in which the enemy had been driven towards their works and loop-holed barracks, and of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of forcing them without the aid of our artillery and the co-operation of our fleet. The former, with all the exertions made in towing the schooner, had not been landed; and the latter, from the state of the wind, could not approach sufficiently near for their guns to bear upon the enemy's batteries.

The Commander of the forces then, for the first time, interfered, so as to give any orders respecting the expedition. Though there was scarcely a hope of success, yet he determined not to abandon the enterprise whilst a possibility of attaining his object remained. He accordingly directed Colonel Baynes to concentrate his scattered force, and to advance upon the enemy, who were posted in considerable numbers in front of and behind their loop-holed barracks. Not more than from 300 to 400 men could be assembled for this last attack. It was, however, made by this small band with intrepid gallantry. The enemy, though superior in numbers, were driven from their position, and forced to take shelter in the town; but in the further attempt to approach the works, our troops were met by such a galling and destructive fire of grape and musketry, both in front and flank, that they were compelled to abandon a contest to which their numbers were so unequal. The force of the enemy, at this period, consisted, by their own acknowledgment, exclusive of their killed and wounded, of upwards of 1,100 men, including 142 artillerymen. They were strongly posted in Fort Tompkins, armed with heavy guns, and in their block-houses and loop-holed barracks, the very situation which renders the youngest American recruit (a marksman from his youth), more than a match for the most experienced veteran. Our force was reduced to nearly one-third of its effective strength from the casualties of the field, and from the absence of those who had withdrawn to the rear with the wounded and prisoners. We possessed not a single field-piece, the artillery not having yet been landed. Colonel Young had retired from exhaustion, in consequence of previous illness. All the other field-officers, one excepted, were wounded, together with most of the captains and subalterns. Captain Mulcaster commanding the gun-boat, made every exertion in his power; but there was no hope of assistance from the fleet, in consequence of the state of the wind. Under such circumstances, that so small a band, exhausted by previous exertion, should have attacked and carried Fort Tompkins, the block-houses, and the remaining loop-holed barracks of the enemy, so numerously defended as they were, might probably be expected by such experienced warriors as the Quarterly Reviewer, and those upon whose authority he relies; but it was apparent to every officer and man who was present, that success was impossible. Such being the conviction of the Commander of the forces, who had witnessed with feelings of poignant regret the last gallant though unavailing exertions of his troops, he reluctantly ordered their re-embarkation, which was effected in the most perfect order, and without the slightest precipitation, the enemy not attempting to offer the least molestation. This expedition, though certainly attended with a considerable loss on our part, was not unproductive of advantage to us, or of damage and serious inconvenience to our adversaries. Their apprehensions of the result of the last attack, ignorant as they were of the trifling force by which it was made, induced them to set fire to their new ship and naval arsenal; and although, afterwards, when their fear subsided, from a more perfect knowledge of the state of our force, they succeeded in extinguishing the fire on board the ship, before it had got to any height, yet, by their own acknowledgment, they lost their arsenal, with a large quantity of valuable stores; while one field-piece, and upwards of 200 prisoners were brought away, together with some camp-equipage, and another field-piece was rendered useless. Their loss, also, in killed and wounded was, by their own admission, upwards of 150 men. From this detail of facts, to the truth of which there are abundant living witnesses to vouch, it must be obvious that the main object of the expedition failed principally from the smallness of our numbers, compared with the superior force of the enemy; from the want of our artillery, which could not be landed in time; and particularly from the little assistance which, from the state of the wind, the squadron could afford in taking off the fire of the forts. So far from nearly two days being lost, as the Reviewer has stated,[50] it is notorious to every person who was employed in that expedition, that the fleet sailed on the evening of the 27th May from Kingston, and did not arrive at Sackett's Harbour until the morning of the 28th, when the intended attack was prevented solely by the impossibility of approaching the shore from the state of the wind, and that it did in fact take place on the following morning, the 29th, within 24 hours after the fleet had appeared off the place. It is a fact equally well known to every person engaged in this enterprise, that Sir George Prevost did not take the personal command of it, in the sense in which the Reviewer[51] would have it understood. That he accompanied the expedition was never denied, or attempted to be concealed. His zealous and anxious feelings prompted him to that measure, to prevent any delay in the contemplated service, should a reference to him become necessary. It is freely admitted, that when present he could not divest himself of his authority, or responsibility as Commander of the forces. But independently of its being contrary to all military usage, for the Governor in Chief and Commander of the forces in British North America, to assume the immediate command[52] of so inconsiderable a force, no instance of his interference took place until the period of the last attack, which certainly produced the greatest damage that the enemy sustained. The order to retreat was neither precipitate,[53] nor one which the gallant officers "believed with difficulty."[54] They were all convinced, not excepting the naval commander, Sir James Yeo, that it was impossible longer to contend with any prospect of success, and with our diminished means, against the superior numbers and resources of the enemy. It may indeed be confidently asserted, in direct opposition to the Reviewer's statement, that although "the troops withdrew to their boats in disappointment," at their not having been able to accomplish their object, they felt no disgrace in retiring from a contest which they had so long and so bravely supported; nor did either officers or men experience any indignation or shame at a retreat which, after the most gallant, though unavailing exertions, they knew to be indispensable for their own preservation. It may here be observed, that the situation of our troops at the time of the retreat was most critical. At that very period, a reinforcement of 600 men, under Colonel Tuttle, reached Sackett's Harbour. With the overwhelming superiority which this accession to their force gave the enemy, it is obvious that with very moderate pretensions to either skill or enterprise, they might have opposed most formidable obstacles to our re-embarkation. A further perseverance in the attack on our part, or the least delay in the retreat, would probably have ended in the capture or destruction of the whole of our troops. Fortunately, the coolness and deliberation with which that measure was executed, served to deceive the enemy with regard to our numbers and losses; and the re-embarkation being effected without opposition, the troops returned the same day to Kingston with the field-piece, camp-equipage, and prisoners which they had taken.

On the following morning the American squadron, which had been recalled from the head of the Lake to the assistance of Sackett's Harbour, appeared off Kingston, and it was a most fortunate circumstance that they did not fall in with our fleet, encumbered as it was with troops and wounded men. One material advantage immediately accrued from this expedition, by the recal of the enemy's fleet to Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost lost not a moment in availing himself of the opportunity of their being in port, to embark the 49th regiment on board the squadron, and to despatch it to the head of the Lake to reinforce Brigadier-General Vincent, who was then hard pressed by the enemy, and to whose small force that regiment proved an important accession of strength at a very critical period. Sir James Yeo accordingly sailed with, and safely landed them, and from that time our full equality at least, if not our ascendancy, was established on Lake Ontario.

In reviewing the events that took place during the campaign of 1813, it will be necessary to notice the operations on the Detroit frontier, and on Lake Erie, more especially as the Commander of the forces has been accused of neglecting the representations of Colonel Procter, who commanded in that quarter.

The battle of Frenchtown, in which the Americans were totally defeated, and their General captured, was highly creditable to the talents of Colonel Procter, who certainly, until the retreat from Amherstburgh, was entitled to the reputation of a zealous and active officer.

It is said by the Quarterly Reviewer, that at this period Colonel Procter was positively restrained by Sir George Prevost from any offensive operations. The nature of the instructions given by the Commander of the forces to that officer has been already shewn; and will further appear by a reference to the letters[55] of Sir George Prevost to Colonel, now become Brigadier-General Procter, in answer to the despatches received from him, announcing the different operations which had taken place in the Michigan territory. These operations, though not always attended with success on the part of General Procter, and though they occasioned a considerable diminution of his small force from his repeated losses, were yet favourably viewed by Sir George Prevost, who, as it appears from the correspondence already referred to, was always disposed to give him full credit for his exertions, and to put the most favourable construction upon his failures. That Sir George Prevost was fully aware of the importance of General Procter's position, and of the necessity of strengthening it by every means in his power, will now be shewn by the testimony of General Procter himself.

The letters of that officer fully prove, in contradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer, who has attributed to the Commander of the forces, the neglect (if any took place) in forwarding to him the reinforcements which he had so strongly solicited, that no such neglect is imputable to Sir George Prevost.

As early as the month of March, 1813, a confidential letter was addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Procter, upon the subject of the reinforcements he had solicited, and Captain M'Douall, one of the Commander of the forces' Aids-de-camp, was sent for the purpose of ascertaining General Procter's wants, and the best mode of relieving them. In the correspondence between the Commander of the forces and General Vincent, the situation of General Procter was constantly alluded to, and the former officer was desired to pay his particular attention to the subject. On the 20th June, Sir George Prevost acquainted General Procter that General de Rottenburg, who had been appointed to the command of the forces serving in Upper Canada, had received his directions to push on the remainder of the 41st regiment, from the head of Lake Ontario to Amherstburgh. And in his subsequent letters to General Procter, of the 11th and 12th July, after stating that his wants of money, clothing, &c. had been supplied as far as lay in the power of the Commander of the forces, and that those articles were then on their passage to him, he informed him that the whole of the 41st regiment were either on their way, or would be with him before that letter could arrive. This assurance was given by Sir George Prevost, in the full confidence that the orders which he had sent to the officer commanding in Upper Canada, for the immediate forwarding of the remainder of that regiment to Amherstburgh, had been complied with. That they were not complied with as early as Sir George Prevost intended they should be, was owing to circumstances over which the Commander of the forces had no control. The force under Major-General de Rottenburg, from which the 41st regiment was to be detached, was then before an enemy greatly superior in numbers and resources, and he was very unwilling to weaken it by sending off the remainder of that regiment, until other reinforcements which were on their way to him should arrive. It appears, however, by his letter to Sir George Prevost, of 9th July, 1813, that he had, on the 6th of that month, sent forward 120 men of that regiment to Long Point, in order that thence they might be transported by means of the fleet to Amherstburgh, and that it was his intention to send the remainder of the regiment to General Procter, as soon as the Royals, then daily expected, should arrive. In a subsequent letter from Sir George Prevost to Major-General de Rottenburg, dated 23d July, 1813, in which his high opinion of General Procter's merits and conduct is pointedly expressed, he says, "I trust the reinforcements and supplies, which, in consequence of my orders to you, must be near him," &c.

From these letters it is evident that it was Sir George Prevost's intention that General Procter should be reinforced to the extent he had required, and that the commanding officers in Upper Canada, who from the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed at the time, thought themselves justified, as they really were, in so doing, were the persons who delayed the forwarding of such reinforcements.

That to this cause the delay was attributed by General Procter himself, is unequivocally proved by his correspondence respecting it with the Commander of the forces. The letter to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1813, to which the Reviewer has referred,[56] commences in a way little to be expected, from the extract which that writer has given from it. He says, "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th ult. and am fully sensible that this district has received a due share of your Excellency's attention. I beg to add, that if I had received from the Line the reinforcements which you had directed should be sent, I should by this time," &c.

It must not be forgotten that this letter was before the Reviewer, and that he must therefore have designedly suppressed that portion of it, which completely exonerates Sir George Prevost from any charge of neglect.

In General Procter's next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 11th July, he says, "I beg leave to add, that we are fully confident of every aid from your Excellency, and of the fortunate result of the contest, if we are allowed the benefit of your consideration of us; but I am unfortunately so situated, that your best intentions towards me are of no avail. If the means were afforded me, and which were no more than what your Excellency has repeatedly directed, &c."—In his next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 13th July, he says, "The reinforcements which have been reluctantly afforded me, notwithstanding your Excellency's intentions, have been so sparingly and tardily sent me, as in a considerable degree to defeat the purpose of their being sent. I have no hopes of any aid from the centre division, where our situation is little understood, or has ever been a secondary consideration."—These extracts clearly shew that General Procter ascribed the delay in forwarding to him the remainder of the 41st regiment, not to the Commander of the forces, but to General de Rottenburg, who then commanded the centre division in Upper Canada.

Notwithstanding the Reviewer must have known this to have been the fact, from the very correspondence he was quoting, he has had the hardihood to say, "that although Sir George Prevost fully acknowledged, in his letter of the 12th July, his immediate ability to grant the reinforcement General Procter had asked for, in his letter of the 4th of that month, it will scarcely be credited, that even after this, he should have suffered above five weeks to elapse before he despatched the small amount of regular troops, &c."[57]

Now it appears from General de Rottenburg's letter, before referred to, that 120 men of the 41st, had been despatched to Amherstburgh on the 6th July; and by a return made to the Military Secretary's Office, by Captain Chambers, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General with General Procter's army, dated Amherstburgh, 13th August, 1813, it further appears, that up to the 10th August, more than 300 rank and file of the 41st, and 41 rank and file of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, with nearly 50 officers and non-commissioned officers, had arrived at that post, which was further strengthened, within ten days afterwards, by a detachment of 50 provincial dragoons. The cavalry and men of the Newfoundland Regiment were particularly requested, by General Procter, in his correspondence with the Commander of the forces, to be sent to him.

It may here be observed, that General Procter appears to have attached by far too much importance to his own command, and not to have made proper allowances for the critical situation of the centre division, from which his reinforcements were expected. Upon the safety of that division his own altogether depended; for had they been defeated, or obliged to retire from the Upper Province, he would have been cut off from all supplies and assistance, and his capture would have been inevitable. Whereas, as afterwards happened, a disaster to the force under General Procter, and the capture of Amherstburgh, would not necessarily involve in it the safety of the centre division. These reasons, without doubt, weighed with General de Rottenburg, in retaining the remainder of the 41st regiment, until they could be despatched to General Procter, without injury to the more important service for which they were required on the Niagara frontier.

Having thus proved that, as far as depended upon Sir George Prevost, General Procter's requisitions, of every description, had been complied with, we now proceed to shew that he did not neglect our marine on Lake Erie.

The Quarterly Reviewer, indeed, has not hesitated to say, "that in the whole course of that vacillation and error, which unhappily distinguished the administration of Sir George Prevost,[58] his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant and palpable, in the circumstances which led to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie." These censures, unfounded as they are, may perhaps be thought to require a more particular and detailed reply.

To the exertions made by Sir George Prevost, both before the war and after its commencement, to preserve our naval ascendancy on Lake Erie, we have already had occasion to refer. From these statements it will appear, that, independently of the new schooner, Lady Prevost, launched, armed, equipped, and upon the Lake, before the month of August, 1812, the Detroit, a ship to carry 18 guns, which the Reviewer would have his readers believe was only laid down after Captain Barclay's arrival at Amherstburgh in June,[59] had been commenced building before the month of March preceding, together with several gun-boats. The latter were launched in April. The ship was, in fact, in a state of considerable forwardness, when Captain Barclay assumed the command on the Lake. Upon the declaration of war, we had only one ship and a schooner on Lake Erie; and, within little more than a year afterwards, our fleet there consisted of two ships, a brig, a schooner, and two small vessels. In order properly to appreciate the efforts made for the construction and armament of this squadron, it must be borne in mind that the whole of the supplies necessary for that purpose, with the exception perhaps of the timber alone, were to be transported from the Lower to the Upper Province, by the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, and from thence to Lake Erie, where the superiority of our marine enabled us to convey them to Amherstburgh. As the efficiency of this squadron necessarily depended upon the number and discipline of the crews with which it was manned, the subject of a supply of able seamen, for that service, early engaged the attention of Sir George Prevost. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival at Kingston, and the appointment by him of Captain Barclay, to take the naval command on Lake Erie, the Commander of the forces urgently requested Sir James to supply that officer with a greater number of seamen than he was disposed, from his own wants, to allow him. As the obtaining the naval ascendancy, on Lake Ontario, was a primary consideration, and as the seamen whom Sir James Yeo brought with him were not sufficient adequately to man his own ships, Captain Barclay was obliged to proceed with a very scanty supply of men. The Commander of the forces was in hopes that there might be other opportunities of increasing Captain Barclay's force, and that, in the mean time, the reinforcements which he intended, and immediately afterwards directed, should be sent to General Procter, would enable him to spare a sufficient number of soldiers for the use of the squadron on Lake Erie, until Captain Barclay's wants could be more efficiently supplied. The first letter from Captain Barclay, upon the subject of these wants, was addressed to Brigadier-General Vincent, who then commanded on the Niagara frontier, and was dated 17th June, 1813. The principal object of that letter was to obtain a reinforcement of troops for General Procter, in order to enable him to co-operate with Captain Barclay, in an attack upon the enemy's naval establishment at Presqu' isle, and in that letter he expressly states that he was making an application for seamen to Sir James Yeo. This communication was forwarded to the Commander of the forces by General Vincent, with an intimation that he should immediately push forward the remainder of the 41st regiment, (a company of the regiment having been sent by him the preceding month) in order to assist in the proposed attack upon the enemy's fleet. Before the above letter either was or could be received by Sir George Prevost, he had appointed Major-General de Rottenburg to the command of the forces in Upper Canada, and had given him particular directions for supplying General Procter's wants, and for immediately despatching to him the remainder of the 41st regiment. The Reviewer has asserted,[60] that "Captain Barclay stated the wants of his squadron in men, stores, and guns, with the same truth and earnestness as General Procter had repeatedly expressed; but the only reply of Sir George Prevost, to his statements, was a cold and general promise, in a letter to General Procter, that some petty officers and seamen, for Lake Erie, should be sent forward on the first opportunity."

Captain Barclay's wants were particularly detailed by him to the Commander of the forces, in the only letter he addressed to him on the subject, dated Long Point, 16th July, 1813. The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by Sir George Prevost, on the 21st of the same month, he having the day before sent an extract from it, with a strong letter of representation upon the subject, to Lord Bathurst. In this letter to Captain Barclay, Sir George Prevost states, that he is fully aware of all that officer's difficulties, and that he should endeavour to relieve his wants, as far as was in his power, explaining to him the reasons which prevented him from so doing to the extent required. He repeats, also, what he had before said to General Procter, that Captain Barclay must endeavour to obtain his naval stores from the enemy, but that being satisfied that such a measure could not be effected without an addition to his present strength, he had strongly pressed upon Sir James Yeo the necessity of immediately sending forward to him a supply of petty officers and seamen, and that he (Sir J. Yeo), had assured the Commander of the forces that he would do so without delay: that he had also given positive directions for the remainder of the 41st regiment to be sent to General Procter, and hoped that the arrival of these reinforcements would afford the timely means of attempting something against the enemy's flotilla, before it should be in a state to venture out upon the Lake.—With this assurance from Sir James Yeo, that seamen and officers should be supplied to Captain Barclay, and in the hope that his repeated orders for the reinforcement of General Procter, with the remainder of the 41st regiment, had been complied with, Sir George Prevost might with justice point out to Captain Barclay the necessity of supplying his further wants from the enemy's resources,[61] more especially as General Procter had repeatedly declared that a supply of troops alone would be sufficient to enable him to succeed in an attack upon Presqu'isle.

Subsequent to Captain Barclay's letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 16th July, all further representations respecting the supply of seamen for Lake Erie, were made by General Procter, in his letters to Sir George Prevost. The several answers to these representations the Reviewer has not thought proper to notice, contenting himself with giving a partial and immaterial extract from Sir George Prevost's letter to General Procter, of the 22nd August, evidently for the purpose of introducing what he is pleased to term a taunt, but which was in fact neither designed as such by Sir George, nor so considered by the gallant Captain Barclay. After stating that General Procter had, in his letter of the 18th August, 1813, announced to the Commander of the forces, that the Detroit was launched, and that, if he had seamen, a few hours would place that district in security, the Reviewer adds, "but instead of replying to this application, with an immediate reinforcement of seamen, the Commander-in-chief answered it as usual, on the 22nd of August, with mere promises."

Without dwelling upon the Reviewer's error in supposing that Sir George Prevost, who had no control whatever over the seamen belonging to the squadron on Lake Ontario, who were exclusively under the orders of Sir James Yeo, could by any possibility immediately have sent forward to Captain Barclay the reinforcement of seamen required, we shall shew that Sir George Prevost's answer to the application was not one of mere promises, but that the reinforcement required, and which had been previously provided by him, was then actually on its way to its destination. Within two days after the date of the letter of the Commander of the forces to Captain Barclay before referred to, he acquainted General Procter that Sir James Yeo had assured him, that as many petty officers and seamen as could be spared, should be forwarded to Captain Barclay without delay, but that he, Sir George Prevost, much feared they would, as to numbers, fall short of his expectations. That he was, however, endeavouring to obtain a further supply from Quebec, which he meant should be exclusively appropriated for the service of Lake Erie. This letter, which was an answer to that of General Procter, of the date of 13th July,[62] referred to by the Reviewer, has been altogether suppressed by him, as well as the material fact that almost immediately after the letter of 13th July was written, General Procter relinquished the intended expedition against Presqu'isle, although 120 men of the 41st had been sent forward to Long Point, to be there taken on board by Captain Barclay for that purpose, and employed the whole of his disposable force in an unsuccessful expedition to Forts Meigs and Sandusky, by which proceeding that force was considerably diminished. In his answer of the 22d to General Procter's letter of the 18th August, before referred to, an extract from which is given in the note, Sir George Prevost expressed his opinion of that expedition, and stated the measures he was taking to remedy the inconveniences which might arise from it.[63] After mentioning the reinforcements which he intended to send forward to General Procter, he informed him, that, of the three troop-ships which had arrived at Quebec with De Meuron's regiment, two had conveyed to Halifax 500 American prisoners of war, and the third, the Dover, had been laid up in consequence of his having directed three-fourths of the officers and seamen to be landed and sent forward for the naval service on the Lakes; and that he had the satisfaction to inform General Procter, that the first Lieutenant of that ship, with 50 or 60 seamen, were then at Kingston, from whence they were to be forwarded, without delay, to Amherstburgh. This circumstance Sir George Prevost requested might be made known to Captain Barclay. This portion of the letter, which so clearly shews the exertions Sir George Prevost had made, and was then making, to send a supply of seamen to Lake Erie, the Reviewer, with the whole letter before him, has thought proper to omit, and in lieu of it, to insert as the only reply given by Sir George Prevost to General Procter's request for further assistance, a passage in the letter[64] which was evidently meant as a compliment to the bravery of General Procter's troops, and an encouragement to him to persevere under the difficulties of his situation, assured, as he must have been, that every endeavour was making to relieve him. On the 26th August, four days after the date of the last letter, the Military Secretary informed General Procter that Colonel Talbot had been sent to the head of the Lake to await the arrival of the seamen mentioned in his letter of the 25th, and to forward them to Amherstburgh with all possible despatch. He was further informed, that 12 24lb. carronades for the new ship, the Detroit, were expected in the fleet at Burlington Bay, and General Procter was desired to request Captain Barclay, on his arrival at Long Point, to send off an express to the officer commanding at Burlington Heights, to say when he would be ready to receive them on board. In this letter, the Military Secretary, Captain Freer says, "His Excellency trusts, that upon the arrival of the seamen, Captain Barclay will be able to make his appearance on the Lake to meet the enemy."

From all that has been stated upon this subject, it must satisfactorily appear, that every exertion in the power of Sir George Prevost was made by him to supply the wants of Captain Barclay and the squadron, both with seamen and stores, and that at the very period when the action was fought, more men were on their way to him.

The truth of the Reviewer's assertion, that the conduct of Sir George Prevost contributed to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie, will be best ascertained by a reference to Captain Barclay himself; and the following letter from that officer to the present Sir George Prevost, will clearly shew how unwarrantably the character of the Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been attacked on this occasion.

"Edinburgh, 14th January, 1823.

"Sir,

"I have had the honor to receive a letter from Miss Prevost, acquainting me that the family of the late Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost are preparing a pamphlet, in vindication of his memory and conduct, so ungenerously and cruelly aspersed in the Quarterly Review for October, 1822, and appealing to me for the truth or falsehood of that portion of the article, which attributes the defeat and capture of His Majesty's squadron on Lake Erie, then under my command, to the imbecility of his conduct, and general inattention to our necessities.

"I most deeply lament that an article so ungenerous and severe, should have been written, when the object of its hostility has been so long in his grave, which must not only lacerate most deeply the feelings of his family, but which also tends to open again a controversy which I had hoped was at rest.

"Agitated, however, as the question again is, by this anonymous publication; appealed to as I am for its truth or falsehood, I declare that as far as relates to Lake Erie, nothing can be more false and groundless. So contrary indeed is the fact, that I can say, the only communication which was made by me direct to the Commander of the forces, and which I was only induced to make by the extreme urgency of the case, was answered by his ordering a reinforcement of seamen from Quebec, and which I am confident would have been larger, had it been possible to have waited for them.

"It is also but justice in me to declare, that I ever considered his peremptory order[65] to risk a battle, (which, however, did not arrive till after the battle was over,) arose from his firm conviction of the paramount necessity of a strenuous exertion on the part of the navy for the preservation of the post, and from a generous desire on his part, to share with me the responsibility of a measure so hazardous, should the issue prove unsuccessful.

I have the honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, R. H. Barclay. "Sir George Prevost, Bart. Oriel College, Oxford."

The subjoined extract of a letter from Sir James Yeo to Sir George Prevost, will also shew that the Naval Commander on the Lakes entertained a very different opinion on this subject from the Reviewer.

"Kingston, 23d March, 1814.

"Dear Sir,

"I have had the honor of your Excellency's letter of the 14th inst.

"It is impossible any person can be more truly sensible of your Excellency's unremitting attention and assiduity to every thing connected with the naval department in this country than myself, &c.

I have the honour to remain, With the highest respect, Dear Sir, Your Excellency's Most obedient servant, James Lucas Yeo."

With regard to the naval action on Lake Erie, we shall only observe, that it certainly was not lost from the want of skill or courage on the part of the officers and men of our squadron. The decided superiority of the enemy in their weight of metal and seamen, gave them an advantage which the bravest efforts of our squadron, directed and encouraged by the distinguished gallantry and conduct of their Commander, were insufficient to resist. The causes of the disastrous result of that action are best told, in the words of the sentence of the Court-martial upon Captain Barclay and his officers, which will be found in the Appendix.[66] The situation of General Procter was such, after this disaster, as to render it indispensable for him to take the most prompt and energetic measures for withdrawing his troops from posts which were no longer tenable, and to join the main body of the army on the Niagara frontier, to whose force he knew his men would prove a seasonable and powerful accession. Upon this disastrous retreat it is unnecessary to dwell. It must, however, be remarked, that from the sentence of the Court-martial upon General Procter, and the subsequent remarks upon that sentence by order of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, it certainly appears that General Procter did not avail himself, with sufficient energy and activity of the period which elapsed between the loss of our fleet and the action at the Moravian village, to effect the important object of retiring with his troops to a place of safety.

However meritorious had been the conduct of General Procter, and of the troops serving under him previous to his retreat from Amherstburgh, it was not possible for Sir George Prevost to avoid noticing in the public orders, which announced to the army the capture of the greater part of those troops at the Moravian town, what appeared to him the disgraceful circumstances with which the affair had been attended. Although General Procter might feel hurt by the reflections thus passed upon his conduct, yet the Commander of the forces, in consideration of his former services, was unwilling to make that conduct the subject of public investigation, until His Majesty's Government, to whom General Procter's explanation had been submitted, should determine upon the course to be pursued. It was in obedience to their orders that General Procter was at length put upon his trial.[67]

That the charges against General Procter could only rest upon the events of the retreat which he was accused of misconducting, and that "a long period of arduous services and neglected representations"[68] could form no part of such charges, must be obvious to the lowest capacity. General Procter had, of course, the opportunity of availing himself of those services before the Court-martial, and that he did so the nature of the sentence would lead us to suppose. But it surely cannot be inferred from the opinion of the Court, that Sir George Prevost had any other motive in preferring the charges, than the good of the service, and obedience to the commands of his superiors. Whether, under these circumstances, and with the knowledge of Sir George Prevost's military life, which the Reviewer must have possessed, he is justified in making the gross insinuation with which he concludes his strictures on this subject, will be left to the candid reader to determine.

The greater part of the troops under General Procter having been captured, General Vincent was compelled immediately to retreat to Burlington Heights, a measure which the information received by that officer of the extent of General Procter's loss, and the probable immediate advance of the enemy, seemed to render indispensable.

The first intelligence received of General Procter's defeat was through a Staff-Adjutant, who had escaped from the field of battle, and who, by exaggerated accounts of this disaster, and of the consequences to be expected from it, spread terror and dismay through the country as he passed rapidly along to Kingston, where he arrived on the 12th October. In the mean time, General Vincent, whom these reports had reached, and who had also on the 8th received from General Procter intelligence of the action, had begun his retreat from the four-mile creek, and had halted at the twelve-mile creek, when a communication from Colonel Young, at Burlington, induced him immediately to fall back upon that place as a post where he might with less difficulty maintain himself if attacked, and where he might wait for instructions from General de Rottenburg, the officer commanding in Upper Canada.

General de Rottenburg, who was on his way from York to Kingston, when the intelligence of General Procter's defeat overtook him on the road, immediately sent to General Vincent, directing him, in his despatch of the 10th October, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to hold out against the superior force of the enemy, to destroy the stores, &c. and to fall back on Kingston. These directions, it is to be observed, were given under the impression created by the Staff-Adjutant's account, which, in a very short time was discovered to be greatly exaggerated; and it appears from General Vincent's letter to General de Rottenburg, previous to the receipt of the despatch last mentioned, as well as from the one in answer to it, that he had no immediate intention of retreating from the position he then occupied, although he thought circumstances might afterwards render such a measure necessary. In the mean time the same exaggerated accounts of the action at the Moravian village, which had been carried to Kingston, having been received at Montreal by the Commander of the forces, together with General de Rottenburg's despatches, communicating the orders he had sent to General Vincent in consequence of that intelligence, Sir George Prevost in his letter to General de Rottenburg of the 18th October, approved of those orders, and directed them to be carried into execution.

On the 18th October, the very day on which this last despatch was dated, General de Rottenburg informed Sir George Prevost, by letter, that the Staff-Adjutant's account, by which he had been induced to give the directions to General Vincent to retreat to York, preparatory to falling back on Kingston, was false and scandalous. As soon as it was thus ascertained at head-quarters at Montreal, what the real nature of General Procter's disaster was, the Commander of the forces having also reason to believe, from the information transmitted to him by General de Rottenburg, that the enemy had designs upon York from Sackett's Harbour, instructions, dated the 29th October, were sent to that officer, directing him to prevent General Vincent's further retreat, and to order him to occupy both Burlington and York with the force under his command. The orders, which were accordingly sent from General de Rottenburg to General Vincent to that effect on the 1st November, were received by him on the 4th, and he in consequence remained in the position he then occupied at Burlington Heights, which undoubtedly led afterwards to the recovery of the Niagara frontier.

From the above correspondence it incontrovertibly appears, that the orders transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through General de Rottenburg to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's not retreating to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at Burlington; which, as appears by his own letter of the 27th October, before referred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November.

Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vincent, to fall back upon Kingston, had not reached him on the 23rd October; previous to which, his orders to retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them, and on the 4th of November he received orders to remain where he was.

There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the Reviewer's statements,[69] of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat; of the advice which the firmness of General Procter and others had induced them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being persuaded upon their responsibility to adopt it.

It was, in fact, the prompt and decided measures of Sir George Prevost, as soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known to him, that alone prevented General Vincent from continuing his retreat, and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to General Vincent and Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had received from General de Rottenburg, then commanding in Upper Canada. Even the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a measure practicable.

In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer observes,[70] "that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on the part of the subordinate commanders and troops, presented a brilliant series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nugatory or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and enterprise, in their Commander-in-Chief."

In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering what the Reviewer has himself stated to have been the result of the campaign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, were all obtained either against the positive commands of Sir George Prevost, or without any instructions from him; and that in the only measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he happened to arrive when the enemy were beaten.

The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost. The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan frontier, when General Procter defeated the forces of Winchester and Clay, arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There could, therefore, be no time for communication with the Commander of the forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With regard to the general instructions under which the subordinate Commanders acted, it has already been shewn that General Procter had discretionary orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as circumstances might require; so likewise had General Vincent; and the marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether by Sir George Prevost, who had previously endeavoured to place our marine on the Richelieu, which had been increased by the capture of the two schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently by obtaining the services of Captain Everard, and the officers and seamen of the Wasp sloop of war, then lately arrived at Quebec from Halifax, to man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer particularly selected by Sir George Prevost to command on this expedition, from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply justified his expectations, and this enterprise, undertaken by the orders and under the instructions of the Commander of the forces, was in every respect successful.

The daring exploit which was subsequently achieved by Colonel Murray, in the capture of Fort Niagara, so far from being in opposition to Sir George Prevost's orders, or in the absence of any instructions respecting it, was the consequence of the verbal instructions given by Sir George Prevost to Lieutenant-General Drummond, previous to his assuming the command in Upper Canada, and confirmed in his letter to him of the 3rd December, 1813. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison had been detached from Kingston with the 49th, the 2nd battalion of the 89th, and the Voltigeurs, as a corps of observation, to follow the motions of General Wilkinson's army, then threatening Montreal from Sackett's Harbour, in consequence of the express orders and directions of Sir George Prevost; a fact established by his despatch to Lord Bathurst of the 15th November, 1813.

The foresight of the Commander of the forces in providing this force to watch the enemy, and his judgment in the selection of Lieut.-Colonel Morrison to command it, led beyond all doubt, to the defeat which General Boyd received at Chrystler's farm, and ultimately, by the interruptions thus occasioned to General Wilkinson's plans, to the safety of Lower Canada. That the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost might in some degree have contributed to the success which attended Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry's defence of his position at Chateaugay, the Reviewer seems most unwillingly to admit, while at the same time he imputes to him the base and unworthy attempt of endeavouring to assume to himself the merit which on that occasion was alone due to Colonel De Salaberry.

In Sir George Prevost's despatch to Lord Bathurst on this subject, of the date of 30th October, 1813, he expresses himself fortunate at having arrived at the scene of action shortly after it commenced, as it enabled him personally to witness the conduct of the officers and men engaged in it, and to form a proper judgment of their merits, which he then severally details in his letter. The unqualified praise which he bestows upon the officer immediately commanding, (Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry) is of itself a sufficient refutation of this libel on the part of the Reviewer.[71]

The checks thus received by the forces under Generals Wilkinson and Hampton, from Lieut.-Colonel Morrison, and Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, were, without doubt, no inconsiderable causes of their repulse in the attempt upon Lower Canada; but it was also the duty of the Reviewer to have noticed the prompt and judicious measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, as soon as he had ascertained that General Wilkinson was descending the St. Lawrence to attack Montreal, for the defence of that place, by calling out the whole militia of the district, and by collecting all his disposable force at La Chine, where he commanded in person. The formidable defences which he had prepared both at Coteau du Lac, and at the Cedars, together with the imposing force of militia which had been assembled at a very short notice, must have convinced General Wilkinson that he could not hope to make any impression upon a people who shewed so much zeal and alacrity in defending themselves, and who were commanded by one who possessed their entire confidence and affection. Under these circumstances, and from the opposition already experienced to his attempt, the American Commander resolved to abandon it as impracticable, more particularly as he found himself without support from General Hampton, who had retired towards Lake Champlain.

In detailing the events of the campaign of 1814, the Reviewer has again not scrupled, in his account of Captain Pring's expedition to Vergennes, to distort the truth, for the purpose of attaching the blame of this failure to Sir George Prevost. So far from the Commander of the forces refusing to Captain Pring the assistance of the troops stationed at Isle aux Noix, as the Reviewer asserts,[72] a strong detachment of the marines then in garrison at that post, was embarked on board of his squadron, and the despatch to Lord Bathurst from Sir George Prevost, of the 18th of May, 1814,[73] proves that this expedition was planned and directed by the Commander of the forces, and probably failed from the circumstance alone of Captain Pring being prevented by baffling winds for four days from reaching his destination, before the enemy had time to mature their preparations for defence.

A similar degree of incorrectness prevails in the Reviewer's statements with regard to the force retained by Sir George Prevost in Lower Canada. That Lower Canada, in the middle of April, 1814,[74] had nothing to dread, may be confidently denied. On the 22d and 30th March, two attempts had been made by General Wilkinson to penetrate into that Province by the Montreal frontier, and in the latter instance, in considerable force. Though he was repulsed in both cases, and in the latter with severe loss, he still continued to keep a considerable body of men on the frontier line, from which he did not withdraw until towards the middle of May.[75] Sackett's Harbour, instead of being weakly garrisoned, had been strengthened by two regiments from General Wilkinson's army, besides other reinforcements; and our fleet on Lake Ontario was so far from being at that period ready for sea, that it was not until the 14th of April, that the two ships, which were to constitute its principal strength, had been launched, nor was our squadron in a situation to take the Lake until the beginning of May. The only reinforcements which, up to this period in 1814, and even until the beginning of June, had arrived in Lower Canada, were the 2d battalion of the 8th regiment, which the foresight of the Commander of the forces had induced him to draw in the depth of winter by land from New Brunswick, whence they arrived in the month of March, together with 200 picked seamen from Admiral Griffiths for the fleet on Lake Ontario, without a single accident. This regiment is enumerated by the Reviewer amongst his nine regular regiments of infantry, with three squadrons of dragoons, six strong battalions of militia, and a numerous division of artillery, the whole of which he has untruly asserted, were crowded together in inactivity at Chambly, behind a strong frontier, without an enemy to oppose them;[76] adding, that although reinforcements were daily arriving or expected, not a man was sent to strengthen the inadequate force on the Niagara frontier, until the middle of July, when only two of the Peninsular regiments were reluctantly yielded for that service. Of the nine regular regiments of infantry, of which the Reviewer speaks, one was De Meuron's foreign corps, another the Canadian Fencibles, a third a battalion of Marines, a fourth the Canadian Voltigeurs, militia-men, subject to militia law, and whose force at the utmost was 450 men. Of the real regular regiments, viz. the 8th, 13th, 16th, 49th, and 70th, the 16th did not arrive until June, together with two companies of artillery. This regiment was almost immediately stationed at Montreal, where it remained the whole of July, and in August was despatched to Upper Canada. The 70th garrisoned Quebec, with a portion of artillery, and a small corps, composed of the recruits of the other regiments in the Province. The 13th was in advance at St. John, and La Cole Mill, and the battalion of marines garrisoned Isle aux Noix. Of the six battalions of embodied militia, one was at La Prairie, and another, if not two of the others, at different parts of the frontier; the Voltigeurs were also in advance, and part of the Canadian fencibles were at Coteau du Lac. From this statement, made out from documents, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted, it will appear that the troops under Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province, which were barely adequate to its defence, in lieu of being all assembled at Chambly, were stationed in different parts of the Province, where their services were most required, and that they did not at any time, collectively form the camp of instruction of which the Reviewer speaks. Previous even to the 1st of May, when the Reviewer has stated that Sir James Yeo was ready with his fleet for any operation, no part of this force could, consistently with the safety of Lower Canada, have been despatched for the reinforcement of General Drummond. Still less could a sufficient portion of it have been spared, to have enabled that officer, with any prospect of success, to attempt an attack on Sackett's Harbour. General Drummond was, in fact, aware that, from the period of the first attack on that place, in May, 1813, the enemy had been indefatigable in fortifying it, and that it was at all times guarded by a large body of regular troops and militia, together with a number of able and experienced seamen. Nothing, therefore, short of the full co-operation of a superior fleet, and a large body of troops, could have afforded him a well-grounded expectation of succeeding. General Drummond well knew that, up to May, 1814, and for some time afterwards, no force of this description could be spared from the Lower Province. However desirable he might have thought it, to destroy the naval depôt at Sackett's Harbour, he knew that no adequate means were within his power, or that of the Commander of the forces; and until, by fresh reinforcements from England, those means should be acquired, he was obliged to content himself with operations compatible with his resources. We accordingly find that, as soon as the fleet was in readiness to take the Lake, General Drummond, in consequence of the previous communication which had taken place between Sir George Prevost and himself, undertook the expedition against Oswego, which terminated in the capture of that place, together with a quantity of stores, provisions, and ordnance, most of which being designed for the squadron at Sackett's Harbour, must have materially delayed its equipment. Of this enterprise the Reviewer has thought proper to say nothing, because he knew that it might in a great degree be attributed to the measures of Sir George Prevost. For a similar reason he has altogether omitted to notice the extraordinary and energetic measures which had been adopted by the Commander of the forces, for relieving Michilimachinac, and affording to that garrison an important reinforcement of troops, seamen, and provisions, under the command of an able and experienced officer, who afterwards gave ample proofs of his courage and talents in his successful defence of that post against a powerful attack of the enemy. The reinforcement of that distant position, whilst the enemy were in possession of the whole of the Michigan territory, and by a route never before attempted, reflected the greatest credit upon the Commander of the forces who directed, and upon Lieutenant Colonel M'Douall, who executed, this arduous enterprise, which was highly important in its consequences as respected our Indian allies, and the safety of the Upper Province. Independently of this reinforcement to the troops in Upper Canada, we shall find that Sir George Prevost continued mindful of Lieutenant-General Drummond's situation, and desirous of assisting him, as soon as the means of doing so were placed within his power. It has been already shewn, that out of the force which the Commander of the forces possessed for the defence of Lower Canada, and of which the Reviewer has given so incorrect a statement, the 2nd battalion of the 8th arrived from New Brunswick in March, and the 16th with two companies of artillery in June. It was not until the month of July that the next reinforcements, consisting of the 90th regiment, from the West Indies, and the 6th and 82nd from the army under the Duke of Wellington, reached Montreal. These three regiments were immediately sent forward to the Niagara frontier. The despatch to the Secretary of State, announcing the arrival of these troops, sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the reasons which had hitherto prevented Sir George Prevost from strengthening General Drummond's force in the Upper Province. In the beginning of June, and previously to the arrival of these reinforcements, Sir James Yeo had retired into port after blockading Sackett's Harbour; and from that period, until October, the enemy had the ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Our operations in Upper Canada were, therefore, necessarily confined to the defensive; and although the superior numbers of the enemy gave them at times an advantage over us, and occasioned a considerable loss of valuable lives, the efforts made by the Commander of the forces, to supply these losses, enabled General Drummond successfully to maintain the contest, and to prevent the Americans from gaining any permanent footing in the Province. Upon the arrival of the Nova Scotia Fencibles, a battalion of the Royals, and the 97th regiment towards the end of July, the latter regiment was immediately sent to Kingston, and Sir George Prevost continued to make every exertion to reinforce the army on the Niagara frontier.

Before we proceed to the consideration of the much misrepresented affair of Plattsburg, the orders under which Sir George Prevost acted, and the plan of operations proposed upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Duke of Wellington's army, it will be necessary to expose the perverted statement with which the Quarterly Reviewer has introduced his account of this expedition. "In June and July," he says, "a numerous fleet arrived in the St. Lawrence from Bourdeaux, with the flower of the Duke of Wellington's army."[77] Now connecting this paragraph with the one that follows soon afterwards—"that the Peninsular troops were suffered to ascend no higher than the ill-fated camp of Chambly, where they were detained during the whole month of August"[78]—it is evident that the Reviewer meant his readers to believe that the brigades, under Generals Robinson, Brisbane, Power, and Kempt, had arrived in Canada in June and July, so as to enable Sir George Prevost to assemble them for any service at Chambly by the beginning of August, and yet that he kept them the whole of that month unemployed. It appears, however, from Sir George Prevost's despatches to Lord Bathurst, dated 28th June, 1814, that the only part of the Duke of Wellington's army, which arrived in June, were the 6th and 82nd regiments. The transports having those regiments on board passed Quebec for Montreal, about the 26th of that month, but did not reach the latter place until the first or second week in July, from whence they were immediately pushed forward to reinforce Lieutenant-General Drummond on the Niagara frontier. The brigade under Major-General Power, which was accompanied by Major-General Brisbane, did not arrive at Quebec until late in July; indeed so late, that Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst announcing their arrival, states, that they would scarcely be able to arrive at Montreal, with every exertion, before the 20th of August. The two last brigades, under Generals Kempt and Robinson, arrived still later; and Sir George Prevost's despatch of the 5th August, 1814, announcing their approach to Quebec, stated that it would be impossible, with every exertion, to collect the whole force, viz. all the brigades in the neighbourhood of Montreal, before the end of that month. In fact, it was not until towards the end of August, that two of the brigades above mentioned were assembled at Chambly, and in the neighbourhood; the other brigade, under Major-General Kempt, being stationed partly at Montreal, and partly in advance towards Kingston, in order to be in readiness for the service for which it was designed, whenever our ascendancy on Lake Ontario should be required.

In his next observations, the Reviewer has confounded both dates and facts, in order to make it appear that Sir George Prevost knew not how to dispose of the succours which had reached him; with which, in the Reviewer's opinion,[79] he ought instantly to have made a rapid movement towards Lake Ontario, for the purpose of attacking Sackett's Harbour; an attempt which, it is stated, should have been made whilst Sir James Yeo was blockading that place, instead of wasting some of the most valuable months of the summer in the camp at Chambly:[80] and further, that the march of General Izzard to Sackett's Harbour, with 3,000 or 4,000 regular troops, was a proof that the American Government felt (although our Commander did not), that all objects on the frontier were insignificant, in comparison with the protection of the numerous squadron which was blockaded in their ports on Lake Ontario.

Unfortunately for the Reviewer's consistency, he had previously stated, that in consequence of Commodore Chauncey having prepared two new frigates for sea, Sir James Yeo discontinued his blockade of Sackett's Harbour, and retired to Kingston, to await the equipment of the St. Lawrence, and that during the months of August and September, Chauncey held the Lake.

General Izzard was despatched to Sackett's Harbour about the end of August, or 1st of September, and consequently the American Government, from the Reviewer's own shewing, could not at that time have any apprehensions for their numerous squadron, blockaded in their Port on Lake Ontario. So far indeed from the American squadron being at this time in danger, Kingston, and Sir James Yeo's numerous squadron, were actually at the period of General Izzard's march to Sackett's Harbour, most rigorously blockaded by Chauncey, and so continued for nearly six weeks afterwards. Sackett's Harbour was in fact only blockaded by Sir James Yeo, from the beginning of May to the beginning of June, at which latter period he relinquished the blockade, and did not make his appearance on the Lake until the middle of October following.

It has been already shewn what Sir George Prevost's force really consisted of, in the Lower Province, during the period of this blockade, and until the month of July, when the first reinforcements from France reached him. These reinforcements were immediately sent to the Upper Province. It is consequently most evident that he did not then possess the means of attacking Sackett's Harbour, and that after the blockade had ceased, tenfold the means he possessed would not have sufficed for the service, without the co-operation of the fleet.[81]

It is in the highest degree improbable, that any man in Sir George Prevost's army, or in the Provinces, possessing a knowledge of these facts, which were within the reach of all, should have thought it possible that on the arrival of the troops from Bourdeaux, Sackett's Harbour was or could be the point of attack, so long as our squadron was not able to take the Lake.

It will, it is apprehended, tend very materially to elucidate the subsequent operations of the war, to state the views which probably influenced His Majesty's Government in sending so large a force from the Duke of Wellington's army to Canada, and the manner in which it was directed to be employed. The circumstances under which the war had been commenced on the part of the Americans, and the refusal of their Government to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council, the ostensible ground of war as a cause for pacification, had justly offended both the Government and people of Great Britain. The efforts, however, which they were called upon to make in Europe, had, until the termination of the contest by the abdication of Buonaparte, prevented the British Government from furnishing any other reinforcements for the army in the Canadas, than such as were barely sufficient, aided by the bravery of the troops, and the talents, zeal, and energy of their Commander, for the defence of the country from the repeated attacks of the enemy. As soon, however, as the peace with France placed a larger force at their disposal, His Majesty's Government resolved to avail themselves of a portion of it, in order to retaliate upon America her unjust aggressions, and to carry the war into such parts of her territory as might prove most assailable. In consequence of this determination, the expeditions to the Chesapeake and the Mississipi were planned; and with the same views three brigades were ordered from Bourdeaux to Canada. The objects contemplated in sending this reinforcement to Canada, will be best understood by a reference to Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 3d June, 1814, in which it is said, "The object of your operations will be, First, To give immediate protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to His Majesty's possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour, and the naval establishment on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, come under the first description."—"Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards Lake Champlain, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command, always, however, taking care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a line of advance"—"At the same time, it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the interior of the American territory, as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command." It must be evident to every person in the least acquainted with the territories of America bordering upon the Canadas, that none of the objects of offensive warfare contemplated in the foregoing despatch could be undertaken without the aid and co-operation of a fleet able to contend with that of the enemy. That His Majesty's Government might be aware of the impossibility of complying with the views and wishes above described, until the naval ascendancy should be secured on Lakes Ontario and Champlain, Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 12th July, before referred to, expresses his opinion on this head, stating that he did not expect from the reports he had received from Sir James Yeo, and the officer commanding our naval forces on the Richelieu, that their fleets would be in readiness before the middle of September.

Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being assembled as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of August, it was ascertained that the new ship at Kingston would not be launched until towards the middle of September, and consequently, that Sir James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the beginning of October. All, therefore, that could be done with regard to the projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the attempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was accordingly dispatched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly at Montreal and partly in advance, wherever he judged they might be best placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed. The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the subject of Sir George Prevost's consideration. The enemy had at that time a strong squadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depôt at Vergennes furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also since the first attack fortified Plattsburg, a position which, provided we had the ascendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron, equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to co-operate with the army before the season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every prospect of success. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the depôt at Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and the further advance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not assailable in any other quarter, (Sackett's Harbour being out of the question from what has been before stated,) it can scarcely be necessary to mention, nor has it ever been pretended that they were.

The State of Vermont on the east shore of the Lake might, indeed, have been entered from St. Amand, and our townships on that frontier, without the assistance of our squadron. But independently of there not being any object of sufficient consequence in that quarter to make an attack upon it advisable, it was deemed highly imprudent to molest that State by a mere predatory expedition, whilst two-thirds of the supplies of fresh meat for the army in Canada were furnished by American contractors, and whilst droves of cattle, as well as large sums of money in specie were constantly passing by that route from the United States into Canada; a fact which is not generally known, and which strongly marks the wisdom of that policy which Sir George Prevost pursued during the American warfare. As the destruction of the enemy's naval depôt on Lake Champlain was then the only operation contemplated by His Majesty's Government, which could be undertaken with any prospect of success, Sir George Prevost with a view to that object, had, immediately after the receipt of the despatch of the 3rd June, above referred to, used every possible exertion to accelerate the building of the new ship at Isle aux Noix, and the efficient arming and equipment of the squadron there, for the service in which it was proposed to be employed. Some time previous to this period it appears from Sir George Prevost's correspondence with Sir James Yeo, that he had repeatedly called the particular attention of that officer to the manning of the squadron for Lake Champlain.[82] In addition to this, his correspondence with Captain Fisher, and Vice Admiral Otway, tends to establish the fact of his unwearied and successful exertions to accomplish that object.

The Confiance was launched on the 26th of August, and Sir George Prevost having reason to believe that the efforts which were making for her equipment would enable Captain Fisher to take the Lake in the course of a few days, proceeded, on the 30th, to inspect the first brigade of troops quartered at Chambly; and on the 31st. established his head-quarters at Odell Town, close upon the enemy's frontier. Having here received information that General Izzard had suddenly quitted his position at Champlain Town, and had marched with a body of troops in the direction of Niagara, evidently for the purpose of joining General Brown, who had established a footing on the Niagara frontier, and was pressing upon Lieutenant General Drummond, Sir George Prevost determined to lose no time in entering the enemy's territory, (even though our fleet was not ready to co-operate,) in the hope by this movement of checking General Izzard's progress, and of thus making a diversion in favour of General Drummond. Our troops accordingly crossed the frontier line, and on the 3d of September took possession of Champlain Town, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach. Our forces advanced the following day to Chazy and Simpson's Inn, about eight miles from Plattsburg, where they halted on the 5th. Previously to this advance Captain Fisher, who had superintended the building of the Confiance, and whose local knowledge would have rendered his services peculiarly useful in the joint operations contemplated, had been suddenly and unexpectedly superseded by Sir James Yeo in the command of our naval force on the Richelieu, and Captain Downie had been appointed to succeed him. This officer did not arrive at Montreal from Lake Ontario until the 3rd September, and on the following day repaired to Isle aux Noix to superintend the equipment of the new ship. On the 5th of September, the day on which the troops halted at Simpson's Inn, an interview took place between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, when the latter assured the Commander of the forces, that his flotilla would be ready to co-operate with the army in less than forty-eight hours; that he had correctly ascertained the state and condition of the enemy's fleet; and that in consequence he entertained no apprehensions of the result of an action. Sir George Prevost then explained to Captain Downie the reason of his having pressed forward before the latter was ready. On the following day, the 6th September, the army advanced to Plattsburg, and took possession of that part of it situate on the northern side of the Saranac, the enemy's troops having retreated thence to the south side, and to their fortified position on the crest of the hills.

No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately attacked;[83] but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was extremely harassed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great celerity, and that after allowing the men a reasonable time to rest, the afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it was desirable to have day-light, as the movement was to be made through so thick and intricate a country, Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this reasoning; and being likewise satisfied, from the assurance given him, by Captain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy (where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found anchored; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a determination to support their troops and position on the south side of the Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's flotilla had changed their position since the preceding evening, and had moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the shore, evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they should be attacked and carried.

As soon as Sir George Prevost had, by a thorough reconnoitring of the enemy's position, on shore and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that their fleet was moored too far from the shore to receive any support from their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he communicated the enemy's force and situation to Captain Downie, by a letter[84] dated the 7th September, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded advantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton, Aid-de-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was ordered particularly to explain to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were, in his opinion, anchored out of range of shot from the shore. Major Fulton's statement[85] on this subject, shews most clearly the views which Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours. Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communication, although more guarded in expression, contained in substance what he had said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his being able to meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with regard to the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he, Sir George Prevost, only waited the arrival of Captain Downie to proceed against General Macomb's position. In this letter he particularly points out the co-operation which he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same day, states, "that his ship was not ready, and that until she should be, it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy;" and this determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly expressed by him in his conversation with Major Coore. Hitherto, therefore it may be assumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead the latter to expect any assistance in his approaching contest with the American fleet, from the forces on shore, or that any simultaneous attack was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the successful issue of which we may be assured that he had not a doubt, Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost, informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to commence an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if it should be found anchored in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops to be held in readiness to assault the enemy's works at the same time that the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its appearance, Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie, acknowledging the receipt of his communication of the 9th, and acquainting him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since six o'clock in the morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded to the quarters of Lieutenant-General de Rottenburg, (who was second in command,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as the wind was then fair, the fleet, unless prevented by accident, might soon be expected, and therefore directed him immediately to circulate the orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to Major-Generals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold themselves in readiness as on the preceding day. These orders were so delivered by Captain Burke before the fleet had made its appearance, and before the scaling of their guns was heard. It seems by the time on shore to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and about nine when it rounded Cumberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders having been given by the Commander of the forces that the batteries should open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence, they were accordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full quarter of an hour before the Confiance had fired a shot at the enemy's vessels. The fire from our shore-battery was so well served, that the enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron, or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately upon the commencement of the naval action, orders were despatched for the troops to take their allotted positions for the assault of the enemy's works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under Major-Generals Robinson and Power, proceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs, to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in reverse, the ground being broken and uneven, and the works much too strong to be attempted in front. Whilst these movements were making by our troops, which from their nature, must have been equally concealed from the fleet on the Lake, and from the enemy, Major-General Brisbane's brigade had formed, and was ready to force the bridge of the Saranac, on the right of the enemy's position, as soon as the troops under Generals Robinson and Power should have passed the ford, and made their appearance before the enemy's works. These movements must necessarily have required time for their completion, but no person in the army for an instant doubted that the duration of the naval action would enable the troops to accomplish the design of penetrating, by the ford, and through the road, to the foot of the works which were the object of attack. Unfortunately, during this period, and whilst the two fleets were still engaged, a wrong direction, by the mistake of the guides, was taken through the wood which led to the ford of the Saranac. As soon as the error was discovered, the troops were counter-marched, but before they could recover the right direction, full three-quarters of an hour, and perhaps an hour was lost—an invaluable portion of time, which, had not the mistake occurred, must have brought the troops to the very foot of the enemy's position. On approaching the ford, it was found to be guarded by a strong force of the enemy on the other side. At this period cheers were distinctly heard, which General Robinson supposed to proceed, either from our squadron that had been successful, or from General Brisbane's brigade advancing to the assault. Major Cochrane was therefore despatched to head-quarters to ascertain the fact, and to learn whether there were any further orders. Upon his arrival there, the fleet having at that time surrendered, Sir George Prevost most reluctantly gave the order for the recal of the troops from the attack of the forts, and it is well known to those who were in his confidence, with what poignant regret he thus sacrificed his private feelings to what he considered his paramount public duty. Upon Major Cochrane's return with these orders, he found that the troops had only been enabled to force the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the act of advancing through the wood to the enemy's position. Under these circumstances, General Robinson felt himself bound to obey the orders, and the forces retired from the attack.