Chapter III · THE EFFECT OF THE MEMORANDUM

Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into the Congressional Record, said it was based on the principle of military subordination to civilian control, and that it was not the function of the military to educate the public on political issues.⁠[27] The Senator further said: “The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety of officers of the armed services lending their prestige and official status to meetings which tend to undermine policies of the civil government of the United States, as set forth by the President and the Congress.”⁠[28]⁠

“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that high military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their duty as officers to refrain from public expressions of opposition to the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”⁠[29]⁠

We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when we say that a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect was to challenge the National Security Council directive of 1958. This directive did not deny the principle of civilian control; in fact, because of its subordination to President Eisenhower the military obeyed the directive. Furthermore, the directive did not call for the military to educate the public on political issues in the sense of partisan politics. In the memorandum Senator Fulbright himself said: “Under a National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of the U. S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.”⁠[30]⁠

“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with the underlying problem.”⁠[31]⁠

“There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”⁠[32]⁠

Under “Recommendations” we find:

“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958, suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda’. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce the cold-war effort.”

“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”⁠[33]⁠

The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National Security Council directive, and its implementation, could be attacked from several grounds, including an assumed violation of the “basic traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: “the violation of these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the National Security Council policy, and its implementation.”⁠[34]⁠

This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not directed simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of the policy, but against the policy itself. In addition to saying that the military is not qualified to engage in the cold war, the Senator claims that it is forbidden on constitutional grounds.

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