SEA POWER IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE WAR OF 1812

BY

CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.

United States Navy

AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783," "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE," "THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER," ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

LONDON SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY Limited

PREFACE

The present work concludes the series of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," as originally framed in the conception of the author. In the previous volumes he has had the inspiring consciousness of regarding his subject as a positive and commanding element in the history of the world. In the War of 1812, also, the effect is real and dread enough; but to his own country, to the United States, as a matter of national experience, the lesson is rather that of the influence of a negative quantity upon national history. The phrase scarcely lends itself to use as a title; but it represents the truth which the author has endeavored to set forth, though recognizing clearly that the victories on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain do illustrate, in a distinguished manner, his principal thesis, the controlling influence upon events of naval power, even when transferred to an inland body of fresh water. The lesson there, however, was the same as in the larger fields of war heretofore treated. Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skilful combination. It matters not that the particular force be small. The art of war is the same throughout; and may be illustrated as really, though less conspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada; by a corporal's guard, or the three units of the Horatii, as by a host of a hundred thousand.

The interest of the War of 1812, to Americans, has commonly been felt to lie in the brilliant evidence of high professional tone and efficiency reached by their navy, as shown by the single-ship actions, and by the two decisive victories achieved by little squadrons upon the lakes. Without in the least overlooking the permanent value of such examples and such traditions, to the nation, and to the military service which they illustrate, it nevertheless appears to the writer that the effect may be even harmful to the people at large, if it be permitted to conceal the deeply mortifying condition to which the country was reduced by parsimony in preparation, or to obscure the lessons thence to be drawn for practical application now. It is perhaps useless to quarrel with the tendency of mankind to turn its eyes from disagreeable subjects, and to dwell complacently upon those which minister to self-content. We mostly read the newspapers in which we find our views reflected, and dispense ourselves easily with the less pleasing occupation of seeing them roughly disputed; but a writer on a subject of national importance may not thus exempt himself from the unpleasant features of his task.

The author has thought it also essential to precede his work by a somewhat full exposition of the train of causes, which through a long series of years led to the war. It may seem at first far-fetched to go back to 1651 for the origins of the War of 1812; but without such preliminary consideration it is impossible to understand, or to make due allowance for, the course of Great Britain. It will be found, however, that the treatment of the earlier period is brief, and only sufficient for a clear comprehension of the five years of intense international strain preceding the final rupture; years the full narrative of which is indispensable to appreciating the grounds and development of the quarrel,—to realize what they fought each other for.

That much of Great Britain's action was unjustifiable, and at times even monstrous, regarded in itself alone, must be admitted; but we shall ill comprehend the necessity of preparation for war, if we neglect to note the pressure of emergency, of deadly peril, upon a state, or if we fail to recognize that traditional habits of thought constitute with nations, as with individuals, a compulsive moral force which an opponent can control only by the display of adequate physical power. Such to the British people was the conviction of their right and need to compel the service of their native seamen, wherever found on the high seas. The conclusion of the writer is, that at a very early stage of the French Revolutionary Wars the United States should have obeyed Washington's warnings to prepare for war, and to build a navy; and that, thus prepared, instead of placing reliance upon a system of commercial restrictions, war should have been declared not later than 1807, when the news of Jena, and of Great Britain's refusal to relinquish her practice of impressing from American ships, became known almost coincidently. But this conclusion is perfectly compatible with a recognition of the desperate character of the strife that Great Britain was waging; that she could not disengage herself from it, Napoleon being what he was; and that the methods which she pursued did cause the Emperor's downfall, and her own deliverance, although they were invasions of just rights, to which the United States should not have submitted.

If war is always avoidable, consistently with due resistance to evil, then war is always unjustifiable; but if it is possible that two nations, or two political entities, like the North and South in the American Civil War, find the question between them one which neither can yield without sacrificing conscientious conviction, or national welfare, or the interests of posterity, of which each generation in its day is the trustee, then war is not justifiable only; it is imperative. In these days of glorified arbitration it cannot be affirmed too distinctly that bodies of men—nations—have convictions binding on their consciences, as well as interests which are vital in character; and that nations, no more than individuals, may surrender conscience to another's keeping. Still less may they rightfully pre-engage so to do. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by a triumph of the unjust in war. Subjugation to wrong is not acquiescence in wrong. A beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but the nation or man is disgraced who shirks an obligation to defend right.

From 1803 to 1814 Great Britain was at war with Napoleon, without intermission; until 1805 single handed, thenceforth till 1812 mostly without other allies than the incoherent and disorganized mass of the Spanish insurgents. After Austerlitz, as Pitt said, the map of Europe became useless to indicate distribution of political power. Thenceforth it showed a continent politically consolidated, organized and driven by Napoleon's sole energy, with one aim, to crush Great Britain; and the Continent of Europe then meant the civilized world, politically and militarily. How desperate the strife, the author in a previous work has striven fully to explain, and does not intend here to repeat. In it Great Britain laid her hand to any weapon she could find, to save national life and independence. To justify all her measures at the bar of conventional law, narrowly construed, is impossible. Had she attempted to square herself to it she would have been overwhelmed; as the United States, had it adhered rigidly to its Constitution, must have foregone the purchase of the territories beyond the Mississippi. The measures which overthrew Napoleon grievously injured the United States; by international law grievously wronged her also. Should she have acquiesced? If not, war was inevitable. Great Britain could not be expected to submit to destruction for another's benefit.

The author has been indebted to the Officers of the Public Records Office in London, to those of the Canadian Archives, and to the Bureau of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, for kind and essential assistance in consulting papers. He owes also an expression of personal obligation to the Marquis of Londonderry for permission to use some of the Castlereagh correspondence, bearing on the peace negotiations, which was not included in the extensive published Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh; and to Mr. Charles W. Stewart, the Librarian of the United States Navy Department, for inexhaustible patience in searching for, or verifying, data and references, needed to make the work complete on the naval side.

A.T. MAHAN.

September, 1905.

CONTENTS

ANTECEDENTS OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I Colonial Conditions

Page

Remote origin of the causes of the War of 1812 1

Two principal causes: impressment and the carrying trade 2

Claim of Great Britain as to impressment 3

Counter-claim of the United States 4

Lack of unanimity among the American people 5

Prevailing British ideas as to sea power and its relations to carrying trade and impressment 9

The Navigation Acts 10

Distinction between "Commerce" and "Navigation" 11

History and development of the Navigation Acts, and of the national opinions relating to them 13

Unanimity of conviction in Great Britain 22

Supposed benefit to the British carrying trade from loss of the American colonies 23

British entrepôt legislation 24

Relation of the entrepôt idea to the Orders in Council of 1807 27

Colonial monopoly a practice common to all European maritime states 27

Effect of the Independence of the United States upon traditional commercial prepossessions 29

Consequent policy of Great Britain 29

Commercial development of the British transatlantic colonies during the colonial period 31

Interrelation of the continental and West India colonies of Great Britain 35

Bearing of this upon the Navigation Acts 36

Rivalry of American-built ships with British navigation during the colonial period 37

Resultant commercial rivalry after Independence 40

Consequent disagreements, derived from colonial restrictions, and leading to war 41

CHAPTER II From Independence to Jay's Treaty

Rupture of the colonial relation 42

Transitional character of the period 1774-1794, to the United States 43

Epochal significance of Jay's Treaty 43

The question of British navigation, as affected by the loss of the colonies 45

British commercial expectations from the political weakness of the United States, 1783-1789 46

System advocated by Lord Sheffield 47

Based upon considerations of navigation and naval power 49

Navigation Acts essentially military in purpose 51

Jefferson's views upon this question 52

Imperial value of the British Navigation Act before American Independence 53

Influence of the inter-colonial trade at the same period 55

Essential rivalry between it and British trade in general 55

Common interest of continental America and of Great Britain in the West Indies 56

Pitt's Bill, of March, 1783 58

Controversy provoked by it in Great Britain 60

British jealousy of American navigation 63

Desire to exclude American navigation from British colonial trade 65

Lord Sheffield's pamphlet 65

Reply of the West India planters 66

Lapse of Pitt's bill 67

Navigation Acts applied in full rigor to intercourse between the United States and West Indies 68

This policy continues till Jay's Treaty 69

Not a wrong to the United States, though an injury 70

Naval impotence of the United States 71

Dependence on Portugal against Barbary pirates 72

Profit of Great Britain from this impotence 74

Apparent success of Sheffield's trade policy, 1783-1789 75

Increase of British navigation 75

American counteractive legislation after the adoption of the Constitution 76

Report of the committee of the British Privy Council on this subject, 1790 77

Aggressive spirit of the Navigation Acts 79

Change of conditions through American navigation laws 80

Recommendations of the British committee 81

Effects of the French Revolution 85

Collapse of French colonial system 85

Failure of Sheffield's policy, in supplying the West Indies from Canada 86

Great Britain's war necessities require aid of American shipping 86

Her resolve to deprive France of the same aid 88

Consequent lawless measures towards American ships and commerce 88

Jay's mission.—Impressment not mentioned in his instructions 88

CHAPTER III From Jay's Treaty to the Orders in Council, 1794-1807

Arbitrary war measures of Great Britain, 1793 89

Rule of 1756 90

Peculiar relation of the United States to this Rule 92

Jay's arrival in London 93

Characteristics of his negotiations 94

Great Britain concedes direct trade with West Indies 95

Rejection of this article by the Senate, on account of accompanying conditions 96

Concession nevertheless continued by British order 97

Reasons for this tolerance 97

Conditions of trade from Jay's mission to the Peace of 1801 97

No concession of the principle of the Rule of 1756 98

Renewal of war between Great Britain and France, 1803 99

Prosperity of American commerce 100

Question raised of "direct trade" 100

Decision in British Admiralty Court adverse to United States, 1805 101

United States subjected again to colonial regulation 103

Remonstrance and negotiation of Monroe, American Minister in London 104

Death of Pitt. Change of ministry in Great Britain. Position of Charles James Fox 105

Fox's attempt at compromise 108

The blockade of May 16, 1806 108

Its lawfulness contested by the United States 110

Its importance in history 112

Retaliatory commercial action by the United States 113

Pinkney sent to England as colleague to Monroe 113

Colonial trade, and impressment of seamen from American vessels, the leading subjects mentioned in their instructions 114

Historical summary of the impressment question 114

Opening of negotiations by Monroe and Pinkney 128

Death of Fox 131

Course of the negotiations 131

Provisional treaty, signed December 31, 1806 133

Rejected by United States Government 133

Monroe and Pinkney directed to reopen negotiations 133

Change of ministry in Great Britain. Canning becomes Foreign Secretary 134

The British Government refuses further negotiation 135

Monroe leaves England, Pinkney remaining as minister 135

"Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" 135

Consistency of Jefferson's Administration on the subject of impressment 137

It neglects to prepare for war 138

CHAPTER IV From the Orders in Council to War

Reservation of the British Government in signing the treaty of December 31, 1806 141

The Berlin Decree 142

Ambiguity of its wording 143

The question of "private property," so called, embarked in commercial venture at sea. Discussion 144

Wide political scope of the Berlin Decree 148

Twofold importance of the United States in international policy 149

Consequent aims of France and Great Britain 149

British Order in Council of January 7, 1807 150

Attitude of the United States Government 152

Military purpose of the Berlin Decree and the Continental System 153

The "Chesapeake" affair 155

Conference concerning it between Canning and Monroe 156

Action of President Jefferson 160

Use made of it by Canning 161

Correspondence concerning the "Chesapeake" affair 161

Rose appointed envoy to Washington to negotiate a settlement 165

Failure of his mission 167

Persistent British refusal to punish the offending officer 169

Significance of the "Chesapeake" affair in the relations of the two nations 168

Its analogy to impressment 170

Enforcement of the Berlin Decree by Napoleon 172

Its essential character 174

The Decree and the Continental System are supported by the course of the American Government 175

Pinkney's conviction of Great Britain's peril 177

The British Orders in Council, November, 1807 177

Their effect upon the United States 178

Just resentment in America 178

Action of the Administration and Congress 181

The Embargo Act of December, 1807 182

Explanations concerning it to Great Britain 183

Its intentions, real and alleged 185

Its failure, as an alternative to war 186

Jefferson's aversion to the carrying trade 187

Growing ill-feeling between the United States and Great Britain 190

Relief to Great Britain from the effects of the Continental System, by the Spanish revolt against Napoleon 191

Depression of United States industries under the Embargo 192

Difficulty of enforcement 194

Evasions and smuggling 195

The Embargo beneficial to Canada and Nova Scotia 198

Effects in Great Britain 199

Relief to British navigation through the Embargo 200

Effect of the Embargo upon American revenue 202

Numbers of American vessels remain abroad, submitting to the Orders in Council, and accepting British licenses and British convoy 203

Napoleon's Bayonne Decree against them; April 17, 1808 203

Illustrations of the working of Napoleon's Decrees and of the Orders in Council 204

Vigorous enforcement of the Embargo in 1808 206

Popular irritation and opposition 207

Act for its further enforcement, January 9, 1809 208

Evidences of overt resistance to it 209

Act for partial repeal, introduced February 8 210

Conflicting opinions as to the Embargo, in and out of Congress 211

The Non-Intercourse Act, March 1, 1809 214

Its effect upon commercial restrictions 215

Canning's advances, in consequence of Non-Intercourse Act 215

Instructions sent to Erskine, British Minister at Washington 216

Erskine's misleading communication of them, April 18, 1809 218

Consequent renewal of trade with Great Britain 219

Erskine disavowed. Non-Intercourse resumed, August 9, 1809 219

Orders in Council of November, 1807, revoked; and substitute issued, April 26, 1809 220

Consequent partial revival of American commerce 220

Francis J. Jackson appointed as Erskine's successor 221

His correspondence with the American Secretary of State 222

Further communication with him refused 225

Criticism of the American side of this correspondence 226

Wellesley succeeds Canning as British Foreign Secretary 229

Jackson's dismissal communicated to Wellesley by Pinkney 229

Wellesley delays action 230

British view of the diplomatic situation 231

Failure of the Non-Intercourse Act 232

Difficulty of finding a substitute 233

Act of May 1, 1810.—Its provisions 234

Napoleon's Rambouillet Decree, March 23, 1810 235

Act of May 1, 1810, communicated to France and Great Britain 236

Napoleon's action. Champagny's letter, August 5, 1810 237

Madison accepts it as revoking the French Decrees 238

The arguments for and against this interpretation 239

Great Britain refuses to accept it 242

Statement of her position in the matter 243

Wellesley's procrastinations 245

Pinkney states to him the American view, at length, December 10, 1810 245

Wellesley's reply 246

Inconsistent action of the French Government 247

Non-Intercourse with Great Britain revived by statute, March 2, 1811 249

The American Minister withdraws from London, February 28, 1811 251

Non-Intercourse with Great Britain remains in vigor to, and during, the war 252

Augustus J. Foster appointed British Minister to the United States, February, 1811 252

His instructions 253

His correspondence with the Secretary of State 254

Settlement of the "Chesapeake" affair 255

The collision between the "President" and the "Little Belt" 256

Special session of Congress summoned 259

The President's Message to Congress, November 5, 1811 259

Increase of the army voted 259

Debate on the navy 260

Congress refuses to increase the navy, January 27, 1812 263

Embargo of ninety days preparatory to war, April 4 263

The evasions of this measure 264

Increasing evidence of the duplicity of Napoleon's action 266

Report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1812 269

Consequent British declaration 270

Use of these papers by Barlow, American Minister to France 271

The spurious French Decree of April 28, 1811, communicated to Barlow 272

Communicated to the British Government 273

Considerations influencing the British Government 274

The Orders in Council revoked 276

Madison sends a war message to Congress, June 1, 1812 279

Declaration of war, June 18, 1812 279

Conditions of the army, navy, and treasury 279

CHAPTER V The Theatre of Operations

Limitations on American action through deficient sea power 283

Warfare against commerce considered 284

Its financial and political effects 285

Its military bearing 285

Distinction between military and commercial blockade 286

Commercial blockade identical in essence with commerce-destroying by cruisers 287

Recognition of this by Napoleon 287

Commerce destruction by blockade the weapon of the stronger navy; by cruisers, of the weaker 288

Inefficiency of the American Government shown in the want of naval preparation 289

Conditions in the army even worse 290

Jefferson's sanguine expectations 291

Propriety of the invasion of Canada discussed 292

The United States, weak on the seaboard, relatively strong towards Canada 295

Function of the seaboard in the war; defensive 296

Offensive opportunity essential to any scheme of defence 298

Application of this principle; in general, and to 1812 298

Conditions on the Canada frontier, favoring the offensive by the United States 300

Importance of the Great Lakes to military operations 301

Over-confidence of Americans 303

Corresponding apprehension of British officers 304

Decisive points on the line between the countries 305

Importance of the Indians as an element in the situation 306

Proper offensive policy of the United States 307

Natural advantages favoring the United States 309

The land frontier the proper scene of American offensive action 310

Seaboard conditions, for offence and defence 311

CHAPTER VI Early Cruises and Engagements. Hull's Operations and Surrender

Composition of Commodore Rodgers' squadron at outbreak of war 314

Indecisions of the Navy Department 315

Question between small squadrons and single cruisers for commerce-destroying 315

Opinions of prominent officers 316

British convoy system for protecting trade 319

The Navy Department formulates a plan of operations 320

Discussion of its merits 321

Rodgers sails without receiving Department's plan 322

Encounter with the "Belvidera" 323

The cruise unproductive, offensively 324

But not therefore unsuccessful, defensively 325

Its effect upon the movements of British vessels 326

The sailing of the "Constitution" 328

Chased by a British squadron 329

Cruise of the "Constitution" under Hull 329

Engagement with the "Guerrière" 330

Hull and Rodgers meet in Boston 335

Misfortune on land 336

Wretched condition of the American army 336

Appointment of Henry Dearborn and William Hull as generals. Hull to command in the Northwest 337

Isaac Brock, the British general commanding in Upper Canada 337

His well-considered scheme of operation 338

Incompetency of the American War Department 339

Hull takes command at Dayton 340

Advances to Detroit 341

Crosses to Canada 341

Brock causes seizure of Michilimackinac 341

Hull's delays in Canada, before Malden 343

The danger of his position 343

The British attack his communications 345

Hull recrosses to Detroit 345

Brock's difficulties 346

Moves against Hull, and reaches Malden 346

Crosses to Detroit, and advances 346

Hull surrenders 347

Criticism of his conduct 348

Extenuating circumstances 349

Ultimate responsibility lies upon the Governments which had been in power for ten years 350

CHAPTER VII Operations on the Northern Frontier after Hull's Surrender. European Events bearing on the War

Brock returns to Niagara from Detroit 351

Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, arranges with Dearborn a suspension of hostilities 352

Suspension disapproved by the American Government. Hostilities resumed 353

Brock's advantage by control of the water 353

Two of his vessels on Lake Erie taken from him by Lieutenant Elliott, U.S. Navy 354

Brock's estimate of this loss 356

American attack upon Queenston 357

Repulsed, but Brock killed 357

Abortive American attack on the Upper Niagara 358

Inactivity of Dearborn on the northern New York frontier 359

Military inefficiency throughout the United States 360

Improvement only in the naval situation on the lakes 361

Captain Chauncey appointed to command on Lakes Erie and Ontario 361

His activity and efficiency 362

Disadvantages of his naval base, Sackett's Harbor 363

Chauncey's early operations, November, 1812 364

Fleet lays up for the winter 366

Effect of his first operations 366

General Harrison succeeds to Hull's command 367

Colonel Procter commands the British forces opposed 367

His instructions from Prevost and Brock 367

Harrison's plan of operations 368

The American disaster at Frenchtown 370

Effect upon Harrison's plans 371

The army remains on the defensive, awaiting naval control of Lake Erie 371

Chauncey visits Lake Erie 374

Disadvantages of Black Rock as a naval station 374

Chauncey selects Presqu'Isle (Erie) instead 375

Orders vessels built there 375

Advantages and drawbacks of Erie as a naval base 375

Commander Perry ordered to the lakes 376

Assigned by Chauncey to command on Lake Erie 376

Naval conditions on Lakes Erie and Ontario, at close of 1812 377

Contemporary European conditions 378

Napoleon's expedition against Russia 379

Commercial embarrassments of Great Britain 379

Necessity of American supplies to the British armies in Spain 381

Preoccupation of the British Navy with conditions in Europe and the East 382

Consequent embarrassment from the American war 383

Need of the American market 384

Danger to British West India trade from an American war 384

Burden thrown upon the British Admiralty 385

British anxiety to avoid war 385

CHAPTER VIII Ocean Warfare against Commerce—Privateering—British Licenses—Naval Actions: "Wasp" and "Frolic," "United States" and "Macedonian"

Consolidation of British transatlantic naval commands 387

Sir John Borlase Warren commander-in-chief 387

British merchant ships forbidden to sail without convoy 388

Continued hope for restoration of peace 389

Warren instructed to make propositions 390

Reply of the American Government 391

Cessation of impressment demanded. Negotiation fails 391

Warren's appreciation of the dangers to British commerce 392

Extemporized character of the early American privateering 394

Its activities therefore mainly within Warren's station 394

Cruise of the privateer "Rossie," Captain Barney 395

Privateering not a merely speculative undertaking 396

Conditions necessary to its success 397

Illustrated by the privateer "America" 398

Comparative immunity of American shipping and commerce at the beginning of hostilities 399

Causes for this 400

Controversial correspondence between Warren and the Admiralty 401

Policy of the Admiralty. Its effects 404

American ships of war and privateers gradually compelled to cruise in distant seas 406

American commerce excluded from the ocean 406

Sailing of the squadrons of Rodgers and Decatur 407

Their separation 408

Cruise of Rodgers' squadron 409

British licenses to American merchant vessels 410

Action between the "Wasp" and "Frolic" 412

Cruise of the "Argus," of Decatur's division 415

Action between the "United States" and "Macedonian" 416

The "United States" returns with her prize 422

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

VOLUME ONE.

The Impressment of an American Seaman Frontispiece

From a drawing by Stanley M. Arthurs.

Gouverneur Morris Page 6

From the painting by Marchant, after Sully, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

John Jay Page 88

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bedford (Jay) House, Katonah, N.Y.

James Monroe Page 104

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the possession of Hon. T. Jefferson Coolidge.

Thomas Jefferson Page 120

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.

James Madison Page 223

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.

The Chase of the Belvidera Page 322

From a drawing by Carlton T. Chapman.

The Forecastle of the Constitution during the Chase Page 328

From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

Captain Isaac Hull Page 330

From the engraving by D. Edwin, after the painting by Gilbert Stuart.

The Burning of the Guerrière Page 334

From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

Captain Stephen Decatur Page 420

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS.

VOLUME ONE.

Theatre of Land and Coast Warfare Page 283

The Atlantic Ocean, showing the positions of the Ocean Actions of the War of 1812 and the Movements of the Squadrons in July and August, 1812 Page 326

Plan of the Engagement between the Constitution and Guerrière Page 332

Map of Lake Frontier to illustrate Campaigns of 1812-1814 Page 370

The Cruises of the Three American Squadrons in the Autumn of 1812 Page 408

Plan of the Engagement between the United States and Macedonian Page 418