Chapter XII · THE LAW FOR HUMANITY.

The Right Law.

302. The department of Ethics contains two divisions: ethics (in the stricter sense) which is concerned with the action of the individual; and politics, which has to do with the order of the State. It has been maintained that in Stoicism the latter is altogether subordinated, and that the central aim of this philosophy is to erect a shelter for the individual[1]. The truth of this view is more than doubtful. Stoic ethics are not based on the needs of the individual, but on the demands of the supreme Law. ‘If there is a universe, then there is a universal law, bidding us do this and refrain from that.’ ‘If there are gods, there is virtue[2].’ We have already noticed that Zeno’s earliest work was ‘on the State[3],’ and that it is an attempt to show how a state can be ordered by wise laws. The whole theory of the Logos leads up to the same point. The same eternal Wisdom through which the primal stuff took shape is, in another function, the Right Rule (ὀρθὸς λόγος, vera ratio) which commands and forbids[4]. Right Rule and Common Law (κοινὸς νόμος, lex communis) are terms of identical meaning, by which a standard of supreme authority is set up[5]; State law and conventional morality, though always of narrower range, and often of inferior purity, are yet a reflection of universal Law. The moral law must therefore first be studied in its bearings on man as a political and social animal.

The Cosmopolis.

303. The root-principle of the Stoic State is that it is world-wide, a cosmopolis. This title arose from the practice, attributed to Socrates and Diogenes (as well as others), of replying to the current question ‘Of what city are you?’ by the answer ‘Of the universe[6].’ We must therefore regard ourselves as members not of a clan or city, but of a world-wide society[7]. In this society all distinctions of race, caste and class are to be subordinated to the sense of kinship and brotherhood[8]. This principle is equally opposed to the nationalist prejudices which rank Hellene above barbarian, to philosophical theories (such as that of Aristotle) which distinguish intelligent peoples fitted by nature to rule and others only fitted to obey[9], and to ideal states (such as that of Plato) in which a ruling class is to be developed by artifice and schooling. Only the brute animals are excluded from this community, for they are not possessed of reason; they have therefore no rights, but exist for the service of men[10]. All human beings are capable of attaining to virtue, and as such are natural-born citizens of the Cosmopolis[11]. Loyalty to this state, however, in no wise hinders a due loyalty to existing states which may be regarded as partial realizations of it. Socrates submitted to the laws of Athens even when they bade him die; Zeno and Cleanthes declined the citizenship of that famous city, lest they should be thought to hold cheap the places of their birth[12]; and amongst the Romans Seneca frequently insists that every man is born into two communities, the Cosmopolis and his native city[13].

The law of nature.

304. The world-state is not held together either by force or by state-craft, but by goodwill. We must be able say ‘Love is god there, and is a helpmate to make the city secure[14].’ This feeling of love and friendship grows up naturally between wise men, because they partake in the reason of the universe; so that we may equally well say that the bond of the state is the Logos (ratio atque oratio)[15]. Since reason and the universal law exist in the community from the beginning, law does not need to be created; it exists of itself, and by natural growth (φύσει)[16]. The writing down of laws is only a stage in their development[17].

Zeno’s revolutionary views.

305. The theory of the world-state, as first sketched by Zeno, found no place for any of the cherished institutions of the Athens in which it was preached. In the heavenly city must be neither temples nor images[18]; so far the aims of the Persian invader are to be carried out. The reason given is far from flattering to the artistic pride of the Athenians, for they are told that their magnificent buildings and statues of world-wide renown are only the work of common builders and workmen[19]. Nor must there be law-courts[20] or gymnasia. The practice of hearing both sides in a law-court is unreasonable, because if the plaintiff has proved his case it is useless to hear the defendant, and if he has not proved it, it is superfluous[21]. The training of the youth in grammar, music, and gymnastic is worthless[22], for the true education is in virtue. Coined money, as in modern communistic Utopias, should not be required either for commerce or for travel[23].

Women to be in common.

306. With regard to the position of women Zeno, agreeing to some extent with Plato, asserted the startling doctrine that ‘women should be in common, and men should mate with them as they pleased[24].’ That Zeno was suggesting, even for an imaginary state, any sort of loose living, need not for a moment be supposed; his continence was notable[25]; he expressly approves of marriage[26]; and the members of his school were honourably known by their aversion to adultery[27]. But Zeno could not base his theory of the relation of the sexes merely upon established practice. We may assume that he observed that in the world of animals and of birds mating was free[28], whereas in human society it was encumbered by national prejudices, class privilege, and personal jealousy; and in particular that woman was regarded as a chattel, contrary to the fundamental principle of his state[29]. By his doctrine of ‘free mating’ he aimed at the root of these evils. The gradual abolition at Rome of the restrictions on ‘connubium’ illustrates the application of his principle, just as the prohibition of ‘miscegenation’ in modern America illustrates its denial. Zeno may well have perceived how deeply the potentiality of marriage affects all social relations, and it is probable that the progress of Stoicism did much to break down the racial barriers that existed in Zeno’s time, but which had almost completely disappeared five centuries later throughout the civilized world. Another application of his doctrine is found in the life of Cato of Utica[30]. But its general meaning is clear: marriage exists not by nature, but by institution (θέσει); its law is human and mutable, but nevertheless within proper limits is one that may not be transgressed. By the side of the text of Zeno we still have the authorized comment of Epictetus[31].

Incest no abomination.

307. The Stoics did not shrink from insisting upon the abstract principle of the community of women even in an extreme case in which their doctrine encountered a violent prejudice. No natural law, they maintained, prohibits marriage relationship between near relatives[32]. The tale of Oedipus and Jocasta, which is so prominent a theme in the great Athenian tragedies, appears to Zeno to be a matter about which too much ado has been made[33]. For suppose the case that all the world were destroyed by flood except one man and his daughter; would it not be better that he should beget children by her, and that the whole human race should not perish[34]? In this reference to the traditional flood we may readily trace one reason why the Stoics insisted on their principle. For at the beginning of human history we are compelled to postulate an Adam and an Eve, a human pair related in their birth and at the same time united as parents of the race[35]. Go back to the beginnings of the universe; there too we must postulate the same combination of relationships, and so only can we understand the poets when they speak of Hera as ‘wife and sister of Zeus[36].’

Burial a convention.

308. Perhaps even more shocking to Hellenic feeling was Zeno’s indifference to the treatment of the dead, Burial was to him no sacred duty to the departed one; it was equally right to throw the body to the fire, as the Indians, or to the vultures, as the Persians[37]. Nor is there any need to condemn those nations amongst which the dead are eaten by their own relatives[38], for all these things are matters not of principle but of convenience, and to eat human flesh may still be desirable if circumstances require it[39], as for instance in shipwreck, or if a limb is amputated[40]. The problem of the disposal of the dead became a favourite subject of discussion in Stoic circles. Chrysippus wrote at length on the subject, comparing the customs of various nations as well as the habits of animals, in order to ascertain the law of nature. He reaches the conclusion that dead bodies should be disposed of in the simplest possible way, not being regarded as of more importance than the hair or nail-parings from which we part in life[41]. Cicero shortly sums up this discussion in the Tusculan disputations, and draws the conclusion that whilst the living must consider what it is fitting for them to do, to the dead man it is a matter totally indifferent[42]. In the imperial period this consideration is of importance as showing that the tyrant has no power after death[43].

Slavery.

309. The Stoic view of slavery can readily be inferred. Without proposing the immediate abolition of this social institution, the Stoics treated it as essentially contrary to nature[44]. The earliest teachers seem to have passed over the subject in silence; Panaetius (as might be expected from his social position), justified slavery by the arguments of Plato and Aristotle in exceptional cases: ‘all those who through the infirmity of their nature are unfit to govern themselves, are rightly made slaves’[45]. According to this theory we may speak of a ‘natural slave’ (φύσει δοῦλος), who as such can no more have rights in the community than the lower animals. The true Stoic theory appears however to be formulated by a definition of Chrysippus, who says that a slave is a ‘labourer hired for life[46].’ This definition makes of slavery a contract, to which there are two parties; and Seneca rightly uses this definition to argue that the relations of master to slave are those of man to man, and that as the master may wrong his slave, so the slave may do a service to his master[47]. All this is really implied in the dogma that ‘women and slaves may become philosophers,’ as is realized by the Church Father Lactantius[48].

Constitutions.

310. The Stoic principles of politics may be realized under any form of government, and the theory of Constitutions, like that of grammar, belongs to a neutral ground on which philosophers of different schools may work in harmony. The Peripatetics appear first to have taken up this study; of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon[49], who himself acted as a political representative of Athens, is stated to have shown interest in this subject; and after him Panaetius developed a complete theory, of which the substance is preserved for us in Cicero’s de Re publica[50]. According to this theory, which Cicero puts in the mouth of Scipio Africanus, surrounded by Roman Stoics of distinction such as Laelius, Tubero, and Furius Philo, the best constitution is one in which the elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are combined, though a bias remains in favour of monarchy[51]. This mixed constitution, according to the teaching of Panaetius and his pupil Polybius, is best illustrated in the Roman state[52]; whereas tyranny, the perversion of monarchy, is the worst of all governments. By such reasoning the Roman nobles of the first century B.C. and the first century A.D. alike persuaded themselves easily that Stoic teaching supported the position of the republican party. But in fact they were maintaining Peripatetic theories of government, and the real Stoic theory was far more in accord with that practice of the principate, according to which all citizens are treated with respect, and the government of them is placed in the hands of men selected for their personal merit. We shall discuss the whole question of the relation of Stoicism to Roman politics in a later chapter[53]; but we may notice here that those Stoics practically abandoned the theory of providence who looked into the history of their own times with the intention of seeing nowhere the ‘king,’ and everywhere the ‘tyrant.’ On the other hand the practical statesmen who set about to re-create Roman law on the principle of substituting everywhere human rights for class privileges were men thoroughly imbued with the Stoic spirit, whether or not they were avowed disciples of this philosophy.

The citizen.

311. We must therefore maintain that the true Stoic state, whether it be called monarchy or democracy, calls for a revolt against nationalism, antiquity, custom, pride, and prejudice; and a new construction based upon universal reason and individual liberty. For the realization of this state it is first necessary to build up the individual, to fill his mind with the conception of reason and love, to strengthen his will to a true independence: for it is not buying or selling that makes the slave, but the will within[54]. All are in truth slaves except the wise man; for freedom is the power of directing one’s own actions[55]. Here then we pass from the community to the individual, from politics to ethics in the narrower sense.

The supreme good.

312. For the individual man the ethical problem is to bring himself, a part of nature, into harmony with the whole. Whether we think of destiny, of providence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual is to agree and to cooperate; to struggle and to rebel is to fail. This success is the end (τέλος) for which man exists, the supreme good (summum bonum), the ultimate good (ultimum bonorum), that towards which all other right action works, whilst it works itself for no other end[56]. Its name in the individual is virtue (ἀρετή, virtus), and it is an active and firmly-established disposition of the soul[57]. It follows from the monistic principle that the end for man is one, and that virtue is one; but nevertheless each is capable of being regarded in many aspects. The harmony of the ethical end with other parts of the Stoic philosophy is marked by such phrases as ‘life according to nature[58],’ the rule ‘keep company with God[59],’ and the identification of virtue and reason[60].

Consistency with nature.

313. Because virtue is one thing and not many, it makes a man’s life one consistent whole, and stands in sharp contrast to the changing and undecided ways of the crowd. Virtue is therefore frequently defined as consistency in life[61], an even steady course of action[62], self-consistency[63], a principle in agreement with its applications[64]. The opposite of virtue is the unending restlessness and indecision of the man in the crowd[65]. Accordingly we are told that the earliest Stoics thought it a sufficient definition of wisdom or virtue that it was something simple[66]; and similarly Zeno said that the end of life was ‘to live consistently[67].’ To this short definition the words ‘with nature’ were soon added[68], whereby the distinctiveness of the original definition was diminished: for all the philosophical schools are agreed that the right life must be guided by nature (φύσει), not by convention (θέσει). From the time of Chrysippus the relation of right living to nature was further analyzed. Chrysippus defined the ‘nature’ referred to as ‘universal and human nature[69],’ thereby further approximating to the teaching of rival schools; but on the other hand he gave this new and more characteristic explanation ‘to live virtuously is to live according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which pervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering of this world[70].’ Diogenes of Babylon introduced the words ‘to take a reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with nature[71].’ Antipater’s definition is ‘to live with preference for what is natural, and aversion to what is against nature[72],’ thus throwing the stress on the doctrine of the ‘things of high degree[73].’ Panaetius made a distinct step forward when he admitted the claims of universal nature to be supreme, but (subject to them) held that each man should follow the pointings of his individual nature[74]; this teaching however comes rather near to naming a twofold end. Cicero follows Panaetius in his de Officiis[75], but in the de Finibus adheres more closely to Chrysippus[76], and Seneca agrees with him in laying stress on the need of scientific knowledge of natural events[77]. In the main therefore ‘life according to nature’ means to the Stoics life in accordance with the general movement of the universe, to which the particular strivings of the individual must be subordinated.

Obedience to God.

314. From the religious standpoint virtue is willing cooperation with the deity, in preference to that unwilling cooperation to which even evil-doers are forced. This conception, first set forth by Cleanthes in a poem that we have quoted above[78], is enforced by Seneca and Epictetus also in varying phrases. ‘I do not obey God,’ says Seneca, ‘I agree with him. I go with him heart and soul, and not because I must[79].’ With a slight change of language this leads us to the paradox that ‘obedience to God is liberty[80].’ ‘I have placed my impulses,’ says Epictetus, ‘in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is my wish also. Does he not wish it? I do not wish it[81].’ The personal bent of Epictetus leads him to develope this idea in the direction of suffering rather than of acting. ‘If the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would cooperate towards his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him in accordance with the universal arrangement[82].’ The proof that this must be so rests on the unity of the Divine and individual purposes: ‘Good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another thing[83].’

Social duty.

315. It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue of the individual is that disposition which will make him the best possible member of society, that is, the best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis. Yet this is everywhere implied. In the first place the wise man will take part in the life of the community[84], he will marry and bring up children[85]. In the second place the virtue of man differs first from the corresponding quality in the animals in that man is formed by nature for social union; hence his reason only comes into play simultaneously with the recognition that he is a member of a community, and as such bound to prefer the good of the whole to that of a part. ‘Nature,’ says Panaetius, ‘through reason unites man to man, so that they have a common bond in conversation and life; it induces men to approve and take part in public gatherings and festivals, and to collect the materials for a social and cultivated life for themselves, their children, and all whom they hold dear[86].’

Health of soul.

316. Virtue, as a disposition of the soul[87], reflects all the aspects in which the soul itself is regarded. Since the principate is both wisdom and will, so virtue is wisdom, according to the paradox of Socrates and the Cynics[88]. Because virtue is wisdom, it can be taught[89]; in fact, it can only be acquired by teaching; and equally evil-doing can be cured by teaching[90]. But no less virtue is will. Cleanthes emphasized this aspect, and identified virtue both with the Socratic ‘strength of character’ and with the Stoic ‘tone[91].’ In so far as virtue is will, it is to be acquired by constant practice[92]. A true judgment is endangered by hasty assent; a healthy will by slackness of the soul’s sinews. In the Stoic system vigour and strength of mind is everywhere identified with the ‘true tone’ (εὐτονία)[93]; the possibility of overstrain is not considered. But in the development of the ideal we have two varying aspects of virtue presented to us. At one moment we see the man of action, engaged in the thick of the battle, sun-browned, dusty, horny-handed[94]; with this model before him we find Musonius objecting altogether to relaxation of moral tone as being equivalent to its loss[95]. At another moment we see the man of quiet conviction, who goes his way unmoved in the face of the howls of the mob or the threats of the tyrant[96]; he is distinguished by a mental calm[97] which no storms can shake. Any discrepancy between these views is finally reconciled by introducing a comparison between the soul and the body. The philosophers had at all times been greatly influenced by the theories and practice of the physicians; and they were proud to call themselves physicians of the soul.’ Chrysippus spent much time in comparing diseases of the soul to those of the body[98]. Equally there must be a healthy state of the soul corresponding to that of the body, in which all its parts are in harmony[99]. Hence in the Stoic prayer health of soul is asked for, side by side with health of body[100]; and Seneca bases a singularly complete statement of the Stoic conception of happiness upon a permanently healthy condition of the mind[101].

Virtue lies in intention.

317. Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the soul; it is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (inclinatio), its aim (intentio), its desire (βούλησις, voluntas) is everything; the performance through the organs of the body is nothing[102]. This Stoic dogma is to-day so familiar in divinity, law, and society that it is not easy to realize how paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its proclamation the Stoics defied the whole system of tabu by which the ancient world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and detestable; a system still in force in many departments of life and theoretically defended by the ‘intuitive system of morals.’ The defenders of tabu were bitterly affronted, and indignantly asked questions which mostly concerned the sexual relations, with regard to which tabu appears to have been at the time most vigorous. ‘Is there nothing wrong in cannibalism? in foul language? in incest? in the accursed relations with boy favourites (παιδικά)?’ To these questions firm-minded Stoics were bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying themselves open to the charge of being defenders of immorality. This charge however is never to be taken seriously; the high practical morality of the Stoics placed them beyond reproach. But it was also easy to raise a laugh by quotations from these austere moralists which sounded like a defence of licentiousness. The solution of the difficulty in each individual case follows exactly the same lines as in politics; and there is the same divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their principles at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are intent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. Here we need only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal with questions affecting practical life in another chapter[103].

Tabus.

318. The principal tabus affecting the individual have to do with cannibalism, the sexual relations, nudity, and obscenity. Of the first we have already spoken; the other three appeared to the Stoics partly due to inherited prejudices, partly to the theory that the body is in itself vile and corrupt. Of neither point of view could the Stoics approve. Hence their repeated assertions that no sexual act, whether commonly described as natural or as unnatural, is in itself to be condemned, but only according as it is seemly or unseemly for the individual[104]. It was perhaps unnecessary to explain to Greeks that the naked body is in itself no offensive sight, but doubtless the Stoics had to make this clear to their Oriental pupils; Zeno at any rate laid down the principle when he said that men and women should wear the same clothes (meaning such as nature requires for warmth and not such as fashion prescribes), and hide no part of the body[105]. As to decency of language, it did not occur to the Stoics to discuss this question in connexion with the history of literature. Since truth is always good, and the very purpose of language is to express truth, a wise man will always say straight out what he needs to say[106].

Virtue in its applications.

319. Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between the ethical principles of the Stoics and the Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy of virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external circumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics virtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the universe. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that universal reason which is equally at work in the universe and in the human mind. The Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into touch with circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this arises their doctrine that virtue is bound up with the study both of universal and of individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent there are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must avoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this doctrine as an afterthought[107], suggested by practical difficulties, and alien from the original teaching of Zeno. This seems to be a misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said: ‘some things are good, some are evil, some indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice, fortitude, everything that is virtue or an aspect of virtue; evil are folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an aspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain and pleasure, riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth[108].’ But there is a difference between a principle and its application; and this very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying difference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno was therefore quite consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of this difference.

Worth and Unworth.

320. This secondary difference is termed by the Stoics a difference of worth (ἀξία, aestimatio)[109]. Health, life, riches, have positive worth in greater or less degree; disease, death, poverty, have negative worth (ἀπαξία, inaestimabile)[110]. Between these lie things that are absolutely indifferent, as, for example, whether the number of hairs on one’s head is odd or even[111], or whether we take up one or the other of two coins that have the same general appearance and the same stamp[112]. Even here a slight distinction has to be made; as to whether the hairs on the head are odd or even in number we have not the slightest concern; but in the matter of the coins we must make a choice, and that quickly. Let us then settle the matter anyhow, by chance as common folk say; ‘for a reason that is not clear to us,’ as the Stoics say, not willing to admit an effect without a cause, and yet leaving the matter much where it was[113]. And now as to the things that have ‘worth’; it is clear that in some sense they are ‘according to nature,’ and in the same sense those things that have ‘negative worth’ are opposed to nature[114]; and the former in some way approximate to the character of the good[115]. It is then necessary to describe them by some term other than ‘good.’ Zeno selected the term προηγμένον ‘of high degree,’ which Cicero translates variously by producta, promota, praecipua, praelata, and praeposita. This term, we are told, Zeno borrowed from court life: ‘for no one would think of calling a king “of high degree,” but only those who are of a rank next to his, though far below[116].’ The opposites were described as ἀποπροηγμένα (remota, reiecta) ‘things of low degree[117].’ Seneca, who states the theory with great clearness[118], commonly uses the handier terms commoda (‘advantages’) and incommoda (‘disadvantages’)[119]. In their treatment of the separate matters which fall under these divisions the Stoics were in close agreement with the Peripatetic theory of natural ends (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν)[120]: but their loyalty to their own school came into question, if they actually termed them ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ as Chrysippus thought permissible if sufficient precautions were taken[121], and as Seneca often describes them in his less careful moods[122].

The aim of virtue.

321. The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory of ‘advantages’ is essential to their system, because without it virtue has no meaning, and practical life no guide[123]; whereas as soon as this theory is established, we can assign to virtue the permanent and distinctive character, that it aims at securing ‘advantages’ and avoiding ‘disadvantages[124].’ Now we are able to enlarge, though we do not alter, our definition of the supreme good; the ‘consistent life,’ the ‘life consistent with nature,’ is the ‘life which is accompanied by a true knowledge of the things that happen by nature’; to which words we now add ‘choosing those things which are in accordance with nature, and avoiding those things which are against nature[125].’ Nevertheless, virtue consists wholly in the aiming at the mark, and not at all in the hitting it. As the true sportsman finds all his pleasure in throwing his quoit according to the rules of the game, and in aiming his arrow at the centre of the target, but cares not in the least (so it would seem) whether he succeeds[126]; so the wise man, even though (by those circumstances which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we call ‘the play of fortune’) he gain no ‘advantage’ at all, but suffer dishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things. This is the Stoic doctrine of the ‘sufficiency of virtue,’ expressed in the language of paradox, but nevertheless the central point of their whole ethical system; and its force is really intensified by the doctrine of ‘advantages,’ which to a superficial critic appears to relax it.

Sufficiency of virtue.

322. The doctrine of the sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια, sufficientia) of virtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of all periods, though in ever-varying phraseology. Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase ‘virtue is sufficient for happiness,’ or in other words ‘virtue needs but herself for a happy life[127].’ Chrysippus maintains that there are only three logical views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or both[128], and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness therefore is not made greater if advantages are added to virtue; or rather, virtue does not permit addition (accessio)[129]. In the transition period Antipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to have attributed a little importance, though very little, to external advantages[130]; but, as we have seen above[131], his definition of the supreme good is in full accord with the general teaching of the school. Panaetius and Posidonius held to the orthodox doctrine both in word and deed, if we may trust the direct statements of Cicero[132]; nevertheless they were so anxious to assimilate their expressions to those of ordinary life, that the conclusion could easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached importance to external goods[133]. One authority indeed states that they held health, strength, and estate to be ‘needful’ for happiness, thus abandoning the sufficiency of virtue[134]; but in the absence of direct quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this statement as implying anything different from the distinction of Chrysippus, viz. that ‘the wise man needs nothing, but has use for everything[135].’ But any faltering shown by the transition writers was more than made good by the zeal of the teachers under the principate. Seneca enforces the paradox in a score of phrases; in the form of a proverb ‘virtue is its own reward[136]’; in rhetorical exuberance ‘virtue can defy death, ill fortune, and tyranny[137]’; it is ‘independent even of the deity[138]’; and ‘no circumstances can increase or impair its perfection[139].’ Epictetus often dwells on the same theme[140], and the whole work of Marcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it[141]. Nor is the dogma merely scholastic; the teachers of the Roman period lay special emphasis on the practical importance of upholding the ideal of virtue, as alike single and complete in itself[142].

Virtue and the virtues.

323. But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in its applications; though it can only be possessed as a whole, it is attained by stages. By this amplification of the Stoic doctrine the way is prepared for that adaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of circumstance which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By the side of virtue stand ‘the virtues,’ sometimes conceived as virtue herself endowed with various qualities[143], more often as virtue at work in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes in turn the shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly understood, namely Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness[144]; we may, if we please, reckon with a smaller or greater number[145]; yet we must always remember that the virtues are so knit together, that he who truly possesses one, possesses all[146]. Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of which (whatever its sphere) is a ‘right action’ (κατόρθωμα, recte factum)[147]. In proportion as virtue is displayed in its various qualities and spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself a larger field; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread out and broadened[148].

How virtue is won.

324. Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also a history. This follows clearly from Stoic principles, since virtue is an aspect of reason, and children are not possessed of reason[149]. Virtue therefore comes by training, not by birth[150]; by art, not by nature[151]. In the period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states of the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of virtue; and he who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom we call ‘the probationer’ (προκόπτων, proficiens[152]), by learning and practice comes daily nearer to his goal, till in the crowning moment he wins it as a whole; for virtue is no sum of lesser dispositions reached by a gradual addition of item to item, but a thing complete in itself[153]. Can virtue thus won be lost at a later time? Virtue, it may seem, is not really such, unless it is indestructible; and the Cynics and the earlier Stoics taught accordingly that virtue cannot be lost[154], that it is a ‘possession for ever.’ In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus yielded to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through intoxication or indigestion[155], to which causes might well be added the failure of the reason through insanity or old age[156]. But in spite of these difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic school held firmly to the doctrine that virtue once acquired is acquired for ever[157].

Wise men.

325. Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philosopher; they exist and can be studied in human shape, in the wise and foolish men of myth, history, and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best be learnt by considering virtuous men[158]. Here the Stoics followed closely the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics[159]. As the best of models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed a god[160], who travelled over all the world, purging it of every lawlessness, and bringing with him justice, holiness, and peace[161]. Next comes Ulysses, who like Hercules was untiring in his labours, triumphant over pain, and a conqueror throughout all the world[162]; an example to all men of endurance and vigour[163]. To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was a like example to prove that suffering is a good[164]. Many such are counted amongst the philosophers; first Heraclitus, not for his insight into nature, but for his control over his passions[165]; then Socrates, who in life and death was equally a model as a man and as a citizen[166]. Diogenes the Cynic is worthy of special honour, for he was so filled with love for mankind and obedience to God, that he willingly undertook a life of labour and bodily suffering, and thus won himself the true freedom[167], and became truly happy, truly divine[168]. Zeno the most temperate of philosophers[169], and Cleanthes[170] the most enduring, were men of like type within the Stoic school itself.

Wise Romans.

326. To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the Romans were proud to add other names from their own history, thereby associating their philosophic principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology Aeneas was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally cooperate with the destiny of his people; from the times of the republic Scipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion Laelius[171]; whilst in Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be found who, like Socrates, would not when on his trial consent to any other defence than a plain statement of the facts, in which he neither exaggerated his own merits nor made any plea for mercy[172]. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica was pre-eminent[173]. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in political life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and success, his testimony to Cato’s sincerity is all the more valuable[174]; nor can we believe that Cato’s voluntary death would so soon and so greatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come as the climax of a life worthily spent[175]. The period of the principate brought to the front both men and women whose fearless lives and quiet self-approved deaths proved them to be worthy successors to the heroes of the past; and at the same time we notice a disposition to find some at least of the elements of the heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the soldier, the athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their degree as models for those that seek wisdom[176].

Wise men are few.

327. The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men had existed and did exist; they looked forward to a time not far distant when there should be a Cosmopolis in which every citizen should be wise. This robust belief was not maintained by their successors. According to Chrysippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed[177]; and he expressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are amongst the number[178]. The Stoics of the transition period avoided the topic as troublesome[179]; and their opponents naturally pressed it on them all the more. Zeno had said ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods: it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.’ This was now parodied: ‘It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore wise men exist.’ If this argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told[180], to the Stoics, because they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, we are not surprised to find that sometimes they refer him to the golden age[181], at other times convert him into an ideal[182]. The Stoics under the Roman principate re-affirmed vigorously the existence of the wise man[183]. Seneca however admits that his appearance is as rare as that of the phoenix[184], and altogether disclaims any such character for himself individually[185]. Epictetus is far more true to the spirit of the old doctrine, when he not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his own character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope of reaching perfection[186].

The glory of virtue.

328. Thus the Stoics founded their moral ideal on the triple basis of the good citizen, the healthily-disposed soul, and the examples of wise men. In impressing this part of their system on their pupils, they made little use of definitions or syllogisms, but all the more they resorted to rhetorical description. As in their physics the Logos became almost a person, so here the picture of Virtue is drawn, as by Prodicus in the old allegory of the choice of Hercules, drawing men to her not by the pleasures she offers but by her majesty and beauty[187]. Cleanthes in particular heaps epithets of praise on virtue[188]; more usually it is sufficient to insist that virtue is good, praiseworthy, and expedient. That ‘the wise man is a king[189]’ almost ceases to be a paradox, since the soul is rightly compared to a kingdom; that he is rich, handsome, free, and invincible can equally be argued on Stoic principles[190]. To carry such statements further seems to savour of pedantry, to ridicule them at any stage is easy. Yet the statement that seems the boldest of all, that ‘the wise man is happy even on the rack[191],’ was many a time verified by the experience of individual Stoics[192]. That the wise man is a god, though subject to the limitations of mortality, is maintained without hesitation[193].

Stoic ethics.

329. The Stoic morality differs not only in form and in its reasoned basis, but in substance, both from the popular morality of the time and the ideals of rival philosophical schools. The Stoic heroes differ from those of Homer by a world-age; they possess what the Romans called humanitas, powers of reasoning and of sympathizing unknown to an age of warriors. The Epicurean sage was not, as popular criticism and that of many Stoics unjustly described him, a man of gross tastes and reckless selfishness; but he was essentially easy-going and a quietist, little inclined to risk his peace of mind by meddling with the troubles of others. To the Cynics the Stoics owed much in their principles, to the Academics (as we shall see) much in their application of them; they stood between the two, more reasonable and judicious than the former, firmer in principle than the latter, possessed of a breadth of outlook which neither of these schools could claim.

FOOTNOTES