Part 1 — CHAPTER II

LEAGUE OF NATIONS—THE NEED

Unless a nation, like an individual, have some purpose, some ideal, some motive which lies outside of and beyond self-interest and self-aggrandisement, war must continue on the face of this earth until the day when the last and strongest man shall look out upon a world that has been depopulated in its pursuit of a false ideal.—NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

Paramount in importance above everything else is the establishment and maintenance of peace between nations. No remedies for disease, no rules for healthy life will avail, if the arteries through which the life-blood is pouring away remain open still or are only temporarily closed and liable after a brief interval to burst out anew. The vitality of the nation would be gone beyond recovery if another generation of its best manhood were to be sacrificed and its materiall resources again squandered to meet the necessities of a great war.

Every day that the War lasts forces on us more clearly the fact that Science, not only natural science—physics and chemistry—but also the scientific organisation of the State as an instrument of war, has so developed the means of destruction as either to blot out humanity or to leave the greater part of mankind in abject and bitter slavery to the powers that can wield most effectively the instruments of death and of torture, if war between the leading nations breaks out again after an interval of seeming peace. How warfare has changed within living memory! Five-and-twenty years ago the highest authority on

But some man—one of those who never look beyond the next year and their own street, and expects always to carry on business as usual—will say that the nations will be exhausted and tired of war, and this War will be

Assume even that no new war does break out again actually, dare any nation neglect to keep up its naval and military armaments on a scale far greater than before? How is the burden to be met when every penny that can be raised as revenue will be needed to meet the charge on our gigantic debt and the necessary claims for carrying on Government, to say nothing of improving the conditions of life? We cannot, nor can other nations, go on using up capital and borrowing indefinitely. The choice is between assured peace and certain ruin, even if no war actually occurs. How can peace be assured? It would be well for some of those with the requisite historical knowledge and insight to trace carefully the causes which have led to war in the past, to attempt a diagnosis of the disease which has again and again devastated the world. A vain classification might perhaps be made into religious wars, dynastic wars, trade wars; but is there not one element common almost to all, namely, the will to power, the desire and intention of some man or set of men to impose their will on others, regardless of justice, which forbids the exercise of force to prevent each thinking, speaking, acting as he will, provided he does not injure the rights of others? It was the assertion of a claim to dominate which led to the eighty years' war when Spain tried to impose her yoke on the Netherlands, and blended with desire for gain a crusade against the faiths which rejected the supremacy of Rome. Was the Thirty years War a religious war or a struggle between

The urgency of taking definite steps to secure peace has been recognised already, much thought has been devoted to it, and schemes even in some detail have been suggested for dealing with it. The idea of a League of Nations to secure peace is occupying the attention of many of the wisest minds and of the statesmen who hold the most responsible positions. It is meeting with strong popular support, at all events in Britain and in the United States. France and Italy are examining the proposal. It is well, however, where attractive phrases are used and schemes proposed, to subject them carefully to the double test: how far they cover the ground and meet the real difficulties; and, secondly, how they would work out in practice in the circumstances which are likely to arise. We want to look at the question as a whole, to see exactly what we have to aim at, sometimes to reiterate what seem almost useless truisms. The obvious is too often overlooked. First we need to recognise the actual facts, then let the right spirit grow up and become general, and after that attempt to plan the best machinery and test its probable effect and efficiency by seeing how it would be expected to work in various special cases.

There are now in the world two fundamentally different ways of looking at international relations. On the one hand, we have the assertions expressed definitely in words by many Germans and acted upon consistently without qualification by the German Government, that justice is the interest of the stronger; that power and force may be, and indeed ought to be, exerted by a State without any check on moral grounds; that a strong nation must realise itself, develop and use its strength without regard to the so-called rights of the weaker; that "those should take who have

LEAGUE OF NATIONS—THE SCHEME

If any peace after the War is to be permanent there must be a settlement not only between territorial claims but an arrangement with regard to the machinery by which peace will be maintained in the future.

Perhaps the most convenient way to gain a more definite idea of what the proposal for a League of Nations really means, to understand both its advantages and the difficulties involved in it, may be to follow the debate on the subject initiated by Lord Parmoor in the House of Lords in March of 1918. It shows that the idea of a League of Nations to prevent war is taking definite shape, and is not regarded by practical men—statesmen with experience of the actual conduct of international affairs, and lawyers who as members of the judicial committee of the Privy Council have had to devote their attention to questions of international law—as outside the range of practical politics. It shows also that the idea will stand the test of discussion and calm criticism.

Lord Lansdowne—to whom, whatever may be thought of some recent utterances, the country owes a debt of gratitude too little recognised, especially for his conduct of foreign affairs at a most difficult period during the Boer War—stated his opinion that "in a league pronouncing a sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away from its obligations you would have a material guarantee for the maintenance of peace." He pointed out how "the existence of such a league might perhaps have prevented the War in July of 1914, as it was impossible in that time of clamour and confusion when one suggestion after another made by those who, like Sir ^[1] These heads would, to say the least, form the basis for discussion leading to practical results. One or two of his proposed clauses may be quoted as expressing in definite language the fundamental principles which must be the basis of any such League. The first may appear perhaps only a "pious opinion." It is really very much more. Assent to it means the complete repudiation of the ideas which have guided German policy—the ideas which made world war inevitable, and which will inevitably lead to war in the future unless they are abandoned. Any nation which assents to the clause tells the world that it expressly rejects those ideas and agrees that its action shall be guided by principles diametrically opposed to them. Assent to a declaration of the kind suggested would certainly affect the spirit in which international questions are approached in future, and probably the resulting action also. It runs:

"The League to recognise that war from whatever cause is a danger to our common civilisation, and that international disputes ought to be settled on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms." The last clause dealing with the admission of new members of the League is the complement of this. There is to be power "to admit a nation as a member of the ^[2]

The great difficulty, of course, arises as to the means of enforcing the agreement against war, of finding some proper and effective sanction to secure its observance. It may be well to note that throughout this discussion the word sanction is used in the strict legal sense, meaning some definite penalty or punishment to be inflicted on a wrong-doer. It is the existence of such a "sanction" which is the clearest way of enforcing

Two definite proposals are made in Lord Parker's scheme. (1) "If an act of war be committed against any member of the League, the Council is to notify it, and thereupon every member should (a) break off diplomatic relations with the nation guilty of such act; (b) prohibit and take effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between itself and the guilty party; (c) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its territories."

A very similar suggestion, though not quite so definite, was made by the present writer in an article on "Sanction in International Law," which appeared in the Italian Journal "Scientia" in 1916. "The nations might agree that any belligerent which wilfully violates or invades neutral territory shall be treated as a moral leper. Without actually going to war they should cease to have dealings with the invader, forbid all intercourse of their subjects with the country which violates the neutral territory."

For the sake of brevity this may be called the "economic boycott," but it is really very much more than simply economic pressure. It is a common habit in political discussions to confuse very different things, to which the same name is given, and the term "economic boycott" is being used to cover three proposals of very different character. (a) It may mean a permanent exclusion of Germany from the markets of the world to punish its people for supporting the crimes of its rulers and incidentally to secure for ourselves a valuable extension of trade by reason of the exclusion of a rival. (b) It may mean a temporary measure to insure that agreed terms of peace are observed by those who disregard "mere scraps of paper," to act as a guarantee that restitution shall be made for wrongs done, to check the revival and extension of the enemy's armaments, to make the German people feel the disadvantages and loss caused by their action, and the c) It may mean a sanction for breach of the stipulations contained in the agreement on which the League of Nations is founded, i.e., a punishment to be inflicted on anyone who infringes the agreement he has made—a means of insuring performance of its terms. It is in this last sense that it is used in the present discussion.

(2) The second sanction proposed in the scheme is of a still more serious character. The clause to embody it runs as follows:

"Certain members of the League specified in a schedule and to consist of the chief military and naval powers, should agree, if required to do so by a resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty nation shall have accepted terms which shall be approved by the League."

This proposal might more effectually prevent wrong-doing, but, even if carefully guarded as Lord Parker proposes, appears open to serious objections. There seems grave reason to fear that while intended to prevent war, it might really be the cause of disputes, and possibly of war of the most deadly kind. Such a stipulation might cast a terrible burden on a strong naval power like Great Britain, and have most disastrous consequences. We are bound to maintain a strong navy to keep open communication between the different parts of the Empire and also to protect our food supplies. Without sea power Britain could in a few months be starved into submission to any terms in case of war, but to maintain a large navy to be at the beck and call of a Council representing all the nations who cared to join the proposed League would be intolerable. Suppose, for example, the United States demanded satisfaction for some outrage on American subjects, or suppose American subjects were threatened with massacre in some unsettled country such as Mexico, and in order to obtain satisfaction or to protect its

Unless it be with some country which she can trust and whose Government and its aims she can thoroughly rely upon, and then only for some limited and specific purpose, Great Britain, or any other naval or military power, ought not to bind itself to go to war and employ its forces. We must be free to reduce those forces or to refrain from employing them in making war. An engagement which might in circumstances, the real character of which no one can foresee at present, compel us to undertake a war at the bidding of others is a thing to which we ought never to consent. Engagements to make war are not a safe way of promoting peace. They may possibly be justified where there is some clearly specified object, some defined case in which ipso facto, an economic outlaw, then the motive both for being included within and for remaining within the League will be increased a hundredfold, and wholly for the benefit of mankind."

Of course, logically many of the objections which can be urged against an agreement to make war might also be urged against an agreement for a boycott of this kind, but in practice the risks in the case of the boycott would be far less serious. Members of a club might well agree to expel and to cut a member who assaults another, but it would be a different vir pietate gravis—stepped in, and each party, without fear that his refraining from fighting would expose him to future encroachments on his rights, could agree to abide by

Where two high-spirited persons are engaged in a dispute, and each is ready to maintain his cause with the sword, the intervention of a third may save both from the disasters of a battle. The words of the Douglas when intervening in a heated contest, "The first who strikes shall be my foe," may sometimes be a model for the real peacemaker. But he would certainly have resented the idea of agreeing to keep prepared, ready armed to fight at the bidding of a number of other chiefs, anyone who used force to prevent or punish some injury to himself.

FOOTNOTES:

[1]

The death of Lord Parker, which occurred soon after these words were written, has deprived the country of the services of one of the few great jurists at a time when they are most sorely needed. There are many good lawyers, many judicial minds acute in seizing the really relevant points in a complicated case, but very few, perhaps none, who united to legal learning and judicial penetration so broad a grasp of principle and appreciation of the larger issues involved in decisions given.

[2]

A passage in Mr. Brailsford's book on a "League of Nations," published some months before the debate took place, but which I had not seen when the above lines were written, puts the point most forcibly:

"We set out to destroy Prussian militarism. It will be destroyed at the moment when a German Government pledges itself to enter a league based on arbitration and conciliation."

LEAGUE OF NATIONS—THE CONDITIONS

After an adjourned debate on June 27th, 1918, in which Lord Curzon pointed out several practical difficulties that would have to be faced, the House of Lords, surely not a body to be carried away by any ephemeral current of popular feeling^[3] or captivated by a vague phrase, passed with practical unanimity a resolution in these terms, "That this House approves of the principle of a League of Nations, and commends to His Majesty's Government a study of the conditions required for its realisation." It in effect declared the "preamble proved," and proposed that "the clauses" should be considered. At the suggestion of Lord Bryce—a true friend of peace, if ever there was one—certain words contained in the original resolution proposing that there should be a tribunal constituted "whose orders shall be enforceable by adequate sanction" were omitted. The question of sanction is, no doubt, a crucial one, but it seemed better to substitute the more general words urging an inquiry into the conditions necessary for the establishment of a League, in fact to see generally—looking at the question as a whole—what definite and practical steps should be taken to bring the League into existence and define its constitution, aims and powers. In passing such a resolution the House of Lords was expressing the feeling of the nation. Its great importance was that by an assembly so critical, containing men of such varied experience and-with special knowledge both of law and of foreign

It would be most unfortunate if the approval of the proposal to give the League powers to direct the use of the naval and military forces of certain of its members were to be made a condition precedent to approval of the principle of a League and as necessarily implied in it. Earnest advocates of that principle may dissent entirely from Viscount Grey's statement in his pamphlet, published about the time when the debate took place, that "those States that have power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military or naval, that they possess." "Anything less than this is of no value." They may hold, on the contrary, that a League might be of great value without any agreement binding certain of its members to employ—which implies an obligation to maintain—naval and military forces and armaments at the bidding of the League Council on a scale and in the manner which would either be settled from time to time by representatives of other nations or be the subject of some preliminary agreement. Settling the terms of such an agreement might involve serious disputes and delay the establishment of the League indefinitely. The moral influence due to the existence of a League embracing all nations which regard war as an evil to be stopped if possible, would be great. A Declaration of Faith, in which those who hold a common belief give expression to it, has its effect. An agreement between nations or individuals, even where there is no legal sanction, would be regarded as something that they will try to carry out. The breach of such an agreement would excite the "resentment which is the life-blood of law." Still the risk of disregard of the obligations is great unless there is a definite material sanction, an evil imposed by force on a wrong-doer, and no doubt it will be urged that some objections to employ military and naval power to enforce the obligations imposed by the League may be raised against the less drastic proposal for an economic boycott, but in actual working the two things, as already

It is constantly found that a penalty of smaller amount, a less severe punishment, is more likely to prevent a wrong than a heavier one, provided that it is prompt and certain. Had Germany known a few months sooner that Britain would assuredly go to war and put into such war her whole resources if Belgium were invaded, it is not improbable that that outrage would never have been committed; but had Germany also known that the moment her troops crossed the Belgian frontier every German ship in the United States would be interned, every American citizen punished as a criminal by the United States Government if he traded with Germany, that "intercourse" with the aggressor would be at once forbidden, and that these restraints would be continued until complete restitution had been made, is it not morally certain that Belgium would not have been invaded? War might have been prevented. In fear of such an injury to German trade and commerce, the bankers of Berlin and Frankfort would have denounced war; the merchants of Hamburg and Bremen would have been the strongest advocates of peace. A like test might be applied to other cases of aggression. The effects of breaking off diplomatic—and, still more, commercial—relationships, although no shot is fired and no regiment mobilised, and of mere neutrality differ toto coelo. The very people who are least influenced by moral restraints, who scorn justice, will be most influenced by the financial losses and the destruction of their trade.

It was, no doubt, right "to commend a study of the question" to His Majesty's Government, but it is also well to commend to the Government the desir

To quote Lord Grey's words, Germany has to be convinced that force does not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her. The regeneration of Germany, a real new birth, is necessary if the peace of the world is to be secured; and surely by now we might have learned that such regeneration will never come unless Germany is beaten in this War. As Lord Grey says, "Recent military success and the ascendancy of Prussian militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence" in Germany. As these words are written comes the report of the sinking of the hospital ship Llandovery Castle, followed by cold-blooded and deliberate murder. The mass of German crime grows daily.

The "economic boycott" above referred to differs absolutely in its aim and character from the proposal to impose a permanent and continuous boycott on German commerce to maintain and extend British or other trade at the expense of Germany. Phrases are sometimes used here which seem to be almost a repetition of those so dear to the Pan-German party. "Destroy British commerce that German may replace it," is echoed back as "Destroy German commerce that British may replace it." The whole idea that the progress and extension of the trade and industry of one country is an injury to another is radically false. A spirit of jealousy, regarding the prosperity of others as involving injury to ourselves, is a curse to the individual, to the class, or to the nation which is imbued with it.

To put these questions on the highest moral basis—

FOOTNOTES:

[3]

These words were written before July 9th, and perhaps now require some modification.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS—ITS SCOPE AND AIM

Just so while it is highly important to have controversies between nations settled by arbitration rather than by war, and the growth of sentiment in favour of that peaceable method of settlement is one of the great advances in civilisation of this generation; yet the true basis of peace among men is to be found in a just and considerate spirit among the people who rule our modern democracies, in their regard for the rights of other countries and in their desire to be fair and kindly in the treatment of the subjects which give rise to international controversies. The basis of peace and order is "the self-restraint of the thousands of people who make up the community, and their willingness to obey the law and regard the rights of others."—ELIHU ROOT.

No League of Peace, however, can be sufficient guarantee against a power which is highly organised, vigorous and united, if it desires war. Either such a power must be so defeated and so weakened as to be unable to renew hostilities, or its character so altered as to make it give up the desire for aggression and domination. As Mr. Gerard points out, "It is only by an evolution of Germany herself towards Liberalism that the world will be given such guarantees of future peace as will justify the termination of this War. Liberalism in this sense does not mean violent revolution, but does mean a spirit opposed to that which animates the present Government of Germany, and will continue to do so if no change is made in that Government." "The whole world," as Mr. Gerard says, "feels that peace made with its present Government would not be lasting, that such a peace would mean the detachment of some of the Allies from the present world alliance against Germany, preparation by Germany in light of her needs as disclosed by the War, and the declaration of a new war in which there would be no battle of the Marne to turn back the tide of German

First, that we should not look for a disruption of settled and orderly government in Germany. The anarchy of Russia does not make for world peace. Would not a reasonable man, however liberal his views, prefer for his country the rule of the Kaiser and his devotees to the rule of a Lenin and of Bolsheviks?

Second, it must be clear that we do not desire the destruction of Germany—a futile desire, even if not wicked—but its regeneration. No doubt for a time, whatever happens in Germany, it will be impossible to forget the crimes that have been committed. British sailors will naturally refuse all association with those who have been guilty of the series of murders at sea. Any attempt, however, to exclude Germany from the markets of the world, permanently to destroy German commerce for all time, would make permanent peace impossible. To make that a war aim would be to strengthen every evil influence in Germany, and if done with the object of securing gain to ourselves by ^[4] Let us keep those aims pure to the end. It would, of course, be affectation to suggest that our object in the War is now simply a chivalrous desire to protect the weak or maintain justice. We now know that it is also to preserve our own existence as a nation, and that it would be better for us and our children that Britain should be sunk beneath the sea than that Germany should achieve a complete victory.

It must be reiterated that until Germans and Austrians can be admitted to free intercourse with other nations we can have no complete world peace. For such admission the conditions precedent above stated are essential. But if these are complied with, we must make our choice between the possibility of general peace with a League of Nations embracing all and a state of "veiled and suspended warfare." This

Although there is no sign at present of a changed spirit in the German rulers, or in the party which is now dominant in Germany, the prospect of an alteration in the spirit of the German people is not hopeless, unless they emerge from the War victorious. A significant passage from a German paper is quoted by Sir Dugald Clerk in the most valuable and encouraging address on the "Stability of Britain," delivered by him to the Royal Society of Arts in 1916. "So the Germans are awakening to a consciousness of the futility of their dream of domination founded upon the idea of might, irrespective of the rights of other nations, and they will ultimately be forced to accept the idea, so strange to them hitherto, that honesty between nations is as necessary as between man and man." The whole address should be read as an antidote by any who take a "gloomy joy in depreciation," as a tonic by those who are depressed by our failures and apprehensive of our future.

To maintain a real peace based on goodwill, we want to get rid of the jealous spirit which regards the prosperity of one nation as an injury to others. "The economic and financial strength of this country is founded upon the welfare not merely of the British people, but practically of all countries." "Commerce is not a war. It will be found that wealth increases simultaneously in industrious nations." "We must not even forget that a poverty-stricken Germany and Austria would react on the whole world." "Punish the Germans and Austrians by all means—they thoroughly deserve it—but do not imagine that by cutting those nations out of the world's commerce the other nations can be rendered more wealthy." These general statements do not exclude, of course, the possibility that it may be found necessary for a time by "economic pressure" to secure performance by the enemy of certain terms, nor that, during a period of reconstruction and readjustment, the conditions affecting certain

It is quite possible to lay too much stress on the necessity for definite and formal sanctions to enforce agreements. There are cases in which the enforceZamora establishes the principle that the law which prize courts will follow is International Law, and that they will do so though some Order in Council may conflict with it.

FOOTNOTES:

[4]

How strong this belief was among many of those who had often been in opposition to the British Government was shown at a meeting in Bombay early in the War. The enthusiastic speech of the chairman, the late Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, one of the ablest and most persistent critics of British rule in India for very many years, is one to be remembered.

CONCLUSIONS REACHED

We may now state in order certain definite conclusions which appear to follow from the arguments urged above:—

1.—It is to be expected that during the next thirty years, a period less than that which has elapsed since the Franco-German War, the scientific knowledge of the means of carrying on offensive warfare will have made such advances and become so generally applied, that, if another world war breaks out, not only will material damage be caused which can never be repaired, but the best part of the human race will either be destroyed or suffer deterioration as disastrous as complete destruction, and that this result will be accompanied by appalling misery.

2.—Unless there is a real assurance of peace, even if actual war does not break out, the maintenance of armaments and the preparation for war would place a burden which would be absolutely intolerable on the leading nations of mankind.

3.—Owing to the close connection through modern means of communication between one nation and another and the way in which their interests are interlocked, a war between two States is liable to develop into a world war. If one nation endeavours to promote its interests by imposing its will by force on another, the other nations must either stand by while the injury is done, in which case it is almost certain that the injury will be repeated by subsequent attacks on some of them, or the nations must league themselves together to prevent aggression and the assertion of the claim to ascendancy.

5.—The defeat of Germany in the present War, followed by subsequent pressure on Germany through economic boycott or else by a clearly proved change in the principles and aims of the German nation, accompanied by a definite repudiation of the persons and the policy and organisation which have led to the War, is absolutely essential for the future peace of the world.

6.—The formation of a League of Nations willing to bind themselves together for common objects, of which the prevention of war is the most important, may not only be the most effective way of securing peace but also provide a means for the consideration and adoption of measures intended for the common welfare of all. Such a League may, probably must, come into existence, and its aims and methods be formulated, before Germany and her Allies could be admitted to it; but as soon as Germany and her Allies can give adequate assurances that they will adopt and be bound by the principles laid down as the foundation of the League, they should be admitted to it. Until this is possible the League must partake of the nature of a defensive alliance rather than of a world-wide league of peace.

7.—Whether any definite sanction for enforcing the principles on which the League is founded and the stipulations which it contains can be imposed or not, the League may be of great value by giving the weight of international opinion expressly to those principles. Public opinion of the nations so expressed might often be effective even though not enforced by a definite sanction.

8.—Of the two definite sanctions proposed, namely, a) the so-called "economic boycott" and (b) the use of the naval and military forces of the leagued States or of certain States selected from them by arrangement, the economic boycott which can readily be applied by all members of the League alike, and that without keeping up any large armaments, is likely to be effective and is free from the most serious objections against the other sanction suggested.

9.—So many difficulties would arise in fixing the terms of any stipulations as to the employment of military and naval forces to carry into effect the requirements of the League, that to make such provisions a necessary preliminary condition to the existence of the League from the outset might indefinitely delay the formation of such a League, and, further, the discussion of such terms would be likely to lead to friction. The obligation imposed on certain States might involve a very heavy burden, first, in keeping up armaments and possibly, later, in actually going to war. Such stipulations, for reasons above stated and illustrated, might place the leading powers in a position of great embarrassment, and might actually themselves become the cause of serious wars.

10.—The practice of making Secret Treaties by which the Sovereigns, the Foreign Ministers, or the diplomatists of any nation can bind it ought to be discontinued. The experience of the action of this country as well as of others during the present War, as well as before it, supports this conclusion. Negotiations must no doubt be carried on through the ordinary diplomatic channels, but before a complete and binding agreement is entered into, the duly constituted representatives of the popular will should know and give their sanction to what is being done. On the other hand, for unauthorised persons or any self-constituted bodies or conferences to attempt to pre-judge such questions and to carry on negotiations either with regular or irregular representatives of other nations is pernicious. Such action is likely both to lead to confusion and to hamper the action of the authorised

11.—Much may be done in settling the terms of peace after the War by acting so as to remove probable causes of war in the future. The adoption of some of the methods used in the past, as, for example, at the Congress at Vienna, is sure to lead to future difficulties. Terms of peace should not be matters for the kind of bargaining between the powerful States by which one gives up something in consideration of another giving up something else in exchange, and the contracting parties treat smaller States or weaker nations as "pawns" in the game. Each territory about which any question arises, each subject which has to be dealt with, should be treated independently in accordance with the requirements of justice, and especially having regard to the welfare of the people most directly affected by it. No claim, for example, on the part of Germany to be compensated for evacuating and making reparation to Belgium by having some advantage in some other part of the world should be entertained for a moment. To do so would be equivalent to bargaining with a criminal as to the compensation to be paid to him for giving up what he has acquired by his crimes. It is, however, legitimate in considering the question of self-determination by the people of any territory to consider how far such people have established or can establish a peaceful and orderly government, and how far the arrangements to be made as regards any country or district will affect the safety of contiguous countries or may give rise to future disputes and really be productive of war.

12.—Whether a League is established or not, treaties for submitting disputes to arbitration, and if possible to tribunals permanently constituted, will still be valuable in the future as in the past. The decisions of regular tribunals composed of impartial persons who inspire respect will gradually form a

13.—It is not desirable to attempt to go into exact detail in all the arrangements so made. For example, the attempt to enumerate a list of articles which are to be deemed contraband, as was tried in the Declaration of London, has led to preposterous results. Articles which at one time were of no use in war have become, through the advance in scientific knowledge, the material for making the most deadly and most cruel instruments in the course of the present War.

14.—An attempt must be made to secure at least partial disarmament. Provision as to the disarmament of Germany should be one of the terms of peace. The extent and character of any arrangements as to general disarmament require separate and detailed consideration. It would naturally be one of the subjects to be discussed by any League which may be formed. It is well to note from the outset (a) that a fleet is essential to the British Empire for purely defensive purposes, and for maintaining connection between the different parts of the Empire, but a great reduction in the size of the fleet may be possible by arrangement. The Allied Powers will recognise that it was the existence of the British fleet that saved them from defeat, and in some cases from utter destruction. (6) That for a nation to train its citizens as a defensive force on the Swiss model may actually tend to preserve peace, and also have a very useful influence on the morale of a nation. A defensive force of this kind would not have

15.—Lastly, it is undesirable and would be futile to attempt to set up a "supernational sovereign authority." The scope of any League—its powers and its objects—should be clearly defined, and the independent sovereign States should bind themselves, as contracting parties, to carry out the terms agreed, and all should agree beforehand as to the steps they would take to prevent or to punish any violation of those terms.

VICTORY AND PEACE

A few still perhaps remain of those who, as under-graduates at the time of the Franco-German War, remember Dean Stanley's first sermons after many years of exclusion from the Oxford University pulpit. Using in one of them his favourite plan of giving life to ancient literature by modern illustrations and conversely making modern tendencies clearer by references to ancient thought, he took the words of the Hebrew prophet, applying them to the troubles and strife of the time. "Who is this that cometh from Edom with dyed garments from Bozrah?" What will emerge from the bloodshed of war and the chaos of communal revolution? The answer was given—"It may be, it must be a united Germany; it may be, it must be a regenerate France."

Truly it has been a regenerate France that, with firm resolve and calm courage, has suffered and withstood invasion, far different from the France which in 1870 went to war with light heart, excited and unprepared, anticipating easy victory. War shattered the Empire and the true soul of France was found.

Well might the "Song before Sunrise" again greet the purified France:—

The prophecy in both parts was fulfilled. Germany did indeed become united, united not only by closer political ties between all its divisions, but united in its aims and in its methods, conscious of union and of strength, marvellous in its power of organisation, fitting each member into his special position in the consolidated state, and moulding him for the place he was to occupy; drilled from earliest youth how to act and how to think, his commonest acts done, and very gestures made, according to rule. Yet they, too, had their ideals. I remember in 1871, the year after the Franco-German War, meeting a party of Germans who were unveiling a tablet by the Pasterze Glacier in memory of a comrade fallen in the war—Karl Hoffman, a pioneer of mountaineering in the Glockner district—and hearing their impassioned speeches. The mountains of Austrian Tyrol were to them "die Alpen seines Vaterlandes," and the song with the refrain, "Lieb Vaterland muss grösser sein" echoed from the rocks, "My beloved Fatherland must be greater"; may not this be the expression of a noble patriotism? But it so easily turns to "my country must have more, must take more," and becomes the very watchword of greed. "Deutschland über Alles" might perhaps mean first to the German "My country before everything to me." Corruptio optimi pessima, it easily becomes "Germany over all,"—the country which dominates an inferior world and is thus the condensed motto of supreme insolence. "Insolence breeds the tyrant," and the doom the ancient poet prophesies is the divine ordinance to be fulfilled by the action of man. "Insolence, swollen with vain thought, mounts to the highest place, and is hurled down to the doom decreed."

Insolence seems the nearest equivalent for the Greek word [Greek: hybris], which implies much more. Some contra naturam. One of these crimes is refusal to aid their fellow-countrymen who are fighting against aggression.

With the spirit that claims to dominate in its "will to power," to override the eternal laws of justice, there can be no compromise. Until that spirit is vanquished, the answer to the question, "Is it peace?" must be, "What hast thou to do with peace, so long as thy brutal acts and thy tyrannies are so many?" The order is given to smite. With profit now we may recall the old narrative,—"And he smote thrice, and stayed. And the man of God was wroth with him, and said, Thou shouldest have smitten five or six times; then hadst thou smitten" the enemy till thou hadst destroyed his evil will. The work must be completed thoroughly; but that task once accomplished, to continue war, whether open or veiled, either to satisfy national hatred and the mere wish for vengeance, or, still more, in the desire of gain, would be to become—to use George Herbert's words—"parcel devils in damnation" with those who have driven or beguiled Germany to crime against humanity and to her own undoing. It is but too easy for heroic effort and firm determination to defend the right, to be corrupted either by a spirit of insolence or greed. Even as we sow the seeds for a fruitful harvest of good, the arch-enemy may be sowing the tares. On